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Chapter 1 
FIFTY STATES AND 90,000 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
This is an unusual state and local government 
textbook in many ways. Authors normally tell you 
about the typical state and the typical local govern-
ment. We think it is vitally important to emphasize 
also how these governments differ. Recognition 
and consideration of differences is fundamental to 
understanding American state and local govern-
ments. At almost every opportunity, American gov-
ernments exercise the option to be different. The 
American “experiment” is about enormous freedom 
of choice limited by relatively few constraints.
 If this were a more conventional textbook, we 
would prescribe changes to improve state and local 
governments in America. We would give plausible 
arguments for why these actions should be taken. 
To a greater or lesser extent, readers would have to 
trust that our statements are supported by appropri-
ate interpretation of factual information. However, 
this textbook takes a different approach. We will be 
presenting numerous empirical analyses about 
patterns of behavior across states and communities.
 The target audience for this 10th Edition is 
undergraduate students at Texas A&M University 
enrolled in a course required for a baccalaureate 
degree.  It is subtitled “A STEM Approach to Poli-
tics, Government and Policy in The United States” 
for two reasons.  First, the large majority of current 
students are in STEM disciplines.  They are already 
familiar with the practice of using empirical infor-
mation logically and consistently to answer ques-
tions and solve problems.  STEM students are also 
knowledgeable about and skillful in using a variety 
of graphics and other data visualizations.  This text 
targets and seeks to build on those skills.
 Second, Political Science is a STEM discipline, 
one of the social sciences.  Most professional Polit-
ical Science research assesses ideas about the real 
world using methods widely employed in Engi-
neering, the Life Sciences, the traditional sciences 
Physics, Chemistry and Biology and Geosciences.  
As a student recently put it, “you are using OUR 
methods to study human social behavior.”
 Not only STEM discipline students, essentially 
all in the contemporary cohort of traditional college 
and university students differ from those of past in 
that you are comfortable with a variety of graphics 
and visual presentations of information. As you will 
see, there are many maps, scatterplots, and other 
visual representations of data throughout this text-
book. Rather than assert what is true, the approach 
will be to demonstrate empirical relationships.
 Evaluating ideas with empirical research has 
little or nothing to do with most discussions of pol-
itics and government.  In Chapter 2, social science 
will be distinguished from pseudo-science in detail.  
The point here is that most analyses of politics and 
government in the news media and among normal 
Americans is essentially stating beliefs and repeat-
ing simple slogans.  They reject as ridiculous the 
central question that identifies scientific thought:  
“What conceivable evidence would make you reject 
your statement as an accurate characterization of 
the empirical world?”  In Texas and the nation as a 
whole, a large proportion of the population rejects 
science, either selectively or entirely.
 All Texas Aggies are familiar with, and might 
even believe, certain popular statements about 
American government that are out of date, incorrect 
or simply preposterous.  One example is the private 
sector is always more efficient and effective than 
government.  The fact that more than half of Amer-
ican private sector companies are out of business 
within five years of creation seems to call into ques-
tion the inherent inferiority of government.  
2 • Chapter 1
Furthermore, state and local governments almost 
always contract with private companies to under-
take public construction projects.  The government 
role is limited to finance and oversight.  Is this pub-
lic-private model efficient or inefficient?
 Another example is government cannot create 
jobs; only the private sector can create jobs. Those 
who espouse this view must think that county 
restaurant inspectors, municipal first responders, 
and public school teachers do not have jobs.  
Perhaps they do not always keep in mind that these 
neighbors and friends are employees of local
governments.  
 Most Americans have the federal government 
in mind when they speak of “the government.”  
They rarely distinguish differences between federal 
and state and local.  Yet, it is clearly a contradiction 
to maintain simultaneously 1) the federal govern-
ment cannot create jobs and is always ineffective 
and 2) our military forces are the best in the world.
 A goal of this text is to help readers understand 
the differences between facts and opinions.  Much 
of what passes for conventional wisdom about 
government may be statements of belief or slogans 
rather than conclusions from rigorous analyses.  
 States are the fundamental units of government 
in American federalism. States created the federal 
government and states created, and continue to 
create and oversee, local governments. We will fol-
low up on the familiar notion that states provide a 
“laboratory” by identifying patterns of differences 
between them. We will also inquire into the extent 
to which patterns of differences are related to each 
other. Identifying systematic patterns of interrela-
tions can potentially help us not only understand 
how states are different but also gain insight into 
why they are different. However, as you will see, 
sometimes the patterns we expect do not exist. 
Other times, patterns exist but are difficult to in-
terpret. Sometimes we will identify puzzles rather 
than explanations.
 We live in an age of unprecedented access to 
information. Through professional associations, 
traditional and electronic news media, the Internet, 
and other sources, government officials can know 
which of their peers have dealt with challenges 
similar to the ones they are facing. They can also 
know about the variety of attempts to deal with 
these challenges and their relative successes and 
failures.
 The same information is usually available to 
you. Furthermore, as a student, you have access to 
sophisticated computing hardware and software 
that enable you to collect and analyze data on 
your own. You can replicate what is presented in 
this book in two senses. You can collect identical 
data and subject them to the same analyses to see 
whether our results are correct. You can also col-
lect and analyze data in the future to see whether 
what is true now is also true then.
 You have been exposed to a lot of information 
about American politics provided by traditional 
and electronic news media and the Internet. You 
already recognize that these information sources 
have their own biases and pursue their own goals. 
Few, if any, seek to tell the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth, and we should not expect 
them to. One goal of this text is to guide readers 
to high quality information about state and local 
governments and demonstrate how the information 
might be used to create knowledge to help us meet 
important goals.
 Perhaps the most striking result of considering 
information about state and local governments is 
an appreciation for how different the states are.  
These differences are usually substantial.  For 
instance, your chances of being murdered in Lou-
isiana are 9 times as great as they would be if you 
lived in Hawaii! The number of marriages per-
formed per 1,000 residents in Nevada is 13 times 
the rate in Pennsylvania. Per capita state and local 
debt in Alaska is 4.5 times that of Idaho. The per-
cent of people without health insurance is 3 times 
as great in Texas as in Minnesota. The percent of 
population 25 years old and over with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher is 2.5 times as great in Massa-
chusetts as in West Virginia. The percent of births 
to unmarried women in New Mexico is more than 
twice the rate in Illinois. New Jersey spends more 
than twice as much per student attending public 
schools as Utah does. Per capita income is nearly 
twice as high in Connecticut as in Mississippi.
 We think all Americans prefer lower rates of 
murder, government debt, and people without 
health insurance, both for the states where they live 
and for all the other states. We think they prefer 
higher rates of formal education and higher in-
come. We think they care deeply about marriage, 
birth rates, and spending on public schools. Amer-
icans want government to play a positive role in 
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making life-enhancing improvements in these areas. 
It is state governments and local governments that 
create policies and activities that have the greatest 
impact on these and other aspects of our daily lives.
 Clearly, some states are more successful than  
others in achieving quality of life goals. Frequently, 
the efforts of state governments are credited as mak-
ing improvements, either directly or indirectly. Al-
though government officials would rather not admit 
it, frequently their work does not lead to improve-
ments.  Sometimes efforts at first deemed successful 
are later judged unsuccessful and abandoned.
 Having 50 states and approximately 90,000 
counties, municipalities, school districts and spe-
cial districts allows a comparison of them and their 
characteristics to see what works. In this text we 
choose most often to compare the combined ac-
tivities of state and local governments within each 
state. This is because, while states undertake many 
activities in common, they are quite disparate in 
how they assign responsibilities to state level and 
the variety of local level governments. For example, 
in some states, spending on public elementary and 
secondary education is financed mainly by state 
funds. Other states fund education mainly by local 
funds. Only by considering combined state and lo-
cal spending can we make appropriate comparisons.
 Before pursuing state differences further, let’s 
consider the larger context in which they operate.
State and Local Governments in American
Federalism
American government is one of the most complex 
systems to be found in any nation. In a country such 
as Sweden, the central government, such as ours 
in Washington, D.C., decides policies. Regional 
governments, similar to our states and local govern-
ments, administer these policies. Most Americans 
think our system works essentially the same top-
down way. This is incorrect.
 Americans know more about the federal gov-
ernment than they know about state and local gov-
ernments.  High school civics and history classes 
focus most strongly on the development, powers 
and activities of the federal government. Every day, 
the media you and others use for information and 
entertainment highlight the federal government. The 
media that target nation-wide audiences do so to 
meet the presumed interests of the largest numbers 
of readers, viewers and listeners. The media that 
target smaller audiences provide some information 
about state and local government activities. But 
they devote even more coverage to national and 
international events that emphasize the federal gov-
ernment and exclude state and local governments.
 The cumulative effect inevitably gives the im-
pression that America has a national government. 
The imbalance in coverage leads to the conclusion 
that the federal government is the most active and 
the most important. It is reasonable to deduce the 
federal government is nearly omnipotent in its abil-
ity to command state and local governments. Our 
system is not so simple.
 The states created the federal government 
when they ratified the Constitution of 1787. That 
Constitution gave certain powers to the federal 
government in Washington, D.C., and reserved the 
others for the states. If the Congress passes a law, 
it is the “supreme” law of the land, overriding any 
state laws. However, states gave themselves what 
they expected would be sufficient power to control 
Congress. States appointed members of the Senate 
and set the rules for electing members of the House 
of Representatives. Through the Electoral College, 
states also made themselves the central actors in 
choosing the President and Vice President. The 
states intended to create an entity they could con-
trol, not vice versa.
 The founders who wrote the Constitution of 
1787 and the Bill of Rights Amendments ratified 
in 1791 did not foretell that the number of states 
would grow from 13 to 50. They did not predict that 
the United States would grow in size, population 
and wealth. They did not foresee industrialization, 
urbanization or agricultural transformation. They 
did not prophesy future urbanization, immigration, 
modern corporations or an international economy. 
They did not expect that women and slaves and 
descendants of slaves would ever have the rights 
granted by the Constitution to a subset of the popu-
lation.
 State leaders in 1787 knew nothing of the events 
that would later make both the states and the people 
want power of the federal government to grow. It 
is doubtful they contemplated the extent to which 
the U.S. Supreme Court would assume responsibil-
ity for deciding when the legislative and executive 
branches have overstepped the authority granted by
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the Constitution.
 The federal government has become larger, 
more active, more important and more powerful 
than originally expected. Yet, states continue to 
hold fundamental powers. They continue to reas-
sign unpopular political tasks from themselves to 
the federal government. Few recognize that states 
are the key governments in America.
 American federalism is complex and evolv-
ing. From our perspective, it is not a top-down or 
bottom-up system. It is a state centric system. We 
invite you to suspend your belief that the federal 
and state governments are adversaries. Instead, we 
encourage you to view the federal government as 
an ever-changing majority—these days a super-
majority—of states working together.  The conflict 
is between the supermajorities and minorities of 
states. It is difficult to see this clearly because the 
states comprise different majority and minority 
groups across policy areas.
 The states are not puppets controlled by the 
federal government.  A more appropriate puppet 
analogy posits the federal government as a mar-
ionette with states pulling its strings in different 
directions.  Yet, depending on the policy issue, 
sometimes the federal government takes the lead 
and sometimes states take the lead. In American 
federalism, no government is always the master.
 Consideration of some high profile contem-
porary issues in American politics will serve to 
illustrate some of the complexities and dynamics of 
federalism.
Firearms
Ownership and possession of firearms is currently 
a hot issue at both the federal and state levels. The
Second Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution states “A well regulated militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free state, the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be 
infringed.”  The Supreme Court ruled in 1833 that 
the Second Amendment limited only the federal 
government. The Second Amendment became 
binding on the states when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was passed in 1868.
 State constitutions also establish limits on their 
governments’ ability to limit possession and use of 
firearms. For example, Article I Section 23 of the 
Texas State Constitution states “Every citizen shall 
have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful 
defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature 
shall have power by law to regulate the wearing of 
arms with a view to prevent crime.”
 On June 26, 2008, in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, the United States Supreme Court issued 
an important opinion on the right to keep and bear 
arms.  The Court ruled that the Second Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution confers an individual right 
to possess firearms for traditionally lawful pur-
poses such as self-defense.1 In essence, the Court 
made the right to keep and bear arms independent 
of the need for a well-regulated militia.
 The Court also specified that the right to keep 
and bear arms is subject to regulation, such as 
concealed weapons prohibitions, limits on the 
rights of felons and the mentally ill, laws forbid-
ding the carrying of weapons in certain locations, 
laws imposing conditions on commercial sales, 
and prohibitions on the carrying of dangerous and 
unusual weapons. It stated that this was not an ex-
haustive list of the regulatory measures that would 
be presumptively permissible under the Second 
Amendment.
 The Court seems to find a crucial distinction 
between infringing and regulating. Federal and 
state government are not allowed to infringe on the 
right of individuals to keep and bear arms. At the 
same time, these governments can regulate these 
rights. So-called “pro-gun” and “anti-gun” organi-
zations chose to focus on different elements of the 
decision. Both declared victory.
 There are ongoing disputes over four major 
legal issues:  what firearms are permissible, where 
firearms are permissible, who is excluded from 
owning and bearing firearms and how change 
in ownership of permissible firearms can occur.
Currently, policies are made primarily at the state 
level. Predictably, the states disagree and have 
different policies.
 On July 20, 2012, 12 people were shot and 
killed at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado by a 
single gunman carrying an assault rifle, a shotgun 
and a handgun. The shooter had legally purchased 
the weapons and ammunition used.
 On December 14, 2012, 20 children and 6 
adults were shot and killed at the Sandy Hook 
Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut by 
a single gunman carrying an assault rifle and two 
handguns. The shooter’s mother legally owned the 
weapons and ammunition used. The shooter had 
shot and murdered her immediately before he went 
to the elementary school.
 Spurred by these shooting massacres and by 
other highly publicized deadly shootings, Presi-
Fifty States and 90,000 Local Governments  • 5 
dent Barack Obama and others pressed the United 
States Congress to enact legislation intended to 
curb gun violence.  One proposal was supported 
consistently by nearly 90 percent of respondents to 
multiple opinion surveys. It was to extend required 
background checks before firearms can be sold 
and to allow only licensed dealers to sell firearms. 
There were also proposals to ban future sales of 
rapid firing assault weapons and to limit the size of 
ammunition clips. All were rejected in the Senate, 
even though a majority of Senators were 
Democrats.
 Both Chambers of Congress have been con-
trolled by Republicans since 2010 and Republicans 
gained control of the presidency in January 2017.  
In President Trump’s first year in office 5 people 
in Orange County, Florida, 3 in San Francisco, 
59 in Las Vegas, 26 in Sutherland Springs, Texas, 
and 4 in Rancho Tehama Reserve, California dies 
in mass shootings.  In the first six months of 2018 
there were 23 school shootings—nearly one per 
week—where someone was hurt or killed, includ-
ing 17 in Parkland, Florida and 10 in Santa Fe, 
Texas.  Unmistakably, President Trump and the 
Republican-controlled Congress are not interested 
in taking any action.  Under current law, federal 
funds cannot be used to study the impact of current 
firearms policies on public health.  Even should 
Democrats gain control of one or both chambers 
in 2019, federal inaction on firearms policy will 
continue.
 Given federal inaction, the states have become 
the leaders in setting firearms policies to enhance 
public safety.  Some states that have been the sites 
of gun massacres, including Colorado, Connecti-
cut and Florida, have enacted stronger regulations 
concerning background checks for firearms sales, 
limitations large capacity ammunition magazines, 
banning certain firearms, and so-called “red flag 
laws” intended to temporarily restrict individuals’ 
access to firearms when they are a danger to them-
selves or to others. Other states have taken action 
to loosen their regulations on firearms by expand-
ing access to own and carry firearms and expand-
ing public venues where weapons may be carried 
to include more elementary and secondary schools, 
college campuses and churches.  Clearly, attitudes 
and laws about firearms are extremely different 
across the states.
 Texas has been a leader in expanding the 
right to own and carry firearms.  In 2015, Texas 
joined 45 other states that allow “open carry” of 
handguns; some with and some without permit 
requirements. The Texas Legislature also passed 
legislation in 2015 expanding the areas on public 
university campuses where those with licenses may 
carry concealed handguns. Private institutions of 
higher education were permitted to choose whether 
or not to allow concealed handguns on their cam-
puses.  With the exception of Amberton University, 
a small, nonprofit school based in Garland, all pri-
vate colleges and universities chose to forbid fire-
arms.  Concealed handguns are allowed in many 
locations on the campuses of public universities. 
The Texas Attorney General has announced that 
public universities may forbid concealed handguns 
in some venues, such as stadiums. They may regu-
late concealed handguns in dormitories. They may 
not forbid concealed handguns in public university 
classrooms. 
 In reaction to the May 18, 2018 high school 
shooting that resulted in 10 dead and 10 more 
injured in Santa Fe, Texas state officials are consid-
ering taking actions.  Governor Greg Abbott held 
three days of roundtable discussions in and issued 
a School and Firearm Safety Action Plan on May 
30, 2018.  The plan contains more than 36 propos-
als, some of which are scheduled to be studied by 
Texas Senate and House committees as they pre-
pare for the 2019 regular legislative session.  Most 
proposals require expenditures without identifying 
sources of immediately available funding.  Gov-
ernor Abbot’s plan and plans advocated by many 
other statewide elected officials involve increasing 
the number of armed employees, including teach-
ers, and armed volunteers in public schools.
 States are the firearms policy leaders, but it 
is questionable whether it is possible for all to 
achieve their different goals. The prospects for 
enforcing strict regulations on who can own, what 
can be owned and how sales are handled are dim 
because states with stricter policies states are af-
fected by the weaker policies of neighboring states.
Marriage equality
In June 2013, the United States Supreme Court 
overturned the section of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act of 1966, which forbade the federal 
government from recognizing legal marriages of 
same sex couples. The Court ruled that the federal 
government must treat legal marriages between 
opposite sex and same sex couples equally. The 
federal government responded to the decision 
very quickly. In August 2013, the Department of 
the Treasury and the Internal Revenue System 
announced all marriages of legally married same 
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sex couples would be recognized for federal tax 
purposes regardless of where they live. Similar 
decisions were quickly announced and implement-
ed by other federal agencies, including the Office 
of Personnel Management, Department of Defense, 
Department of Health and Human Services and 
Department of Homeland Security.
 In its decision of June 2013, the Supreme Court 
did not consider the section of DOMA that speci-
fied states could decide whether same sex couples 
could be legally married and could disregard the 
marriages of same sex couples conducted in states 
that permit them. The Supreme Court addressed 
those issues in June 2015, and held that the four-
teenth amendment requires states both to license 
marriages between same sex couples and to rec-
ognize same sex marriages lawfully licensed and 
performed elsewhere.  This issue is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 11.
Marijuana
Marijuana policies are similarly different across the 
states and the issue is further muddled by federal 
government actions. Eight states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted the laws legalizing mari-
juana for recreational use. Thirty states have laws 
legalizing marijuana in some form.2
 According to the federal Office of National 
Drug Control Policy, “Marijuana is a Schedule I 
controlled substance under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act. As such: A. The drug has a high poten-
tial for abuse, B. The drug has no currently accept-
ed medical use in treatment in the United States 
and C. There is a lack of accepted safety for use of 
the drug under medical supervision.”5 The policy 
statement goes on to say “Regardless of state laws 
to the contrary, there is no such thing as “medical” 
marijuana under Federal law.
 The federal Food and Drug Administration has 
a different view. It has approved medical use of 
isolated components of marijuana. The Department 
of Justice has issued guidelines to its prosecutors 
indicating “it is not an efficient use of federal re-
sources to focus enforcement efforts on individuals 
with serious illnesses who use marijuana as part of 
a recommended treatment regimen consistent with 
applicable state law”6 These guidelines, neverthe-
less do not legalize marijuana and the enforcement 
of major illegal drug trafficking remains a core 
Department of Justice priority.
 State policies and intentions concerning 
marijuana are as different as they can be. Most 
criminalize the drug, some permit medical use 
and two permit its sale with both state excise and 
sales taxes applied. Federal law criminalizes it, 
yet Department of Justice policy does not endorse 
prosecution of medical use of the drug—which 
it does not recognize. The Obama administration 
was not pursuing the policy originally intended by 
Congress and applied by previous administrations. 
There are indications that the Trump administration 
is considering overriding state decisions and taking 
control of marijuana policies by the federal gov-
ernment. There is an evolving conflict between the 
states, between federal and state governments and 
between branches of the federal government. To 
repeat, American federalism is not simple.
The Importance of State and Local Government 
Spending
Federal spending and state and local spending are 
inextricably linked. Earlier, we noted that state 
governments have successfully reassigned some of 
their most onerous tasks to the federal government. 
The most important reassignment concerns collect-
ing revenue.
 In 2014, the federal government spent an es-
timated $4.4 trillion.7 In the same year, American 
state and local governments spent $2.9 trillion. 
Through simple arithmetic, we could calculate 
total government spending as 7.3 trillion dollars, 
60 percent federal and 40 percent state and local. 
The total would be correct, but the percentages are 
quite misleading.
 The sixty-forty split in spending is based on 
final spending by each. However, $552 billion in 
federal funds were transferred to state and local 
governments as grants and subsidies.  These trans-
fers comprise 7 percent of total spending, and are 
counted twice.
  If the split is calculated in terms of where funds 
were raised, the division is 65 percent federal and 
35 percent state and local.  If the split is calculated 
in terms of where funds were spent without double 
counting federal grants and subsidies, the division 
is 57 percent federal and 43 percent state and local.  
 We can now appreciate the important fiscal 
element of American federalism. Very few are 
aware of the implications of the flow of funds from 
federal to state and local governments.  The upshot 
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is that the states can portray themselves as “col-
lecting” 35 percent but spending 43 percent.  The 
federal government is portrayed as “collecting” 65 
percent and spending only 57 percent. No wonder 
that most Americans view the federal government 
as extraordinarily wasteful and inefficient and view 
state and local governments as more prudent and 
efficient! This fiscal slight-of-hand is a prime ex-
ample how The states make themselves look better 
by making the federal government look worse. The 
history of this budgetary misdirection is even more 
telling. From 1950 to 2002, federal grant funds 
given to state and local governments total $2.1 
trillion.8 Total federal deficit spending in the same 
years totals $3.1 trillion.9  In an important sense, 47 
percent of federal grants to state and local govern-
ments comprise 47 percent of the federal deficit in 
these years.
 Figure 1.1 shows spending by categories for 
all governments in 2014. Each category is divided 
into three kinds of spending: federal spending from 
federal funds, state and local spending from federal 
funds and state and local spending from state funds.
 Health care is the most expensive governmental 
service in the United States, more than 29 percent 
of all spending. It is the fastest growing expenditure 
for three reasons.  First is the rising cost of health 
care in general.  Second is the increasing share of 
the population age 65 and older eligible for Medi-
care insurance. The third is the increasing number 
of indigent elderly and children and their caretakers 
who qualify for Medicaid health coverage resulting 
from the economic depression that began in 2007.
 The next largest spending category is income 
security, 23 percent of the total. It includes Social 
Security, welfare, social services and unemploy-
ment. Social Security is another program affected 
by the aging of the American population.
 The top two categories, health and income 
security, account for more than half of government 
spending. Both are entitlement programs, meaning 
that individuals who qualify are entitled to receive 
benefits if they claim them. Payroll taxes fund 
Social Security and partially fund Medicare.  For 
Figure 1.1 
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those programs, recipients feel they are entitled to 
benefits because they have already paid for them.  
This meaning of entitlement also applies to Med-
icaid recipients who paid federal and state taxes in 
the past, but it does not apply to the largest Medic-
aid group, children. 
 The third most expensive governmental service, 
public primary, secondary and higher education, 
takes 14 percent of total government spending. 
State and local governments pay the most for 
education. They pay 88 percent; 84 percent from 
their own sources and 4 percent from federal grants. 
Education is an entitlement program in the sense 
that services must be provided to eligible children 
who enroll in public schools. It is not an entitlement 
program in the sense that children have paid in 
advance.
 The fourth most expensive program, 13 per-
cent of total spending, has the misleading label 
general public service. A small part of the category 
is spending on what the label suggests: costs of 
executive and legislative branches, tax collection 
and financial management.  However, the largest 
expenditures are for interest payments on debt.
 Including both direct payments and grants to 
state and local governments, the federal government 
pays 60 percent of general public service expenses. 
Almost all state governments have constitutional 
limitations requiring annual operating budgets to be 
balanced by annual revenues and accumulated sur-
pluses. Local government borrowing is constrained 
by state laws. In contrast, the federal constitution 
does not limit borrowing. Over the last several 
decades, current revenues from taxes and fees have 
financed a decreasing share of federal spending. 
Federal borrowing has financed an increasing share.
 National defense, funded entirely by the feder-
al government, is 9 percent of total spending. One 
hundredth of one percent of defense spending is 
federal grants to state and local governments. These 
payments typically provide partial payment for 
local government expenses incurred by military res-
ervation personnel stationed in the area. The federal 
lands are not subject to local government property 
taxes, and the grants are limited compensation for 
the tax revenue that otherwise would have been 
collected.
 The five most expensive categories account for 
88 percent of total governmental spending. The 
economic affairs category includes transportation, 
general economic and labor affairs and natural re-
sources.  Costs are shared almost equally be federal 
and state and local governments. Public order and 
safety—police, fire, courts and prisons—are paid 
mainly through state and local funds. The federal 
government pays 90 percent of funding for housing 
and community services. State and local govern-
ments pay 83 percent of recreation and culture costs 
from their own funds. 
 What would happen if American state and local 
governments vanished overnight? Unless and until 
the federal government took over paying for all 
existing government programs, we would have 
Medicare, Social Security, and   payments on debt 
and national defense. We would have funding for 
most of Medicaid but no one to administer the pro-
gram. We would have greatly reduced welfare and 
economic affairs programs. We would essentially 
have no education, no police, no fire protection, no 
sewage, and no highway maintenance or construc-
tion.
 The point is many of the government services 
affecting us are not the result of efforts by our elect-
ed officials in Washington, D.C. Rather, state and 
local officials chiefly decide the laws, set the taxes 
to cover these services, and decide how extensive 
these services will be.
State Differences
Now, we return to considering how the states are 
different and to what extent. Throughout the text, 
we present empirical information on states. For 
most government programs, we use data on the 
combined policy efforts of state and local govern-
ments in each state because the division of labor is 
so different across the states. Our facts come from 
sources we regard as high quality: state and local 
governments themselves, the federal government, 
independent nonprofit organizations and academic 
studies.
 The numbers we use are reliable; different 
individuals or organizations that collect the same 
information independent of each other do or would 
report the same values. However, you should be 
aware that measurement error is an issue in even 
the highest quality information on the states. Our 
data are good, but they are not perfect.
 Imperfections result from simple human error 
in counting, transcribing, sending and receiving.  
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Modern information technologies have made cer-
tain random errors less likely. For example, copy-
ing and pasting does not add random inaccuracies.  
On the other hand, incorrect copying and pasting 
does introduce misinformation.  Fortunately, those 
slipups are systematic and are much easier to iden-
tify and correct than are random mistakes.
 There are inevitable failures in the challenging 
task of reorganizing disparate information from 
tens of thousands of governments into meaning-
ful new categories. The decennial census is very 
accurate, but it is not perfect.  Measurement error 
in random sample surveys is a function of sam-
ple size. However, a large sample national survey 
does not necessarily have large numbers from 
each state.  For example, the United States Census 
Bureau’s 2014 American Community Survey had 
information from 165,116 individuals. Hawaii had 
the fewest, 832; California had the most, 15,58910
 Some things one would think are easy to 
count accurately sometimes are not.  The number 
of Republicans and Democrats in a state legis-
lative chamber is an example. We could use the 
list of winners from the most recent elections, but 
that might not catch changes due to successfully 
contested election outcomes or election winners 
changing party affiliations. We could use the list 
of members at the beginning of the legislative 
session. Because there are more than 7,000 state 
legislators, it is a certainty that some members will 
resign, become too ill to serve or die every year.
 You might think the dollar measures of budgets 
contain precise descriptions of how money will be 
spent, but they do not. Your college or university 
has a budget for this year, but it is more a general 
plan than a document of binding decisions. For 
example, an instructor scheduled to teach summer 
school may receive a research grant or cancel be-
cause of a family illness.
 The summer courses may be withdrawn or 
be taught by other faculty who are paid more or 
less than the original instructor. All government 
budgets are modified between appropriation and 
execution.
 Even determining dollars of past expenditures 
is problematic. The fiscal year for the state of 
Texas begins September 1 and ends August 31 in 
the following calendar year. Fiscal years are named 
for the calendar years in which they end. There are 
estimates of spending during the year and shortly 
after August 31, but final audits of all state ac-
counts will not be published until more than a year 
later. As a result, spending data are always esti-
mates subject to revision. But even auditors face 
insurmountable problems in the quest for perfectly 
accurate accounts. One is the reality that the ac-
counting systems of different government agencies 
disagree on fundamentals such as when funds are 
recorded as received and disbursed.
 Some data simply do not exist or have not 
yet been collected or are too expensive to gather. 
Sometimes high quality data is available, but only 
once every five years or ten years or only once so 
far. Suffice it to say even the best information on 
state and local governments should be critically 
evaluated before use. The data presented in this 
text have what we regard as acceptable measure-
ment error.
 We can use empirical records to measure dif-
ferences across the states in simple numbers. We 
can show how much the states differ on a variety of 
measures. But you must decide for yourself wheth-
er the differences are large or small, important or 
unimportant. Recognize that there can be legiti-
mate disparities in interpretations of important and 
unimportant between you and your classmates, you 
and students at rival schools, you and your parents, 
and so forth. We invite you to consider also your 
own assessments of what differences are important 
that might well change over time.
Identifying the best state
Consider the premise that we can use information 
about the states to determine which are more and 
less desirable places to live. If you were tasked to 
identify the best state to live in, what information 
would be germane to your assessment?
 For some, there is no need to use comprehen-
sive information systematically to compare the 
states. Some already know which is the best state. 
More than 90 percent of our students at Texas 
A&M University are convinced that Texas is by 
far the best state, both at the beginning and at the 
end of their academic courses on state and local 
government. Texas is so superior that they cannot 
imagine a future decision to move elsewhere vol-
untarily. 
 Identifying the best state can be viewed as a 
strictly emotional decision, or a decision where 
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emotion takes precedence over logic. The state-
ment “my state is the best state” may be a way of 
saying “I like where I live.” Most college students 
do not require a complex spreadsheet analysis to 
decide with whom they want to eat lunch or sit 
with at a sporting event. Some readers may not 
need to assess information further to know which 
is the best state.
 Those who already know which is the best 
state might be willing to compare comprehensive 
information on the most superior and the inferior 
states.  We might convince them to “reverse engi-
neer” their conclusion so we can understand how 
and why they identified the best state.  Comparing 
states might be a means for them to convince the 
rest of us that they have correctly recognized the 
best state.
Empirical Measures of Differences
Throughout this text we will be presenting many 
comparisons and analyses of state differences.  In 
this section, we will compare the states on only a 
few measures.  Our goals here are limited to con-
sidering whether state differences are large or small 
and important or unimportant.
 Size and Population. The 50 states differ great-
ly both in size and population. Information on both 
dimensions is provided in Figure 1.2.11 Alaska, the 
largest state, encompasses 425 times the area of 
Rhode Island, the smallest state. Providing services 
in some states can be very expensive. For example, 
states such as Wyoming and Alaska have small 
populations dispersed across a large geographic 
area. Many miles of expensive highways will be 
needed, but small publics will pay for them.
 Services such as unemployment compensation 
will require many expensive offices in geograph-
ically large states and each will serve few clients. 
Large but populous states, such as California, 
New York, or Texas, will need more highways and 
offices, but each has the population base to distrib-
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ute the cost broadly. State populations range from 
a low of 586,000 in Wyoming to more than 39 
million in California. The difference between the 
two is more than the combined populations of the 
21 states with the smallest populations.
 Paying for a $100 million highway program 
has little individual impact on 39 million Califor-
nians, but it would impose financial burdens on 
626,000 Vermonters.  We expect unanimous agree-
ment that the population differences in the states 
are large and important.
 Six states have fewer than 1 million people: 
Wyoming, Vermont, Alaska, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Delaware. Upper New England, the 
Great Plains, and the Western mountain states,as 
is evident on the map in Figure 1.2, have fewer 
people. We might expect a lifestyle difference 
between such states and California, Texas, or New 
York, as people can have more personal space and 
experience less impact on their environment. A 
New Yorker and a Montanan may react differently 
to living near many people. Having many people 
around may be desirable for the New Yorker but 
not for the Montanan. On this measure, they may 
differ on what is “best.” 
 More populous and more diverse states assure 
the full range of occupations that result from more 
complex or well-developed economies. The less 
populous states lack such economies, as they are 
not industrialized. An agricultural or ranching state 
needs few high-paying professional jobs. People 
who always have lived in large cities are likely 
to feel less comfortable apart from the masses of 
people to which they have grown accustomed. Per-
haps a measure of these ideas is the percentage of a 
state’s population that lives in metropolitan areas.
 Percentage Metropolitan. Each metropolitan 
area contains either a city with a minimum pop-
ulation of 50,000 or as defined by the Office of 
Management and Budget urbanized area and a total 
metropolitan population of at least 100,000 (75,000 
in New England). By this definition, the population 
of the United States in 2015 was 85 percent metro-
politan.
 According to the Census Bureau, two states 
had 100 percent metropolitan populations: New 
Jersey and Rhode Island (Figure 1.3). Wyoming 
was the least metropolitan, with only 31 percent 
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living in metropolitan areas. Do you think the 
difference of 69 percent between most and least 
metropolitan is large? Is it important? In general, 
the most populous states have many people living 
in metropolitan areas. There are, however, met-
ropolitan states with smaller populations, such as 
Nevada, where the availability of water forces the 
few people living there into metropolitan areas.
 In Alaska, the largest state geographically, only 
63 percent live in metropolitan areas. The next two 
largest states, Texas and California, are 92 and 97 
percent metropolitan. Arizona, Florida, Illinois 
and New York, are large states with 90 percent or 
greater metropolitan populations.  Undeniably, 
large territory alone does not determine the urban 
and rural distribution of residents.
 As college graduates, few of you will find the 
high paying jobs you seek in the less metropolitan 
states. A clear curve of rural or non-metropolitan 
states can be seen in the map running across most 
of the South through Oklahoma and Kansas into 
the upper Great Plains and the northern Mountain 
West. There are also rural states scattered from 
New England to the South.
 High Income. On average, residents of some 
states enjoy higher incomes. The measure used is 
per capita income, or the average income of every 
man, woman, and child in the state (all income in 
the state divided by its population). Per capita in-
come gives us information about central tendency 
only. Some individuals, including nearly all chil-
dren, earn low or no incomes even in states with 
high per capita incomes. We will consider income 
dispersion later.  Figure 1.4 maps state per capita 
income in 2014. 
 A state with a very high per capita income will 
have many more resources for dealing with social 
problems and providing government services.  
Connecticut ($62,467), Massachusetts ($59,192), 
New Jersey ($56,807) and New York (56,231) rank 
as the four wealthiest or “best” states for income. 
The “worst” state on this measure is Mississippi 
($34,333).  The difference between the highest 
and lowest states per capita income is more than 
$28,000. On this measure too, we expect unani-
mous agreement that the range is large and import-
ant.  Per capita income in Connecticut has nearly 
twice the income of a person in Mississippi. This 
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means also that a 1 percent income tax in Con-
necticut would yield nearly twice as much as from 
each individual in Mississippi. 
 Figure 1.4 shows a pattern of wealth. There 
is a broad band of poor states across the South 
and Southwest and up through the Great Plains 
and Mountain West. The Northeastern states and 
Wyoming have the wealthiest citizens. No doubt 
many people hold excellent paying jobs even in the 
poorer states, but you can expect, given these data, 
that most such jobs will be in the darker shaded 
states. In the next chapter, we will begin to explore 
why wealth is not equally distributed across the 
states and what impact this wealth has on services 
provided by state government.
 Unemployment. For many or even most peo-
ple, job opportunities alone define their “best” 
state. “Best” in this context might, therefore, be 
defined as the state with the lowest unemploy-
ment. We may find unfilled jobs even in states with 
low unemployment, but that does not mean those 
states are “best” in terms of employment. Figure 
1.5 identifies unemployment rates for each state in 
December 2014.
 North Dakota had the lowest unemployment 
rate, 2.7 percent. South Dakota’s rate was 2.9 per-
cent and 9 other states had rates below 4 percent. 
Mississippi had the highest unemployment rate, 6.8 
percent, followed by New Mexico and Alaska, both 
at 6.6 percent. Do you think the difference between 
2.7 percent and 6.8 percent unemployed is large? 
Do you think it is important? Would it matter if 
you were seeking employment?
 The map in Figure 1.5 shows the four group-
ings of states on unemployment. Clearly, there 
is a very low unemployment cluster in the Great 
Plains states. Note also that, with some exceptions, 
more populous and metropolitan states have higher 
unemployment. Should state elected officials be 
held accountable for high unemployment in more 
metropolitan states? Since all metropolitan states 
suffer with unemployment, is it even possible for 
officials there do anything? 
 Murder. The “best” state is that with the lowest 
murder rate. In 2014, New Hampshire, with only 
0.9 murders per 100,000, was most murder free. 
Louisiana, with 10.3 murders per 100,000, clear-
ly was the worst. You would have 10 times the 
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chances of being murdered in Louisiana as in New 
Hampshire. Is the difference of 10 more murders 
per 100,000 people large? Is it important? Now 
that you know about the higher murder rate, are 
you less likely to vacation in Louisiana? Would 
you prefer to reside in New Hampshire or Louisi-
ana?
 Figure 1.6 shows that the nine adjacent states, 
Missouri and 8 of 11 former Confederate states, 
have very high murder rates. Murder rates might 
be entirely different than rates for other crimes. But 
you still might choose to live where murders are 
uncommon. 
 Comprehensive Evaluations. Many have cre-
ated indexes combining what they think is appro-
priate information to rank the states from best to 
worst. There are many rankings of states as being 
friendly to business or to new businesses. Chiefex-
ecutive.net listed Texas as the 2015 Best state 
for business. USA today rated Texas as 6th best 
for business in 2015.  CNBC listed Texas as the 
second best state for business in 2015 and Forbes 
listed Texas sixth best for 201412 
 Texas has actively sought recognition as a state 
that offers a favorable environment for businesses, 
both existing and new companies. Texas active-
ly entices businesses in other states to expand or 
relocate to Texas. A variety of incentives, including 
startup cash, land, temporary or permanent tax 
exemptions have been offered by the State of Texas 
and its local governments. More than half its state 
budget is labeled as supporting economic devel-
opment, including incentive programs, education 
at all levels, transportation and other capital infra-
structure. The philosophy of current Texas leaders 
is that a good business environment will ultimately 
result in better opportunities for state residents.
 Other indexes have focused on assessing 
quality of life for people in each state. Gallup 
calculates an annual Index of Population Well-Be-
ing. Gallup combines survey and other information 
on Life Evaluation, Physical Health, Emotional 
Health, Healthy Behavior, Work Environment and 
Basic Access to health care. The 2014 values are 
mapped in Figure 1.7.13
 Hawaii and Alaska have the highest state pop-
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ulation Well-Being. West Virginia and Kentucky 
have the lowest Well-Being. A combination of 
former Confederate states and rustbelt states stand 
out as having lower Well-Being. Texas is ranked 
10th in Well-Being.
 CNN has combined information to identify the 
best and worst states to live in. For 2015, Hawaii, 
Vermont and Minnesota were the three best.  Ten-
nessee, Oklahoma and Michigan were the three 
worst.14  It would seem best for business and best 
for living are distinct evaluations.
 Do you find these rankings convincing? What 
are the rankings for your state? If you do not 
already live in one of them, are you motivated to 
move to one of the top states as soon as you can? 
If you live in one of the five bottom states, do you 
now intend to relocate? If you do consider relocat-
ing, do you want best for business, best for living, 
or a combination? Would you make the same 
choice when you are starting your career, at midca-
reer and near or after retirement?
 Asking which state is “best” prompts us to 
consider what we value. Do any of the combined 
evaluations of the states completely measure what 
you think is important? We hope you recognize 
that the summary information presented above 
does not give sufficient detail for you to know the 
extent to which the data measure any or all of the 
things essential to you.
 The states differ greatly on combined quality 
indexes. Even were Americans to agree totally on 
what measures should be used in identifying this 
“best” state—best for people, or for families, or for 
new businesses, established businesses, small busi-
nesses, large corporations--we would argue that no 
single state would be ranked best by all measures 
or combined indexes. But agreement on appro-
priate measurement seems improbable— even 
between you and your classmates. The popularity 
of ratings produced by the media suggests people 
want to read such rankings, if not to act on them.
Comparing States and Communities
We hope you have an understanding and apprecia-
tion for state differences. These differences are not, 
however, merely random. If we can establish which 
states are more successful than others, we then
explore why they are more successful. We can 
look for patterns of relationships between suc-
cess and other state measures. Knowledge of such 
patterns might help us identify actions that states 
and their residents could take to be more successful 
in achieving their goals. Politicians and com-
mentators profess to know already the best way to 
achieve goals. But they do not have to link their 
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views to factual information. They are not obligat-
ed to offer evidence based on systematic analysis 
of appropriate comprehensive information.  That is 
a job for academics, not for those active in politi-
cal discourse.  If practitioners’ ideas about factors 
related to success and failure are even partially cor-
rect, we should find certain empirical relationships.
 The states offer a unique opportunity to com-
pare different attempts to achieve the same goals. 
The laboratory analogy is useful but limited. Un-
like biology and chemistry laboratories, the states 
do not afford the opportunity to tests with experi-
mental control over treatment and control groups.  
We cannot make the states similar in every way 
except, for example, the resources they devote to 
primary, secondary and higher education.
 We can only compare the states as they are. 
While the differences we observe may seem im-
portant to us, they may not be large enough to have 
an impact. For example, what if elementary school 
classes with 10 or fewer students per teacher re-
sulted in maximum academic achievement? If class 
sizes across the states range from 20 to 35 students 
per teacher, we would find little or no relation-
ship between student-teacher ratios and academic 
success. We might conclude incorrectly that small-
er classes cannot improve achievement because 
we have no examples of classes below the crucial 
threshold.
 States share some general goals, but details 
may pose challenges for identifying successful 
policies. As a thought experiment, assume there is 
a strong relationship between state residents’ aca-
demic attainment levels and state poverty rates. All 
states have low poverty as a goal but they might 
differ about what level of poverty qualifies as ac-
ceptably low. We could easily miss the policies that 
would result in minimum poverty if some states 
make no attempt to achieve the minimum.
 As a final example, assume that greater re-
sources devoted to primary, secondary and higher 
education per student results in a larger proportion 
of those students completing baccalaureate de-
grees.  Imagine all states compete for college-ed-
ucated residents but pursue different strategies.  
Some states devote great resources to educating 
their own children.  Other states make meager 
investments in their own children but pursue 
expensive programs to import college graduates 
from other states and countries.  If the importers 
of college graduates can also succeed in export-
ing their own uneducated residents to other states, 
there may be little apparent relationship between 
resources devoted to education and residents with 
high educational attainment.
 Unless we recognize that students educated in 
some states become residents of other states, we 
will misinterpret empirical analysis. To conclude 
the thought experiment, we ask you to ponder 
whether all states can have highly educated res-
idents if none educate their own and all seek to 
import them from elsewhere.
 Comparing the states with comprehensive data 
has the potential to identify more and less success-
ful policies, but there are challenges and impedi-
ments to success. Those already convinced that a 
policy is successful and those who favor a policy 
whether or not it is successful have an easier mis-
sion. They can use whatever “evidence” that seems 
to support their preferences. They can juxtapose 
isolated information out of context in an attempt 
to convince others the action they advocate will 
produce certain results.
 Social science analysis competes with junk sci-
ence. Junk science often succeeds because it seeks 
to document answers while social science seeks to 
pursue questions. A goal of this text is to make you 
more knowledgeable and more skeptical consum-
ers of empirical data analyses, including those we 
present.
The Plan of This Textbook
In Chapters 2 and 3, we will consider multiple 
differences among the states and the patterns of 
these differences. We will consider differences in 
wealth, politics, and political institution, as well as 
the fact that many differences among the states are 
interrelated. This will both inform and complicate 
our efforts to assess whether policies work.
 This discussion will be followed by a consider-
ation of the historical development of government 
in our society in Chapter 4. The focus will be on 
changing views on the purpose of government and 
how it should be run. Chapter 5 will consider one 
of the foremost concerns of government—the costs 
of providing services and the sources of revenues 
required to provide them. There are different ways 
in which taxes for governmental services can be 
gathered.
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 Chapters 6 and 7 will address a fundamental 
concern of political science, the state of democracy 
in the 50 states, including the role of the governed 
and those who govern. Topics include voting, 
political parties, interest groups, and what is proper 
government.
 Chapters 8 through 11 will consider the basic  
formats of our subnational governments, from mu-
nicipal or city governments, school governments, 
special district governments, and county govern-
ments to the governments of the 50 states. Funda-
mental to our concern will be the process by which 
policies are enacted into law and variations in the 
form of government that are thought to affect those 
policy decisions.
 Finally, Chapters 12, and 13 will consider 
in more detail what seems to matter in terms of 
producing better state policies. It is hoped that we 
will learn what we need to develop better empirical 
analyses and better policies.
Summary
1. American federalism is dynamic and the 
relationships between states and the federal gov-
ernment have changed over time. Most observers 
think the federal government controls the states. A 
more sophisticated, state-centric view is superior.
2. The federal government and the states may not 
infringe, but they can regulate the right to keep and 
bear arms. States have confirmed they vary in their 
reactions to recent deadly shootings. Some have 
increased regulations but most have decreased 
regulations.
3. Marriage rights and marijuana restrictions are 
examples of changing policies. It seems that the 
federal government and some states are pursuing 
different goals.
4. State and local governments spend close to half 
of all government revenues in the United States 
and pass most of the laws that affect our day to day 
lives.
3. Federal grants to states create the impression 
that states are better stewards of government reve-
nue than the federal government.
4. Funds for national defense, social security and 
Medicare are entirely federal. Funding of educa-
tion, public order and safety and recreation and 
culture are almost entirely by states. Spending for 
health care in general, economic affairs and general 
public services are divided between the two levels.
5. Acquiring high quality data on state and local 
governments is frequently more challenging than 
one might expect.
6. States vary in many ways, including 1) physi-
cal and demographic differences; 2) wealth differ-
ences and 3) differences in social problems faced.
7. While on any measure some states are “better,” 
probably no state or states are consistently “best.”
8. Identifying patterns of state differences may 
help us create knowledge to identify policies to 
achieve goals more effectively.
9. We cannot assign states to treatment and con-
trol groups and conduct true experiments.  Sys-
tematic analysis of comprehensive state and local 
information is challenging. Success in identifying 
ways to achieve goals is not guaranteed.
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mary: Personal Income, Population, Per Capita Personal Income, http://www.
bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=6#reqid=70&-
step=30&isuri=1&7022=21&7023=0&7024=non-industry&7033=-1&7025=0
&7026=xx&7027=2014&7001=421&7028=3&7031=0&7040=-1&7083=lev-
els&7029=21&7090=70
Figure 1.5   Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rates for States, www.bls.gov/web/laus/
laumstrk.htm
Figure 1.6  Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime report for 2014, https://www.fbi.gov/
about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-  the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-4
Figure 1.7 Gallup State of the States, Overall Well-Being 2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/125066/
State-States.aspx?ref=interactive
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Study Guide, Chapter 1
Essay Questions
 1. Explain the broad concept of federalism and how it differs from other ways of organizing government. What  
 are the primary roles in making policy for American federal, state and local governments?
 2. Describe how federalism affects the relationship between state governments and local governments.  Does   
 this differ from the relationship between the federal government and state governments?  Why or why not?
 3. How is the American form of federalism more complicated in practice than in theory?  Describe two exam-
 ples of complexity and the roles played by each level of government.
 4. In general terms, how do states act as “laboratories” for “experimenting” with different policies?  Give exam-
 ples.  To what extent can the laboratory analogy be applied to the study of state politics?
 5. What would be the impact on
  A. state and local governments if the federal government stopped transferring federal funds to them?  
  Provide two examples and explain.
  B. citizens if state and local governments vanished?  Why?  Provide two examples and explain.
 6. You and your friend are having a friendly discussion about which state is the “best.”  What concepts (such as  
 wealth, health, opportunity) are most important to you and how would you measure each?  Discuss two mea-
 sures from Chapter 1 and how well they depict your concepts?
 7. How would you support the argument that state and local governments’ laws and policies affect American   
 citizens day-to-day more than federal laws and policies?
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. Who creates local governments?
  a. federal government 
  b. state government
  c. voters in the states
  d. voters in the communities
 2. Which level of government has the most impact on public policies affecting elementary and secondary educ-
 ation, higher education, marriage, and speed limits?
  a. federal government
  b. state government
  c. local government
 3. Which level of government is responsible for national defense?
  a. federal government
  b. state government
  c. shared between federal and state levels, but federal level has primary responsibility
  d. shared between federal and state levels, but state level has primary responsibility
 4. Which policy area is financed mainly by the federal government?
  a. elementary and secondary education
  b. police and corrections
  c. fire protection
  d. welfare and social services
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 1 http://loc.gov/law/help/second-amendment.php   Law Library of Congress.
 2 http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html
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 recipients, tax cuts, and a worldwide economic depression.
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 wall-st-best-states-business-story/24107507/; http://www.cnbc.com/2014/06/24/americas-top-states-for-business.html;   
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We presented evidence in Chapter 1 that the states 
are different and that differences are usually sub-
stantial. In this chapter, we will continue to assess 
differences among the states but also begin to ex-
plore how these differences are interrelated.
 In Chapter 1, we noted the states created the 
federal government when they ratified the Constitu-
tion of 1787. The states themselves came into being 
on July 4, 1776, through the Declaration of Inde-
pendence statement “these United Colonies are, and 
of right ought to be, free and independent states.”  
The Declaration also specified independence was 
necessary to establish a government based on the 
consent of the governed in order to secure rights 
such as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
 Our views of “consent of the governed” and 
“life liberty and the pursuit of happiness” have 
changed over time, but they remain the Raison 
d’être, the reason for being, of the states. The states 
hold these fundamental goals in common today. 
We use government as an important—but not the 
only—actor working to achieve these goals. Other 
important actors include individuals, families, vol-
untary organizations and businesses.
 Progress toward some goals the American states 
pursue can be assessed quite accurately. We can 
use high school and college completion rates to 
assess the educational attainment of residents.  The 
ultimate objective is not necessarily all residents 
holding baccalaureate degrees, but more is prefer-
able to fewer. Similarly, we want higher incomes, 
lower poverty, healthier populations, better roads 
and bridges, greater public safety.
 As we saw in Chapter 1, states can be identi-
fied as being more or less successful than others in 
meeting these goals. Using the laboratory analogy, 
states attempt to deal with common social problems 
by pursuing different policies with different re-
sources. We cannot conduct experiments and assign 
states to treatment and control groups, but we do 
have the opportunity to study states using the com-
parative method. Effective comparative analyses 
have the potential to create knowledge to identify 
necessary resources and effective policies to help 
states achieve the goals they share.
Studying Relationships
Attributes and characteristics that take on different 
values across the states, such as population, income 
and formal education are called variables. If there 
were any descriptors that had identical values for 
all states, they would be called constants. We are 
interested in patterns, or relationships, between 
state variables. There can be no meaningful rela-
tionship between one element that is identical and 
another that is variable for the states. Quite simply, 
something that is the same for all states cannot be 
the cause of something that is different for all states, 
and vice versa.
 There are two important elements of patterns of 
differences—relationships—between variables that 
we want to identify: direction and strength. There 
are two possible directions: positive and negative. 
Consider a relationship between state features X 
and Y. A positive relationship exists when states 
with higher values on X have higher values on 
Y and states with lower values on X have lower 
values on Y. A negative relationship exists when 
the opposite occurs: states with higher values on X 
have lower values on Y and states with lower values 
on X have higher values on Y.
 Direction is the first element of interest. Politi-
cal scientists and other social scientists articulate 
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ideas about empirical relationships, how things 
associate in the real world, in terms of directional 
hypotheses. A hypothesized relationship is dis-
confirmed by finding an empirical relationship in 
the wrong direction. As an example, suppose we 
hypothesize a positive relationship between per-
cent of state residents completing high school and 
percent completing baccalaureate degrees. If we 
analyze appropriate state data and find a negative 
relationship, we must reject our hypothesis as dis-
confirmed.
 The heart of social science analysis is the will-
ingness to disconfirm predictions. Social scientists 
must be willing to say, “I was wrong.” Pseudo 
science or junk science is the opposite of social sci-
ence. For pseudo scientists, the objective is to iden-
tify empirical relationships that confirm predictions 
so they can claim, “I was right.” Pseudo scientists 
will disregard and not report their own research 
that finds relationships in the opposite direction of 
their predictions.
 Social scientists use the best and most appro-
priate data and analyses to test hypotheses.  Junk 
scientists are willing to use faulty data and analy-
ses. Social scientists seek to interpret the empirical 
world accurately. Pseudo scientists seek to serve 
interests they do not identify explicitly and hidden 
agendas.
 Scientists are willing to identify research 
findings that disconfirm their ideas; junk scientists 
are not. We all use examples to clarify our ideas 
to others; examples are not necessarily misrepre-
sentations. However, identifying empirical exam-
ples that support preconceived ideas and ignoring 
examples that disconfirm them is pseudo science 
if the examples are falsely presented as scientific 
evidence.
 Social scientists require more than relation-
ships in predicted directions, relationships must be 
both predicted and strong. Strength is the second 
element of interest. It is virtually always possible 
to find an empirical relationship between variables. 
Consider testing a coin to determine whether it is 
“fair” in the sense that it will land heads half the 
time and tails half the time. If we test a fair coin 
with one thousand flips, the result will probably 
not be exactly 500 heads and 500 tails. Absent a 
strength measure, we would incorrectly interpret 
501 heads and 499 tails as meeting the directional 
prediction “more heads.”
 If we test with five flips, half-and-half is not a 
possible outcome. There will always be either more 
heads or more tails. A junk scientist would report a 
five-flip trial with 60 percent heads (3 heads and 2 
tails) as evidence in support of a prediction of more 
heads, even though 60 percent heads or tails is the 
possible outcome closest to half-and-half.  Unless 
the both sides of the coin are tails, the desired out-
come can be attained with a few series of five flips, 
and the pseudo scientist will choose to report only 
the “successful” result.
 If five-flip trials were the only tests possible, 
a social scientist would insist on making a large 
number of five-flip tests. If one thousand five-flip 
trials were completed and the results were 60 per-
cent with three or more heads, the social scientist 
would conclude the coin was unfairly biased in 
favor of heads. If 501 of one thousand trials were 3 
or more heads, the social scientist would conclude 
the coin was not biased (but a junk scientist would 
wrongly present such a finding as evidence).
 Comparative study of the American states is 
limited to a maximum of 50 units of analysis, or 
observations, in any year or other time period. The 
scientific discipline Statistics recognizes a number 
of measures of association we could use to test for 
relationships.  And, for each measure, Statistics 
identifies threshold values that are appropriate to 
distinguish strong relationships.  Only when empir-
ical findings are in the predicted direction and re-
lationships are strong are hypotheses not rejected. 
Either wrong direction or predicted direction and 
weak relationship are grounds for rejecting hypoth-
eses.  We check direction first because wrong di-
rection always disconfirms, and strength becomes 
irrelevant.  Were we to focus first on strength, we 
might accept strong relationships in the wrong 
direction as meeting our predictions.
 If you have been paying close attention, you 
might expect that we could identify strong rela-
tionships by conducting a large number of 50 state 
trials, analogous to the coin flip trials discussed 
earlier. This could be done by studying the same 
relationships for the states in different calendar 
years, fiscal years, census years and so on. We 
agree that a relationship that is consistently strong 
over many such trials is more impressive than a 
strong relationship for a single trial. But replicating 
state research at different points in time is different 
from coin flip trials. Simply put, the fairness of a 
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coin is not affected by number of flips and fairness 
does not change over time. States and their attri-
butes do change over time.
 There is a fundamental difference between the 
natural sciences, such as Physics, Chemistry and 
Biology and social sciences: the expectation that 
findings will be the same or similar at all places 
and times. Physicists expect the atomic number of 
carbon to be unchanging and the relationship F=ma 
to endure at least as long as there are physicists. 
Social scientists expect all human social behavior 
is subject to change.
 In your lifetimes, Republicans and Democrats 
have exchanged places on many fundamental 
issues. Partisan general elections have transformed 
from typically competitive and close to typical-
ly uncontested by one of the two major parties. 
Parties that create gerrymandered state legislative 
election districts are seemingly invulnerable to 
losing their majorities, even when they lose state-
wide contests by a large margin. For example, in 
the elections of 2012, Republicans retained majori-
ty control of both legislative chambers in six states 
where President Obama won a majority of the 
popular vote for president.1
 The expectation of change creates challenges 
for social science that are rare for natural science. 
When comparing the states, it is entirely possible 
that relationships between attributes will exist at 
some points in time but not at others. In studying 
the states, evidence that relationships do not exist 
at some points in time does not disconfirm their 
existence at others.
Wealth and Education Data in Maps
Some states are wealthier and some are poorer. 
Actually, it is more correct to say that states have 
wealthier and poorer residents. Governments must 
have revenues to pay for governmental services 
such as public education. In the United States, 
taxes provide the largest share of government rev-
enues. Any given state or local government’s taxes 
are paid mainly by people and businesses within 
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the state. A government with only poor residents 
cannot provide services similar to those offered by 
a government with mostly wealthy residents.
 Past research has shown that there are many 
noteworthy empirical relationships involving 
differences in state wealth. Wealth is not only 
an important resource in itself; it is consistently 
positively related to other resources, to government 
policies and programs and to success in meeting 
goals.  Relationships concerning wealth have been 
among the most important and enduring in the 
comparative state research literature.2
 Education is often seen as a means for people 
to improve their future earnings. This is proba-
bly one of the reasons you are pursuing a college 
degree. State government officials see improving 
education as a way to make their states more com-
petitive in attracting businesses with high-paying 
jobs. According to this argument, businesses with 
a choice among states will go to the state with the 
better educated residents because more will be 
available to fill positions requiring better educa-
tions. The lack of an educated public may keep a 
state poor as better paying jobs go elsewhere. An 
educated population is typically a component of 
“best for business” measures, such as those pre-
sented in Chapter 1.
 In the first half of the 20th century, the most 
common measure of state residents’ educational 
attainment was the percentage with at least a high 
school education. In 1960, about 41 percent of 
people over 25 years old had at least high school 
educations, but by 2014, this had soared to more 
than 88 percent.3  In 54 years, the percentage more 
than doubled.
 At the same time, the percentage of those com-
pleting college has also increased dramatically. In 
1960, fewer than 8 percent of Americans 25 years 
and older held bachelor’s degrees or greater, but by 
2014, this quadrupled to 32 percent.4
 There is broad agreement, both inside and 
outside the scholarly community, that education-
al attainment is linked to economic success, both 
for individuals and for communities.5 Educational 
attainment is also linked to better health and longer 
life expectancy.6 There seem to be no advocates of 
the position that lower educational attainment is 
better.
 So, we expect there is a strong positive rela-
tionship between the education levels and wealth 
of states’ population. We expect that both percent 
of residents with high school completion and 
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percent baccalaureate degree completion will be 
related to state population wealth, but which rela-
tionship will be stronger?
 Figure 2.1 is the same map presentation of 
state per capita income in 2014 presented above as 
Figure 1.4. Per capita income is the best available 
measure of state wealth, even though income tech-
nically refers to funds acquired during a year and 
wealth refers to the difference between assets and 
liabilities. We would be interested in using a mea-
sure of wealth if there were trustworthy, valid and 
reliable estimates for each state. The only available 
wealth data that meet those criteria is value of real 
property, that is, land and permanent improvements 
to land.  There are data for the value assigned 
to real property for the purpose of assessing and 
collecting state and local property taxes. We do not 
have data on personal property, that is, cash, gov-
ernment and corporate securities, motor vehicles, 
jewelry, art, and other personal possessions.
 State per capita income is the total personal 
income of each state divided by its population. This 
measure does not take into account the extent to 
which it is more expensive to live in some states 
than in others.
 For some analyses we would like to control for 
cost of living disparities across the states, but there 
are no regular  “official” cost of living estimates 
for the states. It may surprise you to learn that the 
United States Federal Government collects data and 
calculates cost of living indexes only for selected 
metropolitan areas. An attempt to use available 
information to calculate state cost of living indexes 
found only seven states had costs that were more 
than 10 percent higher or lower than the national 
average in 2003.7
 State maps are good data visualization tools to 
identify patterns related to geography, and there 
are some regional patterns of per capita income 
differences in Figure 2.1. With the exception of 
California and Texas, the southernmost states are in 
the lower two income categories.  Six of the for-
mer Confederate states are in the lowest category 
and three are in the next category. Only Virginia 
and Texas are in the second highest category. All 
of the states in the highest income category are in 
the Northeast region except for California, North 
Dakota and Wyoming.
 Figure 2.2 shows percent of state populations 
that completed high school in 2010. The South 
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Figure 2.4 
Per Capita Income and Percent High School Completion 2014 
stands out as poorly educated. All eleven former 
Confederate states are in the bottom two categories 
and nine are in the lowest category. This pattern 
largely reflects the pattern for per capita income.  
However, California and Texas are in the lowest 
category of high school completion while Califor-
nia was in the highest category and Texas in the 
second-highest category of per capita income.
 In other regions the income and high school ed-
ucation maps are different. Many, but not all of the 
Northeastern states in the highest income category 
are in the highest high school completion category. 
The same is true for the six contiguous northern-
most Midwestern and Mountain states. It is not 
easy to describe similarities and dissimilarities in 
the two maps.
 Figure 2.3 shows population percentages with 
bachelor’s degrees or greater for the states. This 
map looks somewhat more like the map of per 
capita income. This would suggest that higher 
education assures high incomes. However, it is not 
entirely clear the extent to which per capita income 
geographic patterns are closer to higher educa-
tional attainment than to high school educational 
attainment—if, indeed, they are closer.
 Thus far, we have merely been eyeballing or 
comparing two maps, seeking to see their overlap. 
We need something better. We need better tools 
that examine information on two variables for all 
states simultaneously. We need scatterplots and 
correlation coefficients.
Scatterplots and Correlations
Figure 2.4 is a scatterplot of the state per capita 
income and percent population with high school 
completion in 2014. It uses the same information 
used to create the maps of Figure 2.1 and Figure 
2.2. The scatterplot shows information for two 
variables for each state.
 Percent high school completion is on the 
horizontal, or X-axis. Per capita income is on the 
vertical, or Y-axis. In Texas, 82 percent of popula-
tion aged 25 and older have completed high school, 
and state per capita income is $45,426. The corre-
sponding values for Connecticut are 90 percent and 
$68,714.
 The scatterplot in Figure 2.4 also displays a 
State Differences and Relationships  • 27 
line that provides the best for the states’ locations. 
It is the straight line that is as close as possible to 
all observations. The regression line is determined 
by a statistical formula, and is expressed as an 
algebraic equation. The equation for the regres-
sion line in Figure 2.4 is Y= 920X – 36,250. In 
this equation, “Y” stands for per capita personal 
income level and “X” for percentage of the popu-
lation that has completed high school. The equa-
tion means the best estimate of a state’s per capita 
personal income is $920 times its percentage of 
population age 25 and older that has completed 
high school minus $36,250. In other words, a one 
percent increase in state percent that completed 
high school is related to a $920 increase in state 
per capita income.
 States above the regression line have a higher 
per capita income than expected given their per-
cent high school completion. States below the line 
have lower per capita income than expected. In the 
lower left corner, Texas, California and Mississippi 
have similar percent with high school completion, 
but Mississippi has lower per capita income than 
expected while Texas and California have higher 
per capita income than expected.  For most scatter-
plots, about half the states will be above the regres-
sion line and half will be below. The scatterplot in 
Figure 2.4 has 20 states above the regression line 
and 30 below. This is because the states below 
are relatively close to the line, but a group of five 
states are very far above the line: Connecticut, 
New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Mary-
land. Distant outliers on one side must be balanced 
by a larger number of states on the other side.
 Regression lines indicate the direction of the 
relationship.  In Figure 2.4, the relationship is posi-
tive; states with lower percent high school comple-
tion have lower per capita incomes and states with 
higher percent high school completion have higher 
per capita incomes. Regression lines with lower 
left to upper right orientation denote positive rela-
tionships. Regression lines with upper left to lower 
right orientation represent negative relationships.
 Figure 2.4 also includes the information r = .43.
This means the value of the correlation coefficient 
for the scatterplot, r, is .43. A correlation coeffi-
cient gives us information about the direction and 
goodness of fit of the estimated regression line. 
Figure 2.5 
Per Capita Income and Percent Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 2014
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Correlation coefficients, or correlations, may have 
values from -1.0 to +1.0. The sign of the correla-
tion coefficient indicates whether the regression 
line is positive or negative. The size of the correla-
tion coefficient indicates how well the regression 
line fits the scatterplot elements and how strong 
the relationship is between the two variables being 
analyzed. Correlation coefficients close to zero 
indicate very weak relationships. Stronger positive 
relationships are identified by correlations closer to
+1.0; stronger negative relationships are identified 
by correlations closer to -1.0. If there were a per-
fect positive relationship, the correlation coefficient 
would be 1.00 and all states would be on a positive 
regression line (lower left to upper right).   
If there were a perfect negative relationship, the 
correlation coefficient would be -1.00 and all states 
would be on a negative regression line (upper left 
to lower right). For perfect positive and negative 
relationships, the maps of each variable would be 
the same.
 A correlation of .00 or -.00 means there is no 
relationship whatsoever between the two variables. 
The regression line would be horizontal, or vertical 
and the states would be scattered above and below 
it with no particular pattern.8   The maps would not 
overlap at all.
 A correlation coefficient is a precise measure 
of the direction and strength of a relationship. For 
all relationships, correlation coefficients closer to 
zero are weaker and coefficients closer to 1.00 or 
-1.00 are stronger. As mentioned earlier, Statistics 
identifies critical values for correlation coefficients 
and other measures of association that scholars use 
to distinguish relationships that could be produced 
by random phenomena such as random sampling 
and random error in data. These critical values are 
used to gauge “statistical significance” of measures 
of association.
 Instead of using statistical significance to iden-
tify strong and weak relationships, we will use a 
simple rule of thumb. We will interpret correlation 
coefficients of .30 and -.30 as sufficiently strong to 
say a relationship exists. Correlations at or larger 
than .30 and -.30 are simple, round number values 
that are a bit higher than the threshold of statistical 
significance for 50 observations most often used 
in comparative state research by social scientists. 
Table 2.1 
Per Capita Income and Educational Attainment Correlations 
Over Time 
 
Year 
Per Capita Income and  
High School Completion 
Per Capita Income and 
Baccalaureate Degree 
 
1950 .70 .52 
1960 .66 .48 
1970 .61 .65 
1980 .63 .64 
1990 .44 .74 
2000 .31 .74 
2010 .37 .79 
2014 .43 .76 
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We will interpret correlations smaller than that as 
below our strength criterion. Correlations between 
.00 and .29 and between .00 and -.29 are so weak 
that we will simply say there is no relationship.
 We will be considering empirical relationships 
by scatterplots, regression lines, and correlation 
coefficients throughout this book. You should not 
be intimidated by the graphic representations and 
correlation values shown. Simply focus on wheth-
er each relationship is positive (r= .30 or larger), 
negative (r=-.30 or larger) or no relationship (r 
between -.29 and .29).
 You can probably tell whether the direction of 
a relationship is positive or negative by scanning 
the pattern of observations and seeing if they form 
a positive or negative diagonal. With some prac-
tice, you will also develop a feel for the strength of 
relationships by scanning scatterplots.  In Figure 
2.4, even without the regression line, you can see 
there are few states in the upper left or lower right 
portions of the scatterplot. Rather, they concentrate 
on a diagonal running from the lower left to the 
upper right.
 For our purposes, correlation coefficients alone 
are sufficient to assess direction and strength of re-
lationships.  However, examination of scatterplots 
linked to correlations frequently yields valuable 
insights. You already have a base of knowledge 
about the states. A goal of this text is to help you 
organize that information and integrate it with new 
information. We invite you to use both the scatter-
plot data visualizations and the correlation coeffi-
cient measures to interpret relationships between 
pairs of variables.
Wealth and Education Scatterplots and Correla-
tions
We know from Figure 2.4 that states with higher 
high school educational attainment rates have high-
er per capita incomes. The correlation coefficient 
.43 meets our strength criterion.  So, we conclude 
there is a positive empirical relationship between 
the two variables in 2014. Figure 2.5 shows the 
relationship between higher educational attainment 
and per capita income.
 Figure 2.5 shows a very strong positive rela-
tionship between state higher educational attain-
ment and per capita income. States are close to the 
regression line with very few exceptions. That is 
why the correlation coefficient is .76. We can now 
answer the question raised earlier about whether 
high school educational attainment or higher edu-
cational attainment is more strongly related to state 
per capita income. The relationship with higher 
educational attainment is very much stronger. The 
regression equation can be interpreted to mean a 
one percent increase in state percent that completed 
baccalaureate degrees is related to a $1025 increase 
in state per capita income.
 Correlations between state per capita income 
and the two measures of state educational attain-
ment over time are presented in Table 2.1. The re-
lationships are consistently positive, but important 
changes in size of correlations have occurred.
 For 1950 and 1960, per capita income is more 
strongly related to high school attainment.  For 
1970 and 1980, per capita income is equally related 
to both measures of educational attainment.  Start-
ing in 1990, per capita income is more strongly 
related to higher educational attainment.  These 
changing relationships over time fit well with 
generalizations you are familiar with. For people 
in your great-grandparents’ age cohort, high school 
completion was the key educational credential for 
quality career opportunities. For people in your 
parents’ age cohort, a college degree was a supe-
rior educational credential.  For your age cohort, 
college degree may approach being a necessary 
credential for career opportunities that have higher 
income.
What Empirical Relationships Mean and Do Not 
Mean
Throughout the book, scatterplots correlations 
merely show the presence or absence of empiri-
cal relationships. Strong empirical relationships 
between state educational attainment and per capita 
income have been reported consistently starting in 
1950. However, empirical relationships document-
ed by correlations alone are not sufficient to prove 
causal relationships.
 You have been taught “correlation does not 
prove causation” in a variety of academic courses 
over the years. We all need to repeat this to our-
selves because the temptation to interpret predicted 
empirical relationships as evidence supporting and 
confirming our ideas is very strong.
 Remember, social scientists test hypotheses by 
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subjecting them to the possibility of disconfirma-
tion. Correlations that show predicted empirical 
relations do not exist are sufficient evidence to 
reject hypotheses.
 We should also repeat to ourselves “lack of cor-
relation disproves causation” to remind us of the 
limitations of social science analyses.
Spurious Relationships
An empirical relationship can be result from some-
thing other than one variable causing the other. 
Empirical relationships also exist when variables 
we correlate are both strongly related to a third 
variable or multiple variables other than the two 
used to calculate a correlation coefficient.
Perhaps a simple example can make the distinction 
between a causal relationship and a spurious rela-
tionship easier to understand. If we were to gather 
data on the number of fire engines at the scene of 
several hundred fires in a city as well as the dollars 
of damage in each of these fires, we would see a 
very strong positive relationship. When there are 
more fire engines at a fire, there is more damage. 
The correlation coefficient in this hypothetical 
example would be very strong, say r = .80.
 If this empirical relationship were mistaken 
as a causal relationship, a misguided city council 
might decide that a plausible and cheap method 
to reduce fire damage would be to have a policy 
that no more than one fire engine could respond 
to any fire. Would this work? Of course not! The 
relationship between number of fire engines and 
damage is spurious. A third variable—the severity 
of the fire—causes both the number of fire engines 
responding and the extent of damage.
 You probably foresaw that this was a spuri-
ous relationship, but most of the time spurious 
relationships are not obvious. Spurious empirical 
relationships are frequently used by pseudo social 
scientists as evidence in support of their ideas. 
We want to call attention to an important spurious 
relationship across the states frequently presented, 
incorrectly, to suggest causal relationships or to 
“prove” causal relationships. Consider the follow-
ing two examples.
 The correlation between total state personal 
income and number of state residents living in 
poverty in 2014 is .96.  It seems strange that there 
is a positive relationship between income and pov-
erty.  Could it be causal? Could reducing residents’ 
income also reduce poverty?
 The correlation between number of prisoners 
released and number of property crimes in 2014 
Figure 2.6 
Spurious Relations With State Population 
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is .88. Could this relationship be causal?  We have 
no information about whether recently released 
prisoners are the ones committing property crimes.  
Can releasing fewer prisoners cause fewer property 
crimes?
 The examples above are both empirical re-
lations that are spuriously related to the absent 
variable state population size. Figure 2.6 displays 
scatterplots of the two relationships. With minor 
exceptions, the states line up on both diagonals in 
order of population size.
 States with more living in poverty have more 
personal income.  But they also have more prop-
erty crimes and more released from prison. States 
with more property crimes have more released 
from prison.  But they also have more living in 
poverty and higher total personal income.
States with more people will have larger counts of 
things people typically do. State population size 
is related to annual purchase and consumption of 
kegs of beer and gallons of milk. States popula-
tion size is also related to number of people who 
attend religious services weekly and number of 
firearms. There are strong correlations between 
these state measures of milk and firearms, but milk 
consumption does not cause firearms or the desire 
for firearms. There are strong correlations between 
beer and religious service attendance, but attending 
services does not cause beer consumption or the 
desire to consume beer.
 The preceding empirical relationships are all 
spurious rather than causal because population 
size was ignored and all measures used are related 
to population size. It is almost never appropriate 
to compare the states and ignore population size 
differences. Sometimes other controls, such as 
number of children in public schools and number 
of welfare recipients, are superior. Beware when-
ever you are shown state relationships that do not 
control for number of people.
What Causes What
Another important limitation of the analyses 
presented in this text is correlations alone are not 
sufficient to tell us which variable causes which 
if there is a causal relationship. We initially began 
our empirical analyses of wealth and education in 
this chapter with the goal of identifying why states 
have higher and lower per capita incomes. We 
have implicitly assumed that educational attain-
ment causes income. It could also be the case that 
per capita income causes educational attainment. 
We need knowledge not conveyed by correlation 
coefficients to identify correctly possible causal 
directions when empirical relationships exist.
 We know that firefighters work to prevent 
and stop fires. That knowledge causes us to reject 
the idea that more fire engines responding causes 
greater fire damage. If there is a causal relation-
ship, it must be that fire damage causes number 
of responding engines. That recognition, and the 
recognition that the relationship is most likely spu-
rious, is not inherent in a correlation coefficient or 
a scatterplot.
 Sometimes awareness of event sequences 
eliminates some causal directions.  In most states, 
general elections for state and federal offices are 
held in November and winners assume office in 
January. Fiscal years in 46 states begin July 1 and 
end June 30 in the following calendar year.9  New 
office holders have much greater opportunity to 
make decisions for the fiscal year that begins on 
the July 1 after they take office than the fiscal year 
that ends June 30 of the year they take office.
 If we were to correlate information about the 
partisan, gender and ethnicity distribution of state 
legislators who appropriated funds for a given 
fiscal year and the appropriations they passed, we 
would know the causal direction if causality exists. 
It must be that the distribution of legislators’ attri-
butes caused the appropriations, not vice versa.
 The spending decisions legislators make after 
an election occurs and a legislative session begins 
cannot possibly cause their partisan affiliations, 
gender or ethnicity. The distribution of members’ 
attributes determined by elections that predate their 
legislative actions cannot cause those actions.
 What if we reverse the time sequence in this 
example? What if we interrelate the appropriations 
decisions made by legislators for, say, 2015 with 
election results in 2016. Voters’ reactions to actions 
taken by legislators could influence who wins and 
who loses subsequent elections. The attributes of 
legislators chosen in 2016 cannot cause appropri-
ations decisions made earlier, but earlier decisions 
could possibly affect the attributes of legislators 
elected afterwards.
 We posit that cause cannot come after effect. 
Sometimes we cannot be as precise as we might 
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like to be in determining when events occur. We 
have no way to restate precisely information pro-
vided for fiscal years in calendar years and vice 
versa. This is an example of the measurement error 
inherent in our empirical analyses.
 Some argue that cause and effect can seem to 
be out of chronological order when people act in 
anticipation of future events. The Medicare Mod-
ernization Act of 2003 expanded entitlement pre-
scription benefits available to Medicare patients. 
However, the legislation did not allow Medicare 
to negotiate prescription drug prices the way other 
federal programs and private insurers could.  As 
a result, profits of pharmaceutical corporations 
increased as they sold more drugs at full price.
 We might hypothesize that prices of stocks for 
these corporations would go up immediately after 
Congress passed the legislation.  However, stock 
prices also rose before final passage of legislation 
because many investors bought on the expectation 
legislation would pass and larger profits would en-
sue. When we hypothesize that actions take place 
in anticipation of future events, we must make sure 
that we focus on when the anticipation occurs, not 
when what has been anticipated occurs.  The tem-
poral sequence of our measures should be antici-
pation before what anticipation is hypothesized to 
cause.
 Correctly identifying cause and effect relation-
ships are ongoing challenges, even for experienced 
researchers. A non-hypothetical example from our 
own research provides an example of incorrect 
thinking about cause and effect.10 
 State legislatures typically take final action on 
a large percentage of the bills they pass in the final 
days of legislative sessions. The so-called legisla-
tive logjam of business builds up during the ses-
sion and is cleared at the very end. Many observers 
think this is an undesirable practice. They argue 
that important decisions are being made under 
severe time constraints and conditions that are cha-
otic. Critics advise state legislatures to implement 
certain practices, such as deadlines for introducing 
bills, to minimize end-of-session logjams.
 We tested the effectiveness of practices rec-
ommended to minimize logjams by comparing 
Figure 2.7
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Figure 2.8
Per Capita State and Local Government Revenue Per Capita and 
Percent of Population with Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 2014
37 state legislatures. We hypothesized a negative 
relationship between use of recommended practic-
es and logjam size. We found the opposite. There 
was a positive relationship between the presence of 
reformed procedures and logjam size. Our hypoth-
eses were rejected by empirical analysis because 
our ideas about cause and effect were wrong. They 
were backwards. We thought that procedural re-
forms would cause smaller logjams. In reality, only 
legislatures with logjam problems were motivated 
to implement such practices. In other words, large 
logjams caused procedural reforms.
Conclusion on What Empirical Relationships Mean 
and Do Not Mean
We now recognize three possibilities as we consider 
state differences and relationships. First, we can 
find that there is no empirical relationship. Sec-
ond, we can find there is an empirical relationship 
that is spurious and not causal. Third, we can find 
empirical relationships that might be causal.
 A finding of no empirical relationship is easy to 
interpret: there is no simple, straightforward causal 
relationship. When we hypothesize a causal rela-
tionship and find no empirical relationship, we must 
reject our hypothesis. We might introduce interven-
ing factors and test a more complex hypothesis, but 
we cannot continue to espouse an idea disconfirmed 
by empirical analysis.
 Finding a predicted empirical relationship is 
usually more pleasing, but empirical relationships 
are starting places for further investigation. The 
existence of an empirical relationship between 
variables does not prove one variable is causing the 
other no matter how high the correlation. On the 
contrary, extremely high correlations should make 
us suspicious that we have found a spurious rela-
tionship.  The longstanding and evolving correla-
tions over time between state per capita income and 
educational attainment are not sufficient for us to 
conclude causal relationships, but they should cause 
us to inquire further into whether and how one vari-
able might affect another.
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More Relationships
Financial Resources: Residents and Governments
We have explored how state per capita income and 
state educational attainment are correlated with 
each other. Per capita income is a measure of state 
residents’ financial capacity. Educational attain-
ment can be viewed as a measure of residents’ 
human capital. Let’s investigate how some other 
state differences are related to differences in these 
monetary and population resources.
 You may think it is a no-brainer to predict that 
state and local government revenues per capita 
will be correlated with per capita income of state 
residents. As Figure 2.7 shows, there is a positive 
correlation, but perhaps not as strong as we might 
expect: .69.
 It is readily apparent that some states are 
outliers, located far from the regression line in the 
scatterplot. The states most distant from the line, 
Alaska, Wyoming and New York, all have much 
larger total revenues per capita than we would ex-
pect from per capita income alone.  Remember that 
not all government income is tied to the financial 
resources of residents. Both Alaska and Wyoming 
receive significant incomes from royalties and tax-
es on natural resources, both petroleum and ore ex-
traction. Since both states have small populations, 
the revenue per capita is quite large. Total revenues 
include grants from the federal government. Alaska 
has long been a leader in grant funds per capita.
 The other outlier, New York has an unusual 
revenue source. The City of New York assesses a 
payroll tax that applies whether or not employees 
reside in the State of New York or in neighboring 
states. Because they live elsewhere, New York City 
does not benefit from the sales, income and prop-
erty taxes they pay to their residential state and 
local governments. The payroll tax offsets the cost 
of providing services to them when they are in the 
city.
 Per capita personal income and per capita state 
and local government revenue are interrelated yet 
distinct. Monetary resources of residents do not 
translate simply and directly into resources for 
governments. Once again, the states have import-
ant differences in their policies for financing gov-
ernment activities. We will consider state and local 
government revenue further in Chapter 8.
 Figure 2.8 interrelates state and local govern-
ment revenue per capita and higher educational 
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attainment. The correlation of .35 is just above our 
minimum value of .30. So, we conclude there is 
a relationship.  The correlation is so low we rec-
ognize that, if higher educational attainment does 
cause state and local government revenue per capi-
ta, other additional variables must also be causes.
 Figure 2.9 relates state and local government 
revenues and expenditures per capita.  The scat-
terplot and correlation of .93 indicates the two are 
nearly identical. In most fiscal years, government 
spending matches revenues quite closely. Fiscal 
year 2014 was unusual. Governments were still 
suffering from the loss of tax revenues that fol-
lowed the financial crisis of 2007 and subsequent 
economic downturn.  Approximately 29 states, 
those above the dotted line denoting equal reve-
nue and expenditure, overspent annual revenue in 
2014. Some shifted funds from 2015. Others took 
on short or long term debt. Approximately 14 states 
spend less than they received in 2014. In most 
cases, this was the result of austerity programs of 
spending cuts.
 Figure 2.9 provides a vivid picture of the range 
of revenue and expenditure differences across the 
states. New York and Wyoming have revenues 
and expenditures approximately twice as large as 
those in Oklahoma, Missouri and New Hampshire. 
Wealthy residents of low revenue and expenditure 
states can purchase services they wish at their own 
expense. Poor residents cannot do so. They might 
want to “vote with their feet” and move to wealthi-
er states.
Crime and Punishment
Figure 2.10 assesses the relationship between 
crime and punishment across the states.  The 
correlation between violent crime rate and incar-
ceration rate is .45 States with higher violent crime 
rates have higher percent of residents incarcerated.  
It is noteworthy that Louisiana, Oklahoma, Ala-
bama, Mississippi, Arizona, Arkansas and Texas 
have the highest incarceration rates in the nation. 
In addition, their rates are very far above the 
regression line, much larger than their crime rates 
would predict. Massachusetts is an outlier with 
much lower incarceration rates than predicted by 
crime rates.
 It makes sense that there would be relationships 
between crime and punishment in the states. We 
can speculate that the high and low outlier states 
Figure 2.10
Incarceration Rate and Violent Crime Rate 2014
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might have different values and practices concern-
ing punishment. Before we interpret the analyses in 
Figure 2.10 as consistent with a causal relationship, 
we should recognize that the crime rate measure 
is for a single year. Incarceration rate is also for a 
single year, but total incarceration in any year re-
flects imprisonments and releases over many years. 
The correlation between same year violent crime 
rate and imprisonment rates is .24; the same year 
correlation between violent crime and release rates 
is .36. It seems the states have a range of practices 
concerning punishment that may be independent of 
crime and more influential than crime.
Income and Poverty
Figure 2.11 is a scatterplot of per capita income 
and state poverty rate. The correlation -.65 informs 
us that there is a strong negative relationship. 
States with higher income have lower poverty and 
vice versa. The distribution of states in the scat-
terplot lets us recognize some of the underlying 
complexity.
 Approximately 22 states are in the most desir-
able quadrant, below average poverty and above 
average income. Another 20 states are in the 
least desirable quadrant, below average income 
and above average poverty. Louisiana is close to 
average on per capita income but has the highest 
poverty rate state.  Louisiana has considerable dis-
persion above and below the income mean. It has 
large numbers of residents who are wealthy and 
who are impoverished. At the other extreme, Iowa, 
Missouri and Vermont are also close to average 
on per capita income but are among the lowest 
poverty rates. Curiously, average income and high 
poverty exists in one state and average income and 
low poverty exists in other states. For most readers 
this complexity may be unexpected. 
Infant Mortality and Life Expectancy
There may be nearly unanimous agreement that, if 
we could, we would minimize infant mortality and 
maximize lifespans. There may also be unanimous 
agreement that, if there is a causal relationship be-
tween lifespan and infant mortality, it must be that 
higher infant mortality causes lower lifespan. The 
two are strongly related; the correlation is -.78 (see 
Figure 2.12).
Figure 2.11 
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 Figure 2.12 shows the relationship between life 
expectancy and infants’ dying before they are one 
year old applies generally across the states. Hawaii, 
North Dakota and South Dakota are outliers with 
much longer lifespans than predicted by infant 
mortality. Nevada is an outlier with shorter than 
predicted average lifespan.
 If states with the lowest life expectancy wanted 
to make rapid improvements, they would be wise 
to provide better health care to infants with the 
greatest risk of dying before reaching the age of 
one year. Their best strategy is to improve prenatal 
and postnatal care available to poor mothers.
 Other strategies might be available for states to 
lower infant mortality rates. Lower infant mortality 
is related to higher per capita income (r = -.57), to 
lower poverty (r = .58); and to more population 
with baccalaureate degrees or higher (r = -.65).
 Strategies other than lowering infant mortality 
may increase states residents’ longevity. Longer 
life expectancy is also strongly correlated with 
higher per capita income (r = .54) and lower pover-
ty (r = -.70)
 Can you live longer by moving to a state with 
long life expectancy? If so, must you arrive be-
fore you reach a certain age? You probably did not 
know before looking at Figure 2.12 that residents 
of Hawaii and Minnesota have the highest lifes-
pans and residents of Mississippi, Alabama, and 
Louisiana have the lowest lifespans. Residents 
of states with the highest lifespans live 2 to three 
years longer than the national average of 77.1 
years.
 Residents of shorter lifespan states live three or 
more years less than the national average. We can 
tell you the difference between lowest and highest 
lifespan states is more than six years. You must 
decide for yourself whether 6 years is an important 
difference. As you do, please keep in mind that no 
correlations and no scatterplots provide sufficient 
evidence in and of themselves for us to conclude 
that relationships are causal.
Conclusion
We want all of our students and all readers of this 
text to be informed and skeptical consumers of 
reports of studies pertaining to government and 
politics that claim to be scientific. Scientific analy-
sis requires valid and reliable data. It is hard to 
Figure 2.12 
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judge data quality without delving into the details 
of research that are frequently not provided in sum-
mary reports.
 For scientific research, quality data must be 
analyzed correctly and results must be presented in 
their entirety. Direction and strength must both be 
important evaluation criteria but direction results 
contrary to predictions disconfirm hypotheses. 
Strong relationships in the wrong direction do not 
support hypotheses; they lead us to develop new 
hypotheses.
 Scientists try to disconfirm their predictions. 
Pseudo-scientists try to confirm their predictions. 
They do not attempt analysis of comprehensive 
data. Replication is not valued; it is viewed as a 
threat. They are willing to juxtapose information 
out of context to guide unsuspecting readers and 
listeners to reach the conclusion preferred by the 
pseudo-scientists and those whose interests they 
promote. Scientists always inquire whether empir-
ical relations could be spurious. Those who misuse 
science for their own ends employ spurious rela-
tions as a tool of their trade.
 Political actors, media personalities, anyone 
can cite “findings” from bad science. The citers 
may not be aware conclusions are fake. Producers 
of sham science and fictitious facts and conclusions 
persist even when they are unmasked. Examples 
abound in “pants on fire” and maximum Pinocchio 
awards to those who repeat falsehoods and thor-
oughly refuted arguments.
 The research methods used in this text to study 
relationships in the states are useful but limited. 
We can use them to create knowledge that only 
begins the challenging work of exploring causality. 
As we do so, we must be mindful of random error 
in our data and the ongoing reality that the people 
and behaviors we study are subject to change.
 States with greater financial and human re-
sources have options not available to their less 
wealthy counterparts.  States need financial re-
sources to educate their children, or to lure those 
educated elsewhere to relocate, or both. It would 
seem to be conventional wisdom that educated res-
idents are a key to business and economic success. 
Educational attainment may be effective means to 
achieve longer and healthier lives as well.
 Social problems are not equally distributed 
across the country. As we have seen, crime and 
health vary from state to state and even show re-
gional patterns. Leaders in unhealthy states may be 
partially responsible for failing to deal with dan-
gerous environments or failing to provide indigent 
health care. States with high death rates caused by 
many elderly retiring there cannot be held respon-
sible for aging, however.
 Clearly, government services can help the poor 
and cost the wealthy. If we put aside the rhetoric, 
such as what is “fair,” “good for the economy,” 
or “liberal,” this question of who pays for what 
services is the basis of most politics. Americans 
have the freedom to relocate. You have the option 
of moving to another state. If you are wealthy, 
you might want to move to a state with low tax-
es, thereby avoiding having your wealth used to 
provide government services to those less able to 
provide for them.
 In the next chapter, we shall turn to state polit-
ical and institutional differences. These differences 
may impact states’ inclination to address social 
problems and their effectiveness in dealing with 
them.
Summary
1. There is bountiful information available about 
state and local governments and their attempts to 
use resources to achieve common goals. We must 
make thoughtful choices if our use of such infor-
mation is to be worthwhile.  Failing to control 
for state population size when studying behaviors 
related to population size almost always results in 
spurious findings.
2. The comparative method allows us to explore 
patterns of state differences.  Data visualizations 
such as maps and scatterplots are useful explor-
atory tools. Correlation coefficients can be used to 
evaluate direction and strength of relationships.
3. Correlations and scatterplots alone cannot 
provide proof that a causal relationship exists. 
Neither can they specify which variable influences 
which. Other information must be brought to bear.  
Frequently that information is anecdotal or from 
nonscientific studies.
4. Some states are wealthy in that people work-
ing within their borders earn substantial incomes. 
Such wealthy residents can, in turn, be taxed to pay 
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for the governmental services provided for others. 
Other states are quite poor because they lack many 
wealthy individuals. A central question is how can 
poorer states become wealthier?
5. States with many college graduates have higher 
personal incomes. Although states cannot pass laws 
demanding that people have higher incomes, they 
can enact policies to encourage residents to pursue 
higher education. They can also encourage college 
graduates residing elsewhere to relocate to their 
states.
6. College education may provide the key to 
improving state economies and state tax bases, but 
there is not a simple direct relationship between 
proportion of college graduates and state and local 
government total revenue per capita.
7. Violent crime rates are related to incarceration 
rates, which are cumulative from past imprison-
ments and releases. States practices concerning 
short-term punishment may be indirectly related or 
unrelated to short-term crime.
8. Per capita income is related to poverty. Howev-
er, poverty can exist in the presence of high income 
or in the absence of high income.
9. Educational attainment and financial wealth are 
also related to lower poverty, lower infant mortal-
ity and longer lifespans. Poverty, infant mortality 
and lifespan are also interrelated.
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Study Guide, Chapter 2
Essay Questions
 1. List three differences between “junk science” and social science.  For each, explain the different methodolo-
 gies used by the two approaches and how the procedure each uses is consistent with their goals.
 2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of data presentations using 1) one variable and one map, 2) two  
 variables and two maps and 3) a scatterplot of two variables?  Give examples of when each of the three might  
 be the preferred presentation method.
 3. Sometimes, things of interest to social scientists are very difficult to measure well.  Give three examples of   
 concepts that are challenging to measure empirically.  For each, explain the measurement challenge and how   
 you would deal with it.
 4. A correlation coefficient is a number that describes two aspects of a relationship between two variables: 
 direction and strength.  What is the direction of a relationship?  What part of the correlation coefficient 
 describes direction?   Explain.  What is the strength of a relationship?  What part of the correlation coefficient   
 describes strength?  Explain.
 5. What is the regression line on a scatterplot?  What does it tell us about the relationship between two vari- 
 bles?  What does it mean when a data point is above, is on or is below the regression line?  Explain with 
 examples.
 6. After analyzing the empirical relationship between two variables with a scatterplot and a correlation coeffi-
 cient, what are the three possible relationships that could be determined?  Explain.  Explain why “causal rela-
 tionship” is not one of the three.
 7. Imagine you are an advisor to a powerful state legislator.  The legislator asks you to examine Table 2.1 and
 tell her or him whether it suggests adopting policies to reduce per capita income would result in higher high   
 school graduation rates.  In a short paragraph, give your answer.
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. What is the correlation between total per capita state revenues and total per capita state expenditures?
  a. positive
  b. negative
  c. no correlation
 2. Which of the following statements is FALSE?
  a. Southern states tax little and spend little.
  b. States with higher revenues have higher expenditures.
  c. States with low revenues provide more services.
  d. States with high per capita income generate high tax revenues.
 3. When are data visualizations using maps superior to scatterplot data visualizations?
  a. never
  b. always
  c. when there are strong regional patterns
  d. when correlations are either small or spurious
 4. What is the correlation between state incarceration rates and violent crime rates?
  a. positive
  b. negative
  c. no correlation
  d. higher than necessary to prove a causal relationship
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Figure 2.1 BEA Regional Data GDP and Personal Income, SA1 Personal Income Sum-
mary: Personal Income, Population, Per Capita Personal Income, http://www.
bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=6#reqid=70&-
step=30&isuri=1&7022=21&7023=0&7024=non-industry&7033=-1&7025=0
&7026=xx&7027=2014&7001=421&7028=3&7031=0&7040=-1&7083=lev-
els&7029=21&7090=70
Figure 2.2 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2014 Annual Social and Economic Sup-
plement, Table 3 Detailed Years of School Completed by People 25 Years and Over by Sex, 
Age Groups, Race and Hispanic Origin: 2014; http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/edu-
cation/data/cps/2014/tables.html
Figure 2.3 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2014 Annual Social and Economic Sup-
plement, Table 3 Detailed Years of School Completed by People 25 Years and Over by Sex, 
Age Groups, Race and Hispanic Origin: 2014; http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/edu-
cation/data/cps/2014/tables.html
Figure 2.4 X: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2014 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement, Table 3 Detailed Years of School Completed by People 25 Years and Over by 
Sex, Age Groups, Race and Hispanic Origin: 2014;
 http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2014/tables.html
Y: BEA Regional Data GDP and Personal Income, SA1 Personal Income Summary: Per-
sonal Income, Population, Per Capita Personal Income,
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=6#reqid=70&
step=30&isuri=1&7022=21&7023=0&7024=non-industry&7033=-1&7025=0&7026=xx-
&7027=2014&7001=421&7028=3&7031=0&7040=-1&7083=levels&7029=21&7090=70
Figure 2.5 X: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2014 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement, Table 3 Detailed Years of School Completed by People 25 Years and Over by 
Sex, Age Groups, Race and Hispanic Origin: 2014; 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2014/tables.html
Y: BEA Regional Data GDP and Personal Income, SA1 Personal Income Summary: Per-
sonal Income, Population, Per Capita Personal Income, 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=6#reqid=70&
step=30&isuri=1&7022=21&7023=0&7024=non-industry&7033=-1&7025=0&7026=xx-
&7027=2014&7001=421&7028=3&7031=0&7040=-1&7083=levels&7029=21&7090=70
Figure 2.6 X: BEA Regional Data GDP and Personal Income, SA1 Personal Income Summary: Per-
sonal Income, Population, Per Capita Personal Income, 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=6#reqid=70&
step=30&isuri=1&7022=21&7023=0&7024=non-industry&7033=-1&7025=0&7026=xx-
&7027=2014&7001=421&7028=3&7031=0&7040=-1&7083=levels&7029=21&7090=70
Y: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html Historical Poverty 
Tables Table 3. Poverty Status of People, by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959 to 2014
X: https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/ta-
bles/table-5 Crime in the United States by State 2014
Y: https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/ta-
bles/table-5 Crime in the United States by State 2014
Figure 2.7 X: BEA Regional Data GDP and Personal Income, SA1 Personal Income Summary: Per-
sonal Income, Population, Per Capita Personal Income, 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=6#reqid=70&
step=30&isuri=1&7022=21&7023=0&7024=non-industry&7033=-1&7025=0&7026=xx-
&7027=2014&7001=421&7028=3&7031=0&7040=-1&7083=levels&7029=21&7090=70
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Figure 2.8 X:U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2014 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement, Table 3 Detailed Years of School Completed by People 25 Years and Over by 
Sex, Age Groups, Race and Hispanic Origin: 2014;  http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/
education/data/cps/2014/tables.html
Y: http://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/compare_state_revenue_2014bZ0a FY 2014 
State Revenue and Debt
Figure 2.9 X: http://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/compare_state_revenue_2014bZ0a
Y: http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/state_spend_gdp_population
Figure 2.10 X: https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/
tables/table-5 Crime in the United States by State 2014
Y: Bureau of Justice Statistics Table 6. Imprisonment rates for sentenced prisoners under 
jurisdiction of state or federal correctional authorities per 100,000 U.S. residents, by sex, 
December 31, 2013 and 2014. Data source(s): National Prisoner Statistics Program
Figure 2.11 X: BEA Regional Data GDP and Personal Income, SA1 Personal Income Summa-
ry: Personal Income, Population, Per Capita Personal Income, http://www.bea.gov/
iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=6#reqid=70&step=30&i-
suri=1&7022=21&7023=0&7024=non-industry&7033=-1&7025=0&7026=
xx&7027=2014&7001=421&7028=3&7031=0&7040=-1&7083=levels&7029=21&7090=70
Y: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html 
Historical Poverty Tables Table 3. Poverty Status of People, by Age, Race, and Hispanic 
Origin: 1959 to 2014
Figure 2.12 X: http://www.americashealthrankings.org/FL/IMR
Y: The Measure of America 2013-2014 http://www.measureofamerica.org/docs/MOA-III-
June-18-FINAL.pdf
Table 2.1 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts, SA1-3 Personal Income 
Summary,  http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/
U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010 1-Year Estimates, Table S. 1501
U.S. Statistical Abstract, various years Digest of Education Statistics, various years 
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2014 Annual Social and Economic Sup-
plement, Table 3 Detailed Years of School Completed by People 25 Years and Over by Sex, 
Age Groups, Race and Hispanic Origin: 2014;  http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/edu-
cation/data/cps/2014/tables.html
BEA Regional Data GDP and Personal Income, SA1 Personal Income Summary: Personal 
Income, Population, Per Capita Personal Income, 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=6#reqid=70&-
step=30&isuri=1&7022=21&7023=0&7024=non-industry&7033=-1&7025=0&7026=
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Chapter 3
POLITICS AMONG THE STATES
Before elections in the United States, television 
commercials, newspaper advertisements, yard 
signs, and bumper stickers advise that we should 
vote for candidate Smith for the state legislature, 
for candidate Doe for governor, and candidate 
Washington for president. The appeal is that if they 
are elected, something concerning government will 
change. Government will be more efficient, taxes 
will be lower, and a specific policy to deal with 
a problem will be implemented. One or more of 
the following will improve decisions: experience 
holding elective office or no experience in politics; 
satisfaction with the way things are or a desire for 
change; knowledge of issues or strong opinions; 
business values, family values, religious values, 
common sense, wisdom, or integrity.
 Political scientists think that there are linkages 
between who makes decisions, what procedures are 
followed, what alternatives are considered, what 
choices are made and what results ensue. For ex-
ample, we expect that, if elections are competitive, 
with two or more candidates articulating different 
positions on issues, and vying with nearly equal 
chances of winning, the election outcome will mat-
ter. Such an election outcome might well result in 
change in public policies. This assumes, of course, 
that candidates speak sincerely rather than strategi-
cally and seek office to pursue policy goals rather 
than merely to gain and hold power.
 If the current office holder is the only candidate 
running, the election outcome is certain.  If incum-
bents are rarely challenged in general elections, 
public policies are unlikely to change. If only mem-
bers of their own parties challenge incumbents, 
policy changes are likely to be slight—if and when 
they occur.
 Americans believe political institutions are 
important. This has been a common view since we 
became a nation based on the novel idea that, in the 
words of the Declaration of Independence, “govern-
ments are instituted among men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.” Govern-
ments derive power from the governed. All states 
have the familiar three branches with checks and 
balances among them. However, within this com-
mon framework, there are differences in the institu-
tions of the states that many think are important.
 The states are sufficiently different in their 
political values and institutions that comparative 
analyses are possible. Some states have distinctive 
political styles that seem to persist over time. Elec-
tion turnout may be high or low; general election 
votes may be close or uncompetitive. Governing 
may be free of corruption, or successive governors 
or congressmen or state legislators or county offi-
cials may be sentenced to federal or state prisons.
 The questions are: Do procedures in choosing 
leaders and making decisions affect what states do? 
Do the views and preferences of residents affect 
what states do? Are some residents, or nonresidents, 
more influential than others? The central foci of 
this chapter are political and institutional differ-
ences among the states. We want to weigh political 
differences, determine whether they are large or 
important and begin to assess whether they might 
be empirically related success and failure in meet-
ing the goals states share.
Proactive and Reactive Government Policy
States attempt to deal with a wide range of prob-
lems. They pursue public policies to achieve certain 
outcomes. The goal of government action is to re-
duce problems and enhance the lives of citizens. So, 
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many of us assume and expect the following causal 
direction: effective government actions cause 
better social conditions. When social conditions are 
measured in terms of problem size, there should 
be negative correlations with government action. 
When social conditions are measured in terms of 
desired outcomes—successes and benefits—there 
should be positive correlations with government 
action. Government is assumed to be proactive 
in dealing with problems and working to achieve 
goals. 
 Viewing government as the actor is appealing 
and perhaps comforting. On reflection, the opposite 
view is equally plausible: government is reactive, 
not proactive. State legislatures’ efforts to deal with 
end-of-session logjams are an example of govern-
ment responding to a problem. Fire departments 
react to fires. The number of engines sent to a 
given fire is a response. The stimulus is perceived 
damage potential of the fire.
 If we always view state governments as power-
ful, effective, proactive agents, we always expect 
that state program efforts will be positively cor-
related with good results. If we always view state 
governments as reactive agents, we always expect 
that state efforts will be negatively correlated with 
good results. A more sophisticated approach would 
be to recognize that, sometimes, state governments 
are powerful actors and sometimes they are reac-
tors whose ability to make bad situations become 
good is limited.
 With this in mind, you should recognize that 
scatterplots and correlations sometimes have the 
potential to help us distinguish when governments 
are actors and when they are reactors. When we do 
not already know what is the cause and what is the 
effect, the direction of relationships measured as 
strong can, at times, aid our understanding.
 In Chapter 2, Figure 2.10 showed a strong pos-
itive correlation between violent crime rates and 
incarceration rates. Should states that desire lower 
crime rates reduce their incarceration rates? Is it 
reasonable to think that no incarceration will cause 
zero or minimal crime rates? Of course not! If 
there is a causal relationship, it must be that crime 
rates cause incarceration rates. State and local gov-
ernments react to crime rates.
 How often are state and local governments pro-
active, and how often are they reactive? An early 
comparative state study offers some information. 
Ira Sharkansky tested the idea that state and local 
governments that spend more have better outcomes 
than state and local governments that spend less.1 
He correlated three measures of state and local 
expenditures on certain policies with 68 public 
service measures in the areas of education, high-
ways, public welfare, health and hospitals, natural 
resources, and public safety. 
 Sharkansky’s results measures were all con-
structed so that a higher value would always be 
success. For example, instead of using rate of 
infant mortality he used rate of infant survival. As 
a consequence, positive correlations would meet 
his prediction that more spending is related to more 
success.  He calculated more than 200 correlation 
coefficients to assess whether states that spend 
more better achieve their goals.2
 Sharkansky reported that only 38 percent of 
the correlations met his threshold criterion for 
strong relationships. None of these strong correla-
tions was large enough to conclude that spending 
alone exerts a pervasive influence on the nature of 
public services. The division between correlation 
directions was 20 percent positive and 18 percent 
negative. In other words, reactive spending rela-
tionships were approximately as frequent as proac-
tive spending programs.
 Some consistent patterns of directional re-
lationships were reported. Correlations between 
education expenditures and educational attainment 
measures generally suggested that state and local 
government programs were proactive. Correlations 
between public safety expenditures and rates for 
rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft all 
suggested that state and local governments react to 
crime rates. 
 Those who promote anti-government doctrines 
frequently tempt others to misinterpret the lack of 
a strong positive correlation between government 
activity and success as evidence of government 
failure. They exploit the unarticulated, and incor-
rect, assumption that government can always be 
proactive. To distinguish good science from bad 
science, we must be aware of stated and unstated 
tenets and also attentive to the details of empiri-
cal research. As we move forward to consider the 
scope and consequence of government efforts, we 
should be mindful that government programs as 
likely to be reactive as they are to be proactive.
Politics Among The States  • 47 
Figure 3.1 
Political Culture in the United States 
Moralistic
Moralistic
Moralistic
Moralistic
Moralistic
Moralistic
Moralistic
Moralistic
Moralistic
Moralistic
Moralistic
Moralistic
Individualistic
Individualistic
Moralistic
Individualistic
Individualistic
Individualistic
Individualistic Individualistic
Individualistic
Moralistic
Individualistic
Moralistic
Individualistic
Individualistic
Individualistic
Moralistic Traditionalistic
IndividualisticMoralistic
Individualistic
Individualistic
Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic
Traditionalistic
Political Culture Differences Among the States
One of the key elements of American politics is 
that states have diverse styles or approaches to 
social problems. Historically, New York has dealt 
with problems differently than Texas. These two 
states sometimes disagree on what qualifies as a 
problem that state government ought to deal with. 
Oregon and Washington, adjacent states, seldom 
enact similar legislation. Newcomers to a state are 
frequently told, “Things are just done differently 
here.” This is the basic idea of political culture or 
cultures. Questions about political culture include 
the following: How many cultures are there? Do 
we have 50 distinct state political cultures? If we 
have fewer, why are some states alike?
 Daniel Elazar has articulated a popular descrip-
tion of American state political culture.3 He posited 
three political cultures but also described some 
states as having a combination of two of the three. 
Figure 3.1 maps Elazar’s political cultures.
 The traditionalistic political culture reflects 
an orientation that predates the industrialization 
and urbanization of the United States and rests on 
the “normal” ordering of society going back to 
England. Those of wealth and position were ex-
pected to rule and to have their property protected 
by the government from theft by others.4 Turnout 
in elections and other political participation should 
be low. Decisions were to be made by those most 
capable, not by typical citizens.
 The government is expected to play little other 
role, since to do so is not traditional. No one ex-
pects an active government seeking to end cor-
ruption, to lessen the impact of economically tight 
times, or to deal with immorality. Government is to 
do only what it has always done—maintain records 
of who owns what and stop some from stealing 
from others.
 With the exception of Texas, the white settle-
ment of the Southern states was primarily from 
England. Immigrants brought the values of the 
traditional political culture with them. Until well 
after World War II, these states experienced little 
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demand for government action and probably would 
have been unresponsive to such demands anyway. 
Good examples of this political culture include 
South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi.
 It should be noted that Arizona and New Mex-
ico are non-southern traditional political culture 
states and that all the traditionalistic states in 
Figure 3.1 have substantial minority populations.5  
This suggests that poor states with substantial mi-
nority populations behave in the manner described 
as traditional.
 The moralistic political culture ranges along 
the northern border in a belt from Maine to Or-
egon. Good government, promoting the public 
goods of honesty and selflessness, and govern-
ments serving God’s purpose define the moralistic 
political culture.6 Like the traditionalistic political 
culture, this culture derives from the ideas that 
whites brought with them, this time from Northern 
Europe, where Protestant religions predominate. In 
this political culture, government is to serve God. 
Government must do what is morally correct. This 
attitude might be expected to regard corruption 
in public office as unacceptable and to demand 
that merit, not whom one knows or one’s political 
party, be the basis for selecting who will get public 
jobs.7
 Participation in elections and other political 
activities is a civic duty in the moralistic culture, 
even though because of relatively homogeneous 
lifestyles, there is little disagreement on what is 
morally correct. Nevertheless, turnout in elections 
and other political participation should be high. 
The states that best exemplify this culture are Wis-
consin, Minnesota, and the Dakotas.
 Finally, the individualistic political culture 
emphasizes the conception of the Democratic order 
as a marketplace. From this perspective, “a govern-
ment is instituted for strictly utilitarian reasons, to 
handle those functions demanded by the people it 
is created to serve.”8 Again, there is a belt of states 
included in this culture that runs from Massachu-
setts through the U.S. industrial heartland. In these 
states, immigrants from all over Europe found 
employment in the industrial revolution and settled 
in rather squalid conditions in cities where that 
revolution was centered. Conditions made them 
receptive to the idea of having government provide 
them necessary services. They were willing to pay 
taxes—or have the wealthy pay taxes—to under-
write these services.
 In the individualistic culture, government is to 
be earned through political competition. Citizens 
should participate in elections and other political 
activities to gain power and influence. Government 
is to serve those who win it. “To the victors go the 
spoils” is the common phrase. It was not limited to 
what was traditional or to what was moral. Even 
the ideas of honesty or using government for the 
public good are less relevant than using govern-
ment to serve one’s purposes. Massachusetts, Ohio 
and Illinois probably best represent this political 
culture. Urban lifestyles prompted this political 
culture, so its best expression or most typical states 
will be those with large cities and a high percent-
age of the population living in metropolitan areas. 
Certainly, Boston in Massachusetts, and Chicago in 
Illinois meet these expectations.
 Elazar’s political cultures can be categorized 
by two key concepts:  scope of government and 
turnout. The traditionalistic political culture calls 
for minimal government and participation by a 
very small elite group. The moralistic political 
culture is the opposite: significant government and 
large-scale participation. The individualistic politi-
cal culture falls in between: more government and 
participation than the traditional culture but not as 
much as the moralistic culture.
 While political culture gives many intuitive-
ly satisfying insights, applying Elazar’s ideas to 
contemporary America is challenging. Elazar wrote 
that he used a lot of empirical data to categorize 
states.  But, he did not specify exactly what data 
and exactly how those data were used to create 
his measures. As a result, we do not know how to 
update his measures by replicating his procedures.9
 While we cannot update Elazar’s political 
culture designations, we can assess whether they 
are still accurate today. Figure 3.2 is a scatterplot 
of the two key concepts in political culture: scope 
of government and participation.  Scope of gov-
ernment is measured as the percent of Gallup Poll 
respondents who identified themselves as Conser-
vative in 2014. Participation is measured as turnout 
of voting age population in 2014.
 If the state behavior patterns of specified in 
Elazar’s political cultures holds true today, the 
states with darkest shadings in Figure 3.1 should be 
in the lower right, traditionalistic quadrant.  States 
with lightest shadings should be moralistic and 
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states with middle shadings should be individual-
istic.
 Figure 3.2 shows that Elazar’s predicted behav-
ior patterns hold true for only 21 of 48 states.  Only 
2 of the 15 states designated as Individualistic is 
in the high turnout high conservative quadrant.  
Moralistic states are in the predicted quadrant 11 of 
17 times. Traditionalistic states are in the predicted 
quadrant 8 of 16 times.
 The comparable analysis for 2012 in the 9th 
edition of this text found that Elazar’s predictions 
were generally correct.  Perhaps Elazar’s analyses 
were based mainly on high-turnout presidential 
election years as opposed to low-turnout non-pres-
idential election years. It should not be surprising 
that the predictions of the concept political cultural 
defined more than 40 years ago do not hold up, 
either in the short term or in the long term. We turn 
now to political differences among the states we 
know how to measure precisely.
Other Political Differences
A Democratic public is supposed to participate in 
government. Elections are supposed to be oppor-
tunities for citizens to express their preferences 
between candidates offering different plans of ac-
tion. These preferences should then be reflected in 
the policies adopted by elected officials. This is the 
way the indirect democracy, Republican form of 
government conceived by the Founding Fathers is 
supposed to work. There are substantial differences 
among the states for all of these political concepts.
Participation in Elections
Most people’s political actions affecting govern-
ment are limited to voting. Although other possi-
bilities include contributing money, working on 
campaigns, running for office, attending meetings 
of government bodies, and contacting government 
officials, few Americans do much other than vote. 
However, voters in the states turn out at substan-
tially different rates. Figure 3.3 presents a scatter-
plot of general election turnout in the latest elec-
tions for governor in 1993-1966 and 2012-2015.10
 Fewer than 35% of voting age publics voted for 
governor in 2012-2015 in Texas, New York, Cali-
fornia and Louisiana. Turnout was more than 60% 
in Montana, and North Carolina, There was a 
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similar range of turnout in 1994-1997: two states 
had turnout lower than 30% and four states had 
turnout higher than 60%.
 Turnout was unmistakably lower for elections 
in 2012-2015 than in 1994-1997.  Average turn-
out in the earlier period was 49% and in the later 
period 40%.  Turnout increased in 12 states and 
declined in 38 states.
 Figure 3.3 shows that across a 20-year period, 
low-turnout states remain low-turnout states. The 
correlation between the two series of election turn-
out for governor is .54.
 It is possible to see a certain degree of regional-
ism in Figure 3.3, as most of the high-turnout states 
are in the largely rural Great Plains and Mountain 
West states. Similarly, the Southern states tend to 
be in the lower left.  Turnout declined by more 
than 20% in California, New York, South Dakota, 
Louisiana, Utah and Wyoming.  Turnout increased 
by more than 10% only in Delaware and North 
Carolina.
Liberals and Conservatives
These terms are frequently used to characterize the 
preferences of political leaders and of voters. The 
media and politicians frequently characterize the 
outcome of elections as being “conservative” or 
“liberal.” Candidates use these words to describe 
their opponents in negative advertising. The goal is 
to communicate that opponents are extremists, out 
of touch with the public, a danger, and unworthy of 
public office.
 We cannot provide consistent definitions for 
these popular political descriptions. Some think of 
liberal and conservative in terms of the preferred 
role of government. For others, size of government 
and fiscal and monetary policies are the defining 
factors. Others have social policies in mind. Yet 
others think of foreign policy. Finally, some define 
liberal and conservative in terms of positions on 
a single issue. And there is wide disagreement on 
what single issue defines the terms. Figure 3.4 is a 
scatterplot of self-identified liberals and conserva-
tives in 2014 Gallup Polls.
 The correlation of -.90 between state percent 
liberal and percent conservative is evidence of the 
contemporary polarization of American politics. 
Conservatives are the most unique and strongest in 
their views. It is easy to overlook in Figure 3.4 the 
numerical advantage conservatives have over lib-
erals. The state average is 37% for conservatives, 
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21% for liberals.  However, the average for moder-
ates is 36%. 
 Figure 3.5 interrelates percent conservatives 
in 2014 and 1988-1999.11   The correlation is .77, 
indicating they are strongly related. The United 
States is much more conservative in 2014 than at 
the end of the 20th century. The average increase 
is 6 percent, from 31 percent to 37 percent. Only 
3 states are not more conservative in 2014: South 
Dakota, Delaware and Vermont.  
 Americans characterize themselves as more 
conservative in 2014. But this change in self-iden-
tification may or may not be the same as a change 
in policy and party preferences. Are Americans 
more fiscally conservative or socially conservative 
or both? Do they favor retaining the current role of 
government or scaling it back? Do they prefer con-
tinuing current federal and state roles or devolving 
authority from federal to state governments?
 Republicans and conservatives increased 
their numbers in the midterm elections for federal 
offices in 2014. Republicans became the majority 
party in the United States Senate, increasing from 
45 to 54 seats.  In the House of Representatives, 
Republicans increased their majority from 233 to 
247 seats.  Republican majorities in the Senate and 
House did not result in the expected increases in 
Republican power and policies.  
 It is not unusual for Congressional parties with 
large majorities to split into factions. An invita-
tion-only group of approximately 40 right-wing 
conservatives called the House Freedom Caucus 
acted as a faction that refused to work with the 
Republican Party leadership.  In 2015 and 2016, 
Freedom Caucus members staged a rebellion 
against their own party leaders, disrupting them 
to the point of forcing Speaker John Boehner to 
resign.12 To pursue its goal of electing a Republican 
President in 2016, the Freedom Caucus focused on 
articulating policies rather than acting on legisla-
tion that would be approved by their Republican 
colleagues in the House or Senate.  House Repub-
licans were not a majority without the support of 
Freedom Caucus members.  The primary source of 
legislative dysfunction and gridlock changed from 
being disagreement between two major parties 
to disagreement within the majority party in the 
House.  Of course, there was also substantial dis-
agreement between the Republican Congress and 
Democratic President Obama.   Although stymied 
at the federal level, the Republican Party and its 
Tea Party activists were extraordinarily success-
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Republican Percent of State House
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Figure 3.5 
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Figure 3.6 
Party Control of State Legislatures 2016 
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ful in governing and enacting policies at the state 
level. 
State Partisanship
We might well expect states where the Democrats 
control to differ in policies from those controlled 
by the Republicans.13 The mass media certainly 
speak of the Democrats as willing to expand gov-
ernment and provide new services. They charac-
terize Republicans as ever seeking to cut taxes and 
services. These images are not necessarily based 
on events in the recent or distant past at both the 
federal and state levels of government.
 Figure 3.6 is a scatterplot of Republican mem-
bers of the two legislative chambers in forty-nine 
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state legislatures in 2016. Most won elections in 
2012 or 2014.14 The percentages of Republicans 
in the states’ upper and lower houses are strongly 
related. The correlation is .90.
 Figure 3.7 is a map of party control in state 
legislatures after the 2016 elections.  Republicans 
control 24 states and Democrats control 6 states.  
Control is divided in 19 state legislature and Ne-
braska has a unicameral, nonpartisan legislature.
 The parties control states in distinct regions.
Republicans control legislatures of the former con-
federate states, many midwestern states and moun-
tain west states. Democrats control legislatures in 
almost all the other coastal states and Illinois.
 Figure 3.8 is a scatterplot of self-identified 
Republicans in Gallup public opinion surveys and 
in state Houses in 2015-2016.  The correlation is 
strong, .88.  Why is the correlation not 1.00?  Sev-
eral reasons come to mind.  First, those who vote 
in legislative elections may not reflect the prefer-
ences of the entire population.  Second, majority 
parties create legislative districts to maximize their 
partisan majority.  Third, incumbent members have 
electoral advantages over challengers.
 The partisan divide in the states is strongly 
related to the rift between conservative and liberal 
preferences articulated in survey polls. The correla-
tion between conservatives in the population and 
Republicans in state lower legislative chambers is 
.79. The cumulative evidence of different prefer-
ences across the states in political orientations and 
parties is undeniable.
 Figure 3.9 maps the combined partisan con-
trol of both chambers of state legislatures and 
state governorships after the 2016 elections.  In 
30 states, one party has total control; Republicans 
control 24 and Democrats control 6. Of the remain-
ing 20 states, 19 have divided control and Nebras-
ka has a Republican governor and a nonpartisan 
unicameral state legislature.
 There is a strong contrast between Republicans’ 
ability to govern and make policy at the federal 
and state levels. While stymied at the federal level, 
Republicans controlling 23 states are enacting the 
Figure 3.7 
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conservative policies they favor.  In Texas, Repub-
licans have controlled all statewide elected exec-
utive branch positions and both chambers of the 
state legislature since 2003.  According to Texas 
Republicans, only the interference of the federal 
government prevents them from creating what they 
view as the ideal state.
Conclusions about Political Differences
The maps and scatterplots in this chapter and the 
preceding ones are numerous. Much of what has 
been introduced will be dealt with more exten-
sively later. First, we have considered differences 
across the states ranging from economics, polit-
ical culture, politics and government, and social 
problems faced that probably greatly influence 
what a state does. Clearly, there are meaningful 
differences between states on most, if not all, such 
measures.
 Second, resources available to states play a 
very important role in accounting for differences in 
circumstances or experiences of the states, as well 
as the policies that they enact to cope with prob-
lems. A poor state has few resources with which to 
solve its problems, regardless of its politics. How-
ever, we should not conclude that economics is the 
only consideration.21
 Finally, all of these differences persist although 
each state is a partner in our federal system of 
government and subject to the limitations that the 
federal government (Congress, the presidency, and 
the federal courts) can impose.
 The federal government frequently acts as a 
supermajority of states trying to influence the be-
havior of a small minority of states. In such cases, 
the goal is to provide incentives for the minority 
to behave more like the majority. Yet, we still see 
remarkable differences between the states.
 Where you live affects many things in your life 
that are of concern to government. Policymakers in 
government can manipulate only some of these dif-
ferences. These differences, as we will see, permit 
a comparative analysis of the states, as discussed 
in this chapter. It is apparent from our consider-
ation of political culture and of liberal/conservative 
differences that states differ on the fundamental 
purposes of government and what goals should be 
pursued. The next chapter deals with many of the 
ideas that shape what we expect of government.
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Figure 3.8 
Republicans in the Population and State Houses 2015-16 
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Figure 3.9 
Party Control of Legislature and Governor After 2016 Elections 
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Summary
1. Governments exist to address problems and 
enhance the lives of citizens. However, govern-
ment is not always the main proactive force and 
is not necessarily proactive at all. Government is 
sometimes a reactor.
2. Public and decision-maker attitudes concerning 
what government should do, called political cul-
ture, may influence how government seeks to cope 
with social problems. Political culture categories 
created to describe views on the proper 
government scope and participation in politics in 
the 1960s are fairly accurate today.
3. Americans are not avid participants in elections 
or politics, and rates of participation and voting 
turnout vary greatly across the country.
4. There is an ideological rift in American poli-
tics that finds expression in both federal and state 
politics.
5. The ideological divide matches differences in 
the two major political parties. At the federal level, 
there have been partisan conflict levels sometimes 
characterized as gridlock. States are at or near 
historical high points for unified party control of 
government. As a result, state governments are pur-
suing quite different policies. 
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Information Sources
Figure 3.1 Daniel Elazar (ed.), American Federalism: A View from the States, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1972) p. 117.
Figure 3.2 X: U.S. State Political Data 2014, www.gallup.com
Y: http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/voter-turnout-data
Figure 3.3 X: U.S. Statistical Abstract 2008, Persons Reported Registered and Voted, by State: 2006, 
http://  www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/elections/votingage_population_and_
voter_participation. html
Y: http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/voter-turnout-data and various state 
Secretary of State Historical Records Internet pages
Figure 3.4 X: U.S. State Political Data 2015, www.gallup.com
Y: U.S. State Political Data 2015, www.gallup.com
Figure 3.5 X: Data are an update by Luttbeg using CBS/New York Times cumulative surveys for 
the period 1988-1999 using data and procedures reported in Gerald C. Wright, Robert 
S. Erikson, and John P. McIver, “Measuring State Partisanship and Ideology with Survey 
Data,” Journal of Politics (1985, 469-489)
Y: U.S. State Political Data 2015, www.gallup.com
Figure 3.6 X:  http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/statevote-charts.aspx 
Y: http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/statevote-charts.aspx
Figure 3.7 http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/statevote-2014-post-elec-
tion-analysis635508614.aspx; http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Statevote/StateVote_Com-
bined%20Presentation.pdf
Figure 3.8 X: U.S. State Political Data 2015, www.gallup.com
Y:  http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/statevote-charts.aspx
Figure 3.9 http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Statevote/StateVote_Combined%20Presentation.pdf   and    
http://www.nga.org/ cms/governors/bios, Current Governors by State, Party Affiliation, 
and Terms in Office
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Study Guide, Chapter 3
Essay Questions
 1. What are the three types of state political culture as posited by Daniel Elazar? Explain the differences. Which  
 state political culture would you expect to be most supportive of the interests of large corporations and busines- 
 ses in general?  Why?
 2. What is the most common form of political participation? What are the causes of variation in this means of   
 participation over time and across the states?  How does Texas compare with other states?  Is this form of parti-
 cipation increasing or decreasing in Texas?  Explain how this information is consistent or inconsistent with 
 Elazar’s political culture designation for Texas.
 3. Chapter 3 identifies five different ways Americans may define themselves as Liberal or Conservative.  For   
 each of the five, identify an example of a Liberal preference and a Conservative preference.  In your view, is it
  possible for an individual to be Liberal in some ways and Conservative in others?  If so, give an example.  If   
 not, explain why not.
 4. Government programs can be proactive in dealing with problems or can react to problems.  Some agencies
 attempt to do both.  How can a fire department be proactive in limiting damage caused by fires?  How can a fire  
 department be reactive in limiting damage caused by fires? Do you think fire departments spend more resources  
 and time on proactive or reactive efforts?  Explain why.
 5. Figure 3.2 uses a 2014 Gallup Poll to measure the percent of state residents who identify as conservative and  
 uses elections in 2014 to measure turnout.  The previous edition of this text used a 2010 Gallup poll and elec-
 tions in 2012.  The results in the previous edition are not identical to the results in this edition.  Give three rea  
 sons why results might be different and explain each.
 
 6. In the midterm elections of 2014, the Republican Party increased its majority in the U.S. House of Represen-
 tatives and became the majority party in the U.S. Senate.  But Republicans could not implement all the policies  
 they preferred, even with majority control of Congress.  Identify and discuss at least three reasons for Republ-
 icans failing to achieve all their goals in 2015 and 2016. 
 7. In recent years, at which level of government have Republican politicians been most successful in winning   
 and retaining sufficient political power to pass the conservative policies they prefer?  What are some reasons   
 that they have been successful at this level but not at the other level of government where elections for top   
 executives and the legislative branch are contested on a partisan basis? 
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. Which of the following statements is true?
  a. there is a strong correlation between state residents who say they are liberal and residents who say they   
  are conservative
  b. more Americans said they were conservative in 2012 than in 1988-99
  c. there is a positive correlation between percent conservative in 1988-99 and percent conservative in 2012
  d. all of the above
 2. According to Daniel Elazar, “…Texas has a ___________ political culture.”
  a. moralistic
  b. traditionalistic
  c. individualistic
  d. individualistic and moralistic
 3. Ira Sharkansky’s study of state expenditures and public services suggests state governments are __________  
 on education and ______________on crime.
  a. reactive/reactive
  b. proactive/proactive
  c. reactive/proactive
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  d. proactive/reactive
 4. Correlations above the 0.30 threshold are evidence of
  a. one variable tracked exactly the other variable
  b. a causal relationship between the two variables
  c. an empirical relationship between the two variables but not necessarily a causal relationship
  d. a relationship so weak that we regard it as no relationship
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 1 Ira Sharkansky, “Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States,” American Political Science  
 Review (1967, 1066-1077).
 2 Not all of his measures attempted to control of state popu- lation differences.
 3 Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie: The Metropolitan Frontier and American Politics (New York: Basic Books,   
 1970). He later implied the culture of the state from that which pre- dominated among its cities; see Daniel J. Elazar,
 American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Most recently, a collection of essays on  
 his ideas has been published: John Kincaid (Ed.), Political Culture, Public Policy and the American States (Philadelphia:   
 Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982).
 4 Elazar, American Federalism, pp. 92-93.
 5 Norman R. Luttbeg, “Classifying the American States: An Empirical Attempt to Identify Internal Variation,” Midwest  
 Journal of Political Science (1971, 703-721).
 6 Elazar, American Federalism, pp. 89-92.
 7 Jody L. Fitzpatrick and Rodney E. Hero, “Political Culture and Political Characteristics of the American States: A 
 Consideration of Some Old and New Questions,” Western Political Quarterly (1987, 145-153).
 8 Elazar, American Federalism, p. 86.
 9 Some have tried to measure political culture in ways that potentially could be replicated. Charles A. Johnson, 
 “Political Culture in American States: Elazar’s Formulation Examined,” American Journal of Political Science (1976, 491-  
 509); and Joel Lieske, “Regional Subcultures of the United States,” The Journal of Politics (1993, 888-913) are examples.
 10 Each year, some states have elections for governor. Some states elect governors every two years. Some states hold   
 special elections when an elected governor resigns or dies.
 11 These latter data are an updating by Luttbeg. See: Gerald C. Wright, Robert S. Erikson, and John P. McIver, “Mea- su 
 ring State Partisanship and Ideology with Survey Data,” Journal of Politics (1985, 469-489). Their procedures were used.
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 http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/10/the-freedom-caucus-historic-rebellion-213256  
 http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/01/19/one_year_later_freedom_caucus_upbeat_on_2016_goals_129356.  
 html
 13 Austin Ranney, “Parties in State Politics,” in Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, Herbert Jacob  
 and Kenneth N. Vines (Eds.), (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 61-99.
 14 Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey and Virginia hold elections for state offices in odd-numbered years.
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Chapter 4 
THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
When you know government is about to make 
decisions that greatly affect your life, you are likely 
to care about those decisions. You might even want 
to know how they will be made. You are unlikely to 
be concerned enough to run for public office. You 
probably will not contact a government official. If 
you are like most Americans in most elections, you 
will not even vote.
 We rarely think about how often government 
affects  our daily lives. If you are attending a pub-
lic institution of higher education, you probably 
know the tuition and fees students pay depend on 
financial assistance provided by state and/or local 
government. You are aware that states and cities 
establish driving regulations and enforce them with 
state and local police. You might recognize that 
local, state, or even federal government provides 
the roads you travel on. You probably give little 
thought to the role governments play in ensuring 
the safety of the water you drink and the food you 
purchase.
 The overwhelming majority of Americans live 
in metropolitan areas. We are close to many neigh-
bors and might come in contact with dozens or even 
hundreds of people on any given day. In addition, 
modern communications and transportation tech-
nologies link us to Americans outside our neighbor-
hoods. In the global village of the 21st century, we 
are potentially affected by the behavior of people 
elsewhere in the nation or even elsewhere on the 
planet.
 The United States of America was created long 
before the Internet, television, radio, and telephone. 
There were no airplanes or automobiles. Distances 
we travel today in hours took days. Information did 
not move faster than people did. In earlier times, 
typical Americans were not continually and instan-
taneously affected by the behavior of neighbors.
 The majority sustained families more with 
what they produced on their farms than through 
commerce. Such people asked and received little 
from government. Taxes were low. There was little 
concern about governments, government decisions, 
or who governed. Much has changed since then.
Periods of Government in America
We shall consider several historical periods of the 
United States. Our purpose is to consider the think-
ing of people at the time. There have always been 
three levels of government.  The key questions for 
us here are: 1) what should government do; and 2) 
which level of government should be doing it?  You 
might be surprised at how often multiple levels of 
government cooperate with each other. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, this cooperation is not always 
recognized.  Most often, state and local govern-
ments take credit and downplay or ignore the role 
of the federal government.
 Different ideas arose during different periods 
concerning what government should do and how it 
should operate. Many of these same ideas continue 
to exist today. Some made sense at the time they 
were conceived but do not apply very well to the 
way we live today. For example, from the first peri-
od, we have the idea that the best government is the 
least government. Many still declare this, despite 
driving on public roads, using public education, en-
joying government testing and regulation to ensure 
safe drugs, looking forward to social security, ex-
pecting protection from criminals, and demanding 
security from international terrorism. Why do 
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we say,  “the least government is best,” other than 
to discourage new programs and higher taxes? Is 
not the proper response, “That is the silliest thing I 
have ever heard!”? Putting ideas in the context of 
their times allows us to see why they are part of the 
rhetoric of contemporary American politics. More 
importantly, we shall see how events drive our 
political system and all political systems to change 
in efforts to deal with society’s troubles.
No Government Period: 1776 to 1850
There are many who would probably take excep-
tion both to the characterization of this period as 
the “no government period” and to the dates for the 
beginning and end of this period and others. There 
is no question that each period blends gradually 
into the next and that some states—notably Mas-
sachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and probably Il-
linois—left this particular period for the next at an 
earlier date. Similarly, some states moved into the 
later period much after 1850. These labels reflect 
events that shaped the dominant tone of thought 
that in turn affected our governing institutions and 
still shape our thinking and conversation.
 At the end of the successful fight for indepen-
dence, a nation of many states evolved into a new 
federal system of government. There were many 
details that needed to be resolved. There were ex-
ternal threats from European countries on the other 
side of the Atlantic and from American Indians to 
the west. Individual states could not deal with these 
threats on their own. A central government had to 
take the lead. There were questions of interplay 
between the states and of smoothing commerce by 
dealing with interstate trade and creating a stable 
economy.
 Early in the period, the states ratified the Con-
stitution of the new federal government. Not long 
after, state and county governments undertook sub-
stantial capital infrastructure projects such as the 
canals in New York and Pennsylvania. Neverthe-
less, the average American living on a subsistence 
farm could fully expect to live a life with nearly no 
contact with government. For this reason, we call 
this the No Government Period.
 This would have been ideal for contemporary 
Americans who wish for a simpler life free of 
government interference. If you needed a service, 
you had to provide it yourself. If you wanted to 
burn your leaves in the fall, you did so. You rarely 
had to complete any government forms or file tax 
returns. You might deal with the county clerk’s 
paperwork involved in reporting a birth or in buy-
ing or selling a farm. Every 10 years, you might 
interact with the Census counter. On occasion, you 
might cooperate with the county sheriff as he dealt 
with theft of property or loss of life. So, we might 
call this the period of county government.
 There were few towns of any size. In the first 
census of 1790, no U.S. city had a population of 
more than 50,000. Only five cities were larger than 
8,000 people. Not until 1820 were there any larger 
than 100,000, and there was no American city 
with a million people until 1880.1 In 1820, only 
5 percent of Americans lived in areas designated 
in the first census as “urban”—2,500 populations 
or more. Of necessity, Americans were a more 
resourceful and less dependent people. In times of 
need, they relied on those they knew best: family, 
friends, neighbors, and community. They did not 
contemplate help from large-scale governments 
headquartered in distant capitals.
 Ideas such as self-dependence sprang from this 
period. If something unfortunate happened, you 
were on your own. The best government was the 
least government, largely because little or no gov-
ernment was the only thing available. When you 
did have contact with government, such as with the 
sheriff, troops, or a tax collector, it was usually a 
negative experience.
 Ideas about accountability of government to 
citizens had little meaning in an agricultural soci-
ety. Who cared whether the mayor of New York 
was corrupt, since few people lived there and 
people outside New York were not affected? Even 
the ideas of corruption or inefficiency meant little, 
since governments provided little service. Govern-
ment officials could do little harm or good. Even 
issues of states’ rights versus those of the central 
government in Washington, D.C., had little rele-
vance to the average American. This changed in 
1860 when Lincoln called for preserving the Union 
after the south attempted to secede.
 To use the language of political culture from 
Chapter 3, government in this earliest period was 
traditional. Traditional government defined own-
ership of property, kept records, and protected 
property as it had for hundreds of years. These 
services were provided, but no others were needed 
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until people began to concentrate in urban areas.
Central Ideas from the No Government Period
 • Families are self-dependent, but you can  
 count on your neighbors. There is a “sense of  
 community.”
 • Government is not an institution that you turn
  to when there is trouble. When you have con- 
 tact with any government,it usually affects you  
 adversely. The best government is the least  
 government.
 • Government should do what it traditionally  
 has done— very little.
Municipal Government Period: 1850-1895
During and after the Civil War, urbanization in-
creased in the United States. This change in where 
and how people lived was driven largely by the 
industrialization of our economy and the arrival 
of European immigrants. Manufacturing in the 
1800s required concentrating plants and industries 
at points where access to the sea or to other water 
transportation allowed raw materials to be shipped 
in and finished products to be shipped out. In 1870, 
seven of the 15 largest cities were seaports, and 
six more were lake or river ports.2 Since the only 
realistic means to get from home to work was to 
walk, urbanism—with its concentration of workers 
in tenement housing near where they worked—was 
a second requirement. A substantial influx of Euro-
pean immigrants provided the unskilled work force 
necessary for industrialization.
 Families living in congested urban areas did 
not have options available to farm families. They 
could not grow and raise their own food. They 
could not craft clothing and build shelter from 
nearby raw materials. Water was not readily avail-
able and often became tainted because there was 
little understanding of how waste materials could 
contaminate drinking water. The rural practice of 
discarding refuse onto the land or into the water 
did not work in growing cities. Strangers who lived 
nearby could not be counted on to aid your family 
if something went wrong. The sense of community 
did not apply to an entire city.
 With urban concentration, crime increased and 
more police were needed. Families could not cope 
with greater threats to health and security. Large-
scale problems needed large responses from gov-
ernment. Cities were pressured to pass health codes 
and provide more law enforcement. Building codes 
were demanded to deal with dangerous tenement 
housing built at the lowest possible prices. Mass 
education became urgent. The public needed to 
be literate to read instruction manuals or even to 
find its way in the streets. In urban areas, old and 
new services had to be provided to an increasingly 
dependent population.
 When large numbers of people concentrated 
in an area, they could request permission from the 
state government to establish a city or municipal 
government. Such local governments could pass 
laws to provide needed services and to collect 
taxes to provide services. Although states had 
laws making robbery and murder crimes, they 
had neither resources nor inclination to enforce 
them. Even asking them to provide urban services 
seemed unnecessarily complicated and indirect. In 
a word, it was senseless. If government is to help 
cope with local problems, it should be local gov-
ernment, because local government is closest to 
the people and knows what they need.
 The first government that greatly affected peo-
ple in their daily lives was municipal government. 
Much of our contemporary notions about govern-
ment were shaped by the experience of this period. 
The first of these new ideas was government could 
and should provide services beyond those deal-
ing with property. Second, candidates for public 
office could promise to provide services desired by 
citizens in exchange for their votes. Third, corrupt 
administration of government is inefficient and 
expensive. Corruption is abhorrent to contemporary 
American values. It is hard for us to understand the 
high tolerance urban residents had for the corrupt 
practices of machine political organizations that 
dominated early urban governments. The idea that 
efficient government is preferable to corrupt gov-
ernment originated in the small middle and upper 
class population of that time. They had the greatest 
wealth and paid the most in taxes.
 It was probably inevitable that large city poli-
ticians, elected from ethnically distinct districts or 
“wards,” would recognize the benefits of develop-
ing “solid neighborhood loyalty.” By being a friend
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of that neighborhood through providing of city 
services, the politician assured his party’s reelec-
tion success.3 Local politicians were called “ward 
heelers.” There is little question that the service of 
the representative seeking to give service to con-
stituents, and those constituents in turn supporting 
him for reelection during this period, is fundamen-
tal to our concept of democracy.
 It was public knowledge that ward heelers 
took bribes, kept tax funds for themselves, granted 
special favors to friends, and made life difficult for 
enemies. Their lower- and working-class sup-
porters voted for their machine friends in spite of 
corruption. Recent arrivers came from countries 
with equal or greater dishonesty in government. 
They had no recourse; political power followed 
from wealth and titles obtained through heredity. 
Immigrants found the corruption of political ma-
chines a small price to pay for social and economic 
opportunities available in America. In addition, 
machine representatives were friendly to them and 
helped them find housing and employment. Critics 
accused the machines of pandering to immigrants 
and reflecting a “foreign” way of doing things.4
 The United States did not invent municipal 
government. Many of the names and ideas for 
the shape of this government, including corrup-
tion, came from England. Words such as sheriff, 
alderman, borough, township, and bailiff can be 
traced back to 9th-century English names. During 
that century, kings structured territorial local 
governments and urban concentrations that are 
the precursors of both our county and municipal 
governments.5 These governments also distin-
guished between legislative, or at least somewhat 
representative, bodies and executives, accountable 
to the Church of England or the crown. Both forms 
of local government evolved but were initially 
imposed on local areas by the central government, 
the king of England.
 The documents of the founders stated ideals 
such as all men are created equal and government 
derives power from the consent of the governed. 
In practice, only the wealthy elite articulated their 
consent. Voting rights were limited to men of prop-
erty, older age, and long residence. In federal poli-
tics, only members of the House of Representatives 
were chosen directly by these voters. The Electoral 
College and selection of U.S. senators by state leg-
islatures concentrated the power of choice in even 
smaller privileged bodies. Perhaps the most im-
portant new idea from what we call the municipal 
government period is that outcomes of mass-par-
ticipation elections could change policies. Until 
this idea took root, the election of one privileged 
politician over another had virtually no meaning to 
normal citizens. Immigrants were probably amazed 
to find that merely voting into public office those 
who promised to improve local life could change 
their day-to-day experience.
 The novel idea that the votes of normal citizens 
matter inspired the highest rates of voting in our 
history.6 Those competing in high turnout elections 
recognized organization was important to winning 
public office. Only by getting immigrants to vote 
together was victory assured. Government ser-
vices became important tools in winning elections. 
Political machines had to follow through on their 
promises. The idea developed that the mission of 
government was to work in the best interests of all. 
Finally, we had the idea that the public trust meant 
that public decision makers had to behave more 
responsibly than private sector decision makers.
 While the urban machines did provide new 
governmental services, especially to those most in 
need, the extensive corruption eventually became 
more visible and more costly. Even so, machines 
could not be defeated in local elections. In the next 
government period, middle and upper class oppo-
nents moved the contest for power over cities to a 
venue where they could win: state government. Re-
formers persuaded state legislatures that machine 
corruption and inefficiencies could not be tolerated. 
State legislatures passed a series of changes that 
ended the reign of urban political machines.
Central Ideas from the Municipal Government 
Period
 • Government can help solve problems, espe - 
 cially local government because it is closest to  
 the people.
 • Candidates are more likely to gain voter sup 
 port if they promise certain actions if elected.
 • Those who win public office can make deci- 
 sions affecting everyone—elections matter.
 • By being organized, you can win elections.
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 • Inefficiency and corruption in government  
 can cost individuals higher taxes, especially  
 those with money.
 • Those in public office can violate public trust  
 and can be criticized for doing so.
State Intercity Government Period: 1895-1932
The privileged elite who held power before the rise 
of urban machines resented their change of fortune. 
They were accustomed to holding municipal offic-
es and making municipal policy before industrial-
ization. They resented everything about the ward 
heelers: their style, their supporters, and their pol-
icies. Along with those living in rural areas, they 
saw the new urban centers as hostile, foreign, and 
contrary to their self-interest.7 One scholar of this 
period saw a community whose ideas of decency 
were offended by the society they saw, not only 
by the excesses of the “robber barons” of private 
industry, but even more so by the alien elements 
controlling and abusing city government.8 Things 
would be right only if “responsible men” were put 
back in charge of government.
 Those pressuring states to assume a more ac-
tive role in urban areas focused their talking points 
on political corruption in the cities. There was also 
some new thinking about how to cope with a much 
more complex society, including the problems 
posed by the excesses of robber barons in the oil, 
railroad, and steel industries. Prejudices formed 
against the new immigrants and against their 
potential support for the socialist ideas then being 
popularized among industrial workers in Europe.
 By any objective standard, corruption was 
rampant.  In 1870, of the nation’s 10 largest cities, 
New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Chicago, and 
San Francisco were judged corrupt by the press 
and public opinion. Moreover, Boston, Brooklyn, 
and New Orleans either had corrupt mayors or city 
councils. Only Baltimore and St. Louis were essen-
tially honest. Generally, the mayor played a lesser 
role than the ward heelers on the city council. City 
councils made most political appointments and 
were divided into subject-matter committees that 
made day-to-day administrative decisions.9 There 
were instances of citywide political machines in 
which a mayor played the central role, including 
the Tammany machine in New York City in 1868. 
They were short-lived and perhaps exaggerated in 
importance.10
 The economic crash of 1873 caused many 
cities to default on their debt and even to surrender 
their charters or to relinquish their status as cities.11 
Cities were competing with each other and over-
extending themselves to attract railroads. Machine 
opponents had been advocating “state legislative 
supervision,” supposedly motivated by concern 
for the “moral order of the cities” since the 1850s. 
These arguments gained favor with state legisla-
tors as cities became economically and politically 
weaker. In the 1870s, the municipal reform move-
ment became national in scope.
 Reforms imposed by state governments on 
urban municipalities changed the rules of political 
engagement. Election reforms made it impossible 
for machines to use the strategies that had kept 
them in power. Elections became nonpartisan and 
held at different times of the year than partisan 
state and federal contests. Responsibility for pre-
paring ballots was shifted from political parties to 
municipal government. Ballots prepared by parties 
listed only their own candidates. Voters merely 
cast the ballots handed out by ward heelers. Ballots 
with all candidates required voters to make choic-
es. Without the cue of party affiliation, most found 
it challenging to identify machine candidates.
 Other reforms changed the status of may-
ors and city employees. Mayoral powers were 
strengthened. They were tasked with reorganizing 
municipal agencies to achieve greater efficiency. 
Another major change was implementation of a 
civil service system. Municipal employees were 
chosen by merit, rather than political loyalty. They 
retained their positions for good job performance, 
not for delivering services and votes to machine 
leaders. Also, public schools were made indepen-
dent of cities. This removed schoolteachers, and 
a large number of jobs filled by patronage, from 
control of the urban machines. Taken as a package, 
reforms were intended to remove corruption from 
municipal elections and municipal administration. 
It was not a coincidence that reforms also reduced 
the participation and political influence of the im-
migrant and working classes.12
 This is an excellent example of changing the 
arena of conflict to improve chances of winning 
political conflict. The groups who had lost out 
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in the politics of industrialized municipalities 
remained in control of state and national govern-
ments. If they could pass laws at these levels of 
government and force them on the municipalities, 
they could win at the state levels what they had 
lost at the municipal levels. To do so, they had to 
establish the right of states to tell municipalities 
that they had to enact civil service procedures for 
employment, have voter registration, and keep 
functional budgets subject to inspection, among 
other things.
 An argument by an academic and the willing-
ness of the state courts to demand certain actions 
by cities facilitated this changing of arenas. In 
1878, a lawyer, Thomas Cooley, used common law 
to argue that local government should deal with 
a limited range of services, those they can offer 
easily, cheaply, and intelligently. State government 
should have more general powers.
 He argued that any violations of this rule were 
unconstitutional.13 Scholar John Dillon extended 
these ideas and thus shaped how the courts reacted 
to efforts within the cities and within the legisla-
tures to reform municipal government.14 He ar-
gued:
 It is a general and undisputed proposition of 
law that a municipal corporation possesses and can 
exercise the following powers, and no others: First, 
those granted in express words; second, those nec-
essary or fairly implied in or incident to the pow-
ers expressly granted; third, those essential to the 
declared objects and purposes of the corporation, 
not simply convenient, but indispensable.... All acts 
beyond the scope of the powers granted are void.15
 As applied by state courts, this became known 
as Dillon’s rule. It severely constrained opportuni-
ties for municipalities to deal with their problems 
creatively and independently. On the other hand, 
it also limited opportunities for municipalities to 
ignore problems.
 State legislatures became active producers of 
statutes designed to remove corruption and intro-
duce efficiency in municipal services. But this was 
not the limit of their activity. Some cities were 
granted powers to make franchise agreements with 
private businesses. The goal was to impose order 
to a chaotic situation. Competing utility companies 
kept the streets dug up endlessly and made the air 
above a hopeless tangle of wires. The presumed 
benefit of lower prices from private sector compe-
tition was abandoned in favor of the control and 
order that could follow from awarding a franchise 
agreement to a single company. Franchising may 
have helped to provide order, but it also gave the 
companies a reason to become involved in munici-
pal politics.16
 Some cities took effective steps to protect resi-
dents from unsanitary sewage disposal, contagious 
diseases, and hazardous buildings. Other cities 
chose to pay no attention to such threats to public 
health and safety. People who were displeased with 
their city’s willful disregard in these areas sought 
out sympathetic state legislators who would en-
act state statutes. These statutes forced all cities 
to comply by way of the Dillon rule. One could 
get building and health codes forced on cities by 
winning a state statute requiring such codes. States 
became active in passing statutes affecting life in 
the cities.
 Increasingly, the common law that we had 
adopted from Great Britain proved inadequate to 
cope with the new problems of an industrialized 
and urbanized state. Common law is a series of 
case-by-case judicial court principles for resolving 
disputes, such as what happens when a cow dies 
shortly after being bought or when people are de-
nied access across property after having long been 
allowed that access. In the first case, the common 
law is to “let the buyer beware,” meaning that he 
or she has no recourse to government. Similarly, if 
the public has not been allowed access for “a year 
and a day,” under common law the property owner 
can have violators arrested for trespassing. Under-
taking a job under common law means that one 
accepts the possibility of being maimed while do-
ing it. All of these common laws and many others 
no longer seemed fair in the urban industrialized 
economies. State legislatures needed to be active. 
They stepped in and passed statutes that overruled 
or took precedence over the common laws. States 
became active in passing statutes to undo a system 
of common law that predated modern urban life.
 Intrastate commerce, most often involving 
goods moving between the farm and the city, was 
a concern shared by state government as well as 
multiple local governments. Railroads, waterways, 
and land routes had to be regulated or provided. 
State government had the geographic scope to be 
the appropriate level for such governmental activ-
ity. Because it controlled the land between cities, 
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state government became active in passing stat-
utes to regulate intrastate commerce. Many ideas 
important today came from this time. One is local 
government is a creation of the state government. 
This afforded the possibility for various interests 
who lost in a policy-making decision at the local 
level to “change the arena” to the state level and 
win there. State government in this period joined 
municipal government in being active in coping 
with problems. State government was especially 
active when those problems crossed the boundaries 
of several local governments or when there was 
corruption in a major city in the state. State statutes 
became the means for overriding common law, 
which might otherwise have been revered since 
it represented wisdom derived over hundreds of 
years.
 Perhaps the most important concept from this 
period was reform—the idea that government 
institutions can be manipulated to achieve intended 
results. Changing institutions could alter human 
behavior. Society would be improved. This idea 
is optimistic. Historical hindsight lets us identify 
cases in which such optimism is naive. An experi-
ment with prohibiting alcohol proved unsuccessful 
and was ultimately abandoned. The 55 mph speed 
limit is another example of an effort that was soon 
forsaken. It is easy to predict that there will be sim-
ilar changes in your lifetimes. No doubt you will 
tell future youngsters that legal behavior used to be 
criminal, and vice versa. 
 The reform movement promised to weed out 
corruption and fraud and thereby achieve greater 
efficiency. To cope with municipal inefficiency and 
fraud, states merely needed to pass election laws, 
require auditing to ensure proper use of public 
funds, and select quality public employees based 
on merit rather than political spoils. To ensure 
quality local government, states needed to require 
checks and balances between the legislative (city 
council) and the executive (the strong mayor) 
branches or to combine the two branches into a 
manager-council form of government. Although 
many would accuse the reformers of reflecting 
their class interests in their reforms, it should be 
noted that they believed reforms would work. Per-
haps the primary ideas that persist from this period 
are (1) there are clear standards by which govern-
ment can be judged, and (2) reform can improve 
government performance.
Central Ideas from the State Intercity Government 
Period
 • State government could also become active.  
 Many problems were forcing such governments  
 to become active.
 
 • Under the name “the reform movement,”  
 many sought to undo urban machines, using  
 state government to pass laws shaping munic- 
 ipal elections and procedures that were forced  
 on the cities under the Dillon rule.
 • The decline of urban machines as a result  
 of the “reforms” enacted led to the belief that  
 laws can shape behavior and outcomes.
 • The success achieved by opponents of ma- 
 chine government created recognition that, in  
 the American federal system, you could lose at  
 one level, shift the contest to another level, and  
 win there.
 • States could regulate intercity or intrastate  
 commerce, require municipalities to institute  
 health and building codes, and supersede 
 common laws.
Federal Government Era: 1932-1981
Two events drove the United States into the next 
era of government. The first was the Great Depres-
sion of the late 1920s and early 1930s. We use the 
year in which Franklin Roosevelt was elected pres-
ident, 1932, to identify the beginning of this era. 
The second event was the declaration of war by the 
United States against Japan and Germany immedi-
ately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor on Decem-
ber 7, 1941. Both of these events raised enormous 
challenges. The United States met these challenges 
by greatly increasing the scope of federal gov-
ernment responsibilities. The federal government 
became responsible for managing the economy and 
actively providing national defense.
 The Constitution of 1789 gave the federal gov-
ernment responsibility for national defense. Until 
1941, with few exceptions, only a small part of the 
federal budget was devoted to national defense. In 
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1940, for example, national defense received only 
18 percent of the $9.5 billion federal government 
budget. After declaration of war, the proportion 
increased to 43 percent in 1941 and 69 percent in 
1942. Defense expenditures remained 20 percent 
or higher until 1993 and then declined each year to 
16.1 percent in 1999. Defense expenditures began 
to increase again even before the events of Septem-
ber 11, 2001. They have been at 20 percent or more 
since 2004.
 Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show expenditures by 
federal and state and local governments from 1929 
to 2015.  They distinguish 1) federal spending 
from federal revenues, 2) federal grants—state and 
local spending from federal revenues—and 3) state 
and local spending from own funds.  Figure 4.1 is 
typically used to document the contention that gov-
ernment spending is out of control.  The 667-fold 
increase from $9 billion in 1929 to $6 trillion in 
2015 is breathtaking. It is also partial information 
taken out of context.
 The massive increase seen in Figure 4.1 does 
not control for inflation, the changing value of 
money over time. Controlling for inflation, one 
dollar in 1929 is worth $13.86 in 2015.17 Figure 
4.2 shows that in constant 2015 dollars total gov-
ernment spending increased from $125 billion to 
$6 trillion, a 48-fold increase.  Figure 4.2 is also 
misleading partial information, because it does not 
take into account the growing population of the 
United States.
 Figure 4.3 is the most accurate and complete 
picture of increased government spending.  Spend-
ing increased from $1,024 to $18,524 constant 
2015 dollars per capita, an 18-fold increase.  Figure 
4.3 shows the effort made by the federal govern-
ment, with both direct spending and grants to the 
states, to bring the United States out of the great 
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depression.  It also shows the massive increase in 
federal spending during the World War II era.
 Several elements important to contemporary 
American politics come from this era. Probably 
foremost is that of the federal government’s in-
come tax. Readopted in 1913, it generated bounti-
ful revenue for the federal government, especially 
in the 1930s and even more so after 1960. The 
graduated income tax, in combination with the au-
thority to borrow money, gave the federal govern-
ment an unprecedented resource base. For the first 
time, the federal government became the wealthiest 
government.
 Federal resources and power became more im-
portant in the workings of state and local govern-
ments and the lives of citizens. The federal govern-
ment took on the role of guardian and protector. 
It became responsible for softening the impact of 
economically bad times. As the United States took 
on a leadership role among nations after World War 
II, defense and international security became per-
manent prime missions for the federal government. 
The federal government was also assigned respon-
sibility in domestic affairs for guaranteeing income 
for elderly and disabled Americans, for protecting 
the environment, for safety in the workplace, for 
assuring quality education, for eliminating dis-
crimination, for reducing crime and pornography, 
and for protecting the integrity of our “national 
pastime,” baseball. The public now expects gov-
ernment to be active in all these arenas. Even if the 
federal government were to step back, state and 
local governments would have to step forward.
 An important concept associated with intergov-
ernmental transfer of funds is attaching “strings,” 
or conditions, to the funds. If local governments 
want state funds or if local and state governments 
want federal funds, they have to adhere to the lim-
itations and conditions imposed. For example, they 
may be required to desegregate their schools, to not 
discriminate on the basis of race or gender, and to 
impose a 21-year-old drinking age.
 Conditions on how individual grants could 
be spent gave grantors important influence over 
recipients. General requirements applied to all 
grants were even more important. Providers of 
these funds wanted proof money had been spent 
appropriately. As a result, state and local govern-
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ments had to maintain accurate financial records. 
Eventually, these records had to be available for 
review by those outside of the spending govern-
ment. To document that they were eligible for grant 
programs, more local governments had to provide 
information to more central governments. Keeping 
secrets became too expensive. The end result is 
what is now called transparency in government. 
Intergovernmental grants were used as tools to 
encourage more honest and ethical behavior. In-
formation requirements and open records reduced 
opportunities for corruption in government. For 
many grants, state and local governments had to 
prove they were in compliance with certain federal 
statutory laws. For many reasons, local standards 
gave way to national standards.
 The federal government’s ability to produce 
revenue from taxes and to deficit spend put it in 
a superior position. The federal government used 
these resources to help the nation get out of the 
Depression and to win the Second World War. A 
popular conclusion was the federal government is 
of the right scale to deal with problems that ex-
tend beyond not only the borders of local or state 
government, but also beyond national boundaries. 
Recent concerns about global climate change and 
the international economy call into question wheth-
er the federal government is of the right scale to 
deal with some 21st century problems.
 There was another example in this era of losers 
becoming winners by change of arenas. State legis-
latures continued to be dominated by rural interests 
in spite of the shift of population to urban areas. 
Federal and state constitutions required reappor-
tionment of legislatures every 10 years. Yet states 
continued to base legislative representation on land 
areas such as counties. Those in the cities now 
could tell their rural opponents in state govern-
ments that legislative representation was not a mat-
ter for states to decide on their own. Federal law 
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required representation based on population. States 
had to obey federal law because it was the supreme 
law of the land. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court 
told the state legislatures that they had to reappor-
tion legislative districts to be equal in population. 
Urban defeated rural by shifting the decision to the 
federal level. We will discuss reapportionment in 
greater detail in Chapter 9. 
 Congress and the Supreme Court have been 
active since World War II in imposing national 
standards on issues such as safety, discrimination, 
criminal rights, civil rights, retirement benefits, 
capital punishment, and others on both states and 
communities. Earlier, the states and communities, 
being responsive to local constituencies, could en-
act local standards. Beginning in this era, national 
standards took precedence over local standards.
Central Ideas from the Federal Government Era
 Government should take responsibility to soften  
 economic hardships, help us in our old age,  
 and assure health coverage.
 National defense and international involvement 
 are also continuing responsibilities of the na- 
 tional government.
 National standards for discrimination, food  
 and drug standards, pornography, car safety,  
 and even the quality of education can override  
 local standards.
 National funds can be given to state and local
 governments with conditions attached.
 The federal government can spend more than  
 its revenue by borrowing money.
 For world, national, and even local problems,  
 we  turn to the federal government.
The New Federalism Era 1980-The Present
There is substantial popular consensus that a new 
era in American Federalism began with the election 
of President Reagan in 1980 and his taking office 
in 1981.  Even President Barack Obama, a Demo-
crat, said Mr. Reagan’s was a transformative presi-
dency. Republicans interpreted their victories in the 
1980 presidential election and 1994 congressional 
elections as widespread support among voters for 
what President Reagan called the New Federalism. 
 New Federalism posited three tenets: individ-
uals make better decisions than institutions; busi-
nesses make better decisions than governments; 
and governments closer to the people make better 
decisions than more distant governments. Propo-
nents pledged to use three principles in govern-
ing: (1) the private sector is superior to the public 
sector; (2) less government is preferable to more 
government; and (3) state and local governments 
make better decisions than the federal government. 
There was widespread expectation that the federal 
government would transfer many of its powers and 
resources to the states.
 Nathan argued that there is a cycle in the in-
terplay between state governments and the federal 
government, with each temporarily leading the 
way in innovative policy. Beginning in 1980, “the 
states again are on the move.”17 He saw five fac-
tors contributing to this new trend. First was the 
New Federalism of the Reagan administration that 
sought to cut federal underwriting to domestic pro-
grams. States had the choice of either paying for or 
abandoning programs.
 Nathan’s second factor was modernization 
of state governments: improved managerial and 
technical capacity. His third factor was the re-
apportionment of state legislatures, giving more 
power to those in cities and especially suburbs. 
Fourth, he argued the South had caught up with the 
rest of the states in government resource capacity. 
Finally, Nathan believed that the states overre-
acted to the sharp recession of the U.S. economy 
in 1980-1981 by passing new taxes and sharply 
curtailing expenses. When the economy recovered, 
the states had ample reserves to innovate with new 
programs.18
 Figure 4.4 shows that the federal share of total 
expenditures peaked during and after World War 
II. The federal share declined from 1953 to 1973 
except for the Vietnam War period in the 1960s. 
There was an increase in the federal share during 
the presidencies of Nixon/Ford and Carter. New 
Federalism under Presidents Reagan and George 
H.W. Bush administrations gave more responsibili-
ty to state and local governments and decreased the 
federal share of total government spending. Figure 
4.5 makes it clear that the apparent decrease in fed-
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eral share of government spending was largely the 
result of increased federal grants to state and local 
governments.  Part of the New Federalism was 
that the federal government took the “blame” for 
taking revenues while state and local governments 
took the “credit” for the benefits of their spend-
ing.  This reinforced the belief that state and local 
governments make better decisions than the federal 
government.
 In principle, the New Federalism was to in-
clude devolution of power from federal to state and 
local government, massive deregulation to transfer 
power from government to the private sector and 
tax cuts to transfer power from government to cit-
izens.  Other important goals included decreasing 
federal spending and changing the annual federal 
deficit to an annual surplus.
 To a significant extent, the goals articulated by 
President Reagan were achieved between 1981 and 
2002, although some occurred during the presi-
dencies and because of the efforts of George H. W. 
Bush and William J. Clinton.  Figure 4.5 shows 
that per capita federal spending (the sum of federal 
expenditures and federal grants) increased signifi-
cantly during the first 5 years of the Reagan presi-
dency, then remained quite stable from 1986 until 
1991, the second year of the Bush Presidency.  
 There is widespread knowledge that federal 
income taxes were decreased during the Reagan 
presidency.  Many conclude that a decrease in fed-
eral spending caused growth in the private sector.  
It is not widely known that the decrease in income 
taxes was accompanied by an increase in payroll 
taxes.  As Figure 4.6 shows, this accelerated a pro-
cess of reducing the share of taxes paid by corpora-
tions and increasing the share paid by wage earners 
that began in1950.  This shifting of the burden of 
federal income taxes met the goal of promoting 
the strength of the private sector. As we will see 
in Chapter 5, there was also shifting of income tax 
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burdens from higher to lower income families. Tax 
changes, spending changes and improvement in the 
national economy all contributed to stable federal 
spending per capita for six years.
 Federal spending jumped in the last two years 
of the Bush presidency because of the Gulf War 
and a weaker economy.  In spite of his campaign 
promise of “no new taxes,” President Bush did 
sign a tax increase bill, which, in combination with 
consistent and declining federal spending during 
the Clinton presidency, and another tax increase 
enacted during the first year of the Clinton Pres-
idency, resulted in a federal budget surplus from 
1998 to 2001.
 President Clinton explicitly supported the key 
goals of the New Federalism.  In his1996 state of 
the union address he declared, “the era of big gov-
ernment is over.”  During his presidency, total gov-
ernment spending per capita remained essentially 
constant and, partly because of increased federal 
grants, state and local governments increased their 
share of total spending each year. 
 There is evidence to support the conclusion that 
the major goals of the New Federalism articulated 
by a Republican president were finally achieved 
under a Democratic President and a divided Con-
gress followed by a majority Republican Congress.
 The Republican Party controlled both the presi-
dency and both chambers of Congress from 2001-
2007. Its leaders continued to voice support of the 
goals of the New Federalism.  However, only some 
of President Reagan’s tenets were followed under 
President George W. Bush.   
 The Bush administration and Republican 
Congress did implement significant tax cuts and 
deregulation of the private sector.   Commitment to 
a balanced federal budget, restrained federal spend-
ing and increased state and local spending power 
disappeared. 
 The federal share of government expenditures 
increased during the George W. Bush adminis-
tration, primarily because of new Medicare drug 
benefits and secondarily because of wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  This increased spending and 
the Bush tax cuts were financed through increased 
borrowing and federal debt. Massive increases 
in federal spending began at the end of the Bush 
presidency in reaction to the worldwide economic 
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depression initiated by the collapse of the finance 
sector in the United States.
 Federal bailout programs begun by the Bush 
administration continued for the first several years 
of President Obama’s terms of office.  The world-
wide recession triggered a number of interrelated 
increases in federal expenditures, including federal 
support of some large financial institutions and 
auto manufacturing companies, a federal program 
to reduce state and local government employment 
reductions and stimulate the economy, federal wel-
fare and unemployment benefits to an increasing 
share of the population and a significant decline in 
the tax revenues of state and local governments. 
 Total per capita government expenditure peak-
ed in 2010 as Republicans gained control of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives in 2011.  
Federal and total expenditures per capita started 
declining in 2011, largely because of a limitation 
on federal spending known as sequestration. The 
Republican Congress refused to continue virtually 
all stimulus programs and sought to limit spend-
ing on entitlements that increased with economic 
collapse.
 It could be legitimately argued that the New 
Federalism Era ended in 2001 or 2011 or some 
time between the two years.  The next era could 
be called the Gridlock Era as federal Republicans 
and Democrats seemingly could agree on nothing.  
After President Obama’s election in 2008, Senate 
minority leader, Mitch McConnell said the num-
ber one goal of the Republican Party was making 
sure Obama was a one-term president.  When he 
became majority leader in 2011, he had sufficient 
power to pursue that goal by delaying or blocking 
executive branch initiatives.
 Partisan animosity grew to the extent that the 
Republican Party majority in Congress refused to 
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authorize federal borrowing and spending, result-
ing in government shutdowns in 2013 and 2015.  
Hours after Supreme Court Justice Anton Scalia’s 
death in February 2016, Senate Republican Major-
ity Leader Mitch McConnell announced that there 
would be no action whatsoever on any Supreme 
Court nomination made by President Obama until 
the American people got to vote on a new pres-
ident.  This refusal was unprecedented and ulti-
mately successful. After Donald Trump won the 
presidential election of 2016, he nominated Neil 
Gorsuch.  Senate rules were changed to require 
only majority approval instead of approval from 60 
senators.  The Republican House and Senate found 
other ways to take actions without any support 
from or even participation by minority party Dem-
ocrats. 
 One might argue that these events initiated 
a new era in American federalism that might be 
called the Tea Party Era, the Anti-Federal Era or 
the Era of Minimum Bipartisan Participation. For 
the time being, the Tea Party is a minority within 
the Republican Party at the national level. At the 
federal level, both major parties pay homage to 
the principles of the New Federalism and accuse 
each other of violating them.  It would seem that 
President Obama’s expansion of the federal role in 
health care under the Affordable Care Act violates 
some New Federalism principles.  It is also the 
case that President Bush’s expansion of the federal 
role in health care by expanding Medicare drug 
benefits violates the same New Federalism prin-
ciples.  Tea Party members and others argue that 
private sector bailout programs initiated by both 
Presidents Bush and Obama violate New Federal-
ism principles.
 The large majority of Republicans and Dem-
ocrats in federal politics identify themselves as 
seeking to follow the values of New Federalism.  
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show direct federal spending 
declining starting in 2009 and total government 
spending per capita declining starting in 2011.  
Those patterns seem sufficient to say that, for the 
time being, the New Federalism era continues.  
There will be further consideration of the impor-
tance of the federal government financing state and 
local government expenditures in Chapter 6.
 It is important to stress that many state gov-
ernments chose to exercise their opportunities to 
differ by resisting and acting against federal ini-
tiatives.  Texas chose to reject a small amount of 
federal stimulus funding altogether and spent most 
of the funding it accepted to replace state funds.  
Rather than sustain local government programs and 
employment, Texas chose to keep taxes low and 
maintain a large “rainy day” fund.
 Many states chose not to participate totally in 
the expansion of medical insurance to low-income 
families through expanded Medicaid coverage. 
They rejected federal funding even though the fed-
eral government paid all expenses for the first two 
years of expanded coverage and pledged to pay 
90% or more of costs of expanded coverage there-
after.  Texas chose to reject all optional elements of 
the Affordable Care Act.
 Party affiliation at the state level accounts for 
state participation or resistance to federal initia-
tives to stimulate the economy and expand access 
to health care.  States controlled by Democrats 
participated and states controlled by Republicans 
resisted.  Acrimonious partisanship spread from 
federal politics to state politics.
Central Ideas from the New Federalism Era
 The federal government can better achieve  
 some goals by collecting taxes and assigning  
 more responsibilities to state and local govern 
 ments.
 Lower government taxing and spending can be  
 beneficial by permitting individuals to make 
 decisions for themselves. 
 Government should take responsibility to soften  
 economic hardships, help us in our old age,  
 and assure health coverage.
  
 The federal government should take responsibi-
 lity when private sector failures cause econom- 
 ic catastrophes.
 National defense and international involvement 
 are also continuing responsibilities of the na- 
 tional government.
 States can choose to resist and work against  
 federal programs they do not agree with.
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Division of Authority in American Governments 
The historical pattern we have seen is that first, 
local governments dealt with problems, and then 
states became involved. The federal government 
greatly expanded its role through programs to deal 
with depression and world war. Later, it initiated 
a variety of domestic programs. Those programs 
have continued to grow even though state and 
local governments have assumed a larger share 
of paying for them. When it acts directly instead 
of through the states, the federal government 
represents the ultimate centralization of problem 
solving in our system of government.  Just as ideas 
about how government can best serve the people 
have changed over time, the way the states interact 
with each other and with the federal government 
has changed over time.
Confederacy
The 13 original colonies could have become 13 in-
dependent nations. It is hard to imagine that all or 
any could have been victorious over British army 
and naval forces. There was a need for the colonies 
to give up some of their authority or sovereignty 
to fight the revolution. What evolved was a con-
federacy. Ultimately, after many years of fighting 
the war, the Articles of Confederation, 1781-1789, 
formalized this organization.
 Confederacy represents the absolute minimum 
concession of authority from organizing polities 
to the new central administration. A government 
of governments undertakes programs and services 
desired by all constituent governments. In the case 
of our confederacy, the central government was set 
up to fight the war but was not authorized to collect 
taxes to pay for it or to draft troops to fight it. Typi-
cally, each government in a confederacy retains the 
right to veto and stop actions by the central govern-
ment with a single negative vote. Additionally, the 
members can withdraw or secede without permis-
sion from or approval of other members. If the 
United States had still been a confederacy when 
the depression of the 1930s hit, the New Deal of 
Roosevelt could have been undertaken only if all 
48 states had agreed to it—a very unlikely pros-
pect.
The Constitution of 1789
After only a few years, the confederate form of 
government proved unsatisfactory to many. As you 
know, the states’ representatives who met in Phil-
adelphia to amend the Articles of Confederation 
exceeded their authority and drafted a new Consti-
tution. It established a federal form of government, 
the first ever.19 This form of government is very 
complex since it establishes at least two govern-
ments for each individual. You can turn to either 
of these governments to solve problems, and you 
must obey the laws of both governments. The 
purpose of this complexity is to allow the central 
government to cope with national problems with-
out the unanimous consent of the states.
 Obviously, there is the potential for the laws 
of federal, state, and local governments to contra-
dict each other. One option is to set up a system 
to resolve conflicts. Another alternative is to make 
the laws of the central or federal government the 
“supreme law” of the land. When there is conflict, 
the regional or state government’s laws must give 
way. If this were the case with our complex system 
of modern economies and societies, one should 
be concerned that the central government would 
demote state governments to being its administra-
tive governments. There is legitimate worry that a 
federal system with a supreme central government 
would soon become a unitary government.
 The United States Constitution does have the 
supremacy clause: “Laws of the United States...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land: and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any-
thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.”20 If this statement 
were all that the Constitution said on the subject, 
it seems likely that we would now be a unitary 
government. State governments, like local govern-
ments presently, would be allowed to make laws 
only until the higher level of government acted.
Limiting the Federal Government
There are several other elements in the U.S. Con-
stitution that shape federal and state government 
interactions. The Constitution enumerates 16 
powers that Congress has, plus a 17th that entitles 
it “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
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proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers....”21 To some scholars, known as “strict 
constructionists,” the federal government has no 
powers other than the 16 enumerated powers. 
Those controlling the states advocate this view. 
Others, known as “loose constructionists,” see the 
necessary and proper clause as implying many 
more potential powers for the federal government, 
so long as they are “necessary and proper.” One 
of the enumerated powers, the commerce clause, 
gives Congress the right “To regulate Commerce... 
among the several States....” This clause was the 
primary motivation for the new Constitution and 
has been the basis of much of the federal govern-
ment’s involvement in the national economy.
 The 10th Amendment of the Bill of Rights, the 
reserve powers amendment states, “The powers 
not delegated to the United States (government) by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.” This clause seems to grant a large range of 
powers, some to the states and others to the people. 
There is a single legal definition for “the states.” 
“The people” in the 10th Amendment are not clear-
ly defined. There is also the troublesome potential 
overlap and conflicts between powers that are 
reserved and powers that are necessary and proper.
 The 14th Amendment also has been essential 
to greater federal government activity in contem-
porary times. It states, “nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” This 
is the due process and equal protection clause so 
often used to force the states to stop discrimination 
by majorities against unpopular minorities.
State Responsibilities to Other States
The Constitution also includes several statements 
that shape somewhat how the states deal with each 
other. States must recognize the official acts of 
other states, such as legislative acts, public records 
and judicial decisions, because “Full Faith and 
Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceeding of every 
other State.” This is known as the full faith and 
credit clause.22
 Additionally, “The Citizens of each State shall 
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Cit-
izens in the several States.”23 This privileges and 
immunities clause means that states have to grant 
to nonresidents the same privileges and immunities 
that they accord to their residents. New residents 
have argued that universities continuing to charge 
them out-of-state tuition after they have established 
residency is a violation of the privileges and im-
munities clause. In Florida, Georgia, and Alabama 
federal courts, they have been successful. 
 Finally, “A person charged in any State with...
Felony or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, 
and be found in another State, shall on Demand of 
the executive Authority of the State from which 
he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State 
having Jurisdiction of the Crime.”24 Under this 
rendition or extradition clause, if a state requests 
extradition or that a person charged with a crime 
be made available to be brought back to the state 
where the alleged crime took place, the requested 
governor is supposed to make that person avail-
able. “Waiving extradition” by the charged person 
merely means no paperwork needs to be filed and 
that he or she will go voluntarily.
Judicial Interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court
In the terse language of the U.S. Constitution, 
many of these clauses seem individually absolute 
yet mutually contradictory. The Constitution makes 
no provision for limiting the absolute or contra-
dictory nature of these clauses. But very early into 
our history under the Constitution, one agency of 
the federal government asserted its right to judge 
contradictions—the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Marbury v. Madison (1803) was the first 
case to assert the right of the U.S. Supreme Court 
to judge the compatibility of actions by govern-
ment with statements in the U.S. Constitution, or 
the constitutionality of such acts. Shortly after-
wards, the Court first identified federal actions that 
restricted the powers of the states. In McCulloch v. 
Maryland (1819), the Court broadly interpreted the 
necessary and proper clause and ruled that a state 
cannot tax the federal government because that was 
unconstitutional. 
 Inasmuch as the U.S. Supreme Court lacks 
enforcement capability, it could be ignored. Such 
has seldom been the case. Many of the Court’s 
decisions have shaped policies of state govern-
ments, sometimes limiting actions and sometimes 
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demanding actions.  None of the other federal sys-
tems of government in the world allows one branch 
of the central or federal government to resolve 
conflicts between the regional or state governments 
and the central government.25
 Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
limited the powers of state and local governments 
and upheld the powers of the federal government. 
In a case decided by a narrow vote, Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985), 
the Supreme Court refused to identify “traditional” 
areas of state governing that are beyond the pow-
ers of Congress.26   Instead, it said that the process 
of federalism should preserve the states. Since the 
states have representatives both in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, they can influence 
Congress to respect powers of the states. Until 
Congress enacts a law, they said, the states could 
take action.
 The decision went on to say that, when Con-
gress acts, the states must comply. The Supreme 
Court’s minority opinion charged that, after many 
years of trying to resolve conflicts between the var-
ious clauses of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme 
Court majority had given absolute power to the 
federal government.
 In a recent case, National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business v. Sebelius (2012), the Supreme 
Court ruled the principle “when Congress acts, 
the states must comply” is not absolute. The case 
concerned The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (fre-
quently referred to as Obamacare).  Most public 
attention has focused on the Court’s ruling that 
the federal government can use its taxing power to 
require individuals to purchase health insurance. 
The more important part of the decision has not 
been well recognized. The majority opinion written 
by Chief Justice Roberts decreed that the federal 
government could not penalize states that did not 
participate in the mandated expansion of Medicaid 
by reducing funding levels set by existing statutory 
law.27  This decision may pave the way for the Su-
preme Court to set additional limits on the federal 
government’s power over state and local govern-
ments.
State Constitutions
The Constitution of the United States wrote the 
operating understanding among the states that had 
allowed them to win the Revolutionary War in the 
Articles of Confederation. This document joined 
state constitutions as the only written constitutions 
in the world. The state constitutions were basically 
colonial charters quickly rewritten to weaken the 
office of the governor, who up to that time had 
been the king’s governor. Had the charters not 
existed, our state and federal constitutions might 
not have been written. The written constitution is 
another idea that developed from circumstances in 
our past.
 Today, we revere our national Constitution 
as reflecting the good judgment of the founding 
fathers. These founders also wrote state constitu-
tions and city charters. These documents all reflect 
thinking at the time they were written. The federal 
constitution includes amendment procedures. Yet, 
all attempts to change the constitution generate 
criticism that we should never question the wisdom 
of those who drafted it, even if that wisdom was 
informed only by knowledge available in the 18th 
century.
 An important factor in understanding con-
temporary concern with state constitutions is the 
brevity of the second and current Constitution of 
the United States adopted in 1789. The original 
8700-word document lacked detail. Over more 
than 200 years, detail has been added, subtracted, 
and changed. The changes have come partly from 
27 amendments but primarily from hundreds of 
landmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The current Constitution contains 12,000 words. 
Seven state constitutions plus their amendments 
are of similar length. Of the 43 states with longer 
constitutions, 28 are more than twice as long as the 
Federal Constitution. Critics argue all state consti-
tutions should be as short as the Federal Constitu-
tion. For them, the insights of the founders includ-
ed optimal document length. The rest of us can 
recognize that current American constitutional law 
also includes voluminous text of court decisions.
Periods of State Constitution Writing
The earliest state constitutions typically were about 
10,000 words long, leaving little room for detailed 
procedures and prohibitions and allowing a great 
range of possible legislation. Length began to 
increase in the middle 1800s and accelerated in the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, only to decline sharply 
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when many states began to draft new constitutions 
after World War II. Length and other attributes 
define several periods of constitution writing.
Until 1780
With the exception of New York, states operated 
with legislatively dominant governments, largely 
as a reaction against the excesses of the king’s 
governor before independence. These constitu-
tions were short (about 10,000 words). The basic 
idea was that newly won powers for the legislative 
branch were the basis of responsive government, in 
contrast to the unresponsive king’s governor. Gov-
ernors were viewed as dangerous even to the point 
of being abolished. At least initially, Americans 
trusted only legislatures.
1780 Through 1870
The state constitution of Massachusetts in 1780 
and the federal Constitution of 1789 began the new 
idea of “balanced” government. A strengthened 
executive meant the governor was given powers, 
such as the veto and authority to appoint certain 
officials, to offset those of the legislative branch. 
The U.S. Constitution adopted this idea with the 
two branches checking and balancing each other. 
Neither the executive nor the legislature could be 
trusted; each had to check the other. This idea has 
attained revered status. It is credited to the framers 
of the U.S. Constitution even though it was taken 
wholesale from the Massachusetts constitution 
written 9 years earlier.
1870 Through 1920
The Civil War and its aftermath saw the need for 
much constitutional activity in the South. With 
the exception of Tennessee, all other Confederate 
states repeatedly held constitutional conventions. 
The first was in1861, in Texas and probably else-
where, to substitute “Confederate” for “United” 
States of America in their constitutions. They met 
again in 1864 or 1865 to reverse this action.28 Then 
in 1867 or 1868, they met to enact the new con-
stitution required by Congress under Reconstruc-
tion.29 Finally, during the period 1874-1902, they 
met to enact post-Reconstruction constitutions that 
returned power to the wealthy whites that had con-
trolled state governments before the Civil War.30 It 
was these post-Reconstruction southern constitu-
tions that contained the anti-black Jim Crow laws 
that disenfranchised most blacks and encouraged 
racial separation. 
 After Reconstruction, no constitution of fewer 
than 20,000 words was written, and some of the 
very long constitutions exceeded 50,000 words in 
length. What was included in such lengthy doc-
uments? It was obvious to southern whites that 
there was no protection in a “checks and balances” 
government. The Reconstruction constitutions 
balanced the governor against the legislature, but 
that did not keep the government from, as they saw 
it, excessive actions against whites. When white 
southerners regained control, they sought better 
protection against government than they had under 
checks and balances. They gave power to the peo-
ple, or at least to those allowed to cast meaningful 
votes.
 The basic idea was to limit the power of state 
government with constitutional restrictions. Only 
when the voting public approved a constitutional 
amendment to allow an act could the legislature 
enact it. These constitutions are lengthy in order to 
incorporate the many restrictions on government. 
They are also the most heavily amended, which 
was perfectly acceptable to those who drafted 
them. As we will see, the legislatures and execu-
tives of these states are the weakest among the U.S. 
states, as was intended.
 Even states unaffected by the Civil War and 
Reconstruction passed long constitutions during 
this period. Apparently, activist thinking was 
responsive to the arguments for restricting gov-
ernment and giving the public a substantial role 
in state government. These post-Reconstruction, 
detailed, and restrictive constitutions reflected 
greater confidence in the public than had earlier 
constitutions. The people could hold government 
in check. This was a new idea in American thought 
that spread to constitutions even outside the South.
 Every detail written into a constitution bestows 
advantages on some and levies disadvantages on 
others. Content locked into constitutions can be 
changed only by constitutional amendments. The 
process favors those advantaged by the content of 
constitutions. It is almost always easier to defeat 
proposed amendments than to pass them. Some 
scholars believe various interests and the groups 
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that fight to retain these long, detailed constitutions 
do so because of advantages they receive.31 Oth-
ers see no such relationship but do note that the 
lack of competition between political parties may 
encourage interests to attempt to safeguard their 
interests in constitutional provisions that are more 
difficult to change.32 At this point we will note only 
that both interest groups with a reputation for being 
strong as well as uncompetitive political parties are 
most evident in the South, as are long state con-
stitutions. It may be only coincidental that strong 
interests and weak political parties are found in 
long-constitution states.
1945 Until the Present
No state constitutions were written between 1920 
and 1945. Those written since 1945 are shorter in 
length. Many have fewer than 20,000 words. Ad-
ditionally, many states, such as Georgia and Lou-
isiana, have revised their constitutions rather than 
entirely redrafting them. They have been redrafted 
to exclude archaic laws. Additionally, constitution-
al provisions that seem more appropriate as laws, 
as well as city charters, have been removed.
 These new constitutions allow states to deal 
more efficiently with state problems by strength-
ening both the governor and the legislature, or 
at least that is what the authors of them claim.33 
Certainly, however, many metropolitan and indus-
trialized states with active state governments, such 
as California, Texas, and New York, have long 
constitutions. Apparently, it is possible to function 
in the 21st century even with a long, detailed, and 
restrictive state constitution.
Present State Constitutions
The National Municipal League contends that con-
temporary state constitutions are too long and have 
too much detail.34 They have drafted a model state 
constitution of approximately 10,000 words. They 
argue that shorter constitutions with less detail 
permit greater agility in responding to contempo-
rary issues. It is probably not a coincidence that 
their model constitution deletes elements that limit 
options available to municipal governments. The 
states would seem to disagree. At any rate, con-
temporary state constitutions heed neither the size 
nor content proposals of the National Municipal 
League.
Amending State Constitutions
Every state constitution has been amended. More 
than 100 amendments have been approved in 30 
states. Only Delaware allows its state legislature to 
amend its constitution with no vote of the people. 
The process of amending constitutions used most 
frequently in other states consists of two stages: 
proposal and ratification. Typically, a majority or 
two-thirds vote of state legislative chambers makes 
proposals. In 18 states citizens can initiate amend-
ments. Proposed amendments must be approved 
either by a majority voting on the amendment or 
a majority voting in the larger general or special 
election. Minnesota requires a 60 percent majority. 
South Carolina requires legislative approval after 
voter approval.35
 Amendments are placed at the end of the elec-
tion ballot. Many voters participate only in contests 
at the top of election ballots. It is slightly more dif-
ficult for amendments to pass in states that require 
approval of a majority voting in any contest. Over-
all, voters ratify 66 percent of all amendments.36
Conclusion
We are both the beneficiaries and the victims of 
our ideas. As we have seen in this chapter, ideas 
on governance have arisen to deal with immediate 
concerns faced by society. Some groups support 
new ideas that are more in line with their interests 
and preference, whereas others oppose them. Each 
level of government provides a mechanism for re-
solving disagreements about preferred policies. If a 
sufficiently large majority of elected officials prefer 
a policy, it is enacted. Seldom, if ever, however, 
is the minority converted to the majority’s view. 
Rather, battles are frequently refought.
 A different battleground (a different level of 
government or arena) can be sought that might 
result in today’s losers becoming tomorrow’s 
winners. Politics is conflict; it is about winning 
and losing. State legislatures, governors’ offices, 
Congress, and state and federal courts are among 
the arenas in which political battles are contested. 
Contemporary political leaders are not avid fol-
lowers of academic research. They are unlikely 
to reconsider political beliefs based on historical 
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circumstances that no longer exist. Government 
decision makers in the past were no better in this 
regard.
 The American experience also demonstrates 
that failed attempts to deal with problems are 
ultimately abandoned. Other actions are taken until 
a satisfactory solution is found. Pragmatic consid-
erations override others. Higher levels of govern-
ment historically take these actions, what we have 
called greater centralization. However, each state 
still has latitude to deal uniquely with its problems. 
Municipalities, school districts and other local gov-
ernments still have a broad range of decisions that 
can be made without conflict with higher levels of 
government.
Summary
1. Changes in society have resulted in different 
expectations of how government is to help us and 
to shape what we do. Many of our ideas about 
government date from periods when government 
acted differently than it does today. At least some 
elements of political conventional wisdom are 
obsolete.
2. Major changes in the way Americans live have 
resulted in government at all levels becoming more 
active and more centralized.
3. Government programs attempt to solve prob-
lems and meet needs. Popular programs are not 
always effective and vice versa.
4. There is ongoing conflict over political power 
and government benefits. There is no guarantee 
that government will always seek the greatest good 
for the greatest number.
5. Constitutions have changed as ideas about gov-
ernment have changed.
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Figure 4.6 Tax Policy Center Historical Amount of Revenue by Source 1934-2020, http://www.
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Study Guide, Chapter 4
Essay Questions
 1. Compare and contrast the way Americans lived during the No Government Period as described in the text  
 and the way Americans live today.  What are the similarities and differences between expectations of govern-
 ment then and now?
 2. Using your answer for Question 1 above, list several reasons that the idea “the best government is the least  
 government” is still well suited for contemporary America.  List several reasons why the idea is not as well   
 suited for contemporary America as it was during the No Government Period
 3. How and why did state governments take actions to end the domination of corrupt machine-controlled mu-
 nicipal governments?  Discuss five or more changes made by state governments and the impact of each.   
 4. Why does the federal constitution take precedence over state constitutions?  How would American Feder-
 alism be different if each state could choose which parts of the constitution and federal statutory law to follow  
 and which parts to ignore?  Would America have a federal system of government if state constitutions and laws  
 took precedence over the federal constitution and federal laws?
 5. Explain how the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have shaped American federalism.  Give examples of  
 decisions that increase federal power over the states.  Give examples of decisions that limit federal power over  
 the states.
 6. How did the federal income tax and “deficit spending” increase the power of the federal government?  
 Explain how this increase was at the expense of the states, to the benefit of the states and a mixture of the two.
 7. Compare and contrast the federal constitution with state constitutions on purpose, length and complexity.   
 Explain why there are differences.
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. Which idea was a key element of what President Reagan called The New Federalism?
  a. individuals make better decisions than institutions
  b. businesses make better decisions governments
  c. governments closer to the people make better decisions than more distant governments
  d. all of the above
 2. Which of the following is NOT related to the No Government Period: 1776 to 1850?
  a. subsistence farming life free of government interference
  b. rural communities with a few small cities
  c. self-dependence
  d. most citizens wanted the federal government to do more
 3. Which of the following ideas sprang from the Municipal Government Period: 1850 to 1895?
  a. local government can help to solve problems because it is closest to the people
  b. elections do not matter, so why vote?
  c. federal government can help to solve problems because it is closest to the people
  d. immigrants should not be of concern to municipal governments
 4. The two events that led to the Federal Government Era 1932 to 1981 were
  a. the Great Depression and World War I
  b. the Civil War and the Great Depression
  c. the Great Depression and World War II
  d. the Civil War and World War II
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Chapter 5 
GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND BUDGETING
In The Tax Foundation’s 2009 Survey of U.S. 
Attitudes on Tax and Wealth, respondents were 
questioned about their views on government taxing 
and spending.1 They were asked, “Considering all 
government services on the one hand and taxes on 
the other, which of the following statements comes 
closest to your view?” They answered as follows.
Keep taxes and services about where they are 36%
Decrease services and lower taxes 34%
Increase services and raise taxes 10%
Not sure 19%
 Nearly 50 percent want either to keep taxes and 
services where they are or raise taxes and increase 
services. Thirty-four percent want to decrease taxes 
and services. This would seem to indicate wide-
spread disagreement about taxing and spending in 
the United States. Still, more are either content or 
want more than are displeased and want less.
 Respondents were much less satisfied when 
asked only about taxes. Fifty-six percent said the 
federal income tax they paid was too much. Only 
thirty-five percent said federal income taxes were 
about right or too low.  When asked what maximum 
percentage of a person’s income should be paid in 
all federal, state, and local tax, the average answer 
was 15.6 percent. When asked about the value to 
them of all services they received from all govern-
ments, the average response was $7,635.
 In addition to being unhappy about the level 
of taxation, respondents were critical of the way 
the tax system works. When asked, eighty-five 
percent said federal taxes were somewhat or very 
complex. Eighty-two percent said the federal tax 
system needed major changes or a complete over-
haul. However, fewer than half were willing to give 
up some federal tax deductions in exchange for an 
across-the-board cut in federal income tax rates.
 The survey asked separately about the fairness 
of specific federal taxes and state and local taxes. 
The evaluations were identical. On a scale where 
1 means very fair, 3 means fair, and 5 means very 
unfair, the average for both federal taxes and state 
and local taxes was 3.4.
 These views of government taxing and spending 
are inconsistent. Americans say they are unhappy 
because taxes are too high. Yet, they also say taxes 
are generally fair and should be kept where they 
are or increased. They would prefer simpler income 
taxes but will not give up the benefits they receive 
from the exemptions and deductions that make 
income taxes complex.
 The Tax Foundation survey included the fol-
lowing. “In 2006, 45.6 million Americans-- that’s 
one-third of all taxpayers – paid no federal income 
tax after deductions and credits. Thinking about 
your own tax burden, do you think this is fair, or do 
you feel everyone should be required to pay some 
minimum amount of tax to help fund government?”  
Two-thirds responded everyone should pay at least 
something to help fund the basic costs of govern-
ment.2
 The Tax Foundation interpreted this to mean 
that a large majority thinks it is unfair that so many 
people pay no federal income taxes because every-
one should contribute to the basic cost of govern-
ment. However, other interpretations are possible.
The Tax Foundation survey intermixed questions 
about federal taxes and services and all government 
taxes and services.  It intermingled questions about 
income taxes, other taxes and all taxes. The ques-
tion about fairness juxtaposed the value “everyone 
contributing to the cost of government” and the
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value “everyone should pay federal income taxes.” 
As we will explore in this chapter, taxation is a 
complex topic because there are multiple taxes in 
the United States. The complexity is increased by 
our multiple levels of government and by the spe-
cific tax choices made by individual governments. 
We will discuss different taxes separately but you 
should not lose sight of the big picture. American 
taxpayers pay federal and state and local taxes. 
 Even taxpayers who do not owe federal income 
taxes pay state and local taxes and, most probably, 
federal taxes other than income taxes. Only about 
8 percent of households pay no federal taxes at all, 
usually because they’re either unemployed or on 
disability or students or are very poor.3
 When it comes to taxes, everyone pays some-
thing. Who pays more and who pays less are 
questions we can attempt to answer with empirical 
information. Who should pay more and less are 
questions about what should be, not what is. We 
will present some general principles and explore 
the extent to which tax systems meet specific nor-
mative goals. Obviously, the value of such analyses 
to you depends on the extent to which you agree 
with the specified goals.
Some Unfortunate Truths
Governments must pay their bills every year with 
current revenues, surpluses from the past, and bor-
rowed funds. Eventually, debt must be repaid. Pol-
iticians have always promised to both lower taxes 
and keep services by making government more 
efficient, but none have ever fulfilled that promise. 
Sometimes the things we buy do become better and 
cost less over time. Personal computers and high 
definition television sets are examples. Unfortu-
nately, the primary role of government is to pro-
vide services rather than products. It is unrealistic 
to expect that these services can greatly improve in 
quality and simultaneously cost less.
 There are at least two ways your professors 
this semester could provide more cost-effective 
instruction services to students. First, they could 
teach larger classes. Second, they could cover more 
material in less time by speaking faster when they 
lecture. Productivity would double if there were 
twice as many students in each class. Productivity 
would also double if academic semesters and terms 
were half as long and professors (and students) did 
the same amount of work in half as much time.
 Either strategy would reduce the cost of facul-
ty per student credit hour. But, the quality of your 
academic experience might also diminish if classes 
were larger or academic terms were shorter. We 
could increase the workload on all government 
employees—teachers, police, firefighters, health 
inspectors, judges, and state legislators. However, 
any increased quantity of work might be offset by a 
decrease in quality of work.
 It is not possible for everyone to get more and 
pay less for government over time. On the other 
hand, it is possible for some to get more without 
increasing what is provided if others get less. It is 
also possible for some to pay less without decreas-
ing revenues to government if others pay more. 
Politics is about winning and losing. Many define 
winning and losing largely in terms of what they 
pay and what they get. Yet, most of us are ignorant 
about what we pay to and what we get from gov-
ernment. Furthermore, in order to know whether 
we are winning or losing, we also need informa-
tion about what others are paying and getting. We 
now turn our attention to the question of who pays 
government taxes and fees. You should not be sur-
prised that states have made very different choices.
Normative Ideas
One principle that could be used to decide who 
should pay and who should benefit is “Others 
should pay and we should benefit.” This only 
works if we can distinguish between “we” and 
“others.” There might also be conflict about the 
composition of the two groups. It might surprise 
you to learn that state and local governments 
sometimes can and do assess taxes that are paid by 
nonresidents and benefit residents.
 One example of outsourcing the job of paying 
taxes is severance taxes levied on natural resources 
such as minerals, coal, oil, and natural gas. Those 
who consume the resources will ultimately pay 
these taxes. Resources exported to other states 
result in exported taxes. Part of the price Ohioans 
pay for natural gas from Texas is Texas severance 
taxes. Similarly, Texans who consume Arizona 
copper pay taxes to Arizona.
 A second method of exporting costs to others 
is taxing goods and services purchased primarily 
by non-locals, such as tourists and other visitors. 
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Examples include tariffs on hotel rooms, vehicle 
rentals, and tickets to commercial sporting events.
It is probably fortunate that only a very small por-
tion of taxes paid to American governments can be 
“exported.” In the big picture, residents of the state 
are the primary payers of state taxes. Therefore, a 
state’s wealth is best measured by the wealth and 
income of its residents and their ability-to-pay 
higher taxes.
 Consider two hypothetical families living in 
the same public school district. In Family A, both 
husband and wife work. They have a combined 
yearly income of $120,000, substantially above 
the national median family income. They have a 
single child, who attends public school. Family B 
has a single working parent and a yearly income 
of $36,000. This four-member family has three 
school-age children in public schools. The cost of 
education in the school district is about $6,000 a 
year for each student.
 How should these families pay for the govern-
mental services they receive? To simplify, we will 
limit our discussion to providing public school 
education for their children. In a capitalist society, 
we normally pay for any goods or services that we 
receive. This is called user or client pay. If you 
bought this book you paid for the good received. 
On this basis, Family B would have to devote 
one-half of its before-tax income to educating its 
children. This expense might be beyond what Fam-
ily B could afford, meaning that some or none of 
the children would receive an education. Family A, 
however, could easily afford the $6,000-per-year 
cost to educate one child.
 Many would argue that government services 
such as education should be paid on this basis. In 
our example, the child of Family A would attend 
school. Family B cannot afford to send all three 
children to school. The family cannot afford to pay 
for education in addition to food, clothing, shelter, 
childcare, and taxes. Home schooling is not an 
option for a single parent working to earn a living. 
Although this example is hypothetical, the reader 
should note that the 2016-2017 federal poverty 
level guideline for a family of four living in the 48 
contiguous states is $24,300.4  Family B’s income 
is above the $31,590 threshold to qualify for free 
school meals, but it is below the $44,955 maxi-
mum for reduced price meals.5
 Would there be a cost to society, or to Fami-
ly A, if the children in Family B did not receive 
formal educations? Most people would say yes. 
Family A may be concerned about whether it is 
wrong to live in a society where the poor get little 
or no education. Family A might be concerned 
about its property, since Family B’s children would 
be at home with nothing to do while the members 
of Family A were at work or school. Home security 
might cost Family A more than the cost of taxes to 
support public education. In the future, the unedu-
cated children of Family B would almost certainly 
be poorly paid and unable to pay for their children 
to go to school. Implicit in a user-pay system for 
public education is the idea that education is a 
good consumed by those who receive education. 
However, others in the community gain if the chil-
dren of Family B are educated.
 Education can be viewed as an investment that 
benefits society in general. That is why primary 
and secondary education in the United States has 
traditionally been supported by taxes. Taxes are 
gathered based on the ability-to-pay principle, and 
the services are provided to all who are eligible, 
regardless of their wealth. There are two prominent 
bases for measuring ability-to-pay: income and 
wealth. Income is funds brought in over one year. 
Wealth is the value of what is owned now. Income 
and wealth typically go together, but not always. 
Some of your classmates will earn high incomes 
immediately after they graduate. If they have accu-
mulated debts from borrowing to fund their higher 
education, they may have negative wealth for a 
while. Their liabilities may exceed their assets. You 
probably know older relatives or family friends 
who have retired. They have relatively low in-
comes but may have sizeable wealth accumulated 
over many years.
 To keep our example simple, let’s assume 
income is used to measure ability-to-pay. Family 
A has more than three times the yearly income 
of Family B. So, Family A would be taxed three 
times what Family B is taxed for public education. 
Although this arrangement may not seem a bargain 
for Family A, making education unavailable to 
Family B also has costs. If Family B’s children re-
ceive no formal education, Family A’s child might 
someday be the only taxpayer among these four 
children. For many reasons, Family A may prefer 
to have funding for public education based on the 
ability-to-pay.
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 The use of taxes based on the ability-to-pay 
to fund government programs such as education 
redistributes some of the wealth of the rich to the 
poor. Some government revenue and expenditure 
programs involve redistribution policy. Through 
government, money is redistributed from the 
wealthy in taxes to the poor in services. The tax 
rate in the example is a fixed or “flat” rate. The 
same rate applies to all taxpayers. As we will see, 
there are alternatives to the flat tax rate. When 
taxes are based on the ability-to-pay, the wealthy 
would prefer rates that are the same for everyone. 
The poor would prefer variable rates with high-
er tax rates applied to those with greater abili-
ty-to-pay.
 Self-interest is heavily involved here. Much of 
the controversy in politics centers on redistribution 
policy. No discussion of changes in taxes or ser-
vices is free of the self-interest of the wealthy to 
reduce taxes and move to more user-pay services 
and the self-interest of the poor to have taxes pay 
more of services they receive rather than having 
to pay for these services themselves. This is not a 
trivial issue. The poor often forgo services, such 
as taking their ill children to doctors, because 
they cannot afford to pay. As a result, many other 
children are at greater risk of exposure to commu-
nicable diseases. In some cases, the wealthy are 
willing to pay for services for the poor. Threshold 
levels for clean water, public health, and control of 
garbage, sewerage, and vermin can make the chil-
dren of the wealthy less vulnerable to contagious 
diseases that would otherwise afflict poor children.
 Just as college students prefer receiving higher 
grades to receiving lower grades, citizens prefer 
receiving more and higher quality services from 
government. Citizens prefer paying less to pay-
ing more. We should expect that wealthier people 
would advocate user-pay instead of ability-to-pay 
systems. We should expect the poor to favor abili-
ty-to-pay rather than user-pay systems. The middle 
class will prefer private sector provided services, 
and the working class will prefer public sector or 
governmental services. Both preferences will be 
based on self-interest.
How Broad Is Social Concern?
In our experience, most college and university 
students support ability-to-pay as the basis for 
covering the costs of public education. There seem 
to be two possible reasons. First, students may be 
representative of overall society. Ability-to-pay has 
always been the basis for paying the costs of public 
education because of social concern about the con-
sequences of failing to educate the poor. Paying for 
education with ability-to-pay taxes is conventional 
and traditional. Second, college and university stu-
dents know they benefit because others underwrite 
much of the costs of their education. Self-interest 
may motivate their preference.
 Let us now consider not just two families, but 
also an entire school district. If a school district has 
one section that is wealthy and others that are poor, 
should the wealthy contribute disproportionately 
to the costs of education in the district? Should 
multiple families A pay substantially more than 
their share for the services received and families 
B pay less? Again, most people probably support 
ability-to-pay as the basis for paying district-wide 
educational expenses. Indeed, this is the norm 
across the country. Please note that most districts 
ask parents to supply some or many of the materi-
als used by their children in school. This moves the 
cost of those materials from ability-to-pay to user 
pay—the preference of wealthier residents who 
probably control the school board.
 How about statewide? No state has its wealthy 
citizens evenly distributed from border to border. 
All have poor school districts as well as wealthy 
school districts. Should the wealth of the rich dis-
tricts be redistributed to those that are poor? This 
is not traditional. Moreover, the social benefits are 
less evident. Residents of San Francisco, Dallas, 
and Philadelphia may not recognize that they and 
their children are affected by the quality of public 
education available to children in Los Angeles, San 
Antonio, and Pittsburgh. Thus, there is less support 
for statewide redistribution. The same logic, how-
ever, applies.
 The wealthy portions of the state should see the 
benefit to them and their children of having quali-
ty education for all children whether rich or poor. 
Moreover, states are in competition with one an-
other. A state that fails to educate its students will 
be at a disadvantage in the competition to attract 
new industries and high- paying jobs. Several state 
supreme courts have ruled that inequitable resourc-
es for local school districts are unconstitutional. 
Some states have been compelled to underwrite 
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public education more fully. The Supreme Court 
of the state of New Jersey ruled any plan that does 
not give students in poor districts the same level of 
support as students in wealthy districts is uncon-
stitutional. New Jersey was forced to adopt a state 
income tax to provide more state funding.
 Few people support the idea of wealthy areas 
of a state paying for the public education of chil-
dren in distant poorer areas. Support for the idea of 
ability-to-pay for covering public education breaks 
down outside the local area. This might have 
several explanations, none of which have been re-
searched. Perhaps people feel responsible for their 
local schools but not state schools. Maybe there is 
an importance of spatial separation. This “out-of-
sight, out-of-mind” view is that it does not matter 
whether local schools are better, worse, or the same 
as schools elsewhere in the state. This outlook 
ignores the 21st century reality that competition for 
jobs and many other things of value extends across 
communities, across states, across nations, and 
across continents.
 Support wanes even more for redistributing 
wealth from wealthy states to poorer states. Uned-
ucated Mississippi children are less troublesome 
to people in Connecticut or Alaska than are poorly 
educated children within their own states. The 
federal effort in public education to “leave no child 
behind” as they “race to the top” is strong on slo-
gan and weak on substance. Funding for the states 
promised at the inception of each program has not 
been provided.
 Finally, we could consider redistributing wealth 
from wealthy nations to poorer nations. The United 
States provides some aid to impoverished nations 
in the form of education resources. Foundations 
and other tax-exempt organizations also make 
contributions. The scope and intent of all these 
programs combined is so small that it is more accu-
rate to say they are charitable good works and not 
a significant program of redistribution. The United 
Nations is an international organization. One of its 
mandates is to redistribute wealth across nations. It 
relies on voluntary contributions to fund its efforts. 
As we have seen, there are strict limits on what the 
wealthier voluntarily give to the poorer. Generosity 
seems linked to closeness. However, we can offer 
no empirical evidence that closeness alone is the 
major cause of generosity.
Private Goods and Public Goods
Economists argue that government should provide 
public goods and services and that private goods 
and services should be retained in the private 
sector. This distinction between private and public 
goods depends on two considerations. 
 The first consideration is whether goods and 
services are excludable, meaning that sellers can 
guarantee the benefits of goods and services to 
those who pay and exclude those who do not pay. 
Private sector vendors specialize in things that are 
excludable because purchasers will not pay if there 
is no guarantee that they will receive what they 
paid for. Purchasers also will not pay if they know 
they may receive without paying. Goods and ser-
vices need not be perfectly excludable for the pri-
vate sector to be effective. Even though neighbors 
and visitors can appreciate a beautifully landscaped 
home, the homeowners pay for their own landscap-
ing.
 The second consideration is whether or not a 
good or service used by one person reduces what 
is available for others. If it does, economists say 
it should be a private good. A pie is an example. 
If four people were to eat it all before you arrived, 
there would be none left for you. On the other 
hand, when everyone can use a good or service 
without denying it to others, it is non-rivaling.
 Goods and services that are non-rivaling pose 
two challenges to private sector vendors. First, 
most people do not think of themselves as consum-
ers. They know they benefit from viewing their 
neighbors’ gardens. But, they don’t think of them-
selves as users because nothing of limited supply 
has been used or used up. The second challenge 
is that most will refuse to provide compensation 
voluntarily to the providers of non-rivaling goods 
or services. Users refuse to act as customers, even 
when providers convince them they benefit. They 
argue that they should not pay because they have 
not reduced the supply the vendor can “sell” to 
others. Certain things that are abundantly avail-
able are frequently thought of as non-rivaling. In 
the past, clean air and water have been consensus 
examples—even though we know that when one 
person breathes air or drinks water, less is available 
for others. When crises of air pollution and drought 
make air and water scarce, we recognize that great 
abundance made them seem to be non-rivaling.
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 Markets fail when potential customers think 
they can benefit without paying or should not have 
to pay for benefits they are receiving. The crucial 
element of voluntary exchange has been eliminat-
ed. You know you can underpay your federal taxes 
by cheating and still drive on interstate highways, 
visit federal parks, benefit from national defense, 
and so on. You also know that if everyone cheats, 
the benefits will not exist. Only by making pay-
ments mandatory can goods and services be pro-
vided in the quantity and quality we all want.
Private and Public Sectors
What is the proper division between the private 
sector and the public sector—government? Econ-
omists and others argue that the private sector is 
superior to the public sector in providing goods 
and services at high quality and low cost. Giv-
en the choice between private and public sector, 
they argue, the private sector is always or almost 
always the better choice. This view is a contem-
porary expression of the idea articulated in the No 
Government Period of American history: The best 
government is the least government.
 Even those who advocate minimum govern-
ment recognize that some government is necessary 
because there are some goods and services the 
private sector cannot provide or does not provide 
with necessary scope and effectiveness. Saying that 
the public sector should specialize in market failure 
situations still leaves many questions unanswered.
 There can be legitimate disagreement about 
when market failures exist. It is not always easy 
to know the extent to which things are rivaling 
or non-rivaling. Technological changes can make 
things excludable that previously were not exclud-
able. Changes in the way people live or behave can 
make excludability more difficult. Market failure 
is a concept that helps us understand why govern-
ment is sometimes necessary. It does not provide 
clear guidelines for identifying market failures 
before or as they occur.
 So far, our discussion of market failure has 
been based on technical academic criteria. It is 
also possible to define market failure subjectively 
as situations when the private sector could pro-
vide desired goods or services but does not do so. 
Private companies seek returns on investments: 
profits. Frequently, the private sector does not en-
gage in potentially profitable enterprises. In some 
cases, the investment is too large. In others, ac-
ceptable return on investment may take longer than 
companies deem acceptable. In yet others, the risk 
involved may be unsatisfactory. The private sector 
readily provides utilities and some transportation 
services in locations where populations are dense. 
In sparsely populated rural areas, private sector 
companies are less enthusiastic because infrastruc-
ture and capital costs are high, total consumption 
is low, and time from startup to profitability after 
recapture of investment is long. Many enterprises 
involving large and long term capital investments 
are either entirely financed by government or 
involve significant government subsidies to private 
companies.
 So, government activity could be appropriate 
whenever the private sector does not provide what 
is needed. How do we decide what is needed? 
Another concept provides some guidance: mer-
it goods. Merit goods are those things we think 
should not be denied to those who are unable to 
pay for them. Consensus merit goods include food 
for the hungry, shelter for the homeless, and aid of 
all kinds to victims of natural disasters. Americans 
provide care to those who cannot care for them-
selves.
 Clean air and water might qualify as merit 
goods. Some would incorporate protection from 
tainted food, unsafe drugs, and other products that 
pose dangers that cannot be easily recognized. 
Today, public education and a minimum level of 
health care qualify. Jewelry and travel can hardly 
be considered merit goods, but what about gas 
or electricity to heat your home in winter? What 
about roads and bridges and public transportation 
so your travel time from home to other destinations 
is shorter? We cannot easily divide goods and ser-
vices between merit and non-merit goods.
Clearly Governmental Services
Only the government can gather taxes or money 
without simultaneously providing corresponding 
services. Consider how you would react to a bill 
from a local store asking you to pay for something 
you never received. No wonder no one likes taxes. 
Government can also provide user-paid services, 
such as charging on the basis of the amount of 
water, electricity, or highway mileage used. Thus, 
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even if there were agreement that government 
should handle some services, there is no necessary 
reason why those services could not be paid on a 
user-pay basis.
 Indeed, many municipal services over the years 
have been pressed to “pay their own way” or to 
pay for services without subsidies from general tax 
revenues. Water, sewage, electricity, and sanita-
tion are examples. In order for these services to 
pay their own way, user charges would have to 
equal the costs of the services. This would include 
charges to those who cannot pay. Thus, pay-their-
own-way arguments are just the user pay argu-
ments in new clothing. Those advocating having 
services pay their own way are probably seeking to 
reduce their own taxes.
 Few private goods and services are provided 
based on ability-to-pay. An example of this ap-
proach is dealers selling new cars at prices based 
on shoppers’ incomes or wealth. The most affluent 
would be charged $250,000, and the very poor 
would pay nothing. Can you imagine this hap-
pening? Sometimes it does. Health care provides 
a real life example. Those with health insurance 
are charged more for services than those who are 
unable to pay, especially for childbirth.
 Regardless of how services are financed, they 
can be provided directly by government or out-
sourced to private sector companies. Very few, 
if any, governmental services could not be “pri-
vatized” or given to the private sector to provide. 
Arizona has many services normally provided 
directly by local government, such as fire protec-
tion, provided by private industry. Private police 
shelter wealthy residential enclaves in many 
communities. Depending on where you live, water, 
electricity, fire protection, garbage pickup, street 
lighting, security, bridges, and ferry crossings are 
provided by private sources on the user-pay basis. 
Local governments still provide all of these ser-
vices where most of us live. History and tradition, 
rather than cost-benefit analyses, best account for 
whether government or the private sector offers 
a service. Even if government provides a service, 
ability-to-pay will not necessarily be the basis of 
paying for its costs. Government revenues come 
from a variety of sources.
Taxes
No one likes to pay taxes. Given the opportunity, 
we would all pay nothing for any goods or services 
we receive. Perhaps you have daydreamed about 
such a life. The reality is we have to pay for goods 
and services we receive whether provided by pri-
vate enterprise or government. This does not mean 
that we cannot be resentful of paying too much in 
taxes, just as we are resentful of paying too much 
for a sandwich at a fast food restaurant. We have 
frequent opportunities to judge whether we pay too 
much for sandwiches. When dissatisfied, we can 
usually find other restaurants nearby. Opportunities 
for judging whether we pay too much in taxes are 
less frequent and more challenging. Changing gov-
ernments is much more expensive than changing 
restaurants.
Are U.S. Taxes High?
Recently, many have charged that Americans pay 
too high of a percentage of our money in taxes. 
One member of Congress erroneously said that 
for the first 40 percent (actually about 30 percent) 
of the year, we work for government. Of course, 
since few of us save much, this logic means that 
we work the rest of the year for McDonalds, Wal-
Mart, Exxon Mobil, and other companies from 
which we get services and goods. American taxes 
are not high in comparison with other countries.
Taxes at all levels claimed 25 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product in 2014. This is 25 percent 
below the 36 percent average of 33 members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development.6   Three OECD countries had lower 
rates: Korea, Chile and Mexico. Their respective 
rates are 24.6, 19.8 and 19.5 percent of Gross Do-
mestic Product. In many European countries, taxes 
exceeded 40 percent of GDP, but those countries 
generally provide much more extensive govern-
ment services to their citizens than the United 
States does.7   Examples include health care, day 
care, retirement income, college education, and job 
retraining.
Types of Taxes
In the United States, we have basically three types 
of taxes: property taxes, sales taxes, and income 
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taxes. As we shall see, state, local, and federal 
governments depend on different taxes. The reason 
for this variation goes back to when the different 
governments became active and the type of taxes 
available at the time. There is no reason we could 
not have a single tax gathered once a year and 
distributed to the various governments. That would 
make the cost of government crystal clear to tax-
payers. Officials act to obscure total tax bills, not to 
illuminate them. To make them less visible, gov-
ernments spread tax collection over time by using 
escrow accounts, adding small amounts to retail 
purchases, and withholding from salaries.
 People of varying abilities to pay are not equal-
ly affected by different taxes. Some would like to 
see the income tax eliminated, and others dislike 
the property tax. Some taxes are judged to be fairer 
or more equitable than others, at least by some 
people. The answer to the question “Who pays?” 
determines winners and losers. Any proposed 
change in tax structure mobilizes enormous con-
cern and hot political interest. Thus, the likelihood 
of changing to a simple, single tax is close to zero.
 The complexity, diversity, and timing of taxes  
probably reflect both the history of their invention 
and an effort to make none seem burdensome. The 
type of tax used reflects which government has 
imposed it as well as the influences of the multi-
ple centers of political power inherent in a federal 
system of government. If one interest controls the 
city council and another the state government, two 
different taxes are likely to be collected.
Property Tax
Taxes on real property, land and permanent im-
provements, have been imposed for hundreds of 
years. Real property is simple to recognize. Its 
value can be determined with little difficulty. Prop-
erty owners are relatively easy to identify. When 
most people lived on subsistence farms, they had 
little money income that could be taxed. They were 
more likely to barter than purchase with money. 
Income and sales taxes were not viable. When few 
had money income, barter was the normal mode of 
exchange. How could government tax the “sale” of 
20 chickens for a plow? As a result, the property 
tax is much older than sales or income taxes.
 Government, especially local government, col-
lects taxes on property in its jurisdiction. Owners 
of more valuable property receive larger tax bills. 
Property tax is a flat rate tax. All property owners 
pay the same rate, regardless of the quantity and 
value of property they own. These rates are some-
times measured in thousandths of a dollar of prop-
erty value, called millage or mill rates. They are 
also expressed as pennies of taxes per one hundred 
dollars of value. Imagine your home is valued at 
$300,000 and the mill rate is 8, 80 cents per hun-
dred dollars of value. Your property tax bill will be 
$2,400. If your home is valued at $600,000, your 
tax bill will be $4,800.
 The mechanics of collecting property tax are 
complex. In modern economies and jurisdictions 
with a large amount and/or variety of property, it 
often becomes a tax that is not applied the same 
way to all property owners. Property tax requires 
determining value of property and identifying 
owners. Property tax imposing governments must 
hire property appraisers and must retain records of 
who owns what property. At one time, the king’s 
agents could break in, note all property, appraise 
it, and collect the appropriate taxes on the spot. 
Americans insist on greater protection and privacy 
from government, tax agents make appointments to 
review taxpayers’ records, and personal property is 
not taxed.
 Modern property tax assessors gather data to 
determine property values. They record informa-
tion on lot size, structure size, age, and quality of 
construction. They consider the use of property: 
residential, agricultural, industrial, or commercial. 
They learn about major improvements from build-
ing permits and conduct rare on-site inspections, 
perhaps once or twice every 10 years. They have 
information about surrounding properties and 
comparable properties throughout their jurisdic-
tion. This information then is used to set a value on 
the property, typically by comparing it with similar 
and recently sold property. Assessors use selling 
prices as indicators of market value.
 Theoretically, property taxes define abili-
ty-to-pay in terms of wealth. However, real prop-
erty is only one kind of wealth. Personal property 
such as your electronic gear, wardrobe, and jewelry 
is excluded because it is too difficult to assess. 
Ownership and value of savings accounts, stocks, 
bonds, and other securities is not so difficult to de-
termine. Yet these kinds of property are not subject 
to property tax. The old kings of England would 
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not have missed these tax revenue opportunities.
 Second, the value of real estate, which we 
do tax, changes over time. On-site appraisals, 
although expensive, can deal with this problem. 
Few governments, however, inspect properties 
more than once every 5 years, with 20 percent 
of all property being inspected each year. Some 
Northeastern governments have not conducted 
comprehensive property value reviews since the 
early 1800s, when an appraised value of $300 was 
placed on a property that now sells for $450,000. 
Throughout the nation, new homes and recently 
sold properties are fairly consistently assessed at a 
fixed percentage of the selling price. Older, unsold 
properties are not assessed with similar consis-
tency because there is no convenient standard of 
measure. As a result, older properties, rarely sold 
properties, and unusual properties tend to be un-
der-assessed.
 The first problem, excluding some wealth, re-
sults in the tax being unfair for the poor because it 
is regressive. When it was imposed on all property, 
it had equity because those with greater property 
wealth paid proportionately more than the poor, 
who had little.8 The poor pay a greater proportion 
of their income and their wealth in property taxes 
than do the wealthy. For one matter, the poor who 
do not own property still pay property taxes as part 
of their rent. Owners of rental properties receive 
tax bills but use rental income to pay them. For 
another matter, the home-owning poor have larger 
proportions of their wealth in their residences than 
the more affluent do.
 As wealth goes up, the percentage of one’s 
wealth on which the property tax is collected 
decreases. A family with a $300,000 home with a 
2 percent property tax pays $6,000 a year. If their 
yearly income is $240,000, this is 2.5 percent of 
their yearly income. A person with a home worth 
$30,000 at the same 2 percent property tax rate 
pays $600. If that person’s income is only $15,000, 
property taxes consume 4 percent of his income, 
twice that of the more wealthy family. Property tax 
is a regressive tax because the poor have more of 
their assets in property that is taxed. The wealthy 
own additional valuable property that is not taxed: 
savings, stocks, bonds, and other securities.
 There have been efforts to make the proper-
ty tax more equitable. One example is called the 
homestead exemption. The first $5,000 or $10,000 
of appraised value in one’s primary residence is 
not subject to tax. With a $10,000 exemption, the 
poor individual above then would pay only $100, 
or .7 percent of his income. Another method is to 
set a maximum percentage of a person’s income 
that will be collected as property taxes, called the 
circuit breaker. However, the property tax still is 
challenged as unfair.
 Despite its inequities, the property tax per-
sists as the primary source of local government 
tax revenues. People are accustomed to paying it. 
Because the appraised value of all property in the 
Taxable Income 
Single Taxpayer
Taxable Income 
Married Filing Jointly
Earned 
Income Rate
Long Term Capital 
Gains Rate
Up to $9,525 Up to $19,050 10% 0%
$9,526-$38,700 $19,051-$77,400 12% 0%
$38,701-$82,500 $77,401-$165,000 22% 15%
$82,501-$157,500 $165,001-$315,000 24% 15%
$157,501-$200,000 $315,001-$400,000 32% 15%
$200,001-$500,000 $400,001-$600,000 35% 15%
Over $500,000 Over $600,000 37% 20%
Figure 5.1
2018 Federal Income Tax Rates for Households
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city is known, setting a tax rate yields very predict-
able amounts of revenue. Although dependence by 
city, schools, and county governments on property 
taxes has declined since World War II, there is 
little question that it will be with us in the future. 
The states initially depended on property taxes and 
have only recently gathered more of their revenues 
from sales and income taxes. The federal govern-
ment has never used a property tax.
Income Tax
Both federal and state governments had imposed 
income taxes before 1900. The federal government 
had used it to finance the Civil War and dropped it 
after that cost was paid. The states had tried un-
successfully to use it in the early 1900s. In 1911, 
Wisconsin introduced the first successful state in-
come tax. By 1920, nine other states had followed.9 
Forty-three states now have an individual income 
tax. Of the seven states without individual income 
taxes, four have corporate income or gross receipts 
taxes. Only South Dakota and Wyoming tax neither 
individual nor corporate income.10
 Income taxes assessed by the federal and most 
state governments have progressive rates. This 
means that those with higher taxable incomes pay 
higher tax rates. Figure 5.1 gives the progressive 
rates for federal income taxes in 2018. Of the 41 
states that tax wage and salary income, 33 have 
progressive rates and 8 have one fixed or flat rate 
for all taxable incomes.  New Hampshire and Ten-
nessee tax only dividend and interest income and 7 
states levy no income tax at all.11
 People commonly speak of the taxable incomes 
corresponding to rates as tax brackets. You may 
have heard someone complain about being “in the 
24 percent tax bracket.” You might have thought 
that meant the speaker’s tax bill divided by the 
taxable income of the speaker was 24 percent. A 
closer look at Figure 5.1 clarifies that is not the 
case. For someone in the 24 percent tax bracket, 
24 percent is the highest tax rate paid and it is only 
paid on income greater than $82,501 for those 
filing as single taxpayers and greater than $165,001 
for those married filing jointly. Other income is 
taxed at 12 percent and 22 percent.
 An important complication of progressive in-
come tax rates is that most taxpayers pay multiple 
tax rates. An even more important complication 
is that some income is exempt from income tax-
es.  Remember, the tax rates in Figure 5.1 apply to 
taxable income, not total income.
 According to estimates in 2015, the federal 
internal revenue code is 2.4 million words long and 
federal tax regulations are more than 7.6 million 
words long.12 Tax rates for 2018 are contained in 
Figure 5.1, which is less than one page long and 
fewer than 100 words. The federal tax code con-
tains a separate table of rates for corporations. 
What content of the tax code takes up the other 
99.999 percent of word count?
 The other content of the federal tax code 
discusses what is and what is not income subject 
to income tax. It discusses taxable income, also 
known as the income tax base. The federal tax code 
is so long because it contains thousands of exemp-
tions from taxable income. Some exemptions are 
for individual taxpayers, but most are for corporate 
taxpayers. Some exemptions are for entire indus-
tries, some for corporations in certain locations and 
some for individually identified corporations.
 Exemptions from taxes are also known 
positively as tax breaks and negatively as tax 
loopholes. All “tax reform” legislation involves 
changing who receives new or larger tax exemp-
tions—and pays less and who loses or receives 
smaller tax exemptions—and pays more. You can 
now understand that any tax base change can be 
characterized as a tax break or a tax loophole, de-
pending on the preferences of the writer or speaker.
 Figure 5.1 describes rates for two kinds of 
taxable income, earned income and long term 
capital gains income.  Capital gains income occurs 
when an asset is held for more than one year and 
sold for more than its original cost.  Capital losses 
result from holding assets for more than one year 
and selling them for less than original cost. Capital 
gains taxes are paid only on the differences be-
tween gains and losses. As you can see in Figure 
5.1, more capital gains income than earned income 
is exempt from taxation. Also, capital gains in-
come is taxed at lower rates. Are capital gains a tax 
break or a tax loophole? Yes, but you get to decide 
which.
 Individual federal taxpayers can reduce their 
income that is subject to taxes by taking advantage 
of other breaks and/or loopholes:  tax exemptions 
and tax deductions. With few exceptions, federal 
exemptions and deductions are also used by states 
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that have individual income taxes.
 Tax exemptions are granted for taxpayers and 
their dependents. If your parents pay more than 
50% of your expenses during a year, they can 
claim you as a dependent and reduce their income 
tax base. There are larger exemptions for those 
over age 65 and those legally blind.13  Interest 
income from “tax exempt” state and local govern-
ment bonds are also not part of income subject to 
tax.
 Tax deductions are granted for certain ex-
penses, including property taxes, income or sales 
taxes paid to state and local governments, interest 
on home mortgages and sole proprietor business 
expenses Some expenses, such as educational, 
moving and employee business expenses, are de-
ductible if they exceed certain cost thresholds. This 
is only a partial list of tax breaks available to you.
 Some states allow additional tax breaks for ind-
ividuals. Some income is exempt from taxation. 
Pension and retirement income is at least partial-
ly exempt in more than 30 states. Fourteen states 
also have tax credits— amounts that are subtracted 
from tax bills. Some states have credits rather than 
exemptions for each dependent. Some states that 
apply sales taxes to food and prescription drugs 
have income tax credits for sales taxes paid on 
those purchases.
 For individuals, their federal tax bills are based 
not only on the size of their incomes, but also on 
how those incomes are divided between earned 
income and capital gains. Federal tax bills are also 
affected by exemptions, deductions and tax credits 
available to, and claimed by, taxpayers. Figure 5.2 
compares the incomes of two hypothetical fami-
lies to explain some of the complexities of federal 
income taxes.
 The lower income family had income of 
$60,000. They used the standard deductions for a 
family of four, $24,000. Their taxable income was 
$36,000, resulting in a bill of $4,448, 7.4 percent 
of their total income.  The other family’s income 
was twice as large, $120,000.  Their also used the 
standard deductions for a family of four, $24,000. 
Figure 5.2
Income, Federal Tax Bills and Tax Burdens
For Two Families, Married Filing Jointly 2018
Lower Income Couple
• Total Income $60,000
• Standard Deduction $24,000
• Personal Exemption $0
• Income subject to earned income 
tax $36,000
– $19,050*10% = $1,905
– $16,950*15% = $2,543
• Earned income tax bill = $4,448
• Income subject to long term capital 
gains tax $0
• Long term capital gains tax bill $0
• Total tax bill $4,448
• Tax burden = $4,948/$60,000 = 
7.4%
Higher Income Couple
• Total Income $120,000
• Standard Deduction $24,000
• Personal Exemption $0
• Income subject to earned income 
tax $36,000
– $19,050*10% = $1,905
– $16,950*15% = $2,543
• Earned income tax bill = $4,448
• Income subject to long term capital 
gains tax $60,000
– $41,400*0% = $0
– $18,600*15% = $2,790
• Long term capital gains bill $2,790
• Total tax bill $7,238
• Tax burden = $7,238/$120,000 = 
6.0%
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However, the second family had capital gains 
income of $60,000. Of the $60,000, $41,400 
was below the total taxable income threshold of 
$77,400, so their capital gains rate was 0%.  The so 
their capital gains rate on $41,400 of income was 
0%.  The capital gains rate of 15% applied to only 
$16,950. Their total tax bill of $7,238 was 6.0% of 
their total income, $120,000.
 The lower income family’s tax burden was 7.4 
percent. The higher income family’s tax burden 
was 6.0 percent. The second family’s income is 
200 percent of the first family’s income, but their 
tax burden is only 81 percent of the first family’s 
burden. What would happen if there were no tax 
breaks or loopholes? What if all income had been 
subject to the earned income tax rates in Figure 
5.1? The lower income family would have paid 
$6,819 on income of $60,000, a burden of 11.4 
percent. The higher income family would have 
paid $18,279, a burden of 15 percent.
 The crucial importance of the difference be-
tween total income and taxable income is clear in 
this example. Because only some income is subject 
to income taxes, the higher tax burden falls on the 
lower income family. Most who give hypothetical 
examples about income taxes stress tax rates and 
ignore tax bases. As a result, they conclude that 
higher income families not only pay more taxes in 
dollars, they pay a larger share of their incomes. 
On the contrary, because tax advantages are more 
available to higher income than lower income in-
dividuals and families, the latter end up with lower 
burdens than examples than “predicted” by tax 
rates alone.
 Income taxes are challenging to understand.  
One must consider simultaneously income tax 
rates, total income, income subject to taxation and 
income exempt from taxation. The arithmetic is 
Figure 5.3 
26 Corporations Paying No Total Income Tax in 2008-2012 
2008-2012 2008-2012 2008-2012
Company Profit $millions Tax $millions Tax Rate
Pepco Holdings $1,743 -$575 -33.0%
PG&E Corp. $7,035 -$1,178 -16.7%
NiSource $2,473 -$336 -13.6%
Wisconsin Energy $3,228 -$436 -13.5%
General Electric $27,518 -$3,054 -11.1%
CenterPoint Energy $4,078 -$347 -8.5%
Integrys Energy Group $1,623 -$133 -8.2%
Atmos Energy $1,486 -$114 -7.7%
Tenet Healthcare $854 -$51 -6.0%
American Electric Power $10,016 -$577 -5.8%
Ryder System $1,073 -$51 -4.7%
Con-way $587 -$21 -3.5%
Duke Energy $9,026 -$299 -3.3%
Priceline.com $557 -$17 -3.0%
FirstEnergy $7,236 -$216 -3.0%
Apache $7,580 -$184 -2.4%
Interpublic Group $1,305 -$28 -2.1%
Verizon Communications $30,203 -$535 -1.8%
NextEra Energy $11,433 -$178 -1.6%
Consolidated Edison $7,581 -$87 -1.1%
CMS Energy $2,471 -$26 -1.1%
Boeing $20,473 -$202 -1.0%
Northeast Utilities $2,820 -$19 -0.7%
Corning $3,438 -$10 -0.3%
Paccar $1,711 -$1 -0.1%
MetroPCS Communications $1,956 -$1 -0.1%
TOTAL $169,504 -$8,676 -5.1%
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easy once the numbers are known.  Discussions 
and “analyses” that focus only on tax rates use sim-
ple and incorrect arithmetic. Those who receive the 
greatest tax advantages would rather not talk about 
them and give the impression that their tax burdens 
are greater than they really are. 
 The job of collecting and reporting tax infor-
mation is assigned to the taxpayers. In 2012, the 
Internal Revenue Service estimated that the aver-
age taxpayer needed 22 hours to do his or her 2011 
tax return—32 hours if a Schedule C for business 
or a Schedule E for rental properties was filed.15  In 
2013, 26 percent of Americans surveyed reported 
they hated preparing their federal taxes and 30 
percent said they disliked it. Another 29 percent 
stated they liked it and 5 percent held they loved it. 
It is not surprising that 56 percent said they do not 
prepare their own income tax returns.16
 Even if all taxpayers prepared their own tax 
returned and loved doing it, most would still be 
ignorant of how those with lower incomes can 
have higher tax burdens.  Preparing only their own 
returns will not let them compare their incomes 
and burdens with those of different income levels 
and combinations of individual and capital gains 
income.
 The divide between tax rates and tax burdens 
is even larger for federal corporate income taxes. 
There were 8 federal corporate income tax brackets 
in 2012. The lowest bracket was 15 percent for the 
first $50,000 of taxable income. The highest brack-
et was 39 percent for $100,000 to $300,000. The 
higher income brackets had lower rates, 34 to 38 
percent.  The highest bracket, taxable income over 
$18,333,333, had a rate of 35 percent.17
 Figure 5.3 lists 26 corporations that paid no 
total income tax in 2008-2012. Each of the 26 
corporations would have 35 percent if taxes were 
assessed on total profits.  However, each had ex-
emptions, deductions and tax credits that exceeded 
their tax liability.  Each corporation paid a negative 
tax rate.  In other words, each received a refund. 
These 26 corporations paid no income taxes on 
total profits of $170 billion.  Instead, they received 
total refunds of $8.7 billion. 
 A long list of politicians, think tank fellows, 
pundits, and others have complained that the Unit-
ed States has the highest top corporate tax rates in 
the world, 38 percent. They assert high rates are 
holding back the American economy, sending jobs 
and companies to other countries, and threatening 
the existence of capitalism. This rhetoric about 
rates successfully distracts attention from the effec-
tive rates paid by American corporations. If we ig-
nore the essential difference between total income 
and taxable income, we conclude that corporate tax 
burdens are much higher than they are. The taxes 
paid by the most successful corporations are much 
closer to zero than to tax bracket rates.
 There is nearly unanimous agreement that 
federal tax forms are too complex. Many advo-
cate simplification by making all income subject 
to tax—no deductions and no exemptions.  Many 
support replacing the variable rate structure with a 
single tax rate for all. Presumably, either of these 
reforms could eliminate the tax advantage of long 
term capital gains income, although most who 
call for tax simplification are not explicit on this 
point.  The survey data discussed at the beginning 
of the chapter indicate Americans are not enthu-
siastic about tax reform if it means giving up the 
tax breaks they enjoy now. Simplification of the 
federal income tax will not come easily or quickly, 
if it comes at all.
 Income taxes assessed by the states require 
taxpayers to report information from their fed-
eral income tax returns. Taxpayers have already 
completed the difficult work of collecting and 
reporting financial information for federal income 
taxes. They have already done almost all the work 
of determining what income is and is not taxable 
income. State income tax forms require little or no 
adjustments to the federal calculations of taxable 
income. States have different rate structures with 
widely varying tax rates. But tax rates require only 
simple multiplication or looking up information 
in a table. Compared to federal income taxes, the 
work of state income tax reports is simple. As a 
result, people rarely complain about the complexity 
of state income taxes, even though the complex-
ity of federal taxable income is inherent in state 
income taxes.
Sales Tax
The sales tax is the most recently introduced tax. 
Mississippi in 1932 first introduced a general 
sales tax on a broad range of items bought in retail 
establishments within the state. This tax followed 
more selective sales taxes, such as the tax imposed 
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on gasoline that Oregon introduced in 1919, which 
spread rapidly to all states by 1929. The general 
sales tax also spread rapidly, as 13 more states in-
troduced it in 1933; now 45 states have it on most 
goods. Typically, you pay more than 5 percent but 
less than 10 percent of the value of what you buy 
in sales taxes, most of which goes to state gov-
ernment. Twenty-four states also collect and remit 
sales taxes for local governments.18 Merchants col-
lect both state and local sales taxes and remit them 
to the state. The state sends local governments their 
shares based on where purchases were made.
 In all cases, the sales tax is a flat rate tax, since 
everyone pays the same percentage regardless of 
what they buy. Moreover, since the wealthy pur-
chase items that are not taxed, such as services, 
bonds, stocks and travel, this tax is regressive in 
application. Partially to offset the higher percent-
age of the poor’s money that goes toward buying 
food, 31 states exempt at least non-luxury foods 
from sales taxes.19  Florida briefly enacted a sales 
tax on services as well as goods, which of course 
would have shifted more taxes to the wealthy. 
Its application to national advertisers drew much 
protest, threats to stop advertising in Florida, and 
some canceling of conventions. The Florida legis-
lature hurriedly repealed the measure.20
 Texas, among other states, now collects sales 
taxes on some limited services. Massachusetts 
lends an element of progressiveness to its sales 
tax: individual pieces of clothing are not subject to 
a sales tax unless they cost more than $175. If the 
clothing costs more than $175, the sales tax applies 
to the entire value of the item. Sales taxes are only 
regressive because of how they are presently used. 
Sixteen states have specified “sales tax holiday” 
periods. Most occur near the start of the school 
year and exempt school supplies and certain cloth-
ing items.21
 Retail merchants do most of the work of sales 
tax  systems. They collect sales tax from customers 
at the time and point of sale. Later, these funds 
are transferred to state and local governments that 
have sales taxes. Internet and mail order vendors 
must charge sales tax if they have retail outlets 
in the states where goods are delivered. State tax 
collectors have the challenging task of making sure 
these out-of-state businesses pass on the tax funds 
they collect. When they have the option, Internet 
and mail order businesses do not charge sales tax. 
This gives them a competitive price advantage over 
brick-and-mortar businesses.
 Businesses that collect sales taxes at the point 
of sale want out-of-state competitors to charge 
the same taxes. State and local governments, still 
suffering revenue shortfalls because of a slow eco-
nomic recovery, want the tax income from Internet 
and mail order sales. In May 2013, the U.S. Senate 
passed a bill to end tax-free shopping on the Inter-
net by a vote of 69-27. This Marketplace Fairness 
Act died in the House.  The bill was reintroduced 
in the Senate in the next session of Congress.  As 
of December 31,2016, introduction has been the 
only action. 22 If this bill or a future version were to 
pass, imagine the challenge of collecting sales tax-
es from millions of people who sell through eBay, 
Craig’s List and similar sites!
 Sales tax exemptions. As was the case with 
property and income taxes, there are sales that are 
not part of the sales tax base. Stocks, bonds and 
mutual funds are certainly bought and sold, but 
these transactions are not subject to sales tax.  With 
few exceptions, real estate sales are also not sub-
ject to sales tax. It is the case that relatively inex-
pensive everyday purchases are taxed. The most 
expensive things most people ever purchase are 
not subject to sales tax. Once again, the advantage 
goes to the affluent that have the means to make 
such purchases.
 The federal government has never used a gen-
eral sales tax, although its excise taxes on liquor, 
tires, and gasoline are limited sales taxes. In 2015, 
sales taxes provided about 29 percent of tax reve-
nues for state and local governments.23 The sales 
tax, or gross receipts tax, as it is sometimes called, 
remains the best source of funds for the states.
Tax Burden and Tax Incidence
Tax systems decide who pays more and who pays 
less, who wins and who loses. We have discussed 
how only some property value, income and sales 
are part of the property tax, income tax and sales 
tax bases. Tax base is simply that which is sub-
ject to tax—the property, income, and sales being 
taxed. Tax base is multiplied by tax rate to deter-
mine tax liability—individual tax bills. As we have 
seen, tax bases are where the tax advantages and 
loopholes are found. Tax burden is tax bill divided 
by total income. Those with smaller burdens are 
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Figure 5.4 
Regressiveness of State and Local Taxes 1995 
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winners; those with larger burdens are losers.
 There is another important tax phenomenon 
that influences winning and losing, tax shifting. 
Tax shifting occurs when the individuals are able 
to pass the cost of their taxes to others. This most 
frequently occurs in business situations. Landlords 
receive and pay property tax bills, but they pass 
the costs on to renters. Rental property owners use 
rent income to pay taxes. Private companies make 
greater profits to the extent they can pass on their 
costs of doing business to customers. Buyers pay 
business taxes indirectly as part of purchase prices. 
 The concept tax incidence, also called tax 
application, compares tax burdens across income 
groups.  Tax incidence describes which income 
groups are paying more and which income groups 
are paying less of their income in taxes. Neutral tax 
incidence occurs when the bills for all taxpayers 
are the same proportions of their abilities to pay. 
Progressive tax incidence occurs when those with 
greater ability-to-pay are taxed a larger proportion 
than those with lesser ability-to-pay. Regressive 
tax incidence is the opposite: those with the lowest 
ability-to-pay are taxed a larger proportion than 
those with greater ability-to-pay. Stated simply, 
progressive incidence soaks the wealthy, regressive 
incidence soaks the poor, and neutral incidence 
soaks everyone equally.
 Property and sales taxes have flat rates but 
are regressive in incidence. This is because those 
with lower incomes spend more of that income 
on mortgage or rent payments and sales subject 
to tax than the wealthy spend. The wealthy have 
enough income to spend a smaller proportion on 
shelter. They also have sufficient income to invest 
in securities—that is, they can purchase securities 
without having to pay sales tax. Later, when they 
sell the securities, the investment income is subject 
to lower tax rates than ordinary income.
 Federal income taxes and almost all state in-
come taxes have a progressive rate and a progres-
sive incidence. Although large corporations and 
wealthy individuals have more of their income ex-
empt from the income tax base, as a group, greater 
incomes pay a larger share of income in federal 
taxes.
 Each state has its own mix of state and local 
taxes. Each state makes its own choices about tax 
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Figure 5.5 
Regressiveness of State and Local Taxes 2015 
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rates and tax bases.  We now turn to the question 
of assessing how progressive or regressive each 
state’s overall tax system is. This entails comparing 
tax burdens paid by the poor with tax burdens paid 
by the wealthy. If more regressive taxes are used, 
the poor will end up paying a higher percentage 
of their income in state and local taxes than do the 
wealthy. 
 Figures 5.4 and 5.5 plot the percentage of 
income paid in state and local taxes by a state’s 
lowest income 20 percent of residents and the 
percentage paid by the highest one percent in 
income in 1995 and 2015. The diagonal lines show 
where states would be if their state and local taxes 
had the same incidence for both the rich and poor. 
States above this diagonal are progressive in that 
they charge a higher percentage of income for the 
wealthy than for the poor.
 In 1995, four states were above the line and 
had progressive tax incidences: Delaware, Mon-
tana, Idaho and Vermont. Another three states had 
close to neutral tax incidences: California, Oregon 
and South Carolina. In 2015, all fifty states were 
below the line and had regressive tax incidences. 
Only Delaware had close to a neutral incidence. 
Washington has the most regressive state and local 
taxes. The 20% with lowest income there pay 7 
times the tax burden paid by the 1% with highest 
income. Delaware is at the other extreme.  As a 
proportion of income, the lowest there pay less 
than 10 percent more than the highest.
 Figure 5.6 plots the difference between tax 
burdens for the wealthiest and poorest in 1995 and 
2010 to present a picture of change in tax regres-
siveness. The large majority of states became more 
regressive. Kansas, Hawaii, Rhode Island, Ohio, 
and Arizona had the greatest increases in tax re-
gressiveness. New Jersey, Michigan, and Wiscon-
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Figure 5.6 
Regressiveness of State and Local Taxes 1995 and 2015 
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sin had the greatest decreases in tax regressiveness. 
Essentially, all state and local taxes other than pro-
gressive income taxes are regressive in incidence.
 What is the incidence of all federal, state and 
local taxes in America combined? In other words, 
which income groups have the higher total tax bur-
dens? Figure 5.7 is an estimate of  tax burdens by 
income groups for 2015 prepared by Citizens for 
Tax Justice.24 
 Those with higher incomes pay higher tax bur-
dens, but not very much more. The top 1 percent 
income group has the highest tax burden, but it is 
only one percent more than the burdens of the next 
9 percent and less 6 percent more than the middle 
income group. The richest one percent receives 24 
percent of all income in the United States but have 
a tax burden that is only three percent higher than 
that of the next 39 percent who receive more than 
50 percent of all income.
 Figure 5.8 presents an analytic summary of our  
discussion of the three major taxes used by Amer-
ican governments.  It also adds information about 
income predictability, tax visibility and burden by 
age cohort. Property tax revenue is the most pre-
dictable. Local governments know the taxable val-
ue of the property tax base before they set tax rates. 
The only other factor is late payers and non-payers, 
which tends to be consistent in a taxing district 
from year to year. Income tax revenue will be high-
er or lower than predicted if the economy becomes 
stronger or weaker. Sales tax revenue is even more 
sensitive to the strength of the local economy. 
When incomes decrease because of unemployment 
or other factors, consumers reduce their discretion-
ary spending.
 Property tax is highly visible, but only to 
property owners who receive tax bills. Renters can 
know the taxes paid by landlords only if they go to 
the trouble of consulting county tax records. There 
is a line on income tax forms where taxpayers 
identify their total tax payment. However, most of 
us focus more on the refund or additional payment 
due. Sales taxes are the least visible of all. Each 
retail sales receipt identifies the amount of tax paid. 
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Taxes Overview 
 Property Tax Sales Tax Income Tax 
Base Being 
Taxed Wealth Consumption Income 
Primary User Local Governments State Governments Federal Government 
Compliance 
Workload 
Government assesses property, 
determines tax bills, and collect 
taxes 
Retailer vendors report 
sales, determine tax bills, 
and collect taxes 
Taxpayers report income, 
determine tax bills, and 
submit taxes 
Tax Rate Flat Flat Progressive or Flat 
Tax Incidence Regressive Regressive Progressive, Neutral, or Regressive 
Income 
Predictability Highest Lowest Middle 
Visibility Visible to property owners Least visible Partly visible 
Age Cohort Tax 
Burden Older taxpayers Younger more than older Younger taxpayers 
Politics Preferred by nonpartisan local governments 
Preferred by Republicans 
as a “use tax” 
Preferred by Democrats as an 
“ability-to-pay tax” 
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Few of us keep these receipts, even when we take 
them. Can you estimate how much sales tax you 
have paid since January 1 to the nearest $10 or $50 
or $100?
 Different taxes have distinctive impact on 
age cohorts. Property taxes affect older residents 
because they are more likely to have accumulat-
ed property wealth. Younger taxpayers are more 
affected by income taxes because retired older 
taxpayers have lower taxable incomes. Sales taxes 
also affect younger taxpayers more because older 
people purchase less in general and a larger share 
of their purchases (e.g. food, prescriptions, medical 
care) is exempt from sales taxes.
 If you agree that paying more and less is 
germane to winning and losing, you should have 
noticed in the previous paragraph that your age 
group is likely to have a higher tax burden than 
your grandparents’ age cohort. Can it be that older 
Americans have managed to create a tax system 
that is more generous to themselves than to young-
er Americans? If so, how did they do it? In 
Chapter 6, we will argue older Americans are more 
successful in the political arena because they par-
ticipate more strongly and more frequently.
Variations in State Revenue Efforts
Our earlier discussion of tax incidence compared 
burdens of higher and lower income residents.  
What about the burden of state and local taxes 
combined with other state sources of revenue? 
What about the combined state and local revenue 
effort of each state?
 Figure 5.9 shows all sources of revenue for 
state and local governments in 2013. State and 
local governments received 43 percent of total 
revenues from Federal support.  The remaining 57 
percent came from states’ own sources of revenues. 
Of that 57 percent, 17 percent came from taxes and 
40 percent came from other funds.
 Those other funds included revenue from 
current charges, miscellaneous revenue, utility 
revenue, liquor store revenue, and insurance trust 
Figure 5.9 
State and Local Government Revenue Sources 2013 
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revenue, with current charges being the largest 
of these other revenues for state and local gov-
ernments. Current charges include revenue from 
entities such as higher education institutions and 
hospitals. Insurance trust revenue includes pub-
lic-employee retirement systems, unemployment 
compensation systems, state government workers 
compensation systems, and other state government 
social insurance trusts.25
Budgeting by the States
Thirty-one states’ legislatures meet each year and 
pass an annual budget.  Fifteen states’ legislatures 
meet every year and pass budgets for 2 years, 
called biennial budgets. Four states’ legislatures 
meet every other year and pass biennial budgets. 
All but two of the states that pass biennial budgets 
pass separate budgets for each of two years. North 
Dakota and Wyoming pass two-year budgets. 
Biennial legislative sessions and biennial budget-
ing are more likely to be found in less populace 
states.26  Kansas passes annual budgets for some 
agencies and biennial budgets for others. Missou-
ri has an annual operating budget and a biennial 
capital budget.27
 Most often, a state’s budget is a line-by-line 
plan of how the state’ revenues should be spent by 
the many agencies providing services to the public. 
This money pays salaries, buys equipment, and 
generally allows the agency to function. An agen-
cy can spend less than is appropriated but cannot 
spend more. Agencies that spend substantially less 
than their allocations run the risk legislators will 
conclude they received too much and reduce their 
funding in the future.
 A state’s budget must be passed identically in 
both houses of the state legislature. This budget 
is called legislative appropriations and must be 
endorsed, not vetoed, by the governor to become 
official. All governors have power to veto statutory 
legislation, including appropriations. Forty-one 
governors have line-item budget veto power. Al-
though states have various limitations, governors 
with this power can reduce appropriations amounts 
to zero. Twelve of the 41 have reduction vetoes. 
They can reduce appropriation amounts to lower 
amounts other than zero.
 Most states require that the operating budget 
be balanced, meaning that expenditures must be 
offset by revenues plus unspent funds from the 
past. Since there is never an abundance of state 
revenues, the appropriations process involves 
significant conflict. Agencies compete for funds, no 
matter how important or efficient their programs 
are.
 Legislators, governors, and their support staffs 
are tasked to identify the best use of revenue. This 
is easier said than done. Legislators are advocates 
for their districts and will support programs that 
bring home benefits. Governors are chosen in 
statewide elections. Even so, they must be sensitive 
to the preferences of certain voting groups if they 
intend to be reelected. Budgeting is a zero-sum 
game. One program cannot simultaneously spend 
appropriations spent by another program.
 Agencies seek friends in the legislature and 
powerful friends on the outside who can educate 
and influence legislators about the importance of 
maintaining and increasing funding levels. Much 
of what we characterize as politics centers on 
drafting budget proposals and passing appropria-
tions. Decisions about how government will spend 
money have major impacts on who receives more 
and who receives less. Budgets and appropriations 
determine winners and losers. They are at the heart 
of politics in all organizations, both governmental 
and nongovernmental. 
 The public enjoys services provided in the 
budget but most often will object to any visible in-
crease in taxes. As we have discussed, tax rates are 
highly visible; tax bases are not. In good economic 
times, tax bases expand as incomes, sales, and 
property values go up.
 If tax bases increase, budgets can be main-
tained or enhanced without increasing tax rates. 
If bases increase enough, tax rates might even be 
lowered. In other times, certain expansion of in-
come and sales tax bases may go unnoticed. Higher 
assessments on property may result in few com-
plaints.
 In bad economic times, tax bases become 
smaller and revenues decline. The mantra “greater 
efficiency” is repeated more frequency and urgent-
ly. When revenues fall far short of projections, cri-
ses ensue. There is rarely time for thoughtful and 
strategic decisions. The usual options are across-
the-board reductions or emergency tax increases.
 There have been major efforts to reform the 
budgetary process. The goal has been to increase 
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the capacity of legislators and central administra-
tors to understand what agencies have done with 
money in the past and intend to do with money in 
the future. The assumption has been that greater 
transparency and understanding will result in great-
er efficiency.
 Many new forms of budgeting were intro-
duced in the 1960s and 1970s that were intended 
to improve efficiency. These reforms compared the 
program goals, program achievements, and pro-
gram spending. Planned program budgeting, for 
example, required agencies to compute the costs of 
each of their services, thus making it quite evident 
which services were least and most costly. Costly 
programs could then either be made more efficient 
or stricken from the budget.
 Zero-based budgeting requires each agency to 
defend not only the requested increase in their bud-
gets from one budget to the next, but also all dol-
lars in each budget. Without adequate defense of 
even the last year’s budget, the agency might get a 
zero budget (no funds for the next year). Essential 
to such innovations in the allocation of state funds 
is the legislative and executive branches paying 
closer attention to an agency’s total program rather 
than to the increases it seeks. 
 Performance budgeting explicitly links fund-
ing to substantive agency and program missions in 
budget and appropriations documents. During each 
budget cycle, past performances are reviewed and 
evaluated. Positive evaluations can result in addi-
tional funding. Negative evaluations can result in 
warnings, goal revisions, or reduced budgets.
 While these innovations and others have been 
broadly adopted among the states, there is little 
evidence that they improve efficiency. Informa-
tion has been provided in different formats. The 
quantity of information provided to legislators has 
doubled, redoubled, and doubled again. Yet, infor-
mation alone is not sufficient for informed decision 
making. State and local legislators do not have 
sufficient time or expertise to make effective use of 
mountains of budget information. Nor do they have 
staff to do it for them. Budget procedures have 
changed, but budget outcomes have not. Rather 
than varying as a result of events, state budgets 
make predictable changes as they increase from 
year to year. This phenomenon is known as incre-
mentalism.
Incrementalism
Incrementalism is both a strategy of decision-mak-
ing and a description of budgeting decisions.28 
Contrary to the principles of zero-based budgeting, 
state legislators considering appropriations never 
start from zero. They start with information on 
a series of past decisions: amounts spent in pre-
vious years, amounts authorized for spending in 
the current fiscal year or biennium, requests from 
agencies, and a comprehensive revenue estimate 
and budget recommendation that is almost always 
prepared by the executive branch. They give major 
consideration to problem areas such as growing 
needs, crises such as natural disasters, and man-
dates from the federal government and state courts. 
Legislators also listen to those with political power. 
Then, they make a series of compromises between 
budget numbers submitted by agencies, the execu-
tive branch, and the appropriations committees of 
the upper and lower chambers, legislative leaders, 
and others.
 Leaders of governments and other large orga-
nizations frequently draw an analogy with a large 
ship traveling on the ocean. The ship has consider-
able size and speed. It is going in a certain direc-
tion. Changes in direction are possible, but they 
occur slowly. So do changes in speed. Similarly, 
complex organizations make modest annual chang-
es in spending. There is inertia in the behavior of 
organizations comparable to the inertia of a mas-
sive body in motion. 
 Small, predictable changes in state spending 
are the norm because legislators rarely have the 
capacity to contemplate and enact large, unexpect-
ed changes. Spending increases must be balanced 
by revenue increases. Thousands of interests 
compete for state funding. Those who benefit from 
programs in place lobby for spending increases. 
They do not welcome large increases in programs 
that benefit others because budgeting is a zero-sum 
game. Similarly, they do not welcome new large 
programs of expenditure. There is substantial polit-
ical support for continuing the status quo. 
 While small changes are typical, from time 
to time major changes occur.  Sometimes major 
changes are mandated or stimulated by changes in 
Federal Government programs.  Major changes can 
also be mandated by state or federal court orders. 
For state governments, major changes occur at 
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Figure 5.10 
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the program level. Thus, major change can occur 
in smaller parts of budgets while the budget as a 
whole changes modestly.
 Appropriations are the one statutory action 
required of state legislatures. Innumerable actors in 
each state spend enormous time and energy over a 
long period of time for every state budget. Appro-
priations documents are hundreds of pages long 
and contain tens of thousands of separate decisions 
expressed in dollars. Yet, incremental character 
of state budgets suggests little latitude of action 
by budget makers. On the face of it, anyone with 
simple mathematical capabilities could seemingly 
replace the great efforts of all those involved in the 
budgeting process. We could save great time and 
money. At any rate, do not expect much change in 
your state’s overall budgetary commitments in the 
near future.
Expenditures
After budgets have been established and funded 
through appropriations, money is spent throughout 
the fiscal year or biennium. Figure 5.10 shows the 
distribution of state and local government spending 
for 2013. The greatest share of state and local gov-
ernment expenditures, 26 percent, supports educa-
tion. Public welfare, 21 percent, includes support 
of and assistance to needy persons and the admin-
istration of such assistance. Insurance trust spend-
ing, 11 percent, is the counterpart to Insurance 
trust income discussed earlier.29 Transportation is 
9 percent, Environment and housing is 8 percent, 
and other categories are 7 percent or smaller.  In 
Chapter 12, we will consider educational, welfare, 
and crime expenditure differences among the states 
in greater detail.
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Summary
1. When asked, Americans give ambivalent and 
conflicting answers about taxes in general and 
income taxes in particular. We want changes to 
simplify and close loopholes, but we do not want 
to give up current tax breaks.
2. The principle of user pay works well in the 
private sector. Governments employ both user pay 
and ability-to-pay systems to generate revenue.
3. Tax burdens involve both tax rates and tax bases. 
Almost all advantages are in the details of what is 
and is not subject to taxation, tax bases.
4. State and local governments tax income, con-
sumption and property wealth. State systems vary 
greatly in mix, rates and incidences.
5. Tax revenue structures have implications for 
whether the higher or lower income taxpayers 
have higher tax burdens. Progressive tax incidence 
results only, but not necessarily, from income taxes 
with progressive rates. Income taxes do not always 
result in larger tax burdens for higher income tax-
payers.
6. State and local tax incidences have become more 
regressive since 1995. In 2015, state and local gov-
ernment tax incidences in all states are regressive.
7. The burden of all government taxes is progres-
sive for those with the lowest 80% of incomes.  
There is little or no additional progressiveness in 
total tax incidence for the highest 20% of incomes.
8. Budgeting is incremental in two senses: decision 
makers contemplate a limited number of alterna-
tives, and budgets usually change slowly over time.
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Study Guide, Chapter 5
Essay Questions
 1. Some Americans pay federal income taxes, some pay federal payroll taxes and some pay both federal in-
 come and federal payroll taxes.  Would you agree that only those who pay income taxes are contributing to fed-
 eral revenue? Why or why not?  What can we know about a family that, in a given year, pays federal payroll   
 taxes but does not pay federal income tax?
 2. Many political office holders, candidates and commentators argue that the top U.S. federal tax rate for cor-
 porations, 39%, is much higher than the highest rates in other developed nations.  They then conclude that U.S.  
 corporations are paying more in taxes as a share of corporate income than corporations in other developed na-
 tions are paying. What information is ignored in the conclusion drawn from accurate statements about corporate  
 tax rates?  In this case, is partial information sufficient to reach an accurate conclusion?  Explain and give exam-
 ples.
 3. Taken as a whole, state and local taxes have regressive incidences in all states in 2015.  Explain who wins  
 and who loses when taxes are more and less regressive.  In 1995, seven states had progressive or neutral state   
 and local tax incidences.  Does the change from 1995 to 2015 tell us anything about the states?  How would   
 liberals and how would conservatives answer that question? 
 4. A friend complains that “illegal aliens” living and working in the United States get benefits from federal,   
 state and local governments but do not pay any taxes to any governments. This text says, “When it comes   
 to taxes, everyone pays something.”  Give examples of federal state and local taxes paid directly or indirectly by  
 “illegal aliens.”
 5. Explain market failure as it was used in the text.  How can there be legitimate disagreement about when   
 market failures exist?  Include the concept merit goods as part of your explanation. 
 6. A friend complains that learning about tax rates, tax bases, tax loopholes, tax shifting, tax incidence, tax   
 burdens, etc. is a waste of time.  These stale academic ideas have no value in the real world because we can
 trust governments in the United States to impose fair and efficient tax systems.  What would you say to your   
 friend?  Limit your answer to two paragraphs.
 7. Your employer assigns you to find empirical information in Chapter 5 to support the contention that taxes   
 and fees paid to federal, state and local governments in the United States are too high.  What additional infor-
 mation beyond that in the chapter would you require to make a strong argument that was well documented?    
 Would both rich and poor Americans accept your argument?  Why or why not? 
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. According to the 2009 Tax Foundation’s Annual Survey of U.S. Attitudes on Tax and Wealth:
  a. more people want to keep taxes and services where they are or increase them than want to decrease ser-
  vices and lower taxes
  b. more people want to decrease services and lower taxes than keep taxes and services where they are
  c. more people want to increase services and raise taxes than keep taxes and services where they are
  d. the majority of the people do not know what they want
 2. To understand income taxes, one must consider
  a. income subject to taxation
  b. income exempt from taxation
  c. tax rates on different kinds and different levels of income
  d. all of the above
 3. Property tax
  a. has a flat tax rate
  b. is a progressive tax
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  c. is a tax based on income
  d. is a tax based on user pay
 4. Which of the following achieves the greatest efficiency and is now used exclusively in planning state budgets  
 in all states?
  a. Planned program budgeting
  b. Zero-based budgeting
  c. Performance budgeting
  d. none of the above
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Chapter 6 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
We commonly think and say that the United States 
of America is a democracy. A more accurate state-
ment would be the United States practices repre-
sentative democracy at all levels of government. 
Direct democracy has practical limitations. Imagine 
that a vote on an important decision is about to be 
made. Before ballots are cast, each eligible voter is 
allotted 5 minutes to address all others. Wyoming 
would need more than 26 days of nonstop discus-
sion. California would need more than 235 days. If 
citizens insisted on responding to each other before 
the vote, the ensuing discussion would take months 
in Wyoming and years in California.
 At one time, poor communication and transpor-
tation made any direct government all but impos-
sible except on a small and local scale. In the days 
before amplification, no one could be heard in a 
gathering of many hundreds of people. Voting at 
such meetings would be difficult. Counting hun-
dreds of raised hands or paper ballots would be 
easier said than done. Even assembling everyone in 
one location would be complicated. Before public 
transportation, the automobile, and modern high-
ways, a trip of even 50 miles would have been a 
day’s travel.
 Modern communication and transportation may 
make such direct governing more practical, but 
the procedures of an earlier time remain. Amer-
ican government continues to be organized by 
geography. So does most participation. This could 
change as the digital and virtual worlds become 
more important. For all but the oldest in the pop-
ulation, communications in person are declining 
in frequency and importance. Email, cell phones, 
instant messaging, text messaging, twittering, and 
video conferencing have replaced them. Facebook 
and MySpace social networking websites may be-
come the prototype for representation in the future 
through virtual election districts. Self-identified 
communities of interest—friendships—might be the 
units choosing legislators. But no technology within 
our imagination would make it possible for direct 
democracy to replace representative democracy in 
American governments.
 There are some opportunities for participation 
using the technology of the 18th century that come 
close to direct democracy. Some identify New 
England town meetings as examples. The underly-
ing idea of the town meeting is that the legislative 
body consists of citizens, not their representatives. 
Those who come to a town meeting act as the leg-
islature. If attendance is sufficiently high, decisions 
are guaranteed to reflect public opinion. In the real 
world, such turnout is extremely rare. Percentage 
attendance at town meetings is typically in the low 
double digits. The way they operate, town meetings 
are also examples of representative democracy. 
Those present make decisions for themselves and 
for those absent.
 It is normal in governments across the country  
for the few to act for the many. This has been true 
throughout our history. Many think our political 
institutions fulfill the expectations of a democra-
cy. They believe that the public policies enacted 
by Congress, the states and local governments are 
indistinguishable from those that would have been 
enacted had the entire public been involved. Others 
find strong evidence that the representatives making 
policy on behalf of the public inherently results in 
policies preferred by representatives but not neces-
sarily by the public. Empirically, the disagreement 
is grounded in conflicting interpretations of the 
quantity and quality of public stimuli and govern-
mental responses.
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 In this chapter, we consider the general pub-
lic’s role in governing. In later chapters, the focus 
shifts to the more active elite, such as political 
party leaders, pressure groups, legislators and city 
council members, governors, mayors, and judges.
Participation Opportunities
You have many opportunities to participate in mak-
ing public policy and influencing the many govern-
ments that affect your life. We will start with those 
political acts that play a very direct role in govern-
ing and making policy and then move to those that 
only indirectly shape policy, such as voting.
Seeking Public Office
Our federal system has many elective officials at 
all levels of government. Overall in the United 
States, there are more than 270,000 elected offices 
to be filled and refilled after 2 years or so. Only 
one of these elected officials has a national constit-
uency, the president of the United States, sharing 
the ticket with a vice president. Although there are 
other elected officials who serve in the national 
government, 100 senators and 435 representatives 
to Congress, they are all elected by either state or 
local districts. There are 7,382 state legislators, 
most elected for 2-year terms and all from local 
districts. Finally, there are more than 259,000 city 
council, school board, county commission, and 
town or township board members to be elected.1  In 
short, hundreds of thousands could directly partici-
pate in government by holding one of these offices 
at least for some short time.
 We have great opportunity to run for public 
office in the United States, and although many of 
these offices do not attract much media or public 
attention, many can hold public office at some time 
during their life. Assuming a 2-year term, two can-
didates for each position, and a 78-year life span 
with 57 of those years being eligible for holding 
public office, nearly 17 million Americans could 
have experience at least running for public office. 
This would be about 7.5 percent of adult Ameri-
cans.
 Only a small minority ever seeks to govern. 
Less than 1 percent of the Americans seek elective 
positions. This small proportion makes it appear 
“abnormal” to run for public office. Some have 
suggested that only abnormal personalities must be 
so attracted. 
 Running for office is costly in many ways. 
Contenders must gather campaign contributions, 
lose privacy, and be objects of criticism. Election 
battles may involve disparagement from oppo-
nents. Some of it may be personal and humiliating. 
Candidates must see benefit beyond gratification 
for being civically active. This may just be vanity, 
but it may be more serious. Lasswell suggests a 
“psychopathology of politics” to capture this idea.2 
Children may say they want to grow up to be presi-
dent, but few will seek the office, much less have a 
chance to win.
 Local offices filled by nonpartisan elections, 
such as city council or school board membership, 
might attract more “average” persons and thus 
result in more normal personalities in those offices. 
Political science has yet to provide research assess-
ing whether elected officials are abnormal and thus 
unrepresentative of the public.3 Although there is 
no demonstration that it is true, local elective of-
ficeholders probably differ least from their constit-
uents.
 In the broadest terms, we all want quality indi-
viduals to be our representatives and to be respon-
sive to our demands and interests in how they gov-
ern. But what if the “best” people will not tolerate 
our uninformed demands for how they should act? 
Perhaps the best people will not seek public offic-
es for exactly this reason, and those who do have 
other personal psychological needs that they meet 
when they are a mayor, senator, representative, or 
president.
 Democratic elections may provide a safety 
valve to relieve the displeasure of people whose 
positions on issues are not supported or are ignored 
by government. If you feel strongly about an issue, 
you can seek to influence the decision directly by 
seeking and winning public office. You can also 
support others and defeat those whose actions you 
oppose. This option may dampen the threat that 
people will resort to violent means to get their 
preferences in public policy.4 Other direct forms of 
participation include protest, rebellion, assassina-
tion, and insurrection. None of these activities is at 
all common in the United States. Only the first is 
even condoned as freedom of speech.
 We have to go back to the 1960s for the most 
recent example of massive, sustained protest 
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against government policy in the United States. 
Yet, even at the height of demonstrations against 
the Vietnam War, less than 1 percent was ever 
involved in protesting our military involvement 
there.5 We have no information on the minuscule 
percentages involved in other direct acts. Never-
theless, beginning with Shays’ Rebellion in 1786 
and with the excesses by the general public in the 
French Revolution, many have been alarmed by 
the potential of public excess in democracy. This 
subject, too, will be discussed later, but it may 
explain why few express concern with the lack of 
public involvement in governing.
Attending Public Meetings
As we move from more direct forms of partici-
pation to those that affect policy less directly, the 
number of people involved increases. We have 
many opportunities to attend various public meet-
ings, although our expressed opinions may not 
influence the vote by the school board, city coun-
cil, or county commission. Local governments and 
legislatures invite the public to attend their delib-
erations, although often those watching may have 
no opportunity to speak. Sometimes, however, 
officials can read the audience response as an indi-
cation of how the public feels, and it may influence 
their votes.
 Public attendance in meetings concerning 
governments at all levels covers a very broad 
range. There are official public hearings by stand-
ing committees within state legislatures concern-
ing possible new laws, such as permitting a state 
lottery, or reforming workers’ compensation. The 
average citizen, however, is unlikely to be heard in 
such hearings. There are actual business meetings 
of the city councils and school boards in which the 
audience may be allowed to speak; there are less 
formal public meetings to interact with the candi-
dates preceding elections, and many governments 
ask citizens’ advice on what the future of the city 
or schools should look like. Elected officials often 
schedule such meetings to assure their reelection 
by impressing the public that they care about con-
stituents.
 The extent of public participation in such 
activities is not clearly known, but we can make 
estimates. Across five democracies, 28 percent 
of the public claims to have ever attempted to 
influence the outcome of a government decision 
in their local community and about 16 percent at 
the national level.6 Nineteen percent claim to have 
attended at least one political meeting or rally 
in the last 3 years, and 30 percent claim to have 
worked with others in trying to solve some com-
munity problem.7 The National Election Studies of 
how people vote in presidential and congressional 
elections typically find about 8 percent claiming 
to have attended a political meeting. This figure 
has varied little over time.8 Only about one in ten 
attended a school board meeting within the past 
year.9 At most, about one American in four is 
present at a public hearing or meeting over a year’s 
time. Moreover, many of them say nothing at these 
meetings. Also, some of these activity reports may 
be false. We have been taught that a “good” citizen 
is supposed to be involved. Some respondents an-
swer incorrectly so questioners will think they are 
good citizens.
Communicating with Representatives
A less direct but more common act is to write to 
an elected official. About three in ten claim to have 
written to an elected official.10 Writing to congres-
sional representatives is probably the most com-
mon, even if Congress has nothing to do with the 
problem. Congressional staff members devote con-
siderable time to answering and tabulating these 
letters. Congressional lore holds that responding to 
constituents’ communications is key to reelection.
We know those who write to members of Congress 
are both well educated (probably because they feel 
comfortable in writing) and ideological (in that 
they appear to be sufficiently motivated to write).11 
These are all individual efforts to influence public 
policy. Now we turn to voting, an aggregate action 
that is supposed to influence public policy. It is ag-
gregate in the sense that only your individual vote 
plus many more accumulating to either a plurality 
or a simple majority are needed to accomplish 
anything.
The Public Initiating and Repealing Laws— 
Direct Democracy
Some states and communities allow the public to 
make public policy decisions directly. Sometimes 
this voting is on constitutional or statutory law.
such as the initiative and referendum in California. 
118 • Chapter 6
Sometimes it is on budgets, such as the practice in 
New York and several other states of having the 
public endorse (or reject) a school district’s budget. 
Sometimes it is a request by a local government to 
borrow money for a project that will have a long 
lifespan.
 Referendum (sometimes “popular referen-
dum”) allows citizens to approve or disapprove 
proposals passed by state legislatures.  In 23 states, 
identified in Figure 6.1, mandatory legislative 
referendums are required to enact or reject con-
stitutional amendments and certain statutory laws 
proposed by state legislatures. The voters have the 
final say in those states. All states permit optional 
legislative referendums where legislative bodies re-
assign decisions they could have made themselves 
to voters. This occurs when those empowered by 
representative democracy prefer decisions made 
by direct democracy. Some optional legislative 
referendums ask for advice only and do not make 
binding decisions.12
 The initiative process allows citizens to enact 
a proposal of a new law or constitutional amend-
ment that is placed on the ballot by petition, that 
is, by collecting signatures of a certain number of 
citizens. The 24 states that permit citizen-initiated 
lawmaking are identified in Figure 6.2.13
 The initiative processes starts with collecting 
the signatures of enough registered voters on peti-
tions within a prescribed time. Enough is typically 
defined as 3 to 10 percent of the number voting for 
governor in the last election (California requires 
5 percent). Qualified initiatives are automatically 
up for popular votes. Qualified indirect initiatives 
require legislative approval before being scheduled 
for popular votes. There are only two options on 
the ballot: for and against. A majority vote in the 
election passes or repeals law.14
 Direct democracy through initiative and ref-
erendum was adopted primarily in the early 20th 
century. Of 24 states with initiative or referendum, 
21 had implemented something by 1918. Since 
Figure 6.1 
States With Referendum 
States With 
Referendum 
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then, three states have adopted them and three 
states have made modifications. There is not much 
reason to expect that additional states will approve 
initiative or referendum.15 Although the Progres-
sives considered the referendum as important as 
the initiative, in practice, referendums are fairly 
rare, especially compared to initiatives.
 Every 4 years, the contest for the presidency 
tops the ballot. In most states, ballots also contain 
contests for other federal offices, then state and 
county contests. Occasionally, other local govern-
ment elections come next. When initiatives and 
referendums are decided at the same time, they 
appear at the end of the ballot. Characteristically, 
many who vote for the top offices on the ballot fail 
to vote at the bottom of the ballot. This declining 
vote from the head of the ballot to the bottom is 
labeled roll-off. Only half of voters make choic-
es for all offices and referendums on an election 
ballot. When turnout is low, those who vote are 
less like the general public; and when many voters 
fail to vote at the lower end of the ballot, those that 
do are probably even less like the general public. 
These voters decide the fate of initiatives and ref-
erendums and most candidates for state and local 
offices.
 As noted in Chapter 4, nearly all states have 
public  referendums on state constitutional amend-
ments. This voter approval or disapproval follows 
proposals from state legislatures. Most states also 
permit local governments to hold public referen-
dums on local legislation.16 The city council, rather 
than the public, decides whether it wants to test 
public opinion in such cases. In addition, some 
states and local governments hold nonbinding ad-
visory votes or “straw polls.” The federal govern-
ment offers no such opportunities for the public to 
make policy decisions or even to express its views.
 When asked, most state legislators say the most 
important thing they do is “kill bad bills.” The 
initiative process can propose bad laws that could 
seriously injure the state and its future or that just 
Figure 6.2 
States With Initiative 
No Initiative 
Initiative for statutes 
Initiative for constitution 
Initiative for statutes and constitution 
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would be dumb policy. Some years ago, Califor-
nians were asked to vote on an initiative that would 
have limited the governor’s salary to $80,000 and 
set a maximum compensation of other state and 
local officials at 80 percent of this, or $64,000, 
including fringe and retirement benefits. Had 
this measure passed (it did not), several thousand 
school superintendents, police chiefs, football 
coaches, and other officials would have had to take 
pay cuts or seek jobs in other states. California’s 
future efforts in fighting both crime and other 
states’ PAC-12 teams would have been hurt.
 Although the debate over the advisability of di-
rect initiative will no doubt continue, the evidence 
suggests that the resulting legislation is not easily 
classified, nationwide, as either conservative or 
liberal.17 Within individual states, decisions made 
by initiative reflect ideological preferences of the 
majority of voters.
 There are individuals and groups that are mak-
ing a career of promoting initiatives.18 California 
and Washington have seen the growth of an “ini-
tiative industry” that specializes in getting signa-
tures on petitions and in spending great amounts of 
money to influence the outcome of referendums on 
initiatives. Many suggest that interest groups can 
more easily influence the public in the initiative 
process than they can influence state legislatures. 
We have no definitive data because interest groups 
prefer to keep their activities out of the public eye 
as much as possible. Ironically, the populist ini-
tiative process may actually have given power to 
interest groups instead of to the people. The ini-
tiative has not proven to be a viable form of direct 
democracy usable in large democracies.
Voting for Elected Offices—Indirect Democracy
Of all possible actions that citizens might take 
in governing, only one, voting for public office-
holders, occasionally attracts a majority. These 
elections can be viewed as indirect democracy, or 
a “Republican Form of Government.” Voters can 
affect policy indirectly by supporting candidates 
they agree with and defeating candidates they dis-
agree with. Once in office, winners might be able 
to achieve what their followers hoped for.
Making a Choice at the Polls
The potential information and consideration that 
precede a choice among several candidates can be 
enormous. The simplest choice involves a single 
issue with two possible positions and two candi-
dates who take opposing stances. The voter need 
only decide which option and candidate he or she 
prefers.
 The complexity of this process grows enor-
mously with additional candidates and issues, with 
lack of clarity of the candidates’ positions, and 
with the voter’s need to decide which issues are 
most important. The typical election is likely to 
be much more complex than the single issue with 
clear alternative candidate positions first suggested 
above.
 On each of the issues, one has to become in-
formed and to form one’s personal opinion. Then 
one has to gather information from the candidates, 
and they may not want to take clear positions for 
fear of losing votes to an opponent. Finally, one 
must choose rationally between the two or three 
or more candidates. In addition, one must decide 
which issues are more important. Active involve-
ment in gathering information and participating, 
being informed, and rationally supporting the can-
didate who best reflects one’s personal positions 
are the desirable, if difficult, goals to achieve. They 
are, however, the standards for voters in a democ-
racy. This is called the Rational Activist Model of 
Democracy.
Unanticipated Issues
Finally, one additional requirement for voting 
makes the voter’s task all but impossible. One has 
to select the candidate that takes one’s position on 
unanticipated issues. If at the time of the election, 
no one anticipates a shortfall in the budget or the 
need to ratify a national constitutional amendment, 
the voter nevertheless must select the candidate 
that will vote consistently with the voter’s personal 
positions. But, you ask, how can anyone do that?
 If something about the candidate allows predic-
tions as to how that candidate will vote on unantic-
ipated issues and the voter knows it, the choice can 
be made. Past votes may predict representative’s 
votes on future unanticipated issues, which may be 
a reason to support the known incumbent presently 
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holding the office. But how can one make predic-
tions about challengers who have no experience 
in office available for review? Are labels such as 
“conservative” and “Democrat” sufficient to pre-
dict future behavior?
 Winning candidates gain little information on 
public preferences from elections. They won, but 
they cannot be certain why. Winners may think or 
believe their victory gave them mandates. Some 
think a larger margin of victory means more of 
their campaign talking points have become di-
rectives to enact policies. These beliefs motivate 
behavior, but need not be supported by any specific 
empirical evidence.
Turnout in Various Elections
In the 2012 presidential election, President Barack 
Obama, the Democratic candidate, won 332 of 
538 Electoral College votes, 62 percent. He had 
the support of about 51 percent of just over 122 
million voters. American presidents usually re-
ceive more votes than any of their opponents and 
also a majority of the popular vote. Yet, neither is 
necessary to win the election. Because of votes for 
minor party candidates, President Clinton in 1992 
and 1996 as well as President George W. Bush in 
2000 did not receive a majority of the popular vote. 
Moreover, in 2000, President George W. Bush 
received fewer popular votes—but more Electoral 
College votes—than Al Gore.
 Figure 6.3 shows turnout in elections for Pres-
ident, Governor and Congress from 1960 to 2014. 
Voter turnout in the 2012 presidential election 
was about 58 percent of Americans old enough to 
vote.  Turnout for typical elections to the House of 
Representatives was less than 30 percent. This is 
hardly a ringing endorsement. Few, if any, elected 
officials in the U.S. can say that more than half of 
the electorate voted for them. Perhaps a majority of 
voters supported them, but certainly not a majority 
of all who could have voted. This means none can 
say they have majority approval of the public.
 Most state public offices are filled in elections 
in November of even-number years, when either 
the election for president or for governor heads the 
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ballot. In a few states, both contests are held in the 
same year. As Figure 6.3 shows, in most presiden-
tial-election years the greatest voter participation 
is in the contest for governor. Turnout for guber-
natorial elections is 2 percent higher than turnout 
for presidential elections in these election years. 
Turnout for Congressional elections typically trails 
the vote for governor by 5 to 7 percentage points.
 When the president is not on the ballot (called 
off year elections), turnout is typically 15 to 20 
percentage points lower than in presidential-elec-
tion years. Governors in most states head the ballot 
in off years and usually do better than congressio-
nal candidates by about 2 to 3 percentage points.
 The overall pattern is for presidential candi-
dates to get a turnout of 55 percent. Governors in 
off years get turnouts of about 42 percent. Con-
gress in presidential years gets about 51 percent of 
possible turnout and in off years about 39 percent. 
Figure 6.3 shows turnout for all of these contests 
trended downward until 1988. Since then, it has 
fluctuated.
 Few study the turnout of voters for local elec-
tions. Since nearly 70 percent of local elections 
are held when no state or national office is on the 
ballot, such as in the spring of 2017, turnout is low. 
One nationwide survey reports that municipalities 
claim a 33 percent turnout.19 Research in the San 
Francisco Bay area shows a 31 percent turnout.20 
There is reason to question whether, when calculat-
ing local turnout, city clerks divide by the number 
of those eligible (which they seldom know), or by 
those registered (which they do know). Since few 
of those who move bother to register to vote for 
local elections, we cannot even be certain of the 
percentage of those eligible who are registered. 
Typically, only about 72 percent of those eligible 
are registered. Non-citizens, however, cannot regis-
ter or vote.
 One study divided the ballots cast by the 
eligible electorate that are citizens and found that 
just over 26 percent bothered to vote.21 Thus, true 
turnout in local elections probably barely exceeds 
25 percent. No city council member or mayor can 
claim much of a mandate for a governmental ac-
tion, inasmuch as probably no more than one in six 
to eight voting-eligible adults voted for him or her.
 The lowest turnout happens at the level of 
government acclaimed as “closest to the people.” 
Perhaps individuals feel that a non-voter can influ-
ence local government as successfully as a voter. 
Perhaps citizens vote less often when elections are 
uncontested. Do Americans feel psychologically 
closest to elected officials who live nearby? Or, 
do they feel psychologically closest to the person 
whose election received more media coverage than 
all other elections combined: the President?
Trends in turnout
Figure 6.3 tracks turnout over time since 1960. 
With 1960 as a benchmark to judge trends, we can 
see all offices elected in presidential years decline 
smoothly between 1960 and 1990, with the excep-
tion of 1982.22 Turnout in presidential years has 
increased steadily starting in 2000. Much has been 
said about the 1960 through 1990 turnout decline, 
especially that for president.23
 Off year elections (the bottom two lines) 
always have lower turnout but fail to show any 
smooth trends. Many possible explanations, rang-
ing from increased alienation from and less iden-
tification with political parties, poor presidential 
candidates selected by both political parties, a 
changing pattern of participation stressing more 
direct involvement, and increasingly negative cov-
erage of politics by the news media, fail to account 
for the differences and trends.
Who Can Vote?
The 26th Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution specifies that the states must allow U.S. 
citizens who are 18 years of age or older to vote. 
States can and do grant the right to vote to citizens 
younger than 18. Many states permit 17-year-olds 
to vote in primary elections and caucuses if they 
will be 18 years of age by the general election day. 
Today, all states also require that to vote, an indi-
vidual must be both a citizen of the United States 
and a resident of the state.
 There are two other constitutionally allowed  
restrictions on who is allowed to vote: felons and 
those not competent to conduct their own affairs. 
All states except Maine and Vermont do not allow 
felons in prison to vote. Most also do not allow fel-
ons on probation or parole to vote until they have 
completed all conditions. Most states once denied 
the vote to those convicted of a felony even after 
they have served their sentence, and this restric-
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Figure 6.4 
Voting Age Population and Voting Eligible Population Turnout 1960-2014 
Voting Eligible Presidential Election Years 
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Voting Eligible Non-Presidential Election Years 
Voting Age Non-Presidential Election Years 
tion has not been found unconstitutional.24 Today, 
only Kentucky and Virginia retain this lifetime 
penalty.25 In 2014, more than 4 million felons were 
not eligible to vote.26 Finally, most states disallow 
the vote of the mentally ill and those protected by 
guardians. 
 One study suggests that the declining turnout 
can be partly explained by the way we measure 
turnout rates. Turnout is normally measured in 
terms of number of voters divided by those old 
enough to vote, the population 18 years and older. 
This called voting age population turnout. Critics 
argue this measure is less accurate not as useful as 
it has been in the past for two reasons.
 First, the number of non-citizens—both legal 
and illegal—has become large.  They are part of 
the voting age population but they are not eligible 
to vote. Second, the number of felons ineligible to 
vote has become large.  Including non-citizens and 
ineligible felons as part of the population eligible 
to vote overstates potential voters and underesti-
mates turnout rates.27
 Turnout of voting eligible population has been 
proposed as an alternative to voting age popula-
tion Estimating voting eligible population means 
subtracting from voting age population the non-cit-
izens and felons who are old enough but not legally 
allowed to vote. Figure 6.4 provides such an esti-
mate.
 The same pattern of turnout fluctuation is ap-
parent in Figure 6.4 whether voting age population 
or voting eligible population is used to measure 
turnout. We cannot account for the decline from 
1960 to 1990, but the differences between offices 
seem enduring.
VAP and VEP Turnout in Texas
Figure 6.5 illustrates the difference between Voting 
age population (VAP) and Voting Eligible popula-
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Figure 6.5 
Texas Voting Age Turnout and Voting Eligible Turnout 2014 
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tion (VEP) turnout for the 2014 primary and gen-
eral elections in Texas.  The pie charts of VAP are 
divided into categories of interest. Non-citizens, 
14% and Ineligible felons 2% are in the VAP but 
excluded from the VEP.  For both elections, 15% 
of eligible residents did not register.
 In the primary elections, 59% of VAP were 
registered but did not vote and 9.1% voted.  The 
turnout rate for VEP was 11.0%.  In the general 
elections, 47% were registered but did not vote and 
23.8% voted.  The turnout rate for VEP was 28.3%. 
For both elections, the largest group of non-voters 
was registered to vote.
 Texas is consistently a low turnout state.  In 
2014, its VAP turnout was the lowest in the nation.  
However, Indiana and New York had lower VEP 
turnout than Texas.  Both had lower proportions of 
non-citizens and ineligible felons than Texas.
 Figure 6.6 is a graphic that divides Texas VAP 
population into VEP, ineligible non-citizens and 
ineligible felons from 1980 to 2016.  The total of 
VAP not included in VEP increased from 5% in 
1980 to 16% starting in 2006.
 Figure 6.7 maps the percent of VAP excluded 
from VEP in 2014.  Non-citizens comprise the 
largest excluded group in most states.
Why Do Americans Vote Less?
We do know that some Western democracies 
have seen an even greater decline, whereas others 
show some increase in turnout.28 We cannot easily 
account for the different turnout levels between 
countries. We can see in Figure 6.8 that few other 
democracies have lower turnout in their national 
elections than does the United States. Of 72 nations 
that held presidential elections from 2010 to 2013, 
55 had higher and only 13 had lower voter turnout.
 Four factors largely account for our voting less: 
lack of party-group linkage, registration restric-
Figure 6.7
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tions, lack of penalties for failure to vote, and voter 
exhaustion.
Party-Group Linkages
First and most important, we lack party-group 
linkages found in other democracies. These are en-
during and sharp correspondence between political 
parties and major segments of society.29 America 
does not have the sharp class polarization found in 
other democracies.
 If we wanted to strengthen group-party linkag-
es, what action might be taken? The most effective 
change might be to abandon our winner-take-all 
system of district elections and change to a sys-
tem of proportional representation that stimulates 
creation of multiple minority parties linked to a 
variety of social groups. No one has proposed, or 
is likely to propose, such major transformation of 
fundamental American political institutions.
Voter Registration
The second reason for low turnout in American 
elections is our system of voter registration. 
We have registration procedures least likely to 
encourage participation. In other democracies, 
government is active in making sure citizens will 
be eligible to vote. For example, in many other 
countries, students are registered to vote by their 
schools when they become old enough. Some 
countries employ registrars who go door to door 
just before an election to maximize the number of 
citizens eligible to vote. Elsewhere in the world, 
government is proactive in registering citizens to 
vote. In the United States, citizens themselves must 
be proactive to secure the right to vote.
 Registration is required in all states except 
North Dakota.30   The typical requirement is reg-
istration must be completed 30 days before an 
election. However, registration on Election Day 
Figure 6.8 
Percent Voting Age Population Turnout in Presidential Elections 2010-2013 
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is available in 13 states and is scheduled to begin 
in Vermont in 2017 and Hawaii in 2018.31 Such 
procedures increase turnout by between 5 and 13 
percent with no additional fraud, such as persons 
voting who are not eligible.32
 Twenty-five states have used or approved 
registration through the Internet.33 In 2015, Oregon 
implemented “automatic registration,” a system 
that automatically registers all eligible voters who 
are in the Department of Motor Vehicles database.  
Voters do not need to take any action to register, 
but they can “opt out” of being on the registered 
voter list.34 One study suggests that with easier reg-
istration procedures, turnout could be increased by 
14 percent.35 Such an increase in the United States 
would leave us below more than half of the other 
countries in Figure 6.8.
 Congress passed the National Voter Registra-
tion Act of 1993, called “motor voter law,” as an 
attempt to increase registration.  The law required 
states to make voter registration materials available 
at state offices with high citizen traffic. However, 
materials did have to be displayed prominently 
and no one was required to let visitors know about 
them.
 The 1993 law became important in July 2013 
when the Supreme Court decided that Arizona 
could not require applicants to use a state registra-
tion form that required proof of citizenship. This 
was because the 1993 law required states to “ac-
cept and use” a federal form that asks, “Are you a 
citizen of the United States?” Prospective voters 
must check a box for yes or no, and they must sign 
the form, swearing under the penalty of perjury 
that they are citizens. The court ruled that Arizona 
could not supersede the requirements of the federal 
form for registering residents to vote in elections 
for federal offices.36
No Penalty for Not Voting
Many countries apply fines and penalties for fail-
ure to vote. You would, for example, receive a ci-
tation for failure to vote. This happens in Australia. 
Citation receivers must either explain their failure 
to vote or pay a fine of $20. Again, were the states 
to impose such a penalty, our turnout apparently 
would increase. Presumably, a severe fine would 
have a larger effect. Few would fail to vote were 
the fine $1,000. Some would question the value of 
a vote from someone who did so only to avoid a 
fine. Nevertheless, many democracies do penalize 
those who fail to vote, with no apparent loss of 
quality in voters’ decisions. One can only imagine 
the outcry if someone were to propose that Ameri-
cans who fail to vote should be fined.
Exhausted Voters
One final aspect of how Americans vote should be 
considered. Americans may participate at lower 
levels because they are fatigued by the number of 
times they must go to the polls.37 We call this the 
exhausted voter explanation for why Americans 
vote less. As noted earlier, we elect more than 
270,000 officials, with most elected to 2 or 4-year 
terms. Most of us live under many governmental 
jurisdictions—a city council, a school board, a 
county, a state, and a nation. We can expect every 4 
years to be asked to vote for as many as a hundred 
officials in probably four general elections and four 
more primaries.
 Citizens of many other democracies may have 
as few as three officials representing them—a 
member of parliament, a city council member, and 
a mayor. Is exhaustion, impatience, or possibly 
uncertainty about who is in charge at the root of 
lower U.S. participation?
 Americans have four strikes against their par-
ticipating in elections. In part this is a result of our 
history (the Reform Movement), our governmental 
format (Federalism and many offices to fill), and 
our election institutions (the Winner Takes All for-
mat). Partisan gerrymandering of election districts 
to virtually guarantee victory to one of the major 
parties means winners will be chosen by the very 
small percent of those who vote in partisan primary 
elections.  Even though statewide turnout might be 
more than 50 percent in a general election, most 
winners for state legislative and Congressional 
positions will have already been determined in 
primary elections.
Convenience Voting to Encourage Turnout
The states have not been proactive in registering 
citizens and have not penalized those who do not 
vote. Some have attempted to increase turnout by 
implementing convenience-voting procedures to 
make voting easier. Mail voting, no excuse absen-
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tee voting, early voting, and election-day registra-
tion are examples. Since World War II, most states 
have allowed some voters to cast their ballots by 
mail (or absentee vote, as it is called). Those who 
are hospitalized or expect to be out of the state on 
Election Day can apply for such a ballot, which 
is completed and returned by mail and the signa-
ture is checked against that on the voter registra-
tion. Since the 1970s, these procedures have been 
allowed for all voters in many states. Consistently, 
turnouts of more than 50 percent have been record-
ed when all vote by mail.38  Such elections have 
proved to be about one-third less expensive and 
show little fraud.39 Starting with the presidential 
election of 2000, Oregon has used mail-in ballots 
for all voting.
 Although there are many advantages to mail 
voting and other convenience voting procedures, 
increased voter turnout is not one of them. The 
Center for the Study of the American Electorate 
has reported that, with the exception of the 1998 
elections, states that adopt these reforms have a 
worse performance in the aggregate than those that 
do not.40
Cumulative Voting to Encourage Turnout
In voting for the city council in Peoria, Illinois, 
voters can, if they chose, cumulate their votes for 
seats on the council and give them to a single can-
didate. In a normal at-large election, voters can cast 
as many votes as there are positions to be filled but 
can give each candidate only one vote. In cumu-
lative elections, voters can give more than one of 
their votes to a single candidate. If they choose, 
they can cast all their votes for one candidate.
 Imagine a city council with five members elect-
ed at-large. A minority with 30 percent of the vote 
can seldom, if ever, outvote the majority in normal 
elections. Cumulative voting allows members of 
such a minority to cast all votes for one candidate. 
This is supposed to improve the chances of mi-
norities gaining at least one seat. Although it took 
two such cumulative elections before the minority 
realized that a single minority candidate was neces-
sary to gain the advantage offered by cumulative 
voting, in the spring of 1995, Peoria did see an 
African-American endorsed candidate win a city 
council seat. 
 Single vote, winner-take-all election contests 
make it difficult for any small group to outvote the 
majority. Those whose candidates have no chance 
of winning have little incentive to vote. One study 
has estimated turnout is 5 percent higher under 
proportional election systems than in normal plu-
rality elections.41 In addition to Peoria, cumulative 
voting is used for city council elections in numer-
ous cities in Alabama and Texas.
 It is also used to elect school boards in more 
than 50 independent school districts.42 It has been 
used as a remedy in voting rights cases where 
minorities have been excluded from holding office. 
Yet, cumulative voting is not a well known voting 
system option in the United States. Apparently, in-
creased voter turnout and increased minority office 
holders are not particularly high on the agenda of 
American local governments.
Recent Efforts to Discourage Voting
Some states are taking action to make voting less 
convenient. Since 2010, 17 states have enacted 
new requirements that voters must show photo 
identification. In 9 of those states, acceptable photo 
identification is “strict,” that is, limited to only a 
few government issued credentials.  In those states 
and in two states that require non-photo ID, voters 
without acceptable identification must vote on a 
provisional ballot and also take additional steps 
after Election Day for it to be counted.43
 The legal challenge is that these new laws do 
not provide equal treatment.  Individuals who do 
not already have approved photo identification may 
be required to obtain them at great time and re-
quest.  In Texas, prospective voters would need to 
travel to a state Department of Public Safety office 
to get an election ID card. Although the card would 
be free, those seeking it would have to verify their 
identity to obtain one. In some cases, a certified 
copy of a birth certificate costing $22 would be 
necessary. Federal judges found that the fees and 
the cost of traveling for those voters lacking one 
of the specified forms of ID disproportionately 
affected the poor and minorities, noting many 
would have to travel 200 to 250 miles to and from 
a D.P.S. office.44
 Two days earlier, another federal court held 
that the Texas Legislature discriminated intention- 
ally against minority voters in drawing electoral 
district maps. Texas’ election districts and attempts 
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to enforce “inconvenience voting” laws would 
impact most those voters who support the current 
majority party in Texas the least.45
 In Ohio, Florida, Georgia, Tennessee and West 
Virginia, Republican-led legislatures dramatical-
ly reduced early voting in 2012 as part of what 
the Huffington Post characterized as “a concerted 
effort to suppress the votes of Democratic-leaning 
voters.“46 Some states are taking action that would 
reduce voting convenience and create new barriers 
to voting. One possible explanation is Republi-
cans think that higher turnout puts them in greater 
jeopardy of losing elections. However, it is also 
the case that the states making voting more chal-
lenging are states with political cultures that do not 
value high voter turnout.  In the past, majorities of 
Democrats in those states took action to suppress 
turnout of minority and lower income voters.
 Apparent efforts to suppress voting have con-
tinued through the primary elections of 2016.  A 
Google search of “voting problems 2016” in April 
2016 resulted in links to “Wisconsin’s Voter ID 
Laws Caused Major Problems at the Polls”; “Flor-
ida Voting Problems”; “Arizona’s shameful voting 
delays”; “Voters in Alabama, Colorado, Georgia 
and Texas flooded voter hotlines to complain” and 
more.
 High voter turnout is a value shared by a 
majority of states, but not all states.  The long-
term historical trend has been for greater access to 
voting, primarily through federal action.  It remains 
to be seen whether the supermajority of states that 
favor easier access and higher voter participation 
can convince or defeat the minority of states that 
disagree.
Nonpartisan Elections
More than 90 percent of local elections and many 
elections of state judges are nonpartisan elections, 
in which ballots do not list candidates’ political 
parties. Many times the law prohibits the candi-
dates from advertising their party affiliations. It 
is usually argued that without partisan labels on 
the ballot, voters will be less inclined to vote for 
all Democrats or all Republicans. This practice 
was another part of the reform effort to overcome 
machine politics in U.S. cities in the late 1800s. 
The hope was that issues would replace such blind 
partisanship. Many other democracies use no party 
labels on their ballots, without any apparent loss of 
partisan voting. But, as mentioned earlier, voters in 
such countries cast votes for few offices, making 
their task easier.
Figure 6.9
VAP Turnout Correlations Presidential Election Years
2012 2008 2004 2000 1996 1992 1988 1984 1980
2012 .96 .87 .82 .72 .71 .63 .62 .60
2008 .93 .89 .81 .78 .68 .70 .66
2004 .96 .90 .89 .81 .82 .78
2000 .93 .92 .84 .85 .85
1996 .94 .89 .89 .85
1992 .94 .92 .91
1988 .97 .96
1984 .97
1980
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Figure 6.10 
VAP Turnout Correlations Non-Presidential Election Years 
2014 2010 2006 2002 1998 1994 1990 1986 1982 
2014 .82 .69 .74 .69 .51 .65 .53 .37 
2010 .83 .83 .80 .67 .66 .60 .56 
2006 .82 .78 .84 .66 .64 .68 
2002 .84 .77 .76 .73 .59 
1998 .77 .81 .73 .66 
1994 .75 .81 .79 
1990 .82 .55 
1986 .59 
1982 
State and Local: Not Participating
Generally speaking, there is an inverse relationship 
between level of government and turnout in Ameri-
can elections. Turnout in presidential election years 
can approach or exceed 50 percent. Although there 
is considerable variation, turnout for state elections 
in non-presidential election years is approximately 
40 percent. Local government election turnout av-
erages approximately 26 percent.47 Local elections 
typically are held when no state or national offices 
are also on the ballot.
 Without a presidential or gubernatorial cam-
paign or even the attraction of state legislative 
elections to spur some interest in the mass media, 
that in turn might spur public interest and partic-
ipation, these elections have very low turnouts. 
While we lack other indicators of public interest 
and concern with state and local contests, the low 
voting turnout probably indicates that state and lo-
cal politics hold even lower saliency for Americans 
than do presidential contests. 
Conclusion on Voter Participation
We have seen that for various reasons, few Amer-
icans do anything other than vote, and even that 
minimal act of participation is limited to presi-
dential and gubernatorial elections in presidential 
election years. Those who suspect that represen-
tatives prove unresponsive to their constituents 
see such low participation as an ominous threat to 
American democracy. While it seems clear that our 
institutional provisions for registering and voting 
influence this rate of participation, does low par-
ticipation reduce the quality of responsiveness, rep-
resentativeness, or even policy in the states or com-
munities? Few would suggest that the democracies 
above the United States in Figure 6.8 have better 
democracies. There is no compelling evidence 
that states and cities with low participation in their 
elections are inferior. Nevertheless, public advo-
cates of high turnout are essentially unopposed by 
any who advocate low turnout. As long as voters 
are unlike non-voters, public policy outcomes are 
likely to be biased when turnout is low.
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Figure 6.11 
Correlations With Turnout And Possible Causes 2014 
Voting Age Voting Eligible 
Conservative Ideology -.09 -.16 
Moderate and Liberal Ideology .15 .12 
Percent Senate Republican 2013 -.07 -.12 
Percent House Republican 2013 -.03 -.09 
Median Age of Population .30 .26 
High School Completion .63 .60 
College Degree .18 .25 
Per Capita Income .17 .23 
Poverty Rate -.34 -.34 
Percent Registered 2014 .60 .52 
Percent Anglo Population .48 .38 
Percent African American Population -.32 -.31 
Percent Hispanic or Latino Population -.41 -.30 
Turnout: Why Are The States Different?
Citizen participation, even if limited to voting, is 
seen as essential to a true democracy. Turnout is 
expected to be encouraged by many factors, and 
high participation is expected to have many ben-
eficial results. Apart from the overall decline in 
gubernatorial turnout, there are also substantial 
variations among the states. The 7 that hold guber-
natorial elections in presidential years have consid-
erably higher turnouts than do those in off years. 
However, as always, the states differ in turnout 
levels no matter when they hold elections. What 
might account for these differences?
 We learned in Chapter 3, Figure 3.2, there was 
no relationship between state residents’ political 
ideological preferences measured through survey 
research and turnout of voting age population in 
2014. However, there was a positive correlation 
between turnout for elections for Governor in 
1994-1997 and 2012-2015 (Figure 3.3). So, turn-
out is related to earlier turnout but not to political 
ideology. Figures 6.9 and 6.10 present additional 
evidence that state turnout rates tend to be quite 
consistent over time.  Figure 6.9 shows Voting Age 
Population turnout in presidential election years.  
State turnout for each election year from 1980 to 
2012 is highly correlated with turnout in all other 
election years.  Figure 6.10 presents correlations 
across non-presidential election years.  Again, state 
turnout for each non-presidential election year is 
correlated with turnout in other non-presidential 
election years.
 To sum, we have essentially no firm knowledge 
based on systematic analysis of comprehensive 
data that permits us to identify what state and local 
governments might do to increase voter participa-
tion. Even if we did, the states that do not place 
great value on voter turnout would likely not use 
the knowledge.
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Does Turnout Matter?
There seems to be great agreement on the prop-
osition that more participation by the public in a 
democracy is better than less participation. Sev-
eral normative benefits are expected to come with 
more participation. First is improved legitimacy for 
governmental decisions. Legitimacy is the psy-
chological attitude that one must voluntarily obey 
decisions made by proper officials. Officials are 
proper if they are elected in fair contests open to all 
qualified citizens. Legitimacy is important but hard 
to measure empirically. Some research suggests 
that turmoil and violence are reduced as nations 
experience increased levels of citizen participa-
tion.48 On the other hand, no research suggests 
that those states with low participation have more 
turmoil and violence.
 This research does not focus on legitimacy 
directly, and we can cite no empirical studies of 
legitimacy in the American states. So, there is no 
evidence that there is a relationship between turn-
out and the legitimacy accorded governors, legis-
lators, and other state officials. A second expected 
benefit of greater turnout is better correspondence 
between public opinion and public policy. This 
linkage between what the public wants and what 
policy it gets is expected in a democracy. How is it 
to be achieved if a minority selects those who are 
elected? Do the opinions of those bothering to vote 
reflect those who do not? There is research to sug-
gest little difference between voters and nonvoters, 
but there are other data showing an impact.49
 Figure 6.11 assesses the relationship between 
voter turnout measures and state differences we 
might expect to be related to turnout. The first two 
measures attempt to assess the linkage between 
public preferences expressed in 2014 surveys and 
the results of the election of 2014. There are no 
empirical relationships. Voter turnout is not re-
lated to more accurate matching of ideological or 
any preferences in surveys and seats in the lower 
chambers. Turnout is positively related to old-
er population and more high school completion.  
Turnout is negatively related to poverty.  There are 
positive relationships between percent registered 
and percent Anglo population and turnout.  Percent 
African American and Hispanic or Latino popula-
tion is negatively correlated with turnout.
 Figure 6.12 assesses relationships between 
turnout and possible results of higher and lower 
turnout.  There are no relationships between turn-
Figure 6.12 
Correlations With Turnout 2014 and Possible Results 
Voting Age Voting Eligible 
Accurate Republican Representation in House 2015 -.22 -.28 
Even Division of House Seats 2015 -.28 -.29 
Percent Senate Republican 2015 -.08 -.15 
Percent House Republican 2015 -.07 -.08 
Per Capita State and Local Revenue .18 .21 
Per Capita State and Local Expenditure .18 .21 
State and Local Tax Burden -.05 -.01 
Regressivity of State and Local Taxes -.21 -.19 
TANF Monthly Payment -.04 -.01 
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out and accurate representation of partisan prefer-
ences in the public or division of legislative seats 
between Republicans and Democrats.  There are 
no relationships between turnout and taxing and 
spending policies or generosity of welfare pay-
ments.
 There used to be very strong relationships 
between competition and turnout that existed 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.50  However, in-
terparty competition and the majority party in each 
state both change over time.51 In retrospect, we can 
see that the earlier empirical relationship between 
competition and turnout was probably spurious and 
related to regional differences between Southern 
and Non-Southern states.
 These correlations do not support the idea that 
greater turnout would result in better expression 
of public preferences. They support the conclusion 
that, at current levels, state turnout is not related to 
how accurately elections meet citizen preferences. 
The normative expectation might be met if and 
when all states have turnout levels of at least 66 
percent. We have no reason to think that condition 
will be met in the near future, if it is ever met.
 There are few empirical relationships with 
higher and lower turnout when we compare the 
states. It is also possible to examine higher and 
lower turnout within a state or local government. 
There is evidence that lower turnout than normal 
in some municipalities is related to greater success 
for proposals to borrow and spend money.52 Some 
researchers have found support for the hypothesis 
is that low voter turnout is associated with policies 
that favor privileged voters over under-privileged 
non-voters.53
 Many political practitioners act as though they  
believe there is a relationship between turnout and 
decisions made in ballot issue elections.  Scholars 
tend to focus on the activities of contending in-
terests in an election as the prime factor affecting 
level of turnout. There is another, less commonly 
recognized, cause of turnout that is usually within 
the control of the government affected by a policy 
election: when elections are held.
 Texas provides a clear example of the choices 
available and their impact on turnout.  Amend-
ments to the Texas state constitution must be 
proposed by the state legislature and approved or 
disapproved by voters in an election. The Texas 
Legislature has broad discretion in choosing elec-
tion dates.  If they put constitutional amendment 
proposals on a presidential election ballot, turnout 
might be as high as 50 percent.  If they choose 
the date on which governor and other statewide 
offices are contested, turnout might be as high as 
30 percent. Many Texas government texts observe 
that the average turnout in constitutional amend-
ment elections has been approximately 15 percent. 
Halter explains why: since 1960 more than 70 
percent of constitutional elections have been held 
in odd-numbered years with no overlap with state 
or federal elections. Low turnout in these elections 
results in amendments being approved, including 
those that provide benefits to business owners and 
impose costs on consumers.54
 Some political practitioners seem to recognize 
and act on an empirical relationship between turn-
out and decisions made in policy elections in their 
municipality, school district or state. We do not 
know how practitioners learned about the link be-
tween turnout and results. We suspect their knowl-
edge comes more from local folklore or their own 
experiences than from social science research.55
Summary
1. Americans have numerous opportunities to par-
ticipate in their governments, but few do anything 
more than vote. Very few are politically involved.
2. Only in some presidential elections and in 
some gubernatorial elections in presidential elec-
tion years do more than half of Americans even 
bother to vote.
3. Approximately half of the states allow citizens 
to make policy decisions through initiative and ref-
erendum processes. Large proportions of election 
participants vote in the contests for office at the 
top of ballots and skip the policy elections at the 
bottom.
4. Comparing turnout for our national elections 
with turnouts in other countries finds us to be poor 
participants. Several differences account for this 
low turnout. These are lack of political party/social 
class cleavages, voter registration procedures, and 
non-compulsory voting and voter exhaustion.
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5. As a broad generalization, turnout is lowest in 
local elections, highest in presidential election year 
contests, and in the middle for state off year elec-
tions.
6. Turnout in state elections is no longer related 
to competitive elections or close division of office 
holders between parties.  Turnout is most strong-
ly related to some demographic characteristics of 
residents, to high school completion and to voter 
registration.
7. There is some evidence linking higher and 
lower turnout levels across the states in a given 
election with results of state policy elections. At 
the state and local levels, turnout that is lower than 
the historical norm from many elections is related 
to higher passage rates for proposals to borrow and 
spend.
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Essay Questions
 1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of 1) direct democracy and 2) representative democracy 
 for contemporary American state and local governments?  Is increasing opportunities for direct de-  
 mocracy a realistic goal?  Is increasing representation a likely outcome of current state politics? Why or  
 why not? 
 2. Turnout in elections for President of the United States is lower than turnout in the majority of other 
 countries that hold comparable elections.  Discuss at least 3 reasons for low turnout in the United   
 States.  Why are some states making registration and voting more difficult?  Why might they prefer low,  
 or even lower turnout?
 3. What is political participation? Identify four of the common forms of political participation.  What  
 forms of participation are easier for students at Texas A&M to engage in?  Why?  What forms of partici-
 pation are more difficult for students at Texas A&M University to engage in?  Why?
 4. Explain the difference between initiative and referendum.  Discuss advantages and disadvantages   
 of supplementing representative democracy policy-making with the opportunity for policy-making by  
 a process closer to direct democracy.  Explain the connection between Elazar’s political culture types   
 and the presence or absence of these direct democracy tools.
  
 5. Voter participation rates across the states are positively correlated with the percent of population   
 Anglo and percent of population African American and Hispanic or Latino.  Give at least 3 reasons   
 why this might be the case.  What would have to be done to eliminate correlations between race/ethni-
 city and voter turnout?  Identify two reasons this has not happened.
 6. Identify and discuss at least three convenience-voting procedures.  How is each intended to increase 
 voter turnout?  Is there evidence that any have succeeded in increasing voter turnover over a long peri-
 od of time?  Do you have a fresh idea for making voting more user-friendly?
 7. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a very strong positive relationship between voter turnout and   
 competition (i.e., more equal number of winners) between the two major parties.  Now, there no a 
 relationship between turnout and competition.  What are some possible explanations for this change?   
 What do you think the change means?
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. Turnout is highest in elections for
  a. City council
  b. Governor, off year
  c. Congress, off year
  d. President
 2. Which of the following is part of the voting age population but not part of the voting eligible popula-
 tion for an election?
  a. non-U.S. citizens
  b. citizens who are not residents of the state or locality where the election takes place
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  c. those not legally competent to conduct their own affairs
  d. all of the above
 3. Approximately what percent of the public runs for elective office?
  a. less than one percent
  b. twelve percent
  c. twenty-three percent
  d. no data exist to estimate a percent
 4. Which of the following empirical relationships exist in 2014 and show that voter turnout affects what  
 governments do?
  a. higher turnout is positively correlated with closer division of state house seats between parties
  b. higher turnout is positively correlated with better match of partisanship preferences between   
  residents wand state legislators
  c. higher turnout is negatively correlated with how regressive state and local taxes are
  d. none of the above 
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Chapter 7
POLITICAL PARTIES, ELECTIONS, INTEREST GROUPS
 AND THE IDEA OF COMPETITION
Political parties and interest or pressure groups are 
a natural outgrowth in a democracy. They are active 
in all states and in all of the developed democra-
cies worldwide. Although the founding fathers that 
wrote the Constitution of the United States may 
have wanted to resist “factions” or political parties 
and interest groups, their efforts proved unsuccess-
ful. They themselves formed the first interest group 
and later political party to seek the ratification of 
their newly drafted constitution. Those interested in 
passing a certain policy strive at all levels of gov-
ernment to organize and thereby to optimize chanc-
es of getting their way. It is hard to imagine how a 
modern democracy could function without parties 
or pressure groups.
 Fundamentally, political parties and interest 
groups differ little from each other. When individ-
uals realize that they share a desire for the same 
public policy, they can increase the chances of 
getting their way by organizing. The drafters of the 
new federal Constitution in 1787 shared an interest 
in getting it ratified. They organized to do so and 
succeeded, probably because those opposed to its 
ratification failed to organize. Even the most basic 
and agrarian society, such as the American states in 
the late 1700s, has different interests. Many states 
had the beginnings of industrial development and 
sought to keep inexpensive foreign goods out of the 
country to make their companies more profitable. 
Farmers everywhere wanted the less expensive for-
eign goods. Thus, we had the beginnings of region-
al division between the agricultural South and the 
North with fledgling manufacturing capabilities.
 A modern complex society almost demands 
many organized interests, perhaps many thousands 
at the state level and even hundreds in local poli-
tics. Pressure groups, or to use a more neutral term, 
interest groups, organize such interests to exert their 
influence to get their interests best reflected in pub-
lic policy. As noted in Chapter 1, multiple shooting 
massacres in 2012 resulted in some restrictions on 
purchasing firearms and ammunition—but only in 
Colorado and Connecticut, sites of the most horren-
dous deaths.
 The National Rifle Association easily defeated 
minor reforms at the federal level supported by 
more than 90 percent of Americans. Moreover, 
sales of firearms and ammunition spiked and 
several states made access to firearms and ammu-
nition easier. Evidently, the NRA has been better 
organized than their opponents, as judged by public 
policy.
 The anti-abortion or pro-life segment of opinion 
has been well organized for several years. Recent-
ly, they have influenced many state legislatures to 
place restrictions to reduce the number of providers 
and impediments in the way of seekers of abortions. 
Pro-choice supporters have been much less orga-
nized. The success of their opponents in curtailing 
the availability of abortions may stimulate them to 
become better organized and more effective in the 
political arena.
 Politics is winning and losing. The examples 
above demonstrate organization is important.  
Greater public support and greater funding are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for public poli-
cy victories. Organized interests typically defeat 
disorganized interests. Those who are unconcerned 
cannot be organized.
 As discussed in the last chapter, the vast major-
ity of the public lacks great concern about politics. 
The result is organized interests are a small minori-
ty. On the other hand, some interests are so broadly 
shared that organization is unnecessary. College 
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sports are so popular that there is no need to orga-
nize to deal with hypothetical opponents working 
to eliminate athletic competition between insti-
tutions of higher education. Organization is most 
likely when the opposing views are both minority 
views.
 Small segments of society with no resources 
other than their votes achieve little or nothing by 
organizing. Wealthy small groups, however, have 
had great success, largely because they are able to 
target campaign funds to “deserving” candidates. 
As campaigning for public office has become very 
expensive because of “new style,” television-based 
politics, candidates have increasingly turned to 
wealthy interests for campaign contributions. Cost-
ly campaigns have greatly increased the influence 
of interest groups. With effective organization, in-
terest groups can use dollars to offset their lack of 
voting support. A small interest with many dollars 
can have far greater impact than the few votes its 
members represent.
 Size fundamentally distinguishes interest 
groups from political parties. Political parties must 
organize first to select and elect candidates to pub-
lic office and then to pass and implement policies. 
Large numbers are necessary for success. Plurali-
ties and majorities are necessary for candidates to 
win office. Majorities and supermajorities are nec-
essary to pass legislation. To achieve their goals, 
major political parties must appeal to as many 
voters as possible and offend as few as possible. 
Parties must “patch over” many differences among 
prospective supporters.
 Some interest groups have more reason to be 
uncompromising. They seek to appeal to their 
members, and their members are not pluralities or 
majorities of the population. Even if small in mem-
bers, their generous contributions to campaigns can 
give them great say. They can make their dollars 
speak more loudly than their votes. If they were 
to compromise, those providing the money might 
decline future contributions.
Political Parties
The first political party in the United States, called 
the Federalists, organized to ratify the Consti-
tution. To win a vote in a legislature, at least a 
majority of legislators have to approve; thus, orga-
nization within the legislative body is necessary to 
win. One reason for political parties is to organize 
within the legislative body to pass laws. This can 
be called legislative organization. It is always eas-
ier for legislators to defeat bills than to pass them. 
Those who want to pass bills must organize to have 
success. When one side organizes, the other side 
must organize or risk losing. After elections, the 
first function of political parties is to manage the 
efforts of their members in the legislature.
 A political party must win elections before it  
can coordinate the efforts of officeholders. Party 
activities concerned with appealing to voters and 
contesting and winning contests for office can be 
called electoral organization. With enough victo-
ries, a political party can secure the power to enact 
the policies it seeks. When party members think 
similarly about a broad range of issues, the organi-
zation becomes more enduring. They seek to retain 
their numbers within the legislature or to increase 
them to be successful on more issues. The purpose 
of the Jeffersonian Republicans was to resist the 
centralization of government advocated by the 
Federalists. As the poorly organized anti-Federal-
ists, they sought unsuccessfully to stop the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution.1 Having lost, however, 
they organized to seek like-minded voters who 
would put their candidates into public office.
 The Jeffersonian Republicans were the second 
U.S. political party but the first to organize both 
to win elections and within the halls of govern-
ment. They proved to be the prototype of modern 
political parties. The dual-purpose organization by 
the Jeffersonian Republicans in combination with 
the unwillingness of the aristocratic Federalists to 
stoop to appeal for voter support resulted in the 
Federalists becoming irrelevant to national politics. 
The modern Democratic Party can trace its roots to 
the Jeffersonian Republicans.
A Brief History of American Political Parties
Today’s political parties derive from events in our 
history. Parties become successful by articulating 
basic ideas that lead to electoral success. Party 
leaders find it difficult to venture very far from the 
views they believe first made them victorious. As 
a result, parties are slow to change and the choices 
given to Americans by our political parties seldom 
venture from what has always been offered by 
these political parties. What led to the positions of 
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the two present political parties?
The Politics of Ratifying the Constitution
As already mentioned, the new Constitution of 
the United States led to the organization of the 
Federalists, who sought its ratification. That con-
stitution provided a strong central government 
that many thought would be less sensitive to the 
general public’s demands. Areas of commerce, 
primarily in seaports such as Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia, and Baltimore, sought to ratify the 
Constitution. A stronger central government would 
be able to smooth commerce between the states, 
and many living in these areas earned their livings 
in commerce. A stronger federal government could 
enact tariffs to give American goods a competitive 
advantage over English goods.
 The inland areas, where most farmed to pro-
vide food and shelter for their families, saw a 
stronger central government as a renewed threat, 
not unlike the one only recently overthrown in the 
Revolutionary War. Those of this belief, as noted, 
were disorganized and were generally labeled “an-
ti-Federalists.”
 From 1787 to 1789, only a fool would have run  
as an anti-Federalist for a state legislative seat, 
a U.S. House of Representatives Boston district 
seat, or any local elective seat, given the popular 
support in that area for the new Constitution. The 
district would have been uncompetitive, with only 
Federalists likely to win. Rural districts would also 
have been uncompetitive, but in these districts only 
anti-Federalists could win.
 Elections in statewide races for governor or 
U.S. senator could be competitive. If a state had a 
close mix of voting population in mercantile and 
rural areas, such as Massachusetts, it might have 
a balance of Federalists and anti-Federalists, with 
both capable of winning. The anti-Federalists in 
the rural areas of the state would offset the Federal-
ists of the more urban areas. Not all states had the 
requisite balance. Georgia and other predominantly 
rural states lacked competition both in local dis-
tricts and in statewide elections.
The Civil War
For a time, the Civil War and its aftermath ended 
state and local party competition altogether. The 
deaths and emotion associated with the Civil War 
and the Reconstruction that followed divided the 
country into a Republican North and a Democrat-
ic South. In the North, the Democratic Party was 
associated with the Confederacy and the deaths of 
many thousands of Northern troops. Democrats 
could win no elections and most often did not 
even contest elections. Similarly, no Republican 
could win in the South because of what Sherman 
had done to the South and the later experience in 
Republican-controlled Reconstruction. So, neither 
statewide nor local contests had partisan compe-
tition. Everyone lived in a one-party state and a 
one-party district. Since the North had the larger 
population, Republicans also dominated the presi-
dency.
 With no Republicans in the South and no 
Democrats in the North, both political parties made 
only regional appeals, such as “the South will arise 
again” or “the South must pay.” Appeals based 
on the ideas of states’ rights were seldom heard in 
campaigns. Northerners had little choice but to ac-
cept the programs of the Republicans. Southerners 
had no alternatives to the programs offered by the 
Democrats.
Machine Politics
Before and after the Civil War, Northern cities 
continued to grow. The heavy immigration after 
1850 and the pressing need in urban areas for 
municipal services returned party competition to 
many Northern states. Because the Civil War held 
little meaning for immigrants, they were receptive 
to ward heelers who promised municipal services. 
Soon only “urban machine” candidates could win 
in such cities. At the city or local level, politics had 
changed from Republicans winning uncompetitive 
elections to machine parties winning uncompetitive 
elections. Machines typically called themselves 
the Democratic Party, but they had no ties to the 
Democratic Party of the South.
 Machine supporters focused on local issues and 
seldom considered competing for state and national 
offices. However, if a state had a large city to offset 
Republicanism in rural areas, state politics and 
statewide elections often proved competitive. Each 
political party has a good chance to win an office, 
such as governor or U.S. senator.  Of course, with 
little industrialization or urbanization, the South 
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remained uncompetitive at both the state and local 
levels.
 When industrialization and urbanization finally 
came to the South after the Second World War, it 
led to a change in the politics of the South. Iron-
ically, it led to Republican success in cities and 
continuing Democratic strength in rural areas.
The New Deal
Franklin D. Roosevelt put together a coalition of 
Northern city residents and Southerners, most of 
whom already identified themselves as Democrats. 
The purpose of the coalition was to relieve the 
unemployment in the Depression of the 1930s. 
However, it did little to change the competitiveness 
of any office other than the presidency. National 
public policy became the pervasive concern. Being 
a Democrat took on a new meaning—a supporter 
of the New Deal rather than a Southerner.
 The New Deal coalition put together by the 
Democratic Party evolved after World War II 
to include labor unions.  Bipartisan cooperation 
characterized the era with “liberal” Democrats and 
“moderate” Republicans seeking to expand the 
driving forces behind the great economic expan-
sion:  investment in higher education for World 
War II veterans and others, support for balancing 
the power of business and labor interests so many 
in the working class could join the burgeoning 
middle class, and support for government funded 
investment in infrastructure and research and de-
velopment.  These expansions of federal programs 
were financed partly by borrowing money.  As a 
result, spending exceeded income and the size of 
the cumulative federal debt increased.
 The New Deal Coalition was successful for 
Democrats at the federal level.  From 1933 to 1969 
all presidents were Democrats except for Repub-
lican Dwight Eisenhower, 1953-1961.  For years, 
the Republicans wandered about in terms of their 
issue positions. Initially, they were opposed to the 
New Deal and opposed to civil rights.  Southern 
states were also against much of the New Deal and 
opposed to civil rights.  Yet, they continued fol-
lowing their post Civil War pattern of electing only 
Democrats. 
 Democrats succeeded in expanding new deal 
style programs aimed at bringing more from the 
poor and working class into the middle class.  They 
also passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.
 At the same time Democrats were achieving 
key domestic policy goals they were waging an un-
successful and increasingly unpopular war in Viet-
nam.  Discontent with the war and with the pace 
of increasing civil rights weakened the Democrats’ 
coalition and ability to win presidential elections.  
Republicans took advantage of the opportunity to 
bring southern Democrats who shared their views 
into the Republican Party.
Role Reversal and Hyper-partisanship
Richard Nixon’s “southern strategy” to win the 
presidency in 1968 successfully changed the dy-
namics of federal elections.  From 1969 to 2017, 
Republicans occupied the White House for 28 
years; Democrats held the presidency for 20 years.  
The Party of Lincoln now opposed expanding 
civil rights and sought to roll back social welfare 
programs.  To a significant extent, the parties ex-
changed positions on these major issues.  A combi-
nation of economic disruptions and costly military 
actions in this era largely accounts for both parties 
winning the presidency.
 Although the Vietnam War ended during 
Richard Nixon’s presidency, the Republican Party 
became the supporter of increased military funding 
and military action.  The party took credit for the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the tilting toward 
capitalism of other Communist countries when 
Ronald Reagan was president, 1981-1989.
 President Reagan advocated shrinking the size 
and the role of the federal government.  He called 
for reducing federal regulation of the private sector 
and devolving federal authority to state and lo-
cal government.  He railed against increasing the 
national debt and called for reducing tax rates. He 
encouraged greater military spending to achieve 
peace through strength.
 The term “Reaganism” was coined to refer 
to his articulated goals.  Few recognize that the 
goal most achieved while he was president was 
increased military spending.  Federal income tax 
rates were reduced for businesses and individuals 
in the highest income brackets.  At the same time, 
payroll taxes were greatly increased.  As discussed 
in Chapter 4 and 5, the result was a shifting of tax 
burden from business income to payroll income.  
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Candidate Reagan derided his opponents as “tax 
and spend Democrats.”  Contrary to his campaign 
rhetoric, federal deficits and debt greatly expanded 
during his years in office.  Republicans replaced 
“tax and spend” with “borrow and spend.”
 When Democrat Bill Clinton campaigned for 
president in 1992, he adopted or coopted a key 
element of Reaganism by declaring the era of big 
government was over.  The number of federal em-
ployees declined.  Partly because of tax increases 
while Republican George H. W. Bush was presi-
dent, the federal budget began to have surpluses 
while President Clinton was in office.
 Three forces combined starting in the 1990s 
to produce the current period of hyper-partisan-
ship: 1) Maximization of party control of election 
districts through gerrymandering; 2) expansion of 
partisan electronic and broadcast media; 3) Reduc-
tion of bipartisan cooperation and centralization of 
power in Congress.
 Gerrymandering. The United States Supreme 
Court in the mid-1960s mandated creation of legis-
lative districts with equal population for both Con-
gress and state legislatures. For the most part, state 
legislatures sought to protect incumbents as new 
districts were drawn.  The widespread availability 
of inexpensive computers made it possible to draw 
districts that would give substantial advantage to 
the majority party.  In the 1970s and 1980s, most 
legislatures sought to protect most incumbents 
while leaving others vulnerable to defeat.  This was 
done on a bipartisan basis. But new districts creat-
ed by population growth or shifting or new op-
portunities created by incumbent retirement were 
drawn to the advantage of the majority party.
 Starting in the 1990s, the combination of com-
puter power and accurate databases of human be-
havior became available.  First by zip code, then by 
census block, then by households, available infor-
mation could increasingly accurately predict how 
people would vote.  It was possible to know partic-
ipation in elections, and, in some states, in which 
party primary voters participated.  This information 
was ultimately linked to other information about 
donations to candidates, causes and charities; sub-
scriptions to publications; even household purchas-
es.
 State legislators now had requisite tools to 
draw districts that would nearly guarantee which 
party would win the large majority of general 
elections.  Many states did so, and the number of 
contests for Congress and state legislatures with 
candidates from only one of the majority parties 
soared.
 New Media. You probably do not remember 
when there were only three major television net-
works, few independent stations broadcasting 
locally, and only local radio.  This was also before 
the Internet existed, so there were no online com-
munications at all.  The broadcast and print media 
focused on the same national news stories and 
presented information neutrally.
 Today, the majority of news sources have a 
pronounced bias, and it is often partisan bias and 
most is aimed at conservative audiences.  First 
talk radio and then 24/7 news and other cable TV 
channels had stations that reinforced existing po-
litical points of view, downplaying or ignoring any 
challenging information.
 It is true that most Americans do not rely 
exclusively on biased sources for news.  However, 
the small numbers who vote in primary elections 
are enthusiastic consumers of news from sources 
that reinforce their preexisting political views. The 
hyper-partisanship of so-called “core voters” is 
reinforced, if not driven by hyper-partisan media.
 Congress. The Republican Party regained 
control of the House and Senate in 1995 after the 
first midterm election of the Clinton presidency.  
Republican Speaker Newt Gingrich and other lead-
ers sought to eliminate bipartisan cooperation by 
limiting social interactions between Republicans 
and the now-enemy Democrats.  Gingrich urged 
members to keep their families at home and to 
spend as little time in Washington, DC as possible.  
To that end, he limited House sessions to Tues-
day afternoons through Thursday mornings.  The 
typical member could be in DC only two or three 
nights each week.
 At the same time, Gingrich required total loyal-
ty from members.  Over time, committees became 
less important as party leadership took control 
of the fate of bills.  The number of bills passed 
declined.  Major legislation was passed in large 
omnibus bills.  Few participated in determining the 
final content of these bills.  Only rarely did Demo-
crats participate in writing bills.  Increasingly, bills 
were considered in floor sessions with little or no 
opportunity for Democrats to offer amendments.
 The hyper-partisan style of legislative leader-
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ship has become common in the chambers of state 
legislators.  In about half the states, the majority 
party needs no help or cooperation from the mi-
nority in passing bills.  There is so much work 
to do in state legislatures that hyper-partisanship 
applies to a relatively small number of highly pub-
licized issues.  Some bills are substantive; others 
are merely symbolic.  Whether or not such bills are 
enacted, they serve as vehicles for focusing media 
attention and publicizing to extreme members of 
party bases that issues important to them are being 
addressed.  
 As will be discussed below, there is another im-
port force producing the current hyper-partisan be-
havior: primary elections.  Contemporary primary 
elections held by the two major parties both make 
possible and reinforce hyper-partisan behavior in 
state legislatures and in the United States House of 
Representatives.
Lack of Local Competition
With few exceptions, partisan competition between 
two major parties used to be the norm in feder-
al and state politics. Local areas, however, have 
seldom been competitive.  Your college years may 
well be the only time in your life when you interact 
regularly with neighbors and classmates who have 
political views fundamentally different from yours.  
Later, wherever you live, there is little likelihood 
that your neighbors will be of a different political 
party. It is equally unlikely that your locally elected 
representative for Congress, state legislature, or 
local government will face competition from the 
other political party.
 It is possible to create election districts that 
would  enhance competition between Democrats 
and Republicans. But competitive districts will 
not be created so long as partisan elected officials 
choose boundaries. Political parties have no inter-
est in being competitive, only in winning.
 Historically, local districts, such as those in 
rural areas or deep within large cities, support only 
the locally dominant political party. Events have 
changed what that locally dominant party is over 
time but never resulted in much local competition. 
Some states with a close balance between urban 
and suburban or rural areas have experienced 
competitive statewide politics. Since 1952, most 
presidential contests have been competitive in the 
sense that the national vote total for the major party 
candidates is close. But even in such competitive 
presidential elections, typically only 15 states have 
close contests. Most elections in the United States 
are local elections, and in these, few challengers 
are able to unseat the incumbent of the dominant 
local political party.
Why We Always Have Two Major Political Parties
In the United States, two political parties primarily 
vie for high profile federal offices, although on oc-
casion a third organization centering on an individ-
ual, such as Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996, or Ralph 
Nader from 1996 to 2008, places a presidential 
candidate on many state ballots. The Jeffersonian 
Republicans evolved into the Democratic politi-
cal party and faced only a single opposition party. 
The Federalists, Whigs, and later the Republicans 
provided their opposition.
 Although political scientists may complain 
about the dominance of one political party, espe-
cially in the South, competition between more than 
two political parties is also viewed as undesirable. 
Countries with more than two political parties, 
such as Italy and France, endure many struggles 
to put together a coalition to govern. Members of 
several political parties are needed in these coun-
tries to achieve the majority in their parliaments 
necessary to establish a government. These pre-
carious governing majorities and the uncertainty 
and instability of government no doubt cause this 
concern that multiple political parties may threaten 
democracy. If we understood the reasons why we 
only have two political parties, perhaps we could 
assure that this continues.
Good Fortune
Several factors may explain our being blessed 
with only two major political parties. First is that 
we had the good fortune to face only one divisive 
issue at a time. The agricultural versus mercantile 
divisions surrounding the Constitution gave way to 
the North versus South division and the Civil War. 
Similarly, the civil rights movement of the 1960s 
replaced the controversy between the wealthy and 
poor reactions to Roosevelt’s New Deal programs. 
In each of these disputes, the Democratic Party 
took one stance and its opposition took the other. 
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V. O. Key calls this dualism.2
Institutional Factors
Institutional factors, such as the “winner-take-all, 
single-member districts” are also seen as central to 
our two-party system. If each district has but one 
victor, a new third party is unlikely to see its can-
didate win in any district. A third party must jump 
from getting none of the vote to getting a plurality 
of the vote in at least some districts to win any rep-
resentation in making government decisions. Third 
parties getting 30 or even 40 percent of the vote, 
even if in many districts, will still lose. If there 
were multiple representatives to be selected from 
districts, however, a third party capable of getting 
a third of the popular vote might win as many as 
a third of the seats. All U.S. House and nearly all 
state legislative districts are single-member dis-
tricts, meaning that third parties have little chance.
Primary Elections
Primary elections are another institutional factor 
accounting for only two parties. Winners of the 
Democratic and Republican primary for an office 
win a place on the general election ballot as that 
party’s candidate.3 Those voting their party identifi-
cation can then give them their votes. Third parties 
typically have no primaries! Their candidates can 
get on the ballot by other means. Typically, they 
need a petition signed by many registered voters 
(several percent of the vote last cast for this office). 
Although primaries weaken the major political 
parties by taking candidate selection out of their 
hands, there is little question that they are fatal to 
third parties.
Party Identification
Party identification also contributes to our two-par-
ty system. Figure 7.1 documents that, since 1952, 
15 percent or fewer of Americans refuse to iden-
tify themselves with either the Democrats or the 
Republicans in presidential election years. You 
might be surprised at how consistent the levels of 
support are for each party over 60 years. Please 
keep in mind that party identification and voting 
are different things.  Further, because of the Elec-
toral College, distribution of electoral support is 
all-important in presidential elections.  Because of 
partisan gerrymandering, distribution of electoral 
support is all-important in elections for the U.S. 
House of Representatives and elections for state 
legislatures. 
 Since parents transmit their party identification 
with great success to their children, a third political 
party would have to convert people as adults. Re-
search has shown that only events such as the Civil 
War or the Great Depression of the 1930s have 
such a potential for converting people. Since the 
Vietnam War and World War II proved to be inca-
pable of converting people’s partisanship, however, 
third parties seem to have little or no chance unless 
we have another experience of very great magni-
tude. Even then, however, it was the other major 
political party that benefited in the past.
Settlement from England
Finally, nearly all two-party democracies are 
Anglo, or English by heritage. The United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom are all Anglo, two-party democracies. 
What is it about English heritage that results in 
two-party government? The reduced influence 
of the Roman Catholic Church in these countries 
may underlie their having only two parties. Other 
countries may have a pro-Catholic working-class 
party as well as an anticlerical (against the Catholic 
Church) working-class party. In non-Anglo democ-
racies, even if the middle class is not divided into 
pro and anti-Catholic political parties, there are 
usually at least three political parties. For a while, 
the Communist Party provided an additional some-
what successful party. More recently, environmen-
tal parties, such as the German Green party, have 
also attracted many votes.
 Two of the explanations of our having a 
two-party system, the historical reasons, are acci-
dental and could not be copied by other political 
systems. The explanations of structural barriers to 
third political parties would suggest that we could 
encourage third political parties if we wanted to do 
so. The party identification explanation, while not 
accidental, would be difficult to change to encour-
age third political parties. Third political parties at 
the presidential level stimulate the major parties 
to shift emphases in how they communicate their 
messages. Third parties have no major impact on 
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the fundamental content of the major parties’ mes-
sages.
Regulating Political Parties
Even though political parties are not branches of 
any government, all states regulate political parties. 
This feature is apparently unusual among democ-
racies and probably can be traced to the reform 
efforts to undo urban machine politics in the late 
1800s, as discussed in Chapter 4. State laws regu-
lating political parties are of five types: 1) defining 
membership, typically as being registered as a 
Democrat or as a Republican; 2) defining a formal 
party organization and its selection, including a 
state party chairman and central committee with 
some limited responsibilities; 3) allowing access 
to the state election ballot or denying it if the party 
lacks popular support; 4) providing procedures 
for nominating candidates and holding primaries; 
and 5) restricting campaign financing or providing 
public funds.4
 Despite the overall decline in party control 
since increased state regulation, some state po-
litical parties persist in influencing politics. In 
some states, they more actively recruit candidates, 
contribute more campaign funds, and train candi-
dates in necessary modern campaign skills, such as 
soliciting campaign funds and using election polls. 
Party organizations attempting all of these are 
labeled “well organized.”5
 All of these efforts, no doubt, endear their 
political party to successful candidates; but as 
compared to earlier eras when a tightly organized 
political party could bring large numbers of loyal 
supporters to the polls and assure its candidates’ 
success in winning elections, modern political 
parties are weak imitations. By contrast, wealthy 
interests have gained the attention of candidates 
because they contribute the campaign funds needed 
in modern, television-centered campaigns.
Primary Elections
States have weakened political parties by requir-
ing primary elections.6 Before primary elections 
Figure 7.1 
Gallup Poll Party Identification in Presidential Election Years 
Year Democrat or Lean Democrat Republican or Lean Republican 
1952 57 34 
1956 51 37 
1960 54 34 
1964 60 30 
1968 55 33 
1972 51 34 
1976 52 33 
1980 50 36 
1984 50 42 
1988 47 41 
1992 50 37 
1996 53 39 
2000 49 38 
2004 50 40 
2008 45 44 
2012 47 42 
2016 48 41 
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Figure 7.2 
2016 Primary Election Systems for Congress 
State Closed Open Semi-Closed Other State Closed Open Semi-Closed Other
Alabama D R Montana D,4R
Alaska R D4Two-Round Nebraska D,4R
Arizona D,4R Nevada D,4R
Arkansas D,4R New Hampshire D,4R
California Top4Two New Jersey D,4R
Colorado D,4R New Mexico D,4R
Connecticut D,4R New York D,4R D,4R
Delaware D,4R North Carolina
Florida D,4R North Dakota D,4R
Georgia D,4R Ohio D,4R
Hawaii D,4R Oklahoma R D
Idaho D,4R Oregon D,4R
Illinois D,4R Pennsylvania D,4R
Indiana D,4R Rhode Island D,4R
Iowa D,4R South Carolina D,4R
Kansas D,4R South Dakota R D
Kentucky D,4R Tennessee D,4R
Louisiana Two-Round Texas D,4R
Maine D,4R Utah D,4R
Maryland Vermont D,4R
Massachusetts D,4R Virginia D,4R
Michigan D,4R Washington Top4Two
Minnesota D,4R West Virginia D,4R
Mississippi D,4R Wisconsin D,4R
Missouri D,4R Wyoming D,4R
were required, parties could select their candidates 
however they wished and then announce their 
selections. Frequently, elected state legislators of 
the party would meet and select candidates for all 
legislative seats including those then held by the 
opposition party. No one from those districts could 
be sure they would have any say on nominees
 Criticism of such legislative caucuses centered 
on constituents in such districts having little say. 
Party conventions replaced these caucuses to give 
average party members more say in candidate 
selection. Conventions also have been criticized as 
being closed to the general public, with decisions 
made in smoke-filled rooms.
 The ultimate reform was the primary election. 
Primary elections allow the public a say, but at the 
expense of not allowing the most active and en-
gaged party members to pick its candidates. Best 
candidates would be those likely to win the general 
election while sharing the policy goals of the party. 
Low turnout in primaries often results in a very 
few picking their preferred candidates, who may 
not hold values supported by the party’s supporters 
in the general election.
 The variety of primary elections used by states 
is impressive. States constantly consider changing 
primary election systems. In almost every election 
cycle, some states do make changes.   Furthermore, 
some states permit the parties to have different 
primary election rules and to change them almost 
at will. As a result, any snapshot of state primary 
election systems is likely to be out of date soon. 
Figure 7.2 lists primary election systems used by 
states in elections for Congress in 2016.  Figure 7.3 
presents the same information in map form.
 There are two key dimensions that define 
primary election systems. Ballot form is the first. 
In 3 states, California, Washington and Louisiana, 
primary election ballots contain the names of all 
candidates identified by party: Republican, Dem-
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ocrat or minor party. Voters may choose one can-
didate per office, and have the option of voting for 
some Republicans and some Democrats.  Demo-
crats in Alaska used this ballot form in 2016.
 In 46 states, primary election ballots list only 
the candidate for one party. Voters may cast one 
vote per office. The contests decide which candi-
dates will run in general elections as official party 
candidates.
 The second dimension is when choices are 
made, either before the primary is held or when 
voters arrive at the polls.  In 12 states, both parties 
required participants to be registered as a mem-
ber of the party before the primary election date.  
Democrats in Alabama, and Republicans in Okla-
homa and South Dakota had this requirement.  In 
23 states, some or all voters could choose which 
party’s primary to vote in on the primary election 
day.  Republicans in Alabama and Arizona and 
Democrats in South Dakota had this requirement.
Ballots Listing All Candidates, All Parties
Until 1975, it could be said that all states required 
major parties to choose their candidates for general 
elections through primary elections. The distinction 
between major and minor party typically involves 
a minimum number of votes based on votes in 
an earlier statewide office—usually for the office 
of governor. Today, all states hold elections prior 
to general elections and the results are linked to 
general elections. However, in Louisiana, Califor-
nia and Washington the elections prior to general 
elections do not necessarily choose general elec-
tion candidates from each major party.
 In 1975, Louisiana initiated a unique system. 
It was applied to federal offices from 1976 to 2006 
and continues to be used for state offices. The Lou-
isiana procedure is sometimes called a Two-Round 
Election. The Louisiana system is exceptional 
because candidates who win a majority of the 
vote in the “first round election” win the offices. 
Figure 7.3 
2016 Primary Election Systems For Congress 
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Top Two
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In contests without majority winners, the top-two 
finishers run against each other in a second round 
election.
 Candidates in the first election can choose 
to be  identified on the ballot as a candidate from 
any “registered” party. It is possible for second 
elections to have two candidates from the same 
party. Only Louisiana uses this system in regular 
elections. Texas and some other states use this 
system in special elections called when vacancies 
occur between regular elections.  In Alaska, Demo-
crats may choose to vote from all candidates of all 
parties and the individual who receives the greatest 
number of votes becomes the party’s nominee for 
the general election.
 Washington and California have a primary 
election process called the top-two system.7 Its 
purpose is to choose two candidates who will face 
each other in the general election—but not nec-
essarily candidates from each of the two major 
parties.
 Primary election ballots list all candidates from 
all parties and voters may cast one vote for each 
office. The top-two finishers in the primary for each 
office—regardless of party—face each other in the 
general election. As in Louisiana, both contestants 
in the next election can identify with the same par-
ty. Unlike Louisiana, those who win a majority in 
the primary election do not win office. They have 
to compete again in the general election.
Ballots Listing Candidates of One Party
The 47 other states have separate primary elections 
for each party. These are sometimes called direct 
primary systems. In Alaska, Democrats and Re-
publicans applied different rules. For the 46 states 
that apply the same rules to all, rules have two 
Figure 7.4 
VEP Primary Election Turnout in Presidential Election Years 2000-2016 
In States Where Both Parties Have Primary Elections 
2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Alabama 15% 32% 25% 35% Montana 39% 31% 36% 
Alaska Nebraska 21% 19% 21% 
Arizona 13% 7% 24% 12% 24% Nevada 
Arkansas 15% 27% 16% 30% New Hampshire 44% 30% 54% 31% 52% 
California 40% 31% 40% 23% 34% New Jersey 4% 29% 9% 20% 
Colorado New Mexico 19% 17% 23% 
Connecticut 16% 6% 2% 21% New York 25% 20% 21% 
Delaware 8% 6% 24% 4% 24% North Carolina 33% 32% 32% 
Florida 13% 34% 13% 28% North Dakota 32% 
Georgia 18% 14% 32% 16% 30% Ohio 31% 28% 42% 14% 38% 
Hawaii Oklahoma 11% 15% 29% 15% 29% 
Idaho Oregon 43% 22% 36% 
Illinois 19% 34% 18% 39% Pennsylvania 34% 15% 34% 
Indiana 37% 20% 36% Rhode Island 28% 3% 24% 
Iowa South Carolina 20% 9% 30% 18% 31% 
Kansas South Dakota 28% 15% 20% 
Kentucky 29% 13% 18% Tennessee 11% 11% 26% 13% 25% 
Louisiana 8% 18% 10% 18% Texas 15% 11% 28% 13% 25% 
Maine Utah 25% 14% 
Maryland 25% 17% 32% 15% 33% Vermont 41% 21% 40% 
Massachusetts 16% 15% 38% 11% 37% Virginia 8% 27% 5% 30% 
Michigan 20% 20% 17% 34% Washington 31% 
Minnesota West Virginia 33% 20% 31% 
Mississippi 28% 18% 30% Wisconsin 23% 25% 37% 19% 49% 
Missouri 19% 13% 33% 7% 35% Wyoming 
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important elements: whether the choice of party 
ballot is made before or at the primary election and 
whether the choice is public or private. 
 In the open primary system the choice of party 
ballot is private and the choice is made at the pri-
mary election. In the 22 states with open primary 
systems and the Republican Party in Alabama, vot-
ers typically receive ballots from both parties and 
decide in the secrecy of the voting booth in which 
party’s primary to vote.8 Except in North Dakota, 
primary election voters must register in advance, 
but they do not register by party.
 The closed primary system exists in 11 states 
for both parties, for Republicans in Oklahoma 
and South Dakota and for Democrats in Alabama. 
Registration is by party in advance of the primary 
election, and this information is public. The com-
mitment made at registration is binding. Only those 
registered in a party may vote in its primary—
those who register but choose neither major party 
are not eligible to vote in either’s primary. A voter 
registered for one major party who wants to change 
and vote in the other party’s primary must change 
his or her registration. Deadlines for registering 
and changing are typically 20 to 30 days before the 
primary election.9
 The semi-closed primary system applies to Re-
publicans and Democrats in 10 states, for Republi-
cans in Alaska and for Democrats in Oklahoma and 
South Dakota.  Voters registered as Republicans 
or Democrats must vote in those party’s primaries.  
Unaffiliated voters may choose which party’s pri-
mary to vote in.
 Majority rule is not always the rule in state 
primary elections. In 11 states, typically former 
Confederate states, primary election candidates 
must win a majority. In North Carolina, a plurality 
of at least 40 percent is required.10 Top-two run-
off elections are held when no candidate receives 
the required plurality or majority. States that hold 
runoff elections to choose party candidates keep re-
cords of which party’s primaries voters participated 
in. Those who vote in one party’s primary are not 
allowed to vote in other parties’ runoff elections. If 
Figure 7.5 
Texas Voting Age and Voting Eligible Turnout for Primary Elections 
Republican 
VAP Turnout 
Republican 
VEP Turnout 
 
Democratic 
VAP Turnout 
Democratic 
VEP Turnout 
2000 5.3% 6.3% 7.6% 9.1% 
2004 4.2% 4.9% 5.2% 6.0% 
2008 7.8% 9.1% 16.4% 19.2% 
2012 7.6% 9.1% 3.1% 3.7% 
2016 13.8% 16.4% 7.0% 8.3% 
Presidential Election Years 
Non-Presidential Election Years 
Republican 
VAP Turnout 
Republican 
VEP Turnout 
 
Democratic 
VAP Turnout 
Democratic 
VEP Turnout 
2002 3.9% 4.7% 6.4% 7.6% 
2006 3.9% 4.6% 3.0% 3.6% 
2010 8.0% 9.6% 3.7% 4.4% 
2014 6.6% 7.9% 2.6% 3.1% 
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they could, they might vote for weaker candidates. 
They could “raid” the runoff elections of the party 
they dislike, enhancing the general election for-
tunes of the party they like.
 Many critics think the open and top-two prima-
ries also encourage partisans of one party to vote 
in the opposition party’s primary. They might do so 
to select weak candidates that can be more easily 
defeated by their party’s candidates in the later 
general election. There is, however, little evidence 
that this kind of voting takes place to any signifi-
cant degree.
 Political parties have sought to counter the 
effects of primaries by selecting and endorsing 
desirable candidates before the primary. Although 
this approach has been partially successful, the 
primaries have nevertheless greatly weakened the 
importance of political parties for prospective can-
didates.11 With sufficient money, particularly when 
the incumbent does not seek reelection, anyone 
can run and win the primary of the dominant party 
in the area. Success in the general election should 
then follow. This result can be achieved without 
the political party involved having any say. In this 
situation, a Democratic or Republican candidate 
need not necessarily have the policy positions ex-
pected by the political party.
Primary Election Turnout
Turnout in primary elections differs from turnout in 
general elections in two critical ways. First, turnout 
is much lower in than turnout in general elections.  
Second, the smaller numbers of primary election 
voters are more extreme in their views than the 
other members of their parties.
 General election turnout rates from 1960 to 
2014 were presented in Chapter 6, Figure 6.3. Fig-
ure 7.4 summarizes turnout rates for presidential 
primary elections from 2000 to 2016. 
 Presidential primary elections choose some or 
all delegates to national party nominating conven-
tions. Not all states chose delegates through prima-
ry elections in any or all of the five election years 
summarized in Figure 7.4. You can tell at a glance 
that primary election turnout rates are much low-
er than the general election rates ranging from 50 
to 59 percent. Small as the turnout rates are, they 
give an incorrect impression because they include, 
in almost all cases, voters in two or more partisan 
primary elections.  The information in Figure 7.5 is 
more informative.
 Figure 7.5 presents turnout rates of voting 
eligible electorates separately for Republican and 
Democratic primary elections held in Texas from 
2000 to 2016. To facilitate comparing similar elec-
tions, turnout for presidential and non-presidential 
years are presented separately. The turnout rates 
are very low for each party. More importantly, to 
win party nomination, a candidate needs only more 
than half of primary elections votes cast.
Texas Republican presidential primary turnout 
ranged from 4.3 to 13.8 percent. Majorities for 
these rates range from 2.6 to 7 percent.  Majorities 
for turnout in Democratic presidential primary 
elections ranged from 1.9 to 9.6 percent.
 The majority percentages are much lower for 
nonpresidential election years when Texas holds 
all of its statewide executive branch elections. 
Only more than 2.0 to 4.1 percent of the eligible 
electorate was sufficient to win Republican Party 
nominations. Winning Democratic Party nomina-
tions required more than 2.4 to 3.8 percent of the 
eligible electorate. Republican candidates won all 
general election contests from 2000 to 2012. They 
were nominated by as few as 2 percent of the most 
extremely traditional or conservative Republicans 
in Texas.
 Texas Republicans seeking statewide office 
know that their first, and probably largest chal-
lenge is to secure their party’s nomination.  To 
do so, they must appeal to a very small number 
of voters who are not representative of Texans or 
Texas Republicans. Candidates for United States 
Senate needed the support of 4.6 percent or fewer 
of the voting eligible population. Candidates for 
state executive positions elected statewide needed 
only more than 2.1 percent in 1998 and 2.0 percent 
since 2002.
 Curiously, high-powered ultra-conservative in-
terests use low primary election turnout to threaten 
incumbent Texas Republicans.  These groups mon-
itor the behavior of elected officials, even to the 
point of reviewing votes by individual state legis-
lators. Republican incumbents risk running against 
well-financed challengers in the next primary 
election if they do not actively work for the conser-
vative agenda as defined by the most conservative 
in Texas.
 In Texas and elsewhere, higher turnout general 
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elections no longer play a moderating role in state 
and local politics. Incumbents are more likely to 
be defeated from a challenger from their own party 
in a primary election than a challenger from the 
opposite party in a general election.  Partisan ger-
rymandering of legislative districts and one party 
predominance in statewide elections have made 
low turnout primary elections all-important.
Roles Played by Contemporary Parties 
Although we share the system of two dominant 
political parties with Great Britain, ours are often 
seen as not offering the clear choice that the Labor 
and Conservative parties offer there. When politi-
cal parties take clear stands on issues, select can-
didates who support those party positions, educate 
the public on those positions, remove officeholders 
who do not uphold those positions, and organize 
themselves within the halls of government to enact 
those positions into law, it is called a responsible 
party system.12 Many believe that Britain has such 
a party system and that we would be better off if 
we were to have more responsible political par-
ties. This is the same idea that we discussed in the 
preceding chapter as one source of why Americans 
vote less. Because our political parties are not 
“responsible parties,” a vote does not have clear 
policy consequences. Not voting in such a circum-
stance may have no costs.
 The United States seems unlikely to develop 
such a system; moreover, many factors now all 
but preclude our doing so. As we have seen, most 
Americans loyally support their parents’ political 
party when voting. Many candidates can ignore 
political parties, relying on campaign contributions 
they gather themselves. And primary elections for 
selection of candidates weaken the political par-
ties’ ability to exclude candidates not sharing their 
positions. Candidates in England have no such 
opportunity to ignore the party.
Are Parties Becoming Less Important?
There has been much concern that American po-
litical parties are in decline. Certainly, Americans 
in survey after survey seem more than willing to 
see parties vanish. They feel “the man rather than 
the party” should be the basis of the voting choice. 
Parties are seen as confusing the issues, creating 
conflict where none really exists, and not keep-
ing their promises.13 Nevertheless, most people 
call themselves Democrats or Republicans. Such 
antipathy toward political parties is often cited as 
a reason parties today are not as vital as they were 
before World War II, but there are other reasons.
 We need to be cautious in assessing the 
strength of U.S. political parties. Compared with 
political parties in most democracies, ours can little 
influence the reelection success of those legislators 
who vote as the party would prefer in passing laws 
and making policies. There seems little question 
that our parties were stronger in the past and 
that today even the best organized party would be 
judged quite weak when compared with those in 
the past or present day parties in other democra-
cies.
 Political parties’ inability to influence elections 
does not necessarily mean that liberal Democrats 
and conservative Republicans are equally likely 
to be elected from all districts across the Unit-
ed States. As we have discussed, some areas are 
overwhelmingly likely to elect Republicans and 
others Democrats. And most conservatives will run 
as Republicans and liberals as Democrats. Weak 
political parties also do not mean that Democrats 
and Republicans will be nearly equal in number in 
state legislatures. Most states have one dominant 
political party.
New-Style Politics
New-style politics of campaigning does not rely on 
political party workers to establish ongoing per-
son-to-person contact with voters. Candidates may 
go door to door speaking with individual residents 
for symbolic purposes. The major broad campaign 
communications use television and electronic me-
dia. Narrower, more focused communications are 
targeted to core voters and undecided voters. Rath-
er than rely on party personnel, candidates hire 
expert campaign managers and pollsters. New style 
politics has created employment for and enriched 
consultants, public relations firms and television 
stations.
 Candidates make every effort to seem trust-
worthy and statesmanlike, without taking positions 
on the issues.14  They concentrate mainly on what 
they believe. Public policy goals are addressed 
infrequently and specific plans to achieve goals 
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are rarely articulated. Candidates for offices from 
mayor to President of the United States avow they 
know how to create jobs or strengthen the econo-
my or achieve greater efficiency, etc. When pressed 
for details, they respond, “check my internet site.”
 This new style of politics emulates advertising 
campaigns used to sell cola and cars. Attributes 
that are undefined or not measurable are touted. 
Buy our cola because it is the “real thing.” Buy 
our cars because we are the “number one dealer.” 
Counterpart political claims include a candidate 
“never forgets where she is from” or “believes in 
the American way of life.” The goal is to make 
potential voters feel good about the candidate.
 Another element of the new-style politics of  
campaigning is “going negative.” Negative cam-
paigning has always existed in American politics, 
but new resources make it easier and perhaps more 
effective. Contemporary information technology 
makes it almost effortless to identify statements 
that can be taken out of context or otherwise mis-
represented against a political opponent. Video ads 
on television and the Internet employ misleading 
audio and video snippets of an opponent. Negative 
ads focus on political opponents to the near exclu-
sion of any information about the candidates airing 
them.
 One kind of negative campaigning involves 
turning a candidate’s strength into a weakness. The 
self-named Swift Boat Veterans were so successful 
in questioning and criticizing Senator John Kerry’s 
military service in the 2004 presidential election 
that the phrase “swift boating” has become part of 
our political lexicon.
 Another variety of negative campaigning in-
volves identifying opponents with famous national 
figures who are unpopular locally. Virtually all 
candidates running as Republicans for seats in the 
Texas legislature from 2010 to 2014 asserted their 
Democratic opponents agreed one hundred percent 
with “overreaching liberals in Washington, D.C.”  
Contrary to their opponents, they would “stand up 
to Barack Obama.” A large number of candidates 
in Republican primaries tried to associate their 
Republican opponents with President Obama by 
juxtaposing their opponents’ names and photo-
graphs with unflattering photographs of President 
Obama.  By the same token, Democrats in strong-
hold states such as California and Hawaii did their 
best to associate their Republican opponents with 
President George W. Bush.
 All candidates criticize negative campaigning 
and promise not to do it. The fact that negative 
campaigning has become the dominant style in 
close elections indicates either it is effective or 
many believe it is effective. In an effort to control 
negative campaigning, Congress passed the Bipar-
tisan Campaign Reform Act in 2002. Candidates 
were required to identify themselves and to say in 
audio ads and appear and say in video ads that they 
approved the communication. The net result is that 
feel-good ads have the candidate approval state-
ment at the end, and negative ads have the state-
ment at the beginning.
 New style campaigning changed the roles 
played by the national parties. The “branding” of 
the national parties has become more important. 
Many presidential advertisements are distributed 
nationally through television and other media. To 
the extent possible, other candidates try to use the 
talking points developed by their parties’ presi-
dential candidates. Second, large-scale transfers 
of funds from the national committee have played 
a critical role in implementing national campaign 
strategies through state and local parties.15 These 
efforts are targeted primarily toward the key bat-
tleground states in presidential elections. Parties in 
the 10 to 15 states with close presidential contests 
get attention and support from the national com-
mittees that have the secondary impact of helping 
their down ballot candidates.
 In Figure 7.1, we found very little decline in 
political party identification. Still, one can see a de-
cline in partisanship in the electorate, which some 
see as further evidence of the decline of U.S. politi-
cal parties.  Donald Trump became the Republican 
nominee for President of the United States in 2016 
despite a history of joining and leaving the Repub-
lican Party.  He registered for the first time as a 
Republican in 1987.  He changed his registration 
to Independence Party in 1999, to the Democratic 
Party in 2001, and to the Republican Party in 2009. 
He indicated on his registration form in 2011 “I do 
not wish to enroll in a party.”  He returned to the 
Republican Party in 2012 and declared his candida-
cy for the Republican nomination for President on 
June 16, 2015.16
 A change in general voting procedures may 
have contributed to the declining importance of 
political parties.  Straight ticket voting (also called 
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straight-party voting) allows voters to choose a 
party’s entire slate of candidates with just a single 
ballot marking. Voters make one punch or mark 
on the ballot in order to vote for every candidate 
of that party for each office on the ballot.  Once a 
widespread practice, the number of states making 
the option of voting for all candidates of a party 
with a single ballet marking has steadily declined.  
In July 2016, only 8 states, including Texas, had 
straight ticket voting as a ballot option.17  In 2017, 
the Texas Legislature passed a law ending straight 
ticket voting after September 2020.
 For whatever reasons, Americans are less 
“strongly” committed to their political party than 
in the past. Furthermore, primaries have taken out 
of the political parties’ hands the choice of which 
candidates will be called “Democrats” or “Repub-
licans.” Certainly, the advantage of the incumbent 
in seeking reelection has increased in Congress be-
cause of “candidate centered” campaign techniques 
focusing primarily on the use of television—new-
style politics. The parties nevertheless persist, 
perhaps because they are organized.18 
Interparty Competition
Competition between the political parties has long 
been thought to be important in our democracy.19 
The basic idea is that to compete, political parties 
will select their candidates more carefully and 
better orchestrate the passage of needed legislation. 
They will be more responsive to public demands 
and more effective in passing policies preferred by 
the public when they are not assured of reelection. 
As a result, there has been a long tradition of mea-
suring such competition.20
 The most common measures of competition 
include the percentage of Democrats in both the 
upper and lower houses, the percentage of the vote 
won by the Democratic gubernatorial candidates, 
the division of which party controls the legislative 
houses and the governorship, and the duration of 
one party’s control. All of these measures have 
been weighed equally into a single measure.21 
However, states that are competitive statewide 
may have few districts where incumbents are much 
challenged.22 Generally, the concept of competition 
is based on the incorrect assumption that a com-
1981 0.37 1998 -0.07 
1982 0.37 1999 -0.10 
1983 0.53 2000 -0.09 
1984 0.52 2001 0.13 
1985 0.42 2002 0.15 
1986 0.41 2003 -0.14 
1987 0.31 2004 -0.16 
1988 0.30 2005 0.18 
1989 0.38 2006 0.18 
1990 0.37 2007 -0.07 
1991 0.18 2008 -0.09 
1992 0.16 2009 0.26 
1993 0.43 2010 0.25 
1994 0.43 2011 0.06 
1995 0.04 2012 0.11 
1996 -0.04 2014 0.27 
1997 -0.06 
Figure 7.6 
VAP Turnout and Legislative Interparty Competition Correlations 
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petitive state will be competitive regardless of how 
competition is measured.23
 The measure of party competition used here is 
based on the average difference in seats between 
the two parties in each legislative chamber. That 
average is then subtracted from 100 to create an 
index where a low value means little competition 
and a high value has more competition.
 In 2015, the Democrats controlled 55 percent 
of the Maine House and Republicans controlled 57 
percent of the Main Senate. The competition index 
value is 94. In Hawaii, Democrats held 96 percent 
of Senate seats and 84 percent of House seats.  The 
competition index value is 20.
 We expect that closer competitions between 
parties stimulate greater voter participation just as 
closer competitions between sports teams stimu-
lates fan interest in those contests. There has been a 
longstanding hypothesis that political competition 
benefits the public parallel to the way that econom-
ic competition benefits the public. Many studies of 
the states have documented positive correlations 
between measures of interparty competition and 
spending overall and spending on development of 
human capital.25
 As documented in Chapter 6, competition 
between Republicans and Democrats is at a low 
point and there was no correlation between turn-
out in 2014 and even division of House seats in 
2015. Might results for 2014 be anomalous? Figure 
7.6 shows there were consistent positive correla-
tions between turnout and interparty competition 
through 1990, and no correlations beginning in 
1995. How can we explain the change?
 An obvious explanation is that the turn-
out-competition relationship was never causal. It 
was spurious, an artifact of regional differences 
that altered over time. Through the early 1990s, the 
Southern states were strongly controlled by Demo-
crats and interparty competition was low. Then, in-
terparty competition increased as Southern prefer-
ences switched to Republicans. What has remained 
consistent has been a pattern of lower turnout in 
Southern states, as documented in Figure 7.7. For 
Northern Northern Former Confederate Former Confederate 
VAP VEP VAP VEP 
1980 57% 58% 47% 48% 
1982 46% 47% 31% 32% 
1984 57% 59% 49% 50% 
1986 42% 43% 34% 35% 
1988 55% 57% 46% 48% 
1990 42% 44% 33% 34% 
1992 60% 62% 51% 53% 
1994 43% 45% 34% 36% 
1996 52% 55% 46% 48% 
1998 40% 43% 31% 33% 
2000 54% 57% 48% 51% 
2002 41% 44% 35% 38% 
2004 60% 64% 53% 57% 
2006 43% 46% 33% 36% 
2008 60% 64% 56% 61% 
2010 42% 45% 35% 38% 
2012 56% 60% 54% 58% 
2014 38% 40% 33% 36% 
Figure 7.7 
General Election Turnout: Northern and Former Confederate States Averages 
160 • Chapter 7 
every year, turnout in Southern states is significant-
ly lower than turnout in Northern states.26
 Firgure 7.8 shows that there are no relation-
ships between turnout in the 2014 general elections 
and either partisan results of those elections or on 
policies in 2014.  This is further evidence that gen-
eral election turnout is not strongly related either to 
partisan election results or to state and local gov-
ernment policies.
The Impact of Competition
Are there patterns of differences we care about that 
are empirically linked to higher and lower inter-
party competition?  In the years when turnout and 
interparty competition were correlated with each 
other, there were positive correlations between 
turnout and measures of taxing and spending.  Do 
those patterns hold for 2014? Figure 7.9 correlates 
interparty competition and problem and policy 
measures from Chapter 6.
 It would seem that past correlations between 
interparty competition and policy do not hold for 
2014. Interparty competition is no longer positively 
related to taxing and spending measures as predict-
ed. The two correlations in Figure 7.8 that meet our 
threshold of .30 are how accurately party divisions 
in the State Houses reflect partisan preferences 
expressed in public opinion polls and the percent 
of voting age population registered to vote.  It is no 
surprise that turnout is positively related to regis-
tration rate or that higher turnout results in more 
accurate refection of the partisanship preferences 
of residents in the partisan affiliation of House 
members. There is little to suggest that competition 
directly influences public policy.27 There may be 
an indirect relationship between turnout and policy 
if policy is related to the partisan composition of 
state legislatures. 
 It is logical to expect that party competition 
might force political parties and politicians to be 
more responsive to the wants of the electorate. The 
evidence does not support this model. Perhaps the 
declining importance of parties has undermined 
such responsiveness. Political parties have been 
greatly weakened both by the growth of primaries 
as well as the growing importance of direct mass 
media appeals to voters paid by individual cam-
paign funds rather than the parties.
 Although overall state party competition would 
seem most likely to shape public policy, compe-
tition between political parties at the district level 
might also be important. There is evidence that 
local competition is decreasing.28 District-level 
Figure 7.8 
Correlations With Turnout 2014 Elections and Possible Results 
Voting Age Voting Eligible 
Accurate Republican Representation in House 2015 -.22 -.28 
Even Division of House Seats 2015 -.28 -.29 
Percent Senate Republican 2015 -.08 -.15 
Percent House Republican 2015 -.07 -.08 
Per Capita State and Local Revenue .18 .21 
Per Capita State and Local Expenditure .18 .21 
State and Local Tax Burden -17 -.16 
Per Capita State and Local Long Term Debt -.03 .05 
Regressivity of State and Local Taxes -.21 -.19 
TANF Monthly Payment -.04 -.01 
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competition has declined as the majority parties 
have created safe elections for themselves and for 
their opponents. There is little reason to expect 
district-level interparty competition to increase and 
to be important in the future.
The Importance of Party Control
We turn now to a consideration of whether the 
policies of states with legislatures controlled by 
Democrats differ from those controlled by Republi-
cans. We might expect that a legislature controlled 
by Democrats would enact more liberal programs, 
such as civil rights legislation or programs consis-
tent with the New Deal. Some research has sup-
ported this theory,29 but other research has not.30
 We would expect to find the liberalism of Dem-
ocrats reflected in a larger tax burden and greater 
spending per capita. We would expect policies that 
place fewer restrictions on abortion and welfare 
benefits to be more generous. Figure 7.10 presents 
correlations between Republican Party control and 
a variety of state policies and status variables in 
2014.
 Republican control of state legislatures is 
positively correlated with five of eleven current 
policies. All of the directions are in line with the 
expectation that Republicans enact more conserva-
tive policies. In 2014 greater control by Republi-
cans was related to lower tax burdens, a lower per 
capita state and local debt, lower percent of Med-
icaid expenses paid by state and local government 
and higher incarceration rates overall and higher 
rates of new prisoners.
 Party control has become more strongly re-
lated to state and local policies over time while 
turnout and interparty competition have become 
less strongly related to state and local policies.  
Long-term control of state government by one 
party provides opportunity for that party to im-
plement its preferred policies.  The last ten years 
have provided such opportunities in a large num-
ber of states.  For example, the Republican Party 
won every statewide election in Texas from 1994 
through 2016 and has controlled both chambers 
of the Texas Legislature since 2003.  Republicans 
have had sufficient time to repeal previous policies 
they oppose and implement policies they prefer in 
almost all areas.  Since they have faced no viable 
opposition from Texas Democrats, Texas Republi-
Figure 7.9 
Correlations With Interparty Competition 2015 
Interparty 
Competition 
Accurate Republican Representation in House 2015 .56 
Percent of Voting Age Population Registered to Vote 2014 .41 
Percent Senate Republican 2015 -.23 
Percent House Republican 2015 -.23 
Per Capita State and Local Revenue -.04 
Per Capita State and Local Expenditure .03 
State and Local Tax Burden -.06 
Per Capita State and Local Long Term Debt .16 
Regressivity of State and Local Taxes -.23 
TANF Monthly Payment .25 
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cans have identified the U.S. federal government as 
their main political opponent and the key obstacle 
that prevents them from enacting ideal policies in 
every area.
 If the pattern of one-party control of state 
governments continues, we might well see stronger 
relationships between state partisanship and policy. 
In the near future, there may be strong negative 
relationships between Republican control and per 
capita revenues and expenditures and regressivity 
of state and local taxes.  For now, analyses suggest 
turnout and interparty competition are not strongly 
related to state and local policies but party control 
is. 
Conclusion on the Impact of Party
Our empirical analyses found no evidence that 
supports the generalization that turnout in general 
elections is related to interparty completion or to 
state efforts or outcomes.  No evidence was found 
that interparty competition is related to state efforts 
or outcomes. We found many of the expected 
correlations between party control and policies and 
outcomes. If many states continue to be controlled 
by a single party, there may be more strong cor-
relations with party control in the future. 
Interest Groups
If political parties are weakening in the United 
States, interest groups seem willing and able to 
replace them. Our task in assessing interest or 
pressure groups will not be easy. While political 
parties must be visible and public if they are to win 
elections, interests need not be either visible or 
public to succeed. Interest groups are organizations 
of persons of similar interests and opinions seeking 
to influence public policy; but do they contribute 
to or detract from democracy? Despite Americans’ 
Figure 7.10 
Correlations With Republican Party Control of Legislature 2015 
Republican 
Control 
Per Capita State and Local Revenue -.25 
Per Capita State and Local Expenditure -.24 
State and Local Tax Burden -.31 
Regressivity of State and Local Taxes .22 
Per Capita State and Local Long Term Debt -.64 
Percent of VAP Registered to Vote, 2014 General Election .14 
TANF Monthly Family Benefit -.07 
Educational Spending Per Child in ADA -.47 
Percent Medicaid Paid by State and Local Government -.31 
Poverty Rate .20 
Violent Crime Rate .15 
Property Crime Rate .20 
Prisoners Per 100,000 Population .49 
New Prisoners Per 100,000 Population .30 
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ambivalence toward political parties, few would 
argue that they are undemocratic or that their ex-
istence compromises democracy. Perhaps parties 
have resulted in biased public policy, inefficiency, 
and corruption, but since people voted freely for 
them—or arguably had the opportunity to do so—
they are part of democracy.
 Such is not the case for interest groups. Many, 
but certainly not all, people may be members of 
these groups, and no one votes for them. Further-
more, they organize to offset popular votes since 
they act between elections as well. They seek to 
substitute strong opinions, activism, and money for 
what they lack in votes.
 Although it is useful to have large numbers in 
an interest group, this approach has its cost when 
members are not similarly affected by policies. 
Such internal conflicts might therefore obstruct 
group efforts. What is most useful for an interest 
group is enthusiasm or money. Enthusiasm facil-
itates getting group members to vote, to write, to 
organize, to care what happens, and to contribute 
money. Ample money allows interest groups to win 
appreciation from candidates for substantial cam-
paign contributions to underwrite very expensive, 
new style television campaigns. 
 Ample money allows interest groups to have 
full-time lobbyists present in state capitals to attend 
and speak at public hearings. These lobbyists can 
advise legislators of the group’s interests and gath-
er information concerning how other sympathetic 
state legislatures had coped with a problem. They 
can establish personal relationships with legislators 
by offering them free meals and entertainment
 These efforts may or may not establish sympa-
thetic response to the group’s interests. They will 
establish two things of paramount importance: 
recognition and access. Conference committees 
typically make final decisions on key items of leg-
islation in the final days of sessions. At those times, 
the most a lobbyist can hope for is a minute or two 
of conversation with individual members. Access 
gives them the brief interaction. Recognition saves 
precious time; the lobbyist does not have to identi-
fy who she is and whom she represents.
 Interest group money can play a major role in 
helping candidates win primary and general elec-
tions.  Interest group spending in support of elec-
tions for office and for policy has become extreme-
ly important during contemporary college students’ 
lifespans.  As discussed below, the Supreme Court 
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Commission 2010 has abolished most state and 
federal attempts to limit interest group spending to 
influence elections. 
 The Citizens United decision has had another 
important impact on interest group participation in 
elections: the introduction of Dark Money.  Dark 
Money refers to political spending meant to influ-
ence the decision of a voter, where the donor is not 
disclosed and the source of the money is unknown.  
Dark Money groups account for staggering gaps in 
understanding exactly how each funding dollar is 
being spent during political elections. These gaps 
are becoming wider with every election cycle.31
 The central feature to interest groups’ demo-
cratic contribution is their capacity for allowing the 
emotions of those strongly opinionated on issues to 
be vented constructively. If they lose in an election, 
they can contribute money to interest groups shar-
ing their values and seek to influence elected rep-
resentatives between elections and win their point 
in the next election. Proponents of interest groups 
argue that millions are either members of groups or 
rely on them as reference groups or guides for how 
they should react to proposed legislation. Involve-
ment in interest groups is seen as another form of 
participation in which some opinions are heard 
in the process of making public policy. Interest 
groups can be viewed as one of many channels 
through which the public can speak to their repre-
sentatives.
 Interest groups frequently contribute informa-
tion to the political process. Such groups are likely 
to have more technical competence than do legisla-
tors. Although they may present only their perspec-
tive in offering this technical information to legis-
lators at public hearings, at least that information 
is made available. Other groups may present other 
relevant and contradictory information. Across the 
50 states, legislators accept the notion that such 
groups provide valuable technical information 
and thus contribute to better public policy.32 Case 
studies of many states suggest that the interaction 
between lobbyists and legislators is more construc-
tive in some states than in others. Some research 
shows Oregon to lead this ranking.33 There are few 
such studies because they are difficult to conduct.
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The Strength of Interest Groups
Because interest groups do not stand for elec-
tion, their number and relative strength in various 
states are uncertain. Most states register at least 
some groups, most often if they wish to appear in 
public hearings; and most states require budget 
information on at least the largest groups. This 
information, however, leaves uncertain the relative 
strengths of interest groups. Although groups may 
be asked to indicate the number of their members 
and even their budgets in such reports, neither of 
these pieces of information may determine which 
are most effective in getting their way. Not all 
states require such reports.
 Despite arguments that interest groups con-
tribute to better public policy and to affording the 
public alternative avenues to affect public policy, 
the suspicion remains that they pull public policy 
away from what we would expect were interest 
groups totally absent. A central problem is that 
not all segments of society are equally prevalent 
among interest groups. Interest groups over-repre-
sent the wealthy, better educated, white, males, and 
businesses.34 Although the most effective groups 
in some states are public school teachers’ organi-
zations, such as those affiliated with the National 
Educational Association, business groups dominate 
the most effective ranks in most states.35 General 
business organizations, such as chambers of com-
merce, bankers’ associations, and manufacturers’ 
groups, are second, third, and fourth, respectively, 
in most states. If interest groups are effective, there 
seems to be little question that they oppose rather 
than support the ideal of equal representation.
Efforts to Control Interest Groups
Not everyone would like to see pressure groups 
and their impact on government eliminated. Those 
whose preferences coincide with influential interest 
groups would oppose any reduction in government 
programs they benefit from. Some see these groups 
as one of the many channels through which people 
can influence government policy. Elected officials 
who get the bulk of their campaign funds from 
such groups—and future rivals who hope to—may 
be hesitant to limit their effectiveness, let alone to 
abolish them.
Controlling Interest Groups
Interest groups cannot legally bribe elected offi-
cials to vote the way the group wants. Money can-
not be given in return for favorable votes. Groups 
can make contributions to campaigns with the 
expectation that the relationship will become mu-
tually supportive. This is a very subtle difference, 
especially in states where an elected official can 
pocket any leftover campaign funds on retirement. 
Until the elections of 1994, even members of Con-
gress could move money contributed to campaigns 
to their own pockets on retirement. This continues 
to be true in many states.
 Many states also require registration by 
pressure groups, especially if they wish to speak 
before legislative committees. Registration consists 
of filing necessary forms with information such as 
the membership, budget, and officers of the asso-
ciation, and perhaps even those bills that the group 
would like to speak on in public hearings. The 
public can then learn about the activity of pressure 
groups from those registrations, if they bother to 
check.
 If candidates were able to spend only half a 
year’s salary in their campaigns rather than the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars now spent, the 
limited funds needed could come with fewer 
groups and fewer strings attached. Political party 
and individual contributions could even provide 
all allowed funds. Then interest groups could not 
“buy” votes.
 In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
restrictions on campaign expenditures by candi-
dates are unconstitutional, a violation of the 1st 
Amendment’s freedom-of-speech clause, despite 
the fact that all other developed democracies do 
restrict campaign expenditures.35   In Citizens 
United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010), 
the Court said limitations on spending amounted 
to limitations on free speech. Federal law limiting 
contributions by corporations, unions, and mis-
named “non-political” nonprofit organizations was 
overturned. As a result, existing half-hearted and 
largely ineffective attempts by the states to control 
interest group spending may soon disappear.
 At this point, only an amendment to the federal 
constitution could authorize campaign expenditure 
restrictions, restrictions on contributions or public 
financing of elections. Such an amendment would 
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have to be proposed by those who benefit the most 
from uncontrolled campaign contributions: in-
cumbent members of the U.S. Congress and state 
legislatures. As of July 2016, 16 state legislatures 
had passed resolutions calling on Congress to 
propose an amendment to overturn Citizens United 
v. Federal Elections Commission (2010). Califor-
nia will be the 17th state if a ballot measure in the 
2016 general election is passed.  These resolutions 
are symbolic rather than substantive.35
 PACs have increased   enormously in numbers 
and influence and are rivals to political parties. 
They are little more than reorganized pressure 
groups. Often, they provide the majority of cam-
paign funds to candidates, especially incumbents.36 
PAC spending in state elections rose from $95 
million in 1972 to $400 million in 1984. PACs 
financed 60 percent of the campaign costs for the 
California Assembly in 1984 and 40 percent of 
the funds collected by Illinois legislators in 1984-
1985.37 Such increases are commonplace through-
out the states.38According to the Federal Election 
Commission, PAC contributions to federal can-
didates for elections held in 1999 and 2000 cycle 
totaled $259.8 million.39 The Center for Responsive 
Politics reports that in the 2011-2012 elections, 
the top 20 PAC contributors alone gave more than 
$915 million to candidates.40
 Several states have experimented in partial 
public financing. Until this financing is sufficient 
to require that taking public funds precludes using 
any additional funds, such as is true for presiden-
tial candidates in the past before the corrupting 
influence of “soft money,” which allows bypass-
ing these limits, the effectiveness of such public 
financing remains unknown.
 In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom 
PAC v Bennett (2011), the Supreme Court struck 
down an Arizona public financing law that would 
have provided extra public money to candidates 
who were being outspent by privately funded 
candidates and independent expenditure groups. 
Arizona argued that public funds generated more 
speech, not less. The court determined well-funded 
candidates would be forced to spend more money 
to outspend opponents or spend less so opponents 
would not receive public funds.41
The Power and Impact of Pressure Groups
We have no objective measure of pressure group 
strength or influence.42 We do have a measure 
based on the assessments of public officials and 
political informants in states they know well. This 
is the outgrowth of the combined research of many 
political scientists in 50 states.42 This research 
suggests some changes over this nearly 20-year 
period. Eight states saw the strength of their inter-
est groups decline, while six states saw an increase. 
Nevertheless, the Midwest and the Northeast re-
portedly still have the weakest interest groups.
 Until the early 2000s, two interests were 
perceived as most influential: general business 
organizations (including state chambers of com-
merce) and schoolteachers. In 2007, they were still 
ranked first and second. However, utility interests 
have joined them. These three interests surpass all 
others.43
 We would expect interest groups to shape 
public policy in a direction preferred by business.44 
Other literature suggests that neither business 
groups nor any interest group has much success in 
shaping public policy as compared with others who 
influence public policy, such as political parties and 
institutional leaders.45 There is substantial variation 
from state to state in which groups are most influ-
ential, although, as stated earlier, business groups 
predominate.46
Conclusions on Interest Groups
As noted in the introduction to interest or pressure 
groups, we know little of the importance of interest 
groups to policy-making. There is also uncertainty 
about whether they are democratic. We have not 
been able to justify many conclusions on these 
groups. Certainly, they exist for a purpose. Hun-
dreds of millions of dollars are spent each year by 
individuals and companies to support these groups. 
If an interest group organizes and pays for a lobby-
ist, a rival group might feel the need to countervail 
by organizing itself. This situation might occur 
even if the first group gets no clear public policy 
changes as a return for the money it spends seeking 
to affect policy. If this spending to offset others’ 
spending logic is correct, pressure groups may be 
having little effect on our public policies.
 The greatest concern about interest groups is 
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that they “buy” representatives with their campaign 
contributions and thereby shape public policy to 
their satisfaction. With new-style politics, candi-
dates need great amounts of money to compete, 
even if their districts are overwhelmingly uncom-
petitive. When pressure groups offer campaign 
contributions in return for the candidate’s support 
for the group’s point of view, few candidates can 
resist.
The Potential for Competitive Politics
Both political parties and pressure groups are orga-
nizations actively working for the public policies 
they desire. They almost certainly move public 
policy away from what it would be were such 
organizations absent. Institutionally limiting or en-
couraging either political parties or interest groups 
has proven to have little effect, with one excep-
tion. Primary elections seem to have hurt political 
parties. If we were to reverse this action, howev-
er, and allow parties to select their candidates by 
whatever means they please, would they strengthen 
politically? And if they did, would people whose 
views are under-represented by pressure groups, 
such as the poor, be championed by at least one of 
the strengthened parties? Although many believe 
or hope so, studying the variation in the strength 
of political parties in the states and the variation in 
regulations of those parties offers little confidence 
in this result.
 We have found only modest support for many 
of the hypothesized relationships between political 
parties, pressure groups, and policy. The party of 
the poor, the Democratic Party, sometimes appears 
to be the advocate of that class. But often no rela-
tionship exists. Competition between the political 
parties also fails to have clear and consistent em-
pirical relationships with state policy. Competition 
appears to have the most effect. Competitive polit-
ical parties do not seem to be found in states with 
weaker pressure groups. Such may not have always 
been the case, however, since the parties may have 
once controlled pressure groups. More probably, 
however, time has just changed the role of political 
parties.
 At one time, political parties may have been 
perfectly adequate for representing divisions 
between what people in urban, mercantile areas 
wanted versus what people in rural, agricultural 
areas preferred. With economic complexity, how-
ever, subtle economic differences may be lost when 
there are only two or perhaps even three or four 
political parties. Automotive workers, the elderly, 
students, or residents in states with poor health 
facilities may be too small in number for a political 
party to be concerned with either their plight or 
their votes. Interest groups may allow such groups 
to express their views, supplementing the role of 
political parties.
 Political parties in states with competitive 
parties and weak pressure groups may be able to 
reflect political divisions within the state that do 
not entail the more subtle reflection of interests 
available through pressure groups. Party and pres-
sure group systems may just reflect the politics of 
the state. Pressure groups also may reflect, rather 
than shape, society.
 Can we envision a political system with nu-
merous pressure groups and no political parties 
vying in elections? It probably would look very 
much like a multiparty system. We might suspect 
that candidates would then seek the middle ground 
to appeal to more groups, win elections, seek out 
like-minded fellow representatives, and organize 
to pass policy. Those policies would be used to 
appeal for further voter support, by arguing that it 
is better to get something that they want rather than 
nothing. In effect, this scenario would suggest that 
political parties would reappear.
Summary
1. Those of like mind on the issues of the day can 
often overwhelm their opponents by organizing to 
get their supporters elected and to pass the desired 
policies into law. Political parties were the first 
such organizations, but interest groups also orga-
nize to enact desired policies.
2. At one time, political parties were stronger than 
they are today in the United States.
3. Political primaries and a new style of campaign 
using expensive television commercials paid for 
by interest groups have weakened political parties. 
It is also clear that many Americans are willing to 
cast their votes for candidates solely on the basis of 
which political party candidates are listed under.
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4. States and districts with nearly equal numbers of 
Democrats and Republicans probably have more 
competitive political parties, and improved organi-
zation results from the parties seeking to optimize 
their chances. Few states or districts, however, 
have such balance.
5. Neither turnout in elections nor interparty com-
petition consistently affects the policies on which 
we focused.
6. Party control has become more strongly related 
to state policies over time.
7. Interest groups are also organizations that seek 
to influence public policy to promote their inter-
ests. Business interest groups are most influential. 
There is evidence that would suggest interest 
groups are becoming stronger while political par-
ties weaken.
8. Money is one of the major sources of influence 
for interest groups and is mainly applied by way of 
contributing to the campaign funds of incumbent 
legislators in the hopes of getting them to feel obli-
gated to vote as the groups want.
9. Since the Supreme Court has judged campaign 
expenditure limitations and public funding of 
election campaigns as unconstitutional, there are 
few options for limiting the influence of interest 
groups.
10. Comprehensive subjective data available to 
assess the impact of interest groups suggest that 
they have little impact on state policies for taxing, 
spending, aid for the poor, or abortion. Stories and 
case studies of interest group successes suggest the 
opposite.
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Study Guide, Chapter 7
Essay Questions
 1. Politics is winning and losing. A small number of people with meager funding, but who are 
 organized and working well together can defeat a larger number of people with more funding who are   
 not organized and working together. Why is this the case? Discuss and give three examples. 
 2. A section in the “History of American Political Parties” is titled “Role Reversal and Hyper-partisanship.”  
 What was the role reversal and what was hyper-partisanship?  Discuss the impact each had on state and local 
 politics and policy.
 3. The text lists five factors that help explain why the United States has had two major political parties.    
 Briefly discuss each.  Identify the factor or factors you think have been most important in your lifetime and 
 explain why.  Which factors, if any, were showing signs of weakness in recent election seasons?
 4. The states have a variety of primary election systems and procedures. What are the advantages and   
 disadvantages for open, closed, and mixed primaries and for caucuses?  Explain from both the voters’ and the 
 parties’ perspectives. 
 5. Would you characterize turnout in Texas primary elections since 2000 as high or low?  For each party, has  
 turnout in Texas been stable over time or has it changed? Approximately what percent of maximum turnout is   
 necessary for a Republican primary candidate to win a majority in non-presidential election years?  What are the  
 implications of your answer for representation and power sharing?
 6. Identify and explain at least four elements of New-Style Politics in American elections. Have any of these  
 elements contributed to making political parties weaker?  Why or why not?
 7. What empirical information in Chapter 7 supports the conclusion that states differences in election   
 turnout and close competition between the two major parties is less important now than in the past. Is    
 there any evidence that state differences concerning political parties might be important? 
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. The Federalists, the first political party in the U.S., organized to .
  a. fight for independence
  b. fight against taxation
  c. ratify the Articles of Confederation
  d. ratify the current U.S. Constitution
 2. The impact of electronic and print news media causes Americans to focus most on __________ politics.
  a. community
  b. local
  c. state
  d. national
 3. What is the correlation between Republican control of state legislatures and state tax burdens?
  a. positive
  b. negative
  c. no correlation
  d. since the relationship is spurious, it is not possible to calculate a correlation coefficient
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 4. The ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010)
  a. makes it harder for states to regulate PACs and other interest groups
  b. is limited to the federal government and has no impact on state politics
  c. is more important for non-partisan elections than for partisan elections
  d. will have no impact on the relative power of political parties and interest groups
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Chapter 8 
THE FIRST ACTIVE GOVERNMENT: THAT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
As noted at the beginning of this text, most peo-
ple have federal government in mind when they 
think of “the government.”  In Chapter 4, the role 
of the federal government working to make state 
and local governments look good was discussed. 
This element of American federalism continues to 
meet its goals.  A 2013 Pew Research Center Poll 
reported 63 percent of Americans viewed local 
governments favorably.  State and federal govern-
ments were viewed favorably by 57 percent and 28 
percent respectively.  In a 2014 Gallup Poll survey, 
72 percent of Americans trust local government and 
62 percent trust state government. A Gallup Poll 
survey in 2015 found 38 percent trust the federal 
government’s ability to handle domestic problems.1  
 In the United States in general and Texas in 
particular, there is a strong contemporary anti-gov-
ernment attitude.  To a great extent, negative views 
about the performance of the federal government 
are also applied to state governments.  Local gov-
ernments are viewed more positively, but Amer-
icans seem to forget that local governments are 
governments. 
 Today, you receive services such as education, 
highways, police, and welfare from national, state, 
and local governments. As we noted earlier in dis-
cussing the periods of government, city or munic-
ipal government first served a public increasingly 
dependent on government for a broad range of ser-
vices. Even today, it provides most of our services, 
although those services may be paid with state and 
federal taxes. Some would suggest that cities and 
other local government are so subject to state rules 
and so dependent on money from the federal gov-
ernment that they act as administrators of state and 
federal programs. This conclusion, however, would 
ignore the fact that local governments finance the 
large majority of their activities—68% in 2013—
with their own revenues: taxes, usually property 
taxes, and fees paid to local governments.
Local Government Revenues and Spending
In 2013, local governments received 4 percent of 
their revenue directly from the federal government, 
27 percent from state government and 68 percent 
from own sources of revenue. Figure 8.1 provides 
details on own sources revenues. 
 Local governments rely greatly on property and 
sales taxes. Tax on individual and business income 
is a minor source of funds. Local governments 
receive approximately 41 percent of revenue from 
local sources from things they charge for, including 
utilities.
 Figure 8.2 details local government spending. 
Education is the most expensive program, approx-
imately 34 percent of spending for primary and 
secondary education and 3 percent for higher and 
libraries. Public safety comprises 9 percent. Utility 
spending and Environment and Housing are also 
about 11 percent each.  Transportation is 6 percent, 
hospitals are 5 percent and each of the other areas 
is less than 5 percent. Police, corrections, sewers, 
highways, and utilities constitute less than a quarter 
of local government expenditures for services.
 When we think of local government services, 
we think first of those traditionally associated with 
municipal government: police, fire protection, street 
construction and maintenance, and sewage. For 
most Americans, cities also provide drinkable wa-
ter, electricity, and garbage disposal through public 
utilities.  Utilities could be provided by private 
sector business and are in some locations.  A unique 
element of utilities is that delivery infrastructure 
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costs are so great that it is unrealistic to expect 
that multiple companies will build separate elec-
trical, water and sewer systems and compete for 
customers.  This market failure results in a single 
monopoly provider.  Municipal and other local 
governments are most often the single providers 
for at least two reasons.  First, the startup costs of 
utility infrastructure are so expensive that private 
companies are not willing to wait for decades 
before recognizing a profit.  Second, Americans 
are more willing to have governments than private 
businesses have monopoly control over products 
and services regarded as necessities. 
 Local governments are in the construction 
business, managing and paying for the capital 
infrastructure necessary for local businesses to 
thrive.  With few exceptions, local governments 
contract with private sector companies to build 
roads, bridges, buildings, sewage systems, etc.  Lo-
cal governments maintain such facilities after they 
are built, sometimes with their own employees and 
sometimes by outsourcing to private sector compa-
nies.  It is important to note that these activities are 
part of local governments’ budgets, but the result-
ing private sector economic activity is not linked 
systematically to government in documents that 
report private sector growth or employment. As a 
result, analysts tend to assume the private sector 
activity financed by government results from other 
private sector activity.  The crucial link between 
local government finance and oversight and private 
sector activity is almost entirely undocumented and 
poorly recognized.
 Some cities provide many other services. The 
poor are aided with food and health care and are 
often provided with public housing at very low 
rent. Additionally, hospitals, parks and recreation, 
and airports are among some cities’ services. Most 
cities also provide streetlights, sidewalks, and 
libraries.
 Before the Second World War, it would have 
largely been cities or municipalities providing local 
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services, at least apart from public education. With 
the growth of special districts providing some lim-
ited local services, such as water or electricity, and 
some counties now acting as cities, it would be in-
accurate to present only municipal services. Figure 
8.2 includes all local governments, including cities, 
counties, school districts, and special districts.
 Public education stands out, but apart from 
that, many services take a small share of local re-
sources. Local governments provide a broad range 
of services on which we depend.
Several Local Governments
Local government is no doubt the most complex of 
our government levels. Even if you live in the most 
remote rural area, multiple local governments serve 
you. If you live in a large metropolitan area with 
one or more old core or central cities surrounded 
by multiple incorporated municipalities, you may 
have as many as 10 or 12 local governments, each 
providing you with some services. Overall, there 
are 89,004 local governments.2
County Government
First we will discuss the oldest local government, 
county government. According to the 2012 U.S. 
Census Bureau Census of Governments, all states 
except Connecticut have county governments.3 
They provide a limited number of governmental 
services, such as maintaining property records, pro-
viding public health care, and maintaining roads in 
rural areas.   In Texas, counties inspect restaurants, 
provide jails and pay for county courts, which hear 
civil cases and misdemeanor criminal cases. 
 The county commission is but one of the names 
given to county governing bodies. In the Northeast, 
it is the board of supervisors; in Texas, it is the 
County Commissioners Court. Apart from a hand-
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ful of quite urban counties, county commissions 
combine the functions of both legislative and ex-
ecutive branches. Commissioners both pass county 
policies and see to their administration.  County 
courts are part of state court systems and do not 
check or balance county legislative and executive 
branches.
 Many county executives are elected, such as 
the sheriff, clerk, and tax assessor. But there is no 
independent chief executive to check and balance 
the commission acting as a legislative body. In 
some urban counties, such as Suffolk in New York, 
county government provides services that are more 
like those provided by municipalities. Many of 
these governments have elected or appointed chief 
executives or managers.
 There were 3,031 counties in 2012; there 
has been little change in this number over time.4 
The size of the county commission varies greatly 
between states, with many having 50 supervisors 
and others having five commissioners. Typically, 
this position is described as part-time with low 
pay. Since in most counties there is little for county 
government to do, this low pay does not discour-
age those interested in the satisfaction of being a 
commissioner. Frequently, owners of large farms or 
ranches seek these positions to protect themselves 
from the loss of services or higher taxes on their 
property.
 The historical importance of county govern-
ment is reflected in the way the federal government 
advises citizens about dangerous weather.  The 
National Weather service broadcasts warnings 
about tornados, hurricanes, floods and other threats 
by identifying locations first and primarily in terms 
of counties.  Visitors, short-term residents and even 
many long-term residents are generally ignorant of 
county names and locations.  You probably know 
that College Station, Texas is in Brazos County.  
How many of the other 253 Texas counties can you 
identify by name and location?
Municipal Government Mayor/Council Form
We began this chapter discussing city government 
because it comes to mind first when we mention lo-
cal government. Municipal government, or govern-
ment in incorporated cities, is a relatively old form 
of government adopted from England, as is county 
government. The oldest form of municipal gov-
ernment, the mayor/council form of government, 
has the division between legislative and executive 
branches that Americans expect of government. 
This also dates well back into English history, per-
haps suggesting that all checks-and-balances forms 
of government are copies of English municipal 
government.
 The mayor heads the executive branch, and the 
city council is the legislative branch. Mayors with 
substantial formal powers, such as budget mak-
ing and veto power are labeled “strong” mayors. 
“Weak” mayors lack these powers. They preside 
over council meetings and have the power to vote. 
Some weak mayors have only a tie-breaking vote 
in the council.
 Frequently, weak mayors must vie with elected  
executives other than the city council. Addition-
ally, they lack powers to influence strongly the 
city’s budget. These formal powers, or the lack of 
them, can be offset by other powers of the individ-
uals involved. Mayor Daley’s strong influence on 
Chicago politics during the 1950s and 1960s was 
achieved despite his office being a “weak” mayor. 
Personality, political influence through organized 
political parties, and other informal powers can be 
more important than formal powers.
 The strong mayor/council form of municipal 
government employs the checks-and-balances 
ideas of how to form public policy. In 1915, Cin-
cinnati was the last American city to abandon the 
bicameral or two-house form of legislature that is 
normally associated with the idea of checks and 
balances. Now the check on the second legislative 
chamber on excesses of the first is not present in 
our cities, even those with mayor/council gov-
ernments. The rivalry between the legislative and 
executive branches remains. Each checks and bal-
ances the other in making public policy. Only those 
policies that both think are desirable become law. 
The best policy is the one that meets the approval 
of both the executive and the legislative branch-
es. This can be characterized as policy-making by 
competition.
 Only in the last few years has the proportion of 
mayor council cities fallen below half. According 
to the National League of Cities 2011 survey, 33 
percent of cities use the mayor council form. It is 
the most common form of government in cities 
with populations of at least 250,000.5
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Municipal Government Council/Manager Form
The council/manager form of municipal govern-
ment shares the same form of government used in
U.S. independent school districts because the same
reform movement--the Municipal Reform Move-
ment, created both. This form of government is
used by virtually all independent school districts
and approximately 59 percent of cities. It is the
majority in cities of populations less than 250,000.6
The key idea is that there should be no partisan
way to provide services. There is no Democratic
way to teach Johnny to read and no Republican
way to decide when streets need to be repaved.
Regardless of the service, administration should be
professional rather than partisan. The best policy
is a professional one that need be neither competi-
tive nor cooperative but should be sound and well
based. Under this form, the publicly elected city
council appoints a professional city manager to
administer municipal government during the term
of his or her contract.
      In independent school districts, an elected
school board appoints a professional school super-
intendent. Both the city manager and the school su-
perintendent are products of university profession-
al schools. They typically have earned graduate
degrees in government or education respectively.
Both managers and superintendents have national
professional associations and may have careers that
see them moving long distances as they move up
the career ladder. Since city managers and school
superintendents follow careers that take them
from city to city, many local residents and even
the elected officials appointing them see them as
outsiders.
       No state has ever attempted to have a profes-
sional, appointed executive (akin to a city man-
ager) and elected legislature, and most of the few
large cities that tried it have returned to the mayor/
council form. The professional manager is in a dif-
ficult circumstance politically because supportive
council members may lose to those who are more
critical of the manager’s programs. The manager
is often tempted, therefore, to become involved
in seeking the reelection of supporters. Often, the
manager’s professional judgments on allocation
and queuing—for example, which part of the city
should receive new sewers first—result in loss of
support in the areas that must wait. Representa-
tives from such areas may withdraw their support
as a result. In short, especially in larger cities, two
ill-defined and unlabeled political parties form—
one supportive of the manager and one opposed.
       City managers and school superintendents
become vulnerable when they pursue policies the
public opposes. They can make no claims that the
public has endorsed their programs by electing
them. They can invoke professional expertise if
their elected boards support them. If boards are
divided, managers and superintendents put them-
selves in jeopardy when they take sides. Profes-
sional administrators must play a balancing act
between being professional and political.
       Cities with managers also have mayors with
few formal powers. Often, the mayor is chosen by
citywide elections, whereas other members of the
council are chosen in smaller districts. The mayor
is a member of the city council with many sym-
bolic functions, such as signing proclamations and
greeting visitors. The local mass media often focus
on the individual with the title of mayor. This gives
mayors unusual access to the media and enhanc-
es their influence. Yet, they have one vote on the
council, like other members.
Municipal Government Town Meeting Form
The town meeting and representative town meet-
ing forms of municipal government are used in
less than 4 percent of municipalities. Almost all are
located in New England states. The town meeting
form has strong elements of direct citizen partici-
pation. In the town meeting form, eligible citizens
who attend meetings act as the legislative body.
To a greater or lesser extent, eligible citizens who
attend meetings act as the legislative body. There
is an annual town meeting to approve tax and
budget plans and to elect a board of officers called
selectmen to carry out town policy. There may also
be additional town meetings throughout the year
to make a wider range of legislative decisions. In
the representative town meeting form, an elect-
ed council makes decisions, but all citizens may
attend and participate in council meetings. Mayors
“moderate” town meetings and may have addition-
al symbolic duties. Administrators may be hired to
manage municipal employees.
       The town meeting forms date back to colonial
times. They combine elements of representative
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government and direct or participatory democra-
cy. The potential for citizen participation is very
high in town meeting municipalities. Judging from
ongoing admonitions from meeting attendees and
local newspapers, actual participation is quite low.
Only small municipalities or towns use this form.
It is not an intended or practical form for governing
large municipalities.
Municipal Government Commission Form
The commission form of municipal government
originated in events after a major hurricane hit
Galveston, Texas, in 1900 and killed 8,000 people.
The mayor and city council were not willing or
not competent to clean up the damage swiftly and
to restore order. The new municipal government
formed in Galveston combined both legislative
and executive roles within one institution, the city
commission.
 The City of Portland has the last remaining
Commission form of government among large
cities in the United States. Voters elect a Mayor
and Four Commissioners. The Mayor is the head
of the executive branch and the Commissioners
are the City Council. As a legislative body, the
Council adopts the City budget and passes its laws,
policies and regulations. As administrators, Com-
missioners oversee city departments and carry out
policies approved by the Council. The assignment
of departments and bureaus is determined by the
Mayor and may be changed at his or her discretion.
Bureau assignments do not necessarily correspond
to departmental titles.7
 During the period 1900-1950, the commis-
sion form swept through many cities as a better or
“reform” means of governing. It proved largely
unworkable, however. No one had the long-term
planning responsibilities traditionally undertak-
en by the mayor in the mayor/council form. The
annual city budget placed commissioners in the
contradictory position of being advocates for their
own departments while simultaneously working for
the good of the city as a whole. This conflict was
typically resolved with commissioners supporting
each other’s budget requests rather than question-
ing the need for items on the budgets.
 Overall, the commission form of municipal
government can claim few successes. It is now
used by only 1 percent of American cities. Figure
8.3 summarizes the forms of municipal govern-
ment and the differences we have been discussing.
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Independent School Districts
Free primary and secondary education is provided 
almost everywhere in the United States by Inde-
pendent School Districts. Municipal governments 
once provided public education.  School districts 
are called independent to recognize they are no 
longer part of municipal governments.  Only some 
of the very largest municipalities, such as New 
York City, still provide primary and secondary 
education. The movement to independent schools 
is all but complete. 
 After World War II, there were more than 
100,000 school districts in the United States. With 
the steady increase in urbanization after the war, 
many rural districts consolidated with other rural 
districts. Thus, by 1962, we had only about 35,000 
school districts. This decline continues. In 2012, 
there were 12,884 independent school districts.8
 The State of Hawaii has a single statewide 
school district overseen directly by state govern-
ment.9 All other states assign responsibility for 
providing public primary and secondary education 
to school districts.  All state constitutions require 
equal access to a quality or effective or efficient 
education system. Except for Hawaii, the states 
share this responsibility with local school districts 
in a variety of ways.
 States typically establish basic curriculum 
requirements and let school districts choose how to 
fulfill them and add additional elements as they see 
fit.  School funding is shared by states and school 
districts in 49 states.  The original philosophy of 
shared funding was to permit school districts to 
provide enrichment programs beyond state require-
ments and fund them with local taxes.  However, 
states soon discovered that, instead of school 
districts with higher tax rates spending more per 
enrolled student, school districts with higher tax 
rates spent less per enrolled student.
 Tax rates were negatively related to spending 
per student because school districts rely on proper-
ty taxes.  The amount of spending per student for a 
given tax rate is dependent on a district’s property 
tax base  divided by its number of students.  The 
variation in taxable property value per student was 
such that property wealthy districts could spend 
more per student with low tax rates than property 
poor districts could spend per student with high tax 
rates.  For example, in 2012, Pennsylvania had the 
worst funding disparities between low-income and 
high-income schools. The state’s poorest school 
districts receive 33 percent less state and local 
funding than the richest schools.10 
 The challenge to providing more equal funding 
per student in a state is political.  There are sever-
al simple solutions to large variations in property 
value per student across school districts.  For ex-
ample, states could still fund public education with 
property taxes, but use statewide property value 
per student as the tax base.  That would guarantee 
that districts that imposed larger property tax rates 
could spend more money per student than dis-
tricts that chose smaller tax rates.  Another simple 
solution would be to have a state property tax, and 
then distribute funds to school districts based on 
the number of students and other factors such as 
number of special needs students as defined by the 
state. The ongoing large disparities in spending per 
student exist because of decisions made by state 
officials.
 Federal spending on public education is target-
ed to schools based largely on their numbers of stu-
dents from low income families.  As a result, fed-
eral funding plays a role in making spending per 
student more equal.  In 2012, 24 states spent less 
per student in higher poverty districts with state 
and local funds. When federal funds were included, 
only 7 states spent less in higher poverty districts.11 
It is important to note that a significant portion of 
federal funding to schools pays for free breakfast 
and lunch programs for students in poverty.  These 
programs are intended to enhance students’ read-
iness to learn.  They do not fund enhancement of 
educational services offered to students.
Special Districts
In contrast to the declining number of school 
districts, special districts continue to increase. The 
12,340 special districts in 1952 grew to more than 
37,203 in 2012.12 These districts provide limited 
services most often in a single policy area, such as 
fire protection, mosquito abatement, soil conser-
vation, public transit, water supply, and recreation. 
Special districts frequently cross the boundaries 
of preexisting municipalities, counties and even 
states. Sometimes special districts charge individu-
als for services; sometimes the constituent govern-
ments provide funds.
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 Existing governments agree to the creation of 
special districts that overlap their boundaries for 
political reasons.  A problem exists that affects 
multiple governments and no single government 
can deal with the problem without the participation 
of other governments.  Existing governments agree 
that a new unit of government can be more effec-
tive in resolving conflicts than trying on their own 
to reach agreements.  A new, larger unit of govern-
ment can made decisions in the best interests of all, 
where existing governments would vie for advan-
tages over each other.
 Governance of these special districts varies 
greatly across the states. In a few cases, the gener-
al public elects members of the governing board, 
but most often cooperating existing governments 
are treated as a confederacy, each joining to form 
a central government to provide the special ser-
vice only.  The public may have little or no direct 
control over special district governance.  You are 
probably not aware of all the special districts that 
exist where you reside. As we shall see when we 
discuss metropolitan problems, special districts 
provide one solution to the fragmentation of most 
of our metropolitan area governments.
The Urban Machine and Reform
As we saw earlier, U.S. cities experienced tremen-
dous growth in population and experienced many 
difficulties under the twin forces of industrializa-
tion and immigration. New industries needed a 
workforce. Given the lack of transportation avail-
able in the late 1800s and early 1900s, rivers and 
seaports were chosen as the sites for manufacturing 
plants. Urban areas alone could supply sufficient 
workers who could walk to work. Immigration 
brought a willing and substantial workforce to our 
cities, especially seaports.
 This press of people into our cities resulted 
in a need for many new services that the existing 
governments were generally unwilling to provide. 
Some saw the potential for an appeal to the immi-
grants and seized the opportunity. In exchange for 
their votes to get elected, they provided the ser-
vices needed by the new residents. Such individu-
als, often called ward heelers, soon controlled mu-
nicipal government. When organized, they became 
what we call an urban machine. Such machines 
displaced the well-to-do classes that previously 
governed in their own interests and who were unre-
sponsive to raising their personal taxes to provide 
governmental services for the poor immigrants.
 Those who lost power to the immigrant-based 
machines fought back by forcing cities to reform. 
This effort was called the Reform Movement. 
Various imposed reforms were intended mainly to 
disable the machines and to return power to “prop-
er” persons. The political goal was to make a small 
group of wealthy and middle class residents the 
majority participants in municipal elections and 
other municipal government forums.  The way this 
minority became the majority was to convince state 
legislatures to change municipal charters to reduce 
participation by the majority of residents who 
supported political machines.  There are many ele-
ments to these reforms. We have already discussed 
some of these.
 Probably foremost was the state-provided Aus-
tralian ballot, or secret ballot, as the only lawful 
way to cast one’s vote. Until that time, any way 
of indicating one’s voting preferences was lawful, 
including machine-supplied ballots with voting 
choices already made. Poll watchers for the ma-
chines could see these ballots with the “correct” 
votes being cast. When a comprehensive ballot 
printed by government was wed to marking ballots 
secretly, no one could know how people voted. 
Machines could no longer be certain that support-
ers voted for machine candidates.
 Nonpartisan elections, with candidates not 
identifiable by a party label, made it difficult for 
those with weaker literacy to know which can-
didates were machine candidates.13 The illiterate 
could no longer vote for the donkey or the elephant 
candidates. The added requirement of literacy 
disenfranchised these machine supporters and 
made the question of how to vote moot.  Moving 
the dates of municipal elections far from those of 
partisan state and federal elections further reduced 
voter turnout.  
 Of cities responding to the National League 
of Cities 2011 Survey, 67 percent reported using 
nonpartisan elections and 33 percent reported 
using partisan elections.  Half of those cities use 
the at-large and nonpartisan elections as original-
ly advocated by the municipal reform movement, 
and only 5% use the pairing of district and partisan 
elections.14
 The merit system of selecting public employees 
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was intended to disable the machine’s awarding 
public jobs to supporters. In a merit system, public 
jobs have job descriptions and associated compe-
tency tests. Candidates judged competent receive 
jobs with no consideration of their party affiliation. 
Workers under the machine were expected to give 
up to 10 percent of their earnings back to the party 
organization that helped underwrite the expense of 
running that effort. Civil service employees owe 
nothing to the political parties for their jobs and, 
not unexpectedly, contribute little to the political 
parties. In fact, many states discourage political 
involvement by civil service employees.
 The strong-mayor form of municipal gov-
ernment, with the mayor empowered to fill many 
positions by appointment and given a major role 
in taxing and spending decisions, was also a part 
of the reform movement. This practice clarified 
who was responsible for government actions. It 
also better protected important agency heads, such 
as the police chief, from politics by making them 
appointed. With fewer officials to elect, the ballot 
would be shorter, so this reform is often referred to 
as the short-ballot reform. Later, reformers advo-
cated both the commission form of government, 
with less competition between the legislative and 
executive branches, and the professionalism of the 
city manager in the manager/council form of gov-
ernment.
 In order to weaken the power of ward heelers, 
municipal reformers wanted city council members 
to be elected from citywide elections in which all 
could cast a vote. These at-large elections were 
originally used to defeat political machines. Lat-
er, political leaders in the South effectively used 
at-large elections to guarantee blacks could win no 
elections. Blacks were a concentrated residence 
minority. They would be influential and could 
possibly win elections contested in districts. They 
could little influence and never win citywide at-
large contests.
 At-large elections deny minorities the repre-
sentation on city councils that would be expected 
given their percentage in the community. Federal 
courts have forced district elections both on city 
councils and, more recently, on school boards. 
These efforts improved minority representation in 
local government. Today, 66 percent of cities use 
at-large elections, 17 percent use district elections, 
and 17 percent use a combination of the two.15 
Cities with populations of 250,000 or more tend to 
have at-large elections.
 Just 54% of mayor-council governments use 
at-large elections, while 70% or more of the other 
government forms do. The highest use of at-large 
elections is found in the Pacific Coast (89%) and in 
New England (81%) cities.16
 Election form in municipalities is no longer 
strongly related to minority representation. The 
percentage of minorities on city councils is now 
related to the percentage of minorities in city popu-
lations.
 Finally, the requirements stating that one 
needed to register to vote and had to be a citizen 
to register greatly reduced the votes available to 
machine candidates. Eliminating urban machines 
was never the explicit goal of reformers. Instead, 
reform was advocated to reduce corruption and to 
improve efficiency in cities. It is not self-evident 
that a registration or citizenship requirement for 
voting does either. It is clear that both hurt urban 
machines.
 The political machines died in U.S. cities. The 
machines may have not been viable in the long run. 
Immigrants swiftly acculturated into U.S. soci-
ety and moved past the need for the organization 
provided by the machine. Wealthier citizens might 
have regained political power without reforms. 
Machine politics was not all bad.17 The Reform-
ers’ efforts may have taken municipal government 
away from the public and made it less democrat-
ic.18
Metropolitan Difficulties
Following World War II, there was an explosion 
of movement by American families. Some moved 
from the rural South to the urban North seeking 
jobs. Probably the most significant movement, 
however, was from the older and decaying neigh-
borhoods of central cities to newly developed 
residential areas surrounding those cities—what 
became known as the suburbs. The availability of 
the automobile made it possible to travel relatively 
long distances to work, making it possible to live 
in the suburbs and work in the older core city. The 
long-term graduated repayment mortgage made it 
possible for more to own homes. The federal gov-
ernment’s program to guarantee such home loans 
for veterans fueled the growth of suburban popula
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tions. It was the middle class that could afford such 
a move, and move they did, in great numbers.
 While the suburbanites fled the old core cities 
for the green grasses of the suburbs, they were 
accustomed to local government services, such as 
streets, sewers, schools, and police protection. The 
rural areas to which they moved, where crops were 
often viewed as more important than schooling, 
had not been providing these services, except for 
public schools. Demands were made for changes.
 Most states provide for easy organization of 
such areas as new municipalities (a process called 
incorporation). Most states also discourage an-
nexation by older municipalities of urban concen-
trations around them. So with some exceptions, 
such as Texas, incorporation is easy around central 
cities, and they can seldom annex newly developed 
areas. Our older cities, as a result, are surrounded 
by substantial numbers (often many hundreds) of 
small, incorporated suburban municipalities, each 
seeking to provide municipal services where none 
have been provided before.
 Because of their substantial number and diver-
sity, one could shop for a suburb that most closely 
corresponded to one’s current or aspired station. 
One could seek a well-to-do Anglo community, a 
less well-to-do Anglo community, a middle-class 
Polish community, or an Italian community. Near-
ly all of these communities, however, lacked the 
size or wealth to deal with many of the problems 
that they soon faced. Where was an adequate 
water supply to be found? Where was the money 
to build a new high school? How was sewage to 
be disposed of? Who would pay for new arterial 
highways to speed workers into the city where they 
worked?
 We refer to these numerous but insufficiently 
large governments in suburban areas as fragmented 
governments. They typically result in inadequate 
municipal services provided at high expense. Most 
avoid redistributive services. The poor are in other 
municipalities. There is redistribution from newer 
and wealthier to older and poorer municipalities 
only if the state provides it.
 Texas allows most municipalities to annex ad-
jacent surrounding areas by a simple majority vote 
of the city council doing the annexation. Further-
more, each city can announce its intent to take in 
land as far as five miles away, and no incorporation 
is allowed within that area. The Texas approach 
might have prevented the fragmentation in metro-
politan areas found in other states. Unfortunately, 
such annexation cannot take place retroactively.
 A second rarely used solution was city/coun-
ty consolidation. Many U.S. cities and counties 
held votes to do so, but most lost.19 The idea was 
simple. Most of these fragmented municipal gov-
ernments and the central city that they surround-
ed were in a single county, which made county 
government more like one big municipality. This 
would not work in metropolitan areas located in 
multiple counties. Nor would it work where met-
ropolitan areas overlap multiple states or even into 
another country. City/county consolidations no 
longer have many advocates.20
 There were other impediments to consolida-
tion. One was opposition to the racial integration 
involved in joining white suburban areas with 
black core city areas. A second was the unwilling-
ness of suburban residents to see their tax money 
paying for central city facilities. A third was the 
general hostility toward the central city and its pol-
itics that fueled the reform movement. These and 
other challenges contributed to the failure of this 
solution.21
 It should be noted that such consolidation 
would have made municipal government larger 
and more remote. A positive aspect to fragmented 
government is that dissatisfied residents have more 
options to move to where they prefer the politics. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this practice is called 
“voting with your feet.” Multiple distinct suburbs 
in the same area act as a supermarket for those 
considering relocation.
 Creating special districts has emerged as an 
alternative to just living with fragmentation. When 
multiple suburban municipalities join to provide 
water, sewer, recreation, or transit district services, 
they have the scale to deal with the problem finan-
cially. The geographic area that they cover also 
may be sufficient to deal with many problems, such 
as finding a waste disposal site or a way to dispose 
of effluent from sewage. Finally, special districts 
eliminate much of the difficult and time-consuming 
bargaining required when municipalities cooperate 
with each other. As we saw earlier, special districts 
have proliferated since the 1950s.
 Special districts and more ad hoc solutions, 
such as metropolitan planning agencies and coun-
cils of government, have partially coped with our 
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fragmented cities. Nevertheless, it still is the case 
that most metropolitan areas barely cope with 
day-to-day problems. Most metropolitan residents 
complain about congestion, poor or nonexistent 
services, and high government expense. There are 
no simple administrative or organizational solu-
tions to these complex problems.
Democracy in Local Government
In Chapter 6, which deals with how people vote, 
we noted that there has been no systematic study 
of how people vote in local elections for the city 
council, school board, or county commission. 
We know from aggregate information, such as 
the number of votes cast and simple mass media 
accounts, that local elections suffer low public par-
ticipation and involvement. The best additional in-
formation about the state of elections and democra-
cy in local government comes from three sources: 
(1) surveys by the International City Management 
Association; (2) a study of city council members 
in 87 San Francisco Bay Area councils; and (3) a 
study of 35 Texas cities’ city councils and school 
boards and a follow-up study of 121 randomly 
chosen cities nationwide.
Local Elections
The International City Management Association 
has several times solicited questionnaire responses 
from cities concerning their city council and may-
oral elections as well as on turnout in such local 
elections. Incumbent advantage is evident in U.S. 
cities, since 72 percent of incumbent city council 
members seek reelection and 78 percent of them 
win; mayors have slightly less success.22 Later data 
show that 63 percent of incumbent mayors seek 
reelection and 85 percent win.23 These rates are 
quite comparable to those noted in state legislative 
contests.
 Nearly all (83 percent) of local elections are 
held at a time other than that for state and national 
elections. As a result, turnout is low, averaging 26 
percent.24 Overall, there would appear to be little 
potential for electoral accountability in our cities. 
Few vote, and incumbents overwhelmingly win.
Council members typically devote several eve-
nings a week to their duties for a 2 or 4-year term. 
Most city council members serve with little or no 
pay. The average member of a city council in the 
1992 survey received $7,600, but about 13 percent 
receive pay lower than $500 per year.25 Only in the 
largest cities can one make a living as a city coun-
cil member. Certainly, there is prestige associated 
with being called “the honorable” or just “council-
woman” or “councilman.”
 There are also negative aspects to being on a 
city council. No matter what the decision, some 
people want to complain or lobby for future ac-
tions. Many citizens feel it is their right to call 
council members to register complaints about 
garbage pickup, stray animals, annoying neighbors, 
and other imperfections that may or may not be 
within government purview. Many smaller cities 
cannot afford to buy insurance to protect individual 
members who are sued for council actions. Service 
on a city council does not bring wealth and fame. It 
Figure 8.4 
Electoral Competition For City Council in American Cities 
Minimum Maximum Average 
Average winning percent of vote 2% 100% 32% 
Candidates per seat 1.0 6.8 2.3 
Percent of incumbents running for reelection 29% 100% 70% 
Percent of incumbents winning 0% 100% 70% 
Eligible adults voting 3% 62% 25% 
Average years on city council 2.9 12.8 7.2 
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is more likely to result in the opposite. Perhaps so 
few run because it is a thankless job.
Volunteers
The San Francisco Bay Area study of the motives 
of city council members is the most inclusive 
undertaken so far. It has two shortcomings, howev-
er. First, it centers on the overall characteristics of 
the 87 communities involved, ignoring variations. 
Second, California is probably unrepresentative 
of the United States. In New England, munici-
palities have responsibilities across a very broad 
range of services including public education. As 
one goes west and south, municipal governments 
shed services to special districts—beginning with 
education, as independent school districts are 
established.26 California, with its sprawling subur-
banization, represents the culmination of this trend; 
few services remain for municipal government, 
making serving on a city council largely symbol-
ic. Thus, perhaps the most striking finding from 
this study, the eagerness of city council members 
to leave office, is explained by the irrelevancy of 
those offices.
 Most Bay Area council members were first 
involved in voluntary civic roles, where we do not 
expect much public accountability. A sense of civic 
duty may drive people to volunteer for activities, 
such as serving on the United Fund or the zoning 
board.27 Volunteers do not expect criticism for the 
actions they take to serve the community. Addi-
tionally, about 12 percent run for office to repay the 
community for their successful businesses. About 
one-fourth are initially appointed, 80 percent win 
reelection, and given low turnouts, so few votes are 
necessary to win that an extended circle of friends 
can win the election for a candidate.28 Finally, 
only about half say they will again seek office, and 
most who do will seek only one additional term to 
complete a project.29 These council members seem 
mainly “volunteers,” who seldom face electoral 
challenge and who are unlikely to feel any obliga-
tion to constituents. They are only in office out of 
civic duty or for the praise of doing something for 
the city. Lacking ambition both for reelection and 
for higher office, they seem beyond public account-
ability.
 If all of these characteristics were to apply to 
other elected officials, we might question whether 
democracy can function. It seems unlikely, howev-
er, that there is so little ambition for continuing in 
public office or moving up to higher offices in state 
legislatures or in the halls of Congress. Maybe 
these cities are unrepresentative of others across 
the country. Local officials thus might be the least 
responsive elected officials— certainly not what 
we might expect from the government closest to 
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the people.
Competition at the Local Level
A study of Texas local elections in 1985 found 
that members of city councils and school boards 
were not all volunteers.30 Perhaps what was most 
surprising in this study was the variation found in 
Texas. Using these same measures of competition 
in a national study of 118 randomly chosen cities, 
Luttbeg found the results shown in Figure 8.4. 
 In two complete rounds of municipal elections, 
one city council’s members won narrowly by 
only a 2 percent margin, while another city never 
saw any competitions for any of its candidates. 
The number of candidates vying for council seats 
ranged from one to 6.8. On average, there were 3.5 
candidates in each election. Overall, the average 
winning margin was 32 percent, suggesting that 
strong challenges and close elections were rare.
 Incumbents fared differently in the sample 
cities. While on average 70 percent of city council 
members ran for reelection, in one city only 29 
percent of incumbents sought reelection in two 
complete rounds of elections. However, in several 
cities, over two rounds of elections all incumbents 
sought reelection.
 Similarly, 76 percent of incumbents seeking 
reelection won. The variation was the greatest 
possible. In one city, incumbents never won. At 
the other extreme, in another city, all incumbents 
seeking reelection won.
 Turnout varied greatly, also. While the average 
turnout of those eligible to vote was just over 25 
percent, one city saw only 3 percent voting, while 
another experienced a 62 percent turnout. Finally, 
city council members served an average of 7.2 
years. Averages for individual cities ranged from 
2.9 to 12.8 years.
 The variations evident in this study are useful 
because they allow assessment of how competition 
might be increased and what impact competition 
has on political systems. Although overall compe-
tition may not be evident, there are some compet-
itive communities. Moreover, the complexity of 
competition underlines that political science lacks 
clear understanding of what is important. Do we 
want to encourage incumbents to seek reelection 
with the resulting dearth of challengers and low 
turnout but with occasional losses? Or do we want 
to discourage reelection efforts, thereby promoting 
elections with open seats, multiple candidates, and 
higher turnout?
 Figures 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7 describe the impact 
of competitive elections using an average winning 
margin in each city’s election as the measure of 
competition. This competition measure is cor-
related with voter turnout, city taxes per capita, 
and expenditures per capita. Only the correlation 
between average margin and turnout is statistically 
significant.31 The negative correlation in this graph-
ic means that cities with smaller margins—closer 
elections—have higher turnout. Citizens vote more 
where elections are close. The correlation coeffi-
cients for city taxing and spending are small and 
not significant. The size and scope of government 
are unaffected by how competitive elections are.
 Until we have larger sample studies of local 
elections, we cannot assess how common vol-
unteerism might be or what might reduce it, or 
whether or not we should want to do so. We also 
need more empirical evidence to assess the poten-
tial role of competition in city and school board 
elections.
State and Local Government Relations in Texas
One of the defining elements of Texas Conser-
vatism is the principle that, whenever possible, 
states should make decisions rather than the federal 
government and local governments should make 
decisions rather than state government.  Contempo-
rary Texas statewide elected officials, all members 
of the Republican Party, frequently articulate the 
tenet that government that is most local governs 
best.  For that reason, it is particularly noteworthy 
when Texas state officials consider whether or not 
to transfer authority to make certain decisions from 
local to state government.
Fracking
In November 2014, the City of Denton became the 
first Texas municipality to ban oil well fracking, 
hydraulic fracturing frequently used in combina-
tion with horizontal drilling, when residents voted 
overwhelmingly in favor of a ban. Opponents of 
fracking made it clear that they were not opposed 
to oil drilling in general—Denton had nearly 300 
wells within city limits.  They were not opposed to 
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fracking per se, they were concerned by the pros-
pect of a neighborhood being sandwiched by two 
gas well pad sites.  “It was when people saw how 
close to homes they were drilling that we realized 
we had to look after each other here,” said Dr. 
Adam Briggle, a Denton resident and an environ-
mental studies professor at University of North 
Texas.32 
 While Denton was the first to ban fracking, 
it wasn’t the first to ban drilling within city lim-
its.  That practice goes back years according to a 
survey by the Texas Municipal League that showed 
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about 30 Texas municipalities had general bans on 
drilling. Bastrop’s ordinance banning drilling has 
existed since 2007.  City Manager Mike Talbot 
said, “It’s not something you want in a residential 
neighborhood.  They’re bringing those big rigs in, 
and it could be dangerous or cause a problem, so 
that’s why a lot of cities have that ordinance.”33
 The day after the Denton ban was passed, two 
lawsuits were filed in Austin.  “What was at stake 
here were the rights of those families, mineral 
owners, that were being denied access to their 
property which is protected under the U.S. consti-
tution,” said Todd Staples, President of the Texas 
Oil and Gas Association.  Staples was arguing that 
the property rights of mineral owners who do not 
live near well sites should supersede the property 
rights of homeowners and residents who do live 
near well sites.34
 Staples and others successfully lobbied the 
Texas Legislature to pass a bill in May 2015 that, 
in essence, prohibits bans on fracking.  The Texas 
Legislature and Governor apparently agreed that 
the rights of mineral owners should take prece-
dence over the rights of homeowners and residents. 
This conflict over property rights may ultimately 
be decided by Texas state courts or by federal 
courts.35
 Despite the principle of local control and 
despite the fact that other Texas municipalities 
banned oil drilling within city limits entirely, Den-
ton was not allowed to ban one kind of oil drilling 
to protect a particular neighborhood.  The 2015 law 
passed by the legislature does not prevent Texas 
local governments from continuing or starting to 
prohibit drilling in general.
Bathroom Use
In a one-day specially convened session on March 
23, 2016 North Carolina’s legislature passed a 
sweeping law that reversed a Charlotte ordinance 
that had extended some rights to people who are 
gay or transgender. The law passed by the General 
Assembly and signed that same night by Gov. Pat 
McCrory goes further than a narrow elimination 
of Charlotte’s ordinance, which had generated 
the most controversy by a change that protected 
transgender people who use public restrooms based 
on their gender identity. The new law also nullified 
local ordinances around the state that would have 
expanded protections for the LGBT community.36 
This action by North Carolina ignited a nationwide 
controversy over bathroom use despite no evidence 
that there were problems with individuals’ choices 
of bathrooms in Charlotte, in North Carolina or in 
the United States.  The status of legislation in the 
states is depicted in Figure 8.8.
 On May 9, 2016, Texas Lt. Governor Dan 
Patrick called for the resignation of Fort Worth 
Independent School District Superintendent Dr. 
Kent Scribner over guidelines outlining bathroom 
use. “Campus safety should be of paramount con-
cern for anyone in his position,” Patrick said in a 
statement. “Every parent, especially those of young 
girls, should be outraged.”37
 The Fort Worth Independent School District 
guidelines specified that schools must ensure 
students feel safe in their restrooms. If a student 
is uncomfortable using the bathroom with a trans-
gender peer, the school must let the student use a 
single-stall restroom, a gender-neutral bathroom or 
a restroom where no one else is present.38
 The Fort Worth ISD had been discreetly 
handling the bathroom gender issue in the same 
way for at least 16 years without any problems, 
according to a district official who explained the 
history of its background.  The issue comes up 
perhaps “one time a year” in a district with tens 
of thousands of students.  The Fort Worth ISD 
policy was adopted in 2011 with extensive public 
input, according to former City Council member 
Joel Burns.  A school official said the 2011 policy 
was strengthened as a result of an anti-bullying 
campaign launched nearly a decade earlier.  The 
anti-discrimination policy adopted by the district in 
April 2014 specifically addressed gender identifica-
tion.39
 Fort Worth School Board President Jacinto 
“Cinto” Ramos issued a statement in response to 
criticism of the school district by Lt. Governor 
Patrick and individuals and groups both inside and 
outside the school district.  “Rest assured, the safe-
ty of ALL children is our highest priority on the 
Board. We are completely capable of handling this 
in Fort Worth. We are applying the existing policy 
to make sure ALL children feel safe at school. We 
are here to look out for ALL children; not some, 
not most, but ALL children.”
 On May 30, 2016, Lt. Governor Dan Patrick 
on Tuesday escalated his battle against guidelines 
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in Texas and across the country that allow students 
to use the bathroom that corresponds with their 
gender identity. Patrick announced a number of 
new moves in the offensive, including a request 
for an opinion from Texas Attorney General Ken 
Paxton on whether the Fort Worth Independent 
School District broke the law when it adapted such 
guidelines. Patrick also said he was sending a letter 
to all Texas school districts advising them to ignore 
a similar directive issued this month by the feder-
al government. Throughout his remarks, Patrick 
suggested that state lawmakers would have to step 
in if Fort Worth ISD did not reconsider its actions. 
He also repeatedly pushed back on the idea that he 
was intruding on a local matter, saying it was “this 
superintendent and school board that is prohibiting 
local control.”40
 Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton actively 
sought to bring a case against the federal govern-
ment.  Three days after the federal government 
released guidelines instructing school districts 
to let transgender students use the bathroom that 
corresponds with their gender identity members of 
Paxton’s staff approached the Wichita Falls school 
board about pursuing a lawsuit on May 16.  Board 
members ultimately decided against passing a poli-
cy that would make them party to a lawsuit against 
the federal government.  Wichita Falls Superinten-
dent Michael Kurht agreed with the school board, 
citing legal council that the school district’s current 
policies were in compliance with the new federal 
guidelines.41
 Ten days after the Wichita Falls board meet-
ing, Paxton announced that he had filed a lawsuit 
against the Obama administration to protect a 
different North Texas school district.  At the same 
press conference, Harrold Independent School 
District Superintendent David Thweatt said the 
attorney general approached him about the policy, 
which his school board adopted three days earlier.42 
The school board unanimously passed a policy that 
mandated students use the bathroom that corre-
sponds to their gender at birth.43
 The Harrold school district has never had a 
transgender student among the 100 or so who 
attend as far as anyone can remember. But school 
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officials decided to pass a policy limiting bathroom 
access based on a person’s birth certificate any-
way.44 Alabama, Wisconsin, West Virginia, Ten-
nessee, Arizona’s Department of Education, Maine 
Gov. Paul LePage, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Utah and 
Georgia joined Texas in the suit against the federal 
government. President Trump abolished the federal 
guidelines on bathroom use in public schools short-
ly after taking office in 2017.
 After the elimination of the federal guideline 
and North Carolina’s repeal of its bathroom bill, 
Lt. Governor Patrick made passing a bathroom bill 
one of his highest priorities for the 2017 regular 
legislative session.  The Texas Senate approved 
such a bill, but the Texas House expressed con-
cerns about economic problems in North Carolina 
and did not pass a bathroom bill.  Governor Abbott 
included “privacy” to the agenda of a special ses-
sion he called to begin July 18, 2017. Again in the 
special session, the Senate approved a bathroom 
bill and the House did not.
Ride Hailing
Municipal governments have had longstanding, un-
questioned authority to regulate taxi services doing 
business within their boundaries.  They have cho-
sen to impose insurance requirements and mandat-
ed background checks on drivers before employ-
ment such as submitting fingerprints and checking 
for criminal records.  Uber, Lyft and other ride 
hailing businesses claim to have a business orga-
nization distinct from taxi services.  Taxi services 
hire drivers as employees; Uber and Lyft say their 
drivers are independent contractors.  These new 
ride hailing services say their role is only linking 
potential riders with independent contractors and 
they are not responsible for employment benefits or 
extensive background checks of contractors.
 Uber and Lyft have lobbied the Texas Legis-
lature to eliminate local government oversight of 
their businesses.  In its 2015 session, the Texas 
Legislature passed statewide insurance require-
ments, and forbade municipalities from imposing 
additional insurance requirements.  The Texas 
Legislature considered but did not pass legislation 
concerning issues such as background checks.
 Midland, Galveston and Austin passed specific  
requirements for fingerprinting and background 
checking, applying standards comparable to those 
for taxi services to Uber and Lyft.  The Austin 
decision was made by popular vote, and the new 
ride hailing businesses spent millions of dollars to 
defeat the proposals and also threatened to stop do-
ing business in Austin.  When they lost, they made 
good on their threats and ceased operations.45
 Several state leaders intend to consider whether 
there should be uniform state policy rather than 
local control.  The Legislature has tried before 
— and failed — to come up with statewide reg-
ulations sought by industry heavyweights Uber 
and Lyft to free them from conflicting local rules.  
But the recent decision by voters in Austin — the 
conservative state’s liberal capital — to reject rules 
sought by the ride-hailing giants has been a rally-
ing cry for lawmakers. In its 2017 regular session, 
the Texas Legislature created a regulatory frame-
work for ride-hailing companies overriding local 
measures.46
 
Conflict Over Local Government Authority 
For many state officials in 2017, the politics of 
state and local government in Texas took the form 
of state versus local government.  “We don’t live in 
a democracy,” said Senator Don Huffines, R-Dal-
las.  “All the authority cities have comes from the 
Legislature.  They exist by the mercy of the legis-
lature.  So we have a distinct role in overseeing all 
political Subdivisions that we create, and we’ve 
got to make sure that they don’t trample economic 
liberty, personal liberty and freedoms.”47
 Representative Phil King, R-Weatherford, 
submitted a bill in 2017 that would require local 
governments to seek permission before putting ini-
tiatives on the ballot.  Senator Huffines submitted 
legislation that said: “Unless expressly authorized 
by state statute, a local government shall not imple-
ment an ordinance, rule or regulation that conflicts 
with or is more stringent than a state statute or rule 
regardless of when the state statute or rule takes ef-
fect.48 Neither passed, but they did get the attention 
of local government officials throughout Texas.
 The politics of financing public K-12 education 
in Texas is perhaps the best example of state versus 
local government.  Texas lawmakers have been 
steadily cutting the state’s share of public educa-
tion costs for more than a decade. In 2007, the state 
paid about 45 percent, the federal government paid 
about 10 percent and local school districts paid the 
192 • Chapter 8 
remaining 45 percent. In 2017, the federal share 
was still about 10 percent, but the state’s share 
slipped to 38 percent and the local share — the 
share that’s financed by that notoriously unpopular 
property tax — had risen to 52 percent.  During the 
regular legislative session that ended in June 2017, 
state lawmakers approved a new two-year budget 
that spends less state money per public school stu-
dent than the last budget.49
 In the special session he has called for July 17, 
2017, Governor Abbott has asked the legislature to 
require school districts to increase teachers’ sal-
aries by an average of $1,000 and pay for it with 
local funds.  He has also asked the legislature to 
make it more difficult for other local governments 
to increase property tax revenues.  Limiting local 
governments’ property tax revenue is also a major 
goal for Lt. Governor Patrick.  Texas has shifted to 
local governments the cost of programs formerly 
paid by the state, required local governments to 
spend even more, and then blamed local govern-
ments for raising more revenue from property 
taxes.
 Texas’ political leaders are unequalled in 
complaining about “federal overreach” and “un-
funded federal mandates.” They are among the first 
to sue the federal government to slow or reverse 
its policies.  They seem much less concerned with 
the possibility of “state overreach” or “unfunded 
state mandates” as seen by Texas local government 
officials and Texas residents. 
Summary
1. Although the institutional formats of our na-
tional and state governments differ little and are 
seldom changed, government at the local level is 
often altered and varies greatly.
2. Local governments include city or municipal 
governments, county governments, school district 
governments, and other special district govern-
ments.
3. Much of the change in local governments is 
directed toward improving efficiency and effec-
tiveness and reducing corruption in government. 
There are many reforms that have been in favor at 
different times, but the “reform movement” of the 
late 1800s and early 1900s is most credited with 
reforming our cities.
4. Strengthening the role of the public in govern-
ment, or at least part of the public, is an explicit 
goal of local government reform. Most often, 
reforms seek reducing the role of politicians and 
enhancing the role of “better” elements of society, 
such as businessmen, women, and developers.
5. The little we know about how local govern-
ments differ suggests minimal causal impact of 
institutions on their elections, politics, or policies.
6. The principle of government closest to the peo-
ple governs best is always supported in principal 
by Texas state officials but not always practiced.
 
The First Active Government: That at the Local Level • 193 
Information Sources
Figure 8.1 American Fact Finder 2013 State & Local Summary Tables by Level of Government 
http://www.census.gov/govs/local/
Figure 8.2 American Fact Finder 2013 State & Local Summary Tables by Level of Government 
http://www.census.gov/govs/local/
Figure 8.3 NA
Figure 8.4 Norman R. Luttbeg, The Grassroots of Democracy: A Comparative Study of Competition 
and Its Impact in American Cities in the 1990s (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999)
Figure 8.5 Norman R. Luttbeg, “Multiple Indicators of the Electoral Context of Democratic Respon-
siveness in Local Government,” a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, 1987
Figure 8.6 Norman R. Luttbeg, “Multiple Indicators of the Electoral Context of Democratic Respon-
siveness in Local Government,” a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, 1987
Figure 8.7 Norman R. Luttbeg, “Multiple Indicators of the Electoral Context of Democratic Respon-
siveness in Local Government,” a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, 1987
Figure 8.8 http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-legislative-tracking635951130.aspx
194 • Chapter 8 
Study Guide, Chapter 8
Essay Questions
 1. According to the text, “local governments are in the construction business.”  Explain and give 
 examples.  Do local governments compete with private sector construction companies?  Why or why not? 
 2. In Texas, some school districts have “Independent” as part of their names and some have “Consolidated”   
 as part of their names.  What are the independent school districts independent of? What was consolidated to   
 create a consolidated school district?  Explain how independent and consolidated are important concepts in the  
 history of American public school districts.
 3. What are special districts? How are they created?  Why do you think they are increasing in number more   
 than all other local governments?
 4. Compare and contrast the benefits and risks of merit-based systems of government employment with 
 government employment systems without formal “merit requirements such as many states and localities 
 currently have.  Which system better reflects contemporary expectations of American governments?  Explain   
 why, specifying whether your answer varies by level of government.
 5. What is the problem of fragmented local governments?  Discuss three approaches to coping with difficulties  
 caused by fragmented local governments.  Can each approach be implemented throughout the United States?    
 Why or why note?
 6. In what ways are local elected officials such as city council and school board members more like 
 volunteers than like local employees or like career politicians?  Are Texas Aggies more likely than most 
 to serve on city councils and school boards?  Why or why not?
 7. Texas state officials claim to prefer local governments making decisions rather than state govern-
 ment.  Yet, Texas might be transferring authority from local governments to state government in issues 
 such as banning oil fracking and bathroom use in public schools.  Under what circumstances should 
 state officials reduce the authority available to local governments?  Under what circumstances might 
 local government officials want state officials to reduce the authority of local governments? 
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. In the major/council form of government, “strong” mayors have powers.
  a. budget
  b. veto
  c. substantial formal
  d. all of the above
 2. In the council/manager form of government, city managers are .
  a. elected
  b. appointed by the mayor
  c. appointed by the city council
  d. appointed by the county judge
 3. Which of the following is true about school districts?
  a. The number of school districts has increased since World War II.
  b. The number of school districts has decreased since World War II.
  c. The number of school districts has remained the same since World War II.
  d. There are no more independent school districts in the country.
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 4. Which of the following is not a form of local government in the United States?
  a. counties
  b. school districts
  c. special districts
  d. all are forms of local governments in the United States
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Chapter 9
LEGISLATING POLICY AND REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE
In the next three chapters, we will focus on the 
three branches of state government. Much of what 
will be said applies also to our national and city 
governments. It might seem familiar from prior 
courses. Since our declaration of independence 
from England, the legislative branch has held center 
stage in our thoughts about government. We remain 
committed to the principle of “no taxation without 
representation.” The legislative branch provides the 
requisite representation for American governments 
to assess taxes and fees. We will consider it first.
The Functions of the Legislature
Like any institution, the legislature exists for a 
purpose. As we noted earlier, many institutions 
have seen their functions become more numerous 
and more complex as our society became more de-
pendent on first municipal, then state, and, finally, 
federal or national government. Let us consider the 
functions of contemporary state legislatures.
Representation
Long ago, all people in a society could meet to 
consider how to deal with a problem. Each person 
could be heard, critical comments could be consid-
ered by all, and, with a pressing problem, a quick 
decision could be made. Hopefully, all would agree 
afterwards that they approved of the action taken. If 
needed, majority rule might have to resolve which 
actions to take. All in such a gathering could sug-
gest solutions, participate in the debate, vote for the 
best options, and, having had their say, feel some 
obligation to comply with the group decision.
 Of course, those who spoke without being 
informed or logical might be embarrassed when 
others pointed this out. Probably, they would seek 
to be informed in the future or at least not to speak 
out when uninformed.
 Such meetings were common in early Greek so-
ciety and exist today in the town meetings of New 
England. Starting in 1992, at least one of the de-
bates between the Republican and Democratic nom-
inees for President of the United States use a format 
characterized as “town hall.” The presidential town 
hall debates have only one thing in common with 
the meetings described above: audience members 
could pose questions. Unlike legitimate town hall 
meetings, questions asked of presidential candidates 
were screened and selected by a moderator. Prior to 
every debate, candidates agreed on rules that strict-
ly limited interactions, and audience members made 
no decisions.
 At some point, a society gets too large and 
problems become too complex or too pressing for 
all to participate directly in making decisions. Some 
individuals must make governmental decisions for 
the others. We call these specialists in governmen-
tal decision-making representatives. They provide 
representation for the others in making society’s 
decisions. The Founding Fathers called such repre-
sentative government “republican” government.
 Representative government brings with it many 
troublesome concerns. Should representatives vote 
on the basis of their informed personal opinions or 
of those of their constituents? What is the constitu-
ent’s obligation to comply if his or her representa-
tive did not vote as the constituent preferred? Does 
a majority decision by the representatives equal a 
majority decision among the constituents? In other 
words, is the decision representative? And how do 
we ever know whether a decision is representative 
or not?
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Making Laws
A key function of the legislative branch is to make 
law. All state legislatures make statutory laws, 
and most play a significant role in amending state 
constitutions. The executive and judicial branches 
play roles in implementing and interpreting laws. 
But those roles come after the legislative branch 
has acted. Representatives must have information 
before they can make good law. Such informa-
tion may be provided from a variety of sources, 
including legislative staff, bureaucrats, interest 
groups, and citizen volunteers. Public hearings 
provide another opportunity for those concerned to 
engage legislators, present opinions, and propose 
solutions. Legislators then engage in further delib-
erations through committee meetings and meetings 
of the entire chamber. Finally, at least a majority 
of those voting in each legislative chamber must 
agree to an identical bill. Bills that pass state legis-
latures become law unless vetoed by the governor. 
In some cases, legislatures can override vetoes 
with supermajority votes in each chamber.
 We should note that the laws made by legisla-
tors need not solve problems, or even be sincere-
ly intended to solve problems. Laws may have 
symbolic importance but no substantive impact. 
One example is when a legislature authorizes 
programmatic change or a new program but does 
not provide necessary funding. Another is when a 
legislature prohibits certain behavior but impos-
es no penalties and provides for no enforcement. 
Observers commonly assume insincere and strate-
gic behavior by legislators is intended to help them 
win reelection or maintain good political relations.
Constituent Service
Legislators provide constituent service when they 
help individuals and groups from their districts. 
This usually involves helping a constituent with 
unresponsive or negative bureaucracy, seeking re-
lief for a constituent who was hurt by a law, or just 
communicating with a constituent who opposes a 
law. Thus, an individual charged too much in in-
come taxes, a local restaurant owner who thinks a 
no-smoking law costs him too much, and the voter 
who opposes abortion all might seek services from 
a representative. The websites of state legislatures 
have “find your representative” pages. Individual 
legislators’ home pages invite district residents to 
send messages with a single click.
 State legislators have staffs that seek to re-
spond to all communications. Staff also coordinate 
meetings, arrange tours, and welcome visitors. 
They also write to congratulate district residents on 
achievements such as success in athletic and other 
competitions, retirements, wedding anniversaries, 
and other significant life events reported in local 
newspapers. Sometimes members introduce resolu-
tions that the legislature recognizes these achieve-
ments. These resolutions pass unanimously without 
serious consideration. Then, their representatives 
send copies to those being honored. Constituents 
regard these activities as gestures of recognition 
and respect. Legislators know their prospects in 
future elections are enhanced by all forms of con-
stituent service.
Bringing Government Funds to the District
State government, as we saw in the first chap-
ter, spends many billions of dollars providing or 
helping to provide services. A legislator who gets a 
disproportionate percentage of those dollars spent 
in his or her district might receive overwhelming 
support in the next election. Perhaps this and the 
previous function should be combined under the 
function of seeking to assure the reelection of in-
cumbent (those presently in office) legislators.
 State legislators are as active as members of  
Congress in seeking funds and programs to benefit 
their districts. Members of Congress typically take 
advantage of every opportunity to take credit for 
anything that boosts their districts. State legisla-
tors seem less inclined to do so. This leads to the 
question of why this is so. Perhaps state legislators 
feel more confident of their reelection and do not 
bother, or perhaps it is just the culture of Congress.
Legislators as Representatives
Geographic Representation
Legislators throughout the United States and 
indeed in all democracies are chosen from districts 
defined geographically. Sometimes the districts are 
the states, such as for U.S. senators, governors, and 
other statewide executives. Most often, the districts 
are local or small portions of states, typically with 
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populations of below 500,000. State legislatures 
establish their own districts and the districts for 
members of the United States House of Represen-
tatives. Legislative bodies for counties, municipal-
ities, school districts, and other local governments 
set their own districts.
 Districts defined by geography date to a time 
when they were the only workable solution for 
selecting representatives. We should remember 
that in earlier times, many if not most constituents 
were illiterate, so only face-to-face communication 
could be effective. Candidates could not rely on 
newspapers or campaign literature to reach voters. 
The broadcast media, radio and television, had yet 
to be invented. Only if districts were small enough 
for voters to gather to hear the appeals of candi-
dates could they communicate. They often did this 
in a picnic or by staging a debate. Similarly, voting 
required physically gathering people in polling 
places to cast their ballots. The information, com-
munications, and transportation technologies of the 
18th century made geographically defined districts 
the only alternative. They have been used ever 
since.
 The U. S. Constitution specifies that each state 
shall have two senators. Seats in the House of Rep-
resentatives are to be apportioned among the states 
according to population. Today, total population 
is used for apportioning House seats to the states, 
and we typically think of legislators as represent-
ing the people in their districts. Not only has this 
not always been the case, it is a relatively recent 
development. States originally set their own crite-
ria for congressional and state legislative districts. 
Single-member congressional districts were not 
required until 1842. Population was added in 1872, 
but equality did not become a concern until the 
mid-1960s.1
 Compactness and contiguity were required for 
congressional districts starting in 1901. Briefly, 
compactness means that the district should close-
ly match a square or rectangle, the most compact 
way to divide geographic area. This was an easy 
standard to meet because land was platted by local 
governments into square and rectangular sections. 
Counties typically also had these shapes. Conti-
guity means that all portions of the district must 
be in contact with each other. Districts are not 
contiguous if they have a little portion here and 
another several miles away. States added their own 
requirements to geographical legislative districts. A 
common requirement was that districts not divide 
counties or municipalities.
 Geometric compactness is no longer an im-
portant consideration for legislative districts. It 
was never specifically defined and enforced as a 
requirement. Contiguity remains the only spatial 
requirement for contemporary geographic districts.
Problems of Geographic Representation
The costs or liabilities of geographic representa-
tion were not great at one time. When government 
did not do much, there was little cost to gathering 
the necessary information to cast an informed vote 
and little reason to bother. Even the costs of being 
uninformed or misinformed were minor. More-
over, in a district where most grew their own food, 
natural events, such as the lack of rain, poor soil, 
or threatening insects, would affect all equally. In 
modern society, however, we pay high costs for 
geographic selection of representatives.
 Chief among these costs is the difficulty of rep-
resenting a heterogeneous district rather than the 
more homogeneous districts that once were com-
mon across the country. With a complex economy, 
most geographic districts now include constituents 
who share unanimously few views, if any. They 
are not equally affected by either natural events or 
by government policies directed at such events. A 
district may include poor farmers eager to sell their 
products at high prices and poor workers eager to 
buy farm products at low prices. It may contain 
many unemployed workers hoping to have extend-
ed unemployment insurance and owners of small 
businesses barely able to make a living because of 
present state taxes. This mix of different people is 
what we call a heterogeneous district.
 A substantial minority of farmers or industrial 
workers within a district may cause their represen-
tatives to support policies that those constituents 
favor. The ignored majority of voters may have lit-
tle choice but to endure their lack of representation. 
But what if the representatives’ personal opinions 
favor them? As in so many other areas, the grow-
ing complexity of society has greatly complicated 
the procedures for selecting representatives as well 
as the actions of those representatives.
 Modern efforts to retain geographic districts 
while making them ethnically more homogeneous 
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further aggravate the problem. To draw districts 
that include many minorities, it is often necessary 
to assemble pockets of minorities spread broad-
ly across a state into districts that resemble bugs 
splattered on our car windshields. People in these 
districts may share little other than skin color; they 
may have little sense of who shares their district 
or a sense of community in the district. Moreover, 
the surrounding non-minority districts may share 
little other than the fact that they are not minority 
districts. Most modern districts lack compactness 
and any sense of identity.
 Political scientists have often stressed that 
heterogeneous districts force the representative and 
his or her supporters to compromise even to win 
elections, and that this is essential to democracy. 
We have a continuing dilemma. Homogenous dis-
tricts make representation easier but force compro-
mise to take place after elections; heterogeneous 
districts make representation difficult, especially 
for minorities, but encourage compromise to win 
voter support before elections.
 The winner of a heterogeneous district must 
appeal to a broad range of voters and opinions. To 
do so, he or she might say nothing of substance, 
thus offending the fewest people. Examples of 
such candidate statements include the following: 
“It is time for a change!” “Let’s get America mov-
ing!” “Everyone should feel safe on our streets!” 
and “Let’s get back to what made America great!” 
Some states may have homogeneous districts, but a 
great division of opinion may exist between those 
districts. We do not know if they experience diffi-
culty in reaching the compromises that are neces-
sary to make public policy.
Alternatives for Selecting Representatives
Given modern literacy and communication tech-
nologies, we need not retain the procedures for 
selecting representatives that once were necessary. 
We certainly no longer need to gather prospective 
voters to hear candidates’ appeals face to face. 
Although it is expensive, candidates depend on 
television and new style, negative campaigns 
costing many times more than what their elected 
positions pay in salaries. A candidate who can look 
like a “statesman” and appear “wise and honest,” 
as compared to the opponent who is “tricky” and 
just a “politician” is most likely to win. If interest 
groups are willing to supply the money for such 
campaigns, all is well for incumbent legislators 
desiring to continue in office. They can win re-
election time after time. Are they representative, 
however? Reelection may have nothing to do with 
how representatively a legislator acts.
 Although it is not commonly used, technology 
now allows for vote gathering other than by having 
people visit polling places. Beginning in World 
War II, the states began to allow absentee voting by 
mail for those out of town on Election Day. Oregon 
is now using such mail ballots for its elections, and 
neighboring Washington has most voters voting 
that way. San Diego and other local governments 
have experimented with voting by mail. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 6, these efforts have made voting 
more convenient but have not increased voter turn-
out.
 Much of our daily banking is conducted with-
out interacting in person with bank personnel. 
Customers can use bank machines available at 
many locations. They can also do business at the 
locations of their choice through computers or 
telephones. Similar procedures for vote gathering 
could make voting as easy as visiting a website, 
making a telephone call, or visiting the counterpart 
of a cash card machine. Voters would no longer 
need to gather at polls. Though geographically 
based districts were once technologically neces-
sary, they are not the only option. Such districts are 
hard to represent. Most districts have few interests 
shared by the large majority of their populations. 
Perhaps we should consider alternatives to basing 
representation exclusively on geography.
Non-Geographic Districts
With available computer technology and social 
data, governments now could assign segments of 
society likely to share opinions on governmental 
policies to virtual districts. If one-quarter of the 
state is agricultural, farmers could select one-quar-
ter of the representatives. If appropriate, farmers 
could be further divided by acreage in production, 
income, or other factors. Similarly, if wealthy 
businessmen were to constitute only 2 percent of 
the state, they might get to choose only a single 
representative if legislative seats were apportioned 
based on occupation and income. Race, gender, 
and age are other bases on which such a system 
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might be constructed.
 There is no question that there would be diffi-
culties implementing such a system, but they are 
not insurmountable. Certainly many segments of 
society that are currently over-represented would 
oppose any such restructuring of procedures for se-
lecting representatives. The purpose of abandoning 
geographic representation would be to increase the 
probability that representatives will be like those 
they represent.
 Bias among present representatives, whether 
they are legislators, executives, or judges, will be 
a focus of our concern in the next several chap-
ters. But while we are considering changes in the 
procedures of representation, let us be even more 
fanciful.
Entrepreneurial Representatives
Cyberspace social networking sites such as Face-
book could serve as models for a system of entre-
preneurial representation. Prospective legislators 
could solicit constituents similar to the way social 
networks encourage friendships. Each qualified 
voter could affiliate with one self-nominated candi-
date for the legislature during a specified campaign 
period. In a state with 150 members of its House of 
Representatives, the 150 candidates with the great-
est number of affiliated voters would take office. 
Individual candidates might be successful without 
the backing of any political party.
 The existing electoral advantage of candidates 
with personal wealth or wealthy supporters might 
be as strong in an entrepreneurial system as in our 
current system. If expensive mass media continue 
as the main arenas of campaigning, then entrepre-
neurial representation may not change the makeup 
of legislatures. We think another outcome is pos-
sible. Individuals could be successful by making 
themselves and their candidacies “viral.” Instead 
of the most important resources being campaign 
contributions and familiar partisan talking points, 
individual initiative and creativity could become 
paramount. Parties may become less important as 
individuals create their own constituencies based 
on contemporary common interests more than 
longstanding partisanship.
 Cyberspace social networking could also serve 
as a model for legislators to communicate with 
their affiliates and others. Transparency of effort 
and success would occur for individual legislators. 
Legislative compensation could be linked to size 
of affiliated voters. If representatives had one vote 
and one dollar a year in pay for each voter’s proxy 
they held, some representatives’ ideas and pro-
grams would attract many proxies and substantial 
income. Of equal importance, the unrepresentative 
and unresponsive could not survive.
Randomly Selected Representatives
Finally, we could simply choose our representa-
tives by random selection. Within the limits of 
sampling error, every characteristic of the public 
would then be reflected within the halls of govern-
ment. This would be somewhat similar to the way 
we presently select a pool of individuals as poten-
tial trial jurors, except that all would be eligible, 
none could be stricken for bias, and the sample 
would be the same size as the number of seats in 
the legislature.
 Legislative compensation could be commensu-
rate with the responsibilities that selected legisla-
tors undertook or were assigned. Representatives 
responsible for multi-billion dollar governments 
could be paid what private sector boards of direc-
tors or managers in companies of comparable size 
are paid. Perhaps the term of office would need to 
be limited to 1 or 2 years. Very few would have the 
luck of being selected, but all but the most extreme 
should find their ideas present in government. Only 
the most popular ideas, however, would be likely 
to become policy. Would those holding minority 
ideas accept majority-based decisions without 
having the opportunity to hear their side expressed 
in debate? Would seeing and hearing your opinions 
expressed by someone you could not vote against 
satisfy you?
 Each of these proposals for representation 
based on something other than the traditional ge-
ography model has problems that would need to be 
resolved. Each achieves representatives that better 
reflect the characteristics of the governed. Each 
better copes with the complexity of modern life 
and employs tools we now have to communicate 
and gather preferences for certain policies. We 
challenge the reader to consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of state and local government that is 
truly representative of the entire population.
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Apportioning and Districting Population
For the first 174 years under our current constitu-
tion, states had wide latitude to choose their own 
criteria and procedures for establishing legislative 
districts. Starting in 1963, court decisions and 
federal statutes made population the central crite-
rion for legislative apportionment and districting. 
Supreme Court rulings all pursued the same goal: 
equalizing individual citizens’ impact on legislative 
elections.
 The only way to achieve this goal in contem-
porary America is making voting mandatory and 
severely punishing those who do not.  Actions tak-
en by the Supreme Court have actually increased 
variation in turnout across districts.  Approved 
gerrymandering has made nearly a majority of 
legislative elections nationwide uncompetitive. The 
impact on American politics at all levels has been 
inestimable but not beneficial.
Equal Population Requirements
We noted in discussing geographic representation 
that in earlier times people were spread more even-
ly across the land. Most constituents were farmers 
then. Industrialization and the accompanying con-
centration of people in cities resulted in equal-sized 
geographic districts no longer including the same 
number of people. With many living in few urban 
counties and few living in many rural counties, 
selecting representatives from each county, which 
was the early practice, meant rural areas controlled 
legislatures.
 Because those living in rural areas were in 
power and had no desire to give up that power, 
most state legislatures intentionally ignored their 
charge to apportion how many people live in each 
district within their states. State courts were also 
unresponsive to the under-representation of city 
residents.
 The Supreme Court of the United States re-
peatedly ducked the issue of whether those living 
in urban areas were being treated unconstitutional-
ly. With each urban representative expressing the 
desires of many more people than those in rural ar-
eas, policies were not those of the majority because 
those living in rural districts had too many votes 
in the legislature. The Court said that this was a 
political issue to be dealt with by legislatures.2  Of 
course, legislators over-representing rural areas had 
little reason to vote for change.
 The U.S. Census of 1960 made the inequity all 
the more evident. For example, in Florida, state 
senate districts ranged in population from 10,000 
to 935,000; and in California, Los Angeles, with 40 
percent of the state’s population, held only one of 
the 40 seats in the senate.3
 The Supreme Court accepted a Tennessee case 
involving a poorly apportioned state legislative 
lower house. Surprisingly, in this case, Baker v. 
Carr (1962), the Court ruled that federal district 
courts could consider this issue. A federal district 
court then ordered reapportionment of the Tennes-
see lower house on the basis of population. In Gray 
v. Sanders (1964), Justice Douglas declared, “The 
conception of political equality from the Decla-
ration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nine-
teenth Amendments can mean only one thing— 
one person, one vote.”
 The Supreme Court had made it clear that 
population-based equality was the prime criterion 
for apportioning seats in state houses of representa-
tives.4 Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) applied it to the 
United States House of Representatives. Many ar-
gued that state senates should be allowed to retain 
representation on a geographic basis to protect ru-
ral interests such as farm-to-market roads and state 
assistance with agricultural problems. Chief Justice 
Earl Warren rejected these arguments in Reynolds 
v. Sims (1964) with his statement that “legislators 
represent people, not trees or acres.” The Court 
held that the boundaries of legislative districts for 
both state chambers must be redrawn and that the 
“overriding objective must be substantial equality 
of population among the various districts, so that 
the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in 
weight to that of any other citizen in the state.” 
This pronouncement was dubbed the “one man, 
one vote” principle.
 In addition to being sexist, the phrase “one 
man, one vote” is misleading. The courts have nev-
er required districts with equal numbers of voters. 
Instead, they have required districts with equal 
populations. Even though the stated goal has been 
to equalize individual citizens’ impact on legisla-
tive elections, the courts have required a different 
kind of equality. They have required that each 
member of a legislative chamber have an equal 
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number of people in his or her district.
 A case from Texas, Evenwel v. Abbott (2016), 
forced the Supreme Court to face the reality that 
equal population districts do not equalize voters.  
Two Texas residents argued that the use of total 
population to apportion legislative districts pro-
duced unequal districts when measured by voter-el-
igible population. Voter-eligible population, not 
total population, they urged, must be used to ensure 
that their votes will not be devalued in relation to 
citizens’ votes in other districts.5
 Plaintiffs Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenninger 
lived in Texas Senate districts with particularly 
large eligible- and registered-voter populations. 
Their legal argument was that their votes were 
diluted in relation to voters in other Texas Senate 
districts, in violation of the one-person, one-vote 
principle of the Equal Protection Clause.  They 
documented that the population difference between 
the largest and smallest Texas Senate districts was 
8 percent.  Using the number of eligible voters, the 
difference between the largest and smallest districts 
was 40 percent.
 Ross Ramsey wrote:  “It boils down to a ques-
tion of which differences to correct: Is it better 
to give each voter an equal say in who represents 
them, or to give each resident equal access to an 
officeholder who has been elected? Is this about 
citizens, voters or residents? For congressional dis-
tricts, it’s the third group: Per the Supreme Court, 
each of a state’s congressional districts has to have 
the same number of people in it when the political 
maps are drawn.”6
 Justice Ruth Ginsberg wrote the main opinion 
for the unanimous Supreme Court: use of total 
population, as a base for legislative apportion, is 
constitutional.  “Nonvoters have an important stake 
in many policy debates — children, their parents, 
even their grandparents, for example, have a stake 
in a strong public-education system — and in re-
ceiving constituent services, such as help navigat-
ing public-benefits bureaucracies,” Ginsburg wrote. 
“By ensuring that each representative is subject to 
requests and suggestions from the same number 
of constituents, total population apportionment 
promotes equitable and effective representation.”7
 The Supreme Court changed “one-person, 
one-vote” from meaning equal voting power in an 
election to equal legislative representation for each 
resident.  The Court ruled that states may use total 
population, but total population is not necessarily 
the only acceptable apportionment base. In the 
late 20th century some excluded foreign nationals, 
military personnel assigned temporarily, and other 
citizens of the United States who were “permanent 
residents” of other states. Hawaii has used the 
“population” of registered voters. Throughout the 
21st century, all states have used total population, 
as reported by the United States Census Bureau.
 With the exception of the United States Senate, 
apportionment of legislative districts involves sim-
ple arithmetic. The total population number divid-
ed by the number of districts identifies the number 
of people that would make all districts perfectly 
equal. For some time, the rule of thumb for equal 
congressional districts was the largest and smallest 
districts must have populations within 1 percent of 
each other. In 1983, Karcher v. Daggett, the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down a congressional redis-
tricting plan that had an overall range of less than 1 
percent. Deviations from perfect equality had to be 
justified by “some legitimate state objective.”
 Larger deviations from perfect equality have 
been permitted for the districts of state legislatures. 
The standard set in Reynolds v. Sims was “substan-
tial equality of population.” This has come to mean 
an overall range from smallest to largest of less 
than 10 percent. The 10 percent rule also applies to 
the districts of legislative bodies in local govern-
ments.
 Court decisions have held that congressional 
districts must be “as equal in population as practi-
cable,” where practicable means capable of being 
done. Empirically, neither “less than 10 percent” 
nor “less than one percent” is a goal that can be 
met. For one matter, the United States Census is 
not perfectly accurate. For another, there is a long 
time period between the census count and the first 
elections after redistricting. The census is taken in 
April of years ending in zero. Data are conveyed to 
states for the use of their legislative sessions held 
in the year ending in one. For almost all states, the 
first general election using newly drawn districts is 
held in November of the year ending in two—2.5 
years after the census.
 There is compelling evidence that the normal  
movement of population in 30 months makes 
even the less than 10 percent goal unrealistic.8 The 
Supreme Court has chosen to ignore such consider-
ations.  Instead, it maintains the “legal fiction” 
206 • Chapter 9 
Figure 9.1 
Voting Rights Act Preclearance Jurisdictions 1970-2013 
and Possible New Preclearance Criteria 
Lost or Settled 2 or More 
Cases 1982-2005 Per Million 
Population 	
74%+ Percent of Non-Blacks 
More Prejudiced Than U.S. 
Average 
Covered Since 
1965 Shading 
Added in 1970 
 or 1975 Shading 
Removed by 
Bailout 
Shading 
that redistricting plans based on a given census are 
constitutionally apportioned throughout a decade.9
Race and Ethnicity Requirements
The Voting Rights Act, originally passed in 1965 
and extended and modified numerous times since 
then, requires that all laws and procedures concern-
ing elections have no discriminatory effect against 
specified racial, ethnic, or language minorities. 
Amendments passed in 1982 make it illegal for a 
class of citizens protected by the law to have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate 
to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. The law specifically 
states, “The extent to which members of a protect-
ed class have been elected to office in the State or 
political subdivision is one circumstance which 
may be considered.” In other words, minorities 
must have a fair chance to affect the outcome of an 
election.
 Additional circumstances to be considered are 
whether minorities are politically cohesive, wheth-
er they are sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single-mem-
ber district, and whether bloc voting by the white 
majority usually defeats the minority’s preferred 
candidate.10
 The Voting Rights Act requirements apply to 
all states. In addition, before the Supreme Court 
blocked its enforcement, Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act required certain areas of the country to 
obtain approval ahead of time—preclearance—
from the United States Attorney General before 
implementing any changes that affect voting. 
The intent was to prevent jurisdictions that had a 
history of racially discriminatory electoral practic-
es from developing new and innovative means to 
continue effective disenfranchisement of minority 
voters. The affected districts are identified in the 
top map in Figure 9.1
 The covered jurisdictions include nine states in 
their entirety—seven of them former Confederate 
states— and specified counties in numerous other 
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states. Although Section 5 was intended as a tem-
porary provision of the Voting Rights Act, it has 
been extended each time Congress has amended 
the Act. The 2006 amendments extended the pre-
clearance requirement for an additional 25 years.11
 Jurisdictions could terminate or “bailout” 
from the preclearance requirement. To qualify for 
removal from preclearance requirements, a juris-
diction had to satisfy either the Justice Department 
or three-judge panel in the Federal District Court 
for the District of Columbia that, essentially, it had 
committed no violations for ten years. From 1975 
to 2013, more than 100 jurisdictions successfully 
bailed out of preclearance requirements.
 In July 2013, The United States Supreme Court 
held in Shelby County v. Holder (2013) that the 
criteria for identifying jurisdictions required to ob-
tain preclearance in Section 5 were out of date and 
therefore unconstitutional.12   Only the section of 
the Voting Rights Act concerning preclearance was 
ruled unenforceable.
 The Supreme Court decision said that Congress 
could possibly enact new criteria for identifying 
jurisdictions subject to preclearance requirements.   
However, the decision gave no guidance concern-
ing what requirements would be ruled constitution-
al.
 Within hours of the Shelby County v. Hold-
er (2013) decision, Texas officials said that they 
would begin enforcing a strict photo identification 
requirement for voters, which had been blocked by 
a federal court on the ground that it would dispro-
portionately affect black and Hispanic voters. In 
Mississippi and Alabama, which had passed their 
own voter identification laws but had not received 
federal approval for them, state officials said that 
they were moving to begin enforcing the laws.13
 In addition to showing jurisdictions previous-
ly subject to preclearance requirements, Figure 
9.1 also shows which states would be covered by 
new criteria that may or may not be acceptable to 
the Supreme Court. The first criterion is losing or 
settling 2 or more cases per million residents from 
1982-2005. As points of reference, the popula-
tion of Texas in 2005 was 22.8 million, Georgia 
8.9 million, Ohio 11.5 million, Pennsylvania 12.4 
million.14  The second criterion is states with 74% 
or more of the non-Black population more preju-
diced than the U.S. average.15   A familiar pattern is 
evident: former members of the Confederate States 
of America stand out as being different.
Shape and Compactness
As discussed earlier, there are no shape and com-
pactness requirements for legislative districts. 
Figure 9.2
Racially Gerrymandered Districts’ Shapes
Texas 30th Congressional District
from 1990s
Shape is Bizarre and Possibly Illegal
Illinois 4th Congressional District
from 1990s
Shape is Strange and Legal
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However, courts have used shape and compactness 
to detect districts that might be illegally based on 
race or ethnicity. Districts whose shapes are “bi-
zarre” are unacceptable unless there is a compel-
ling state interest that justifies such a shape. Figure 
9.2 presents both a congressional district that has 
been found unacceptable and one that has been 
found acceptable. 
 The unacceptable Texas district created a 
majority African-American district in the absence 
of a compelling state interest to do so. In 1996, the 
Supreme Court found that race had been used as 
a proxy for partisanship. The real purpose was to 
create a district that could be won only by candi-
dates from the party that drew the boundaries.16 
The Illinois district was accepted because it fur-
thered the compelling state interest of creating a 
majority Hispanic district without diminishing 
African American voting strength in three adjacent 
majority African-American districts. The fact that 
candidates from only one party could win in these 
districts was less important in the Illinois district 
than in the Texas district.17 To our way of thinking, 
neither bizarre shape nor compelling state interest 
has yet been clearly defined by the federal courts.
Partisan Gerrymandering
The term gerrymandering, which means creating 
districts that maximize partisan advantage, comes 
from a political cartoon in the early 1800s. The Jef-
fersonian Republicans had concentrated Federalist 
voters into a district where they would overwhelm-
ingly win a single state legislative seat, while the 
surrounding areas could elect Jeffersonian. The 
cartoon exaggerated the appearance of this district 
to look like a dragon or salamander, or what the 
paper called a “gerrymander” because the gover-
nor involved was a Governor Gerry.
 Given the opportunity, major political parties 
will seek to have districts created that work to their 
advantage and to the disadvantage of all others. 
State legislatures create districts for themselves 
and for the U.S. House of Representatives. The 
legislatures of 45 states allow partisan advantage 
to be a consideration—usually the most important 
consideration—in drawing district boundaries.18 
Nebraska is an exception because members of its 
unicameral legislature are selected in nonpartisan 
elections. Louisiana, California and Washington 
are exceptions because of their unique primary 
election systems that limit the power of parties. 
Iowa is an exception because its statutory law pro-
vides that districts shall not be drawn to favor any 
political party, an incumbent legislator or member 
of Congress, or any other person or group. In ad-
dition, a nonpartisan appointed advisory board has 
acted without regard to the interests of incumbents 
or parties. Other states also have advisory boards 
that have not been independent of such interests.
 You may be surprised to learn that the United 
States Supreme Court has, in effect, said districts 
drawn to maximize partisan advantage violate 
neither federal statutory or constitutional law. In 
LULAC v. Perry (2006), the Court repeated a prin-
ciple articulated in earlier cases: it is possible that 
excessive partisanship could in itself invalidate a 
redistricting plan. The case concerned congressio-
nal districts redrawn by the Texas Legislature to 
replace existing districts in 2003 immediately after 
Republicans gained control of both chambers for 
the first time. The Republican Party and the State 
of Texas openly admitted that the only purpose of 
redistricting was to remove incumbent Democrats 
and replace them with Republicans.19 The Court 
held documenting that the only motive for drawing 
districts was partisan advantage was not sufficient 
to demonstrate excessive partisanship. The goal 
of creating congressional districts in Texas that 
favored candidates from one party ruled unaccept-
able in 1996 was deemed acceptable in 2006.
 Another finding in LULAC v. Perry (2006) en-
hances the prospects for future partisan gerryman-
dering. The Court found that redistricting between 
censuses was not a violation of federal law. Unless 
state constitutional or statutory law limits when 
legislative districts may be considered, legislatures 
may draw new lines whenever the majority party 
changes or whenever they please to do so.
 Political parties are free to use—for political 
advantage—gerrymandering practices declared 
illegal when used for racial, ethnic, or language 
advantage. You probably know about fracturing—
drawing district lines so that the minority party is 
broken up. This practice creates districts where 
the minority party is not strong enough to elect 
representatives. Packing is a complementary and 
even more important practice. Packing is draw-
ing district boundary lines so that the members of 
the minority party are concentrated, or “packed,” 
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into as few districts as possible. They become a 
supermajority in the packed districts—70, 80, or 
90 percent. They can elect representatives from 
those districts, but their votes in excess of a simple 
majority are “wasted.” They are not available to 
help elect representatives in other districts, so they 
cannot elect representatives in proportion to their 
numbers in the state as a whole.20
 Ironically, the best strategy for the majority 
party to maximize its advantage in the legislature 
is to create districts its candidates cannot win. The 
greater the number of all minority party districts 
created, the greater the number of districts where 
only majority party candidates can win. In 2018, 
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected challenges to 
partisan gerrymandering in Wisconsin, Ohio and 
Texas.  
Contemporary Redistricting Standards
There are three standards that must be met when 
drawing legislative district boundaries. The first is 
contiguity. The second is population equality. The 
third is compliance with the Voting Rights Act. 
However, since President Trump took office, the 
Department of Justice has pursued no new voting 
rights cases and has withdrawn as a plaintiff in 
several lawsuits. There are also optional criteria 
that may or may not be considered. One is pres-
ervation of existing governmental boundaries and 
other communities of interest. Another is giving 
advantage to the majority party and/or incumbents. 
Yet another is geographic compactness.
The Results of Reapportionment
It is difficult to assess the impact of urban-rural 
reapportionment comprehensively. Urbanization 
and suburbanization continued unabated during the 
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, and state 
governments increasingly turned to urban prob-
lems.21 However, it is always difficult to say when 
two trends coincide that one is causing the other. 
For example, does the fact that family farms have 
declined swiftly since the reapportionment deci-
sions demonstrate that urban and suburban legis-
lators have ignored these constituents, resulting in 
the failure of small farms? Certainly there are more 
legislators from urban and suburban areas now 
than was the case before the early 1960s. There are 
more Democrats from the cities in northern legis-
latures and more urban Republicans in the South. 
It seems nearly certain that reapportionment based 
on population has given legislators more desire to 
attack urban problems and to devote expenditures 
to those areas.22
 The impact of partisan gerrymandering is eas-
ier to assess. Every census since 1960 has resulted 
in more strategic and precise partisan districting. 
In the 21st century, those who draw district bound-
aries have potent tools to create the sort of legis-
lative districts they prefer. Powerful computers 
link geographic information system programs with 
sophisticated databases. Demographic information 
is available for very small census tracts. Election 
turnout and results data are available at the precinct 
level. Many states have records of who voted in 
primary elections and which party’s primary they 
voted in. Partisan consultants can purchase and use 
information such as publication subscriptions or 
political and charitable contributions to accurately 
estimate partisanship at the household level.
 It is now the case that, for most Americans, the 
party affiliations of their congressmen and state 
legislators are determined at the time legislative 
districts are drawn. The particular individual who 
will take office is increasingly determined in pri-
mary elections. In 1992, there were 103 congres-
sional districts with competitive elections between 
Republicans and Democrats. In 2012, there were 
only 35 competitive congressional districts.  Only 
20 congressional districts were competitive in 
2016.23
 In Texas, challengers more often have defeated 
incumbents in primary elections than in general 
elections for more than a decade.  In typical gen-
eral elections, approximately two-thirds of Texas 
state legislature seats are contested by only one 
major party. In 2016, 75% of Texas Senate and 
60% of Texas House general election contest had 
either no Republican or no Democratic party candi-
date.  For 2018 there is unusually strong interparty 
competition.  Only 13% of Senate contests and 
35% of House contests do not have both a Republi-
can and a Democratic party candidate.  
 There is also increased interparty competition 
in 2018 for Texas seats in the United States House 
of Representatives. In 2016, 28% of general elec-
tion contests had only one major party candidate.  
In 2018, only 14% of general election contests 
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have only one major party contest.  All 36 con-
gressional districts have Democratic candidates in 
2018.  In five districts a Democrat has no Republi-
can opponent.
 As discussed in Chapter 8, primary elections 
are different from general elections in two import-
ant ways. First, turnout is lower—typically less 
than half that of the corresponding general elec-
tion. Second, primary voters tend to be the stron-
gest partisans. Incumbents continuously face the 
prospect of a primary election challenger alleging 
the incumbent is not sufficiently conservative or 
liberal, not a strong enough Republican or Demo-
crat.
 General elections no longer play a moderating 
role by making nominees from both parties vie for 
the support of less partisan voters. Contemporary 
primary elections push candidates away from the 
center toward the political edges. More so than 
ever before, partisan extremists populate legisla-
tures with no experience in communicating with, 
let alone compromising with, the opposite party. 
One result of hyper-partisanship has been a popular 
perception of legislative gridlock.
 A curious situation exists in many states. Exec-
utive elections contested statewide are competitive, 
and the two major parties are close in numbers 
within legislative chambers. Yet, at the same time, 
elections in legislative districts are uncompeti-
tive. The votes of the large majority of Americans 
have no impact on who wins legislative general 
elections. In the near term, voters can have equal 
impact only if they all choose to vote in the prima-
ry elections of their districts’ supermajority parties.
Districting in the Cities
The federal courts have also applied Voting Rights 
Act criteria to city councils and school boards to 
assure representation to minorities. What is used 
might be called court-ordered racial gerrymander-
ing, with a racially based concentration of mi-
norities in certain districts to assure their election. 
Going to at-large elections in which all representa-
tives to a city council are elected citywide was an 
important element in the reform movement. The 
president of Cornell University (upstate New York) 
argued: “The work of a city being the creation and 
control of the city property, it should logically be 
managed as a piece of property by those who have 
created it, who have title to it, or a real substantial 
part in it, and not by a crowd of illiterate peasants, 
freshly raked in from the Irish bogs, or Bohemian 
mines, or Italian peasant nests.”24
 The motive was the dilution of such minorities 
so that none won election to the council. With at-
large districts, all voters choose all council mem-
bers across the city. A minority of 25 or 30 percent 
of the vote would win no seats. In the South, this 
technique worked well in assuring under-represen-
tation of African-Americans.
 In the 1970s, the representation of Afri-
can-Americans on city councils fell far short of 
what their percentage within the population of 
most cities would suggest was “fair.” More re-
cent studies suggest that most of this bias had 
been overcome in the 1980s25 and even became 
over-representation in the 1990s.26 The representa-
tion of Hispanics in city governance will no doubt 
follow the same pattern as the Irish, Bohemians, 
Italians, and African-Americans.
Size of the Legislature
Although it has not been the topic of systematic 
empirical investigation, the size of a state legis-
lature may have an impact both on representation 
and on making laws. All lower houses in the states 
are larger than their senate or upper-house coun-
terparts. The average lower house has 112 mem-
bers, and the senate 40 members. This figure does 
vary greatly, with the smallest lower houses being 
Alaska (40), Delaware (41), and Nevada (42), and 
the largest being New Hampshire (400) and Penn-
sylvania (203). The smallest senates are in Alaska 
(20) and Nevada (21), and the largest are in Minne-
sota and New York (61).
 There are two considerations in setting the size 
of a legislative house, neither of which probably 
concerned those who wrote state constitutions:  
time for debate and maximum size of constituency.
Even with present technology allowing everyone 
to be heard even in a large hall and having votes 
gathered electronically, the upper limit on the size 
of a legislature involves time for debate. With 
thousands of bills to consider, each legislator’s 
opportunity to speak on a bill would be restricted 
further if the house were larger. This situation is 
especially the case in those states that have short 
legislative sessions. To be certain, technology in 
Legislating Policy and Representing The People • 211 
architecture as well as in public address systems 
allows the housing of quite large groups, such as in 
domed stadiums, as well as allowing individuals to 
be heard. Because lower houses are larger than sen-
ates, they typically have leaders of greater authority 
and limited debate.
 Senators in California each represent over 
931,000 people, and those in Texas represent more 
than 811,000 people. Texas’ districts have more 
residents than Wyoming, Vermont, North Dakota 
and Alaska. California’s districts are larger than the 
populations of two additional states: Delaware and 
South Dakota.27
 By contrast, New Hampshire’s lower chamber 
members represent 3,300. The average lower house 
legislator nationwide represents about 66,000 peo-
ple.28 Can they thus give better representation than 
their senate counterparts in the populous states? 
California’s senate would need 12,500 members 
to have the same representation ratio as the New 
Hampshire lower house! It might be possible to 
allow them to be heard, but each might have only 
a few seconds to speak on any bill. There are 
tradeoffs between allowing debate and facilitating 
representation.
 We know that choosing 1,500 California legisla-
tors randomly would give quite accurate representa-
tion. Thus, 12,500 representatives would seem to be 
overkill. Nevertheless, representatives selected from 
low-population districts seem more likely to reflect 
those districts than would be the case in large dis-
tricts. Large districts seem more likely to be varied 
and small districts more homogeneous.
 We have considered several institutional fea-
tures of present-day American legislatures. Many 
of these have been advocated as reforms that would 
improve not only the representation by legislatures 
but also their ability to cope with problems faced by 
the states. Later, we will use the variation from state 
to state on these variables to assess whether the 
institutional reforms might indeed help.
Legislators as Lawmakers
How Laws Are Made: “The Process”
Lawmaking is the primary product of state legisla-
tures. Although they also must pass budgets, ap-
prove of nominations in the case of the upper house, 
and fulfill the other functions of legislators enumer-
ated earlier in this chapter, their main activity is to 
seek lawful solutions to society’s problems, at least 
as they see them.
 Most state legislatures play a role in amending 
state constitutions. State legislatures pass resolu-
tions that are official communications to the United 
States Congress and other organizations. They also 
pass simple resolutions taking note of individuals, 
organizations, and achievements. However, the 
central work of state legislatures is considering bills 
that might be enacted into statutory law.
 Figure 9.3 depicts, in a simplified manner, the 
many steps that must be taken in a legislature for 
an idea to become a law that affects our lives. All 
the bicameral states use this very complex process. 
Most charts of how a bill become law list steps 
in the chamber of origin and say “same in second 
chamber.” We present each step in each chamber to 
underline how many positive decisions are required 
for a bill to be enacted.
 Drafting a bill is a complex task in and of itself, 
since the language must be clear and many, if not 
all, eventualities must be considered. Legal and 
technical advice is quite important, as is research on 
other governments’ efforts to deal with the problem 
in a similar manner and their success or failure with 
it. Although only members can submit bills for con-
sideration in their chambers, others almost always 
draft the bills they submit. Political parties, interest 
groups, fellow legislators, staff, constituents, and 
executive branch departments all draft bills.
 The introduction of a bill is the simple act of 
placing it on the desk or in a basket of the presiding 
officer, typically called the “speaker” in the lower 
chamber and the “president,” “lieutenant governor,” 
or “president pro tem” in the senate. After introduc-
tion, bills are a signed to committees, typically by 
the chamber presiding officer or by chamber ma-
jority party leadership. The act of introduction and 
assignment to a standing committee is called the 
first reading.
 Bills are assigned to standing committees for 
consideration. As discussed earlier, a relatively 
small number of bills are not deliberated. Commit-
tee members deliberate the majority of bills. One el-
ement of deliberation involves seeking information 
from interested parties. Committees schedule public 
hearings to listen to the views of other legislators, 
invited experts, interest group representatives, and 
the general public. Participating in hearings requires 
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presence at the state capitol at certain times. This 
works to the advantage of those who work or live 
near the capitol or have the means to travel there or 
have the resources to engage the services of those 
who do. In a growing number of states, streamed 
video of committee meetings is available on the 
Internet, both as meetings occur and afterward. 
Digital technology has been used to expand the 
audience of public hearings to more of the pub-
lic. This technology may be used in the future to 
expand opportunities to speak at hearings to more 
of the public.
 Whether deliberated or not, most bills die in 
committee.29 Committees have three options for 
bills they recommend for further consideration by 
the entire chamber. First, they may send forward 
an unchanged or “clean bill.” Clean bills tend to be 
those that are simple or uncontroversial. Second, 
they may send forward a changed or “marked up” 
bill, sometimes called a committee substitute. A 
substitute usually adds to the original bill’s text 
some elements from other bills considered by the 
committee. Third, they may send forward a clean 
bill and recommended amendments to the bill. For 
these bills, the committee signals that the entire 
chamber should undertake further serious delibera-
tion during floor consideration.
 Bills recommended favorably by substantive 
committees are considered for placement on a 
calendar for floor consideration. In some cham-
bers, calendar placement is automatic. In other 
chambers, a review committee assigns bills to one 
of several calendars that are considered in specified 
orders at designated times. Most chambers have 
emergency and consensus calendars to accelerate 
considerations of certain bills.30 In some chambers, 
Chamber of Origin Second Chamber Conference Committee 
Bill is drafted 
Introduction and First 
Reading 
Introduction and 
First Reading 
Committee members chosen 
 
Committee referral Committee referral Bill redrafted and sent to both chambers 
Subcommittee Subcommittee If both chambers approve, sent to governor 
Committee hearings Committee hearings 
Committee Action Committee Action 
Calendar placement Calendar placement 
Second Reading floor 
consideration 
Second Reading 
floor consideration 
Third Reading and 
floor vote 
Third reading and 
floor vote 
Reconsideration Reconsideration 
Sent to opposite 
chamber 
If amended, returned 
to chamber of origin 
If approved without 
amendment, sent to 
governor 
Figure 9.3 
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a review committee can kill a bill by not assigning 
it to a calendar.
 The typical calendar specifies the order in 
which bills will receive further consideration on 
the chamber floor. This floor consideration is called 
the second reading. This is the debate and amend-
ing process we consider typical of legislatures. 
When a bill comes up on the calendar, legislators 
will have printed versions of the bill, as reported 
out by the committee, at their desks. They may 
speak for or against, often with time limits imposed 
in the lower chamber. Amendments can be intro-
duced and passed or defeated. The chamber clerk 
or secretary sees that approved amendments are 
included in reprinted versions available to legisla-
tors when bills are next considered.
 Although the purpose of the third reading is to 
pass or defeat the bill approved at second reading, 
further amendments are permitted. In the third and 
final reading, most often a recorded vote is taken. 
All states now use electronic voting machines. If a 
majority of those casting votes approve, the bill has 
been passed in that house.
 In the 49 bicameral (two-house) state legisla-
tures, each chamber must pass identical text for a 
bill to move forward. If there are differences, the 
first chamber has the option of accepting chang-
es made by the second chamber. In most cases of 
disagreement, the first chamber calls for appoint-
ment of a conference committee, composed of 
members of both chambers, to iron out differences. 
Sometimes this task is easy, and other times it is 
all but impossible. If a conference committee fails 
to agree, the bill dies. If a conference committee 
agrees, the redrafted version is sent to both cham-
bers for final consideration.
 Bills that pass both chambers in identical 
form are sent to the governor for further action. 
A governor’s signature is normally required for 
a legislatively enacted bill to become law. A veto 
occurs when the governor explicitly rejects a bill 
passed by the state legislature. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, some governors can veto portions 
of bills, especially bills appropriating money. In 
some states, bills not explicitly vetoed become law 
without the governor’s signature.
 The legislative branch can override the gov-
ernor’s veto if enough votes can be found in both 
chambers. In most cases, two-thirds of each cham-
ber must vote for the legislation to override the 
governor’s veto. If that override vote is obtained, 
the legislation is enacted. Although governors often 
threaten them, vetoes are seldom used. Few vetoes, 
however, are overridden. In the 2011-2012 sessions 
of the state legislatures, average of 8 percent of the 
enacted bills were vetoed.  In 2014, less than 4 per-
cent were vetoed.  Historically less than 15 percent 
of vetoes are overridden.31. The use of the veto by 
governors varies greatly over time, and one state 
may see great use in one year and little use thereaf-
ter.
 Two other procedures further influence each 
new law. First, it is assigned to an agency to 
administer, which entails forms and procedures. 
These are called administrative laws. Either 
through misunderstandings or opposition by 
agency personnel or confusion between different 
sections of the law, the bureaucracy or agency can 
administer the law in a manner contrary to what 
the legislature and governor intended. If the prob-
lem is serious enough, the entire process can be 
used again to force the agency to follow legislative 
intent more closely. In effect, a new law can be 
passed to override the bureaucracy’s administrative 
law.
 Second, once the law is implemented, parties 
affected by it can bring a lawsuit arguing that it 
is unconstitutional. This process is called judicial 
review. In some states, the state attorney general 
can make a judgment on a bill’s constitutionality. 
However, state supreme courts need pay no atten-
tion to such judgments. If the courts declare laws 
unconstitutional, they are null and void. This need 
not be the end. The legislature can propose consti-
tutional amendments, at least to the state constitu-
tion, to override the courts. If ratified, amendments 
supersede court rulings.
The Real Legislative Process
When asked, state legislators say that the biggest 
and most important part of their work is killing bad 
bills. They define bad bills as those that harm the 
citizens of their states or harm the people in their 
districts. Bills that waste resources are deemed bad 
bills. Many legislators also use ideological criteria 
to identify bad bills.
 Bills not reviewed by subcommittees, not 
reconsidered by either chamber and not referred 
to conference committees must succeed at a mini-
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mum of 14 steps.  Of course, bills are also subject 
to multiple amendment proposals in committees, at 
second reading and at third reading.
 Discussion of how bills are passed and the 
Schoolhouse Rock song “I’m Just A Bill” mislead 
us into thinking bill passage happens most of the 
time. Legislators make effective use of their plen-
tiful opportunities to kill bills.  In the legislative 
sessions held in 2014, by conventional measures, 
state legislatures passed 26% of bills introduced. 
The other 74% failed of enactment.32
 A typical state legislature will have hundreds or 
thousands of bills on its agenda during a legislative 
session. The United States Congress ignores the 
large majority of bills submitted each session. State 
legislatures deliberate—actively consider—the 
large majority of bills submitted each session.
 Although many thousands of bills are intro-
duced in legislative sessions in most states, import-
ant bills probably number only in the hundreds. 
Among the unimportant bills are those that deal 
with one local area, such as reimbursing individu-
als for damages done by state employees, changing 
a local institution, or any number of minor changes 
that would interest no one other than the com-
munity and its local delegation to the upper and 
lower house. Bills such as these that harm none 
but benefit few are usually not regarded as bad 
bills. Members tend to vote for bills that help their 
colleagues’ districts and do not disadvantage their 
own districts. Other members return the favor. By 
tacit mutual agreement, incumbents help each other 
pass legislation to fend off challengers in future 
elections.
 Contrary to what we might think, not all bills 
are submitted for the purpose of passing or even 
considering them. Many bills are introduced then 
die immediately with no further action taken. 
Sometimes these bills are introduced at the request 
of constituents, supporters, or potential future sup-
porters. Some bills are submitted for symbolic pur-
poses. One example is when a member knows that 
chamber leaders oppose a bill. By letting the bill 
die immediately, leaders are not offended and the 
member can later say, “I tried.” There is evidence 
that letting some bills die without deliberation is a 
strategy that allows legislators to pass their other 
bills.33
 Bills on the same topic are usually assigned to 
a single committee. Frequently, committees con-
sider multiple similar bills simultaneously, discard-
ing some and combining others. Rather than send 
multiple related bills forward, committees typically 
prefer to recommend only one bill or two closely 
related bills for floor consideration. Thus, in de-
scribing how a bill becomes law below, we are also 
describing how important bills or batches of bills 
on the same topic are combined to become law.
 The conventional bill passage rates discussed 
so far assume all bills submitted are legitimate, 
independent candidates for enactment. That as-
sumption is wrong. At least 28 states and the U.S. 
Congress identify similar and/or identical bills sub-
mitted in both chambers. These pairs are typically 
called companions. Identical bills are not submitted 
with the intention of passing them more then once. 
Introducing identical bills in both chambers is a 
strategy. Companions that clear their chambers first 
are substituted for bills still progressing through 
the opposite chamber. Rather than start at the 
beginning in the second chamber, these companion 
bills assume their twins’ places in the process.34
 Consider the following thought experiment. 
Imagine you are a legislator who wants to pass a 
certain bill into law. You make arrangements with 
a legislator from the opposite chamber to submit 
an identical companion bill and agree to coordi-
nate efforts to get one of the twin bills pass. Now, 
imagine you also convince another member of your 
chamber—the chair of the committee the bill is 
likely to review the bill—to submit a third identical 
bill. You know from the outset that at least two of 
the identical triplet bills must die.
 If one of the identical bills is enacted into law, 
does it matter whether it is your bill or one of the 
other two triplets?  The simple conventional mea-
sure will conclude only one of the three passed, a 
success rate of 33 percent. You and your colleagues 
will think the success rate is 100 percent. A more 
sophisticated measure of bill passage would count 
all identical bills as passed if one were enacted. 
Such an analysis is presented for the Texas Legisla-
ture in Figure 9.4.
 Figure 9.4 presents passage rates at two points 
in the legislative process: passage by committee 
and enactment into law.  Three measures of success 
are used. The first is the conventional measure of 
individual bills. The second credits all identical 
bills with the progress of the bill that went fur-
thest in the process, The third is a variation of the 
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Figure 9.4 
Bill Success in the Texas Legislature 1991-2011 
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second that includes only bills that are deliberated 
by a committee –or an identical bill is deliberat-
ed.  This measure excludes bills members let die 
without hearings to assess only the bills they work 
actively to pass.
 The two alternative passages rates must always 
be higher than the conventional rate. After you 
review Figure 9.4, you will probably agree that 
the differences are important. Texas House bills or 
identical bills pass chamber of origin committees at 
an average rate of 44% by conventional measures 
but 51% or 66% by other measures.  Senate bills 
pass chamber of origin committees at an average 
rate of 53%, 64% or 75%. The conventional wis-
dom that most bills die in first chamber committees 
does not hold if passage of identical bills is part of 
the success measure.
 The conventional measure identifies 21% of 
Texas House bills and 28% of Texas Senate bills 
enacted into law, on average, for the 1991-2011 
legislative sessions. Measures that credit all iden-
tical bills with the progress of the most successful 
ascertain enactment rates of 28% for House bills 
and 38% for Senate bills.
 Measures that consider the fates of identical 
bills still identify some successes as failures. For 
one example, many bills that die are similar, but 
not identical, to bills that later pass. For another ex-
ample, some bills that die are appended as amend-
ments to other bills that pass.
 One last point must be made before leaving the 
topic of bill success and failure. We should not fo-
cus on bill passage to the extent that we forget that 
legislators view killing bad bills as more important 
than passing good bills. Members view killing bills 
as successes. Since they rarely say so publicly, we 
cannot measure successful kills. It is likely that 
every bill killed is viewed as a successful outcome 
by at least some legislators.
Assessing Service to Constituents and Districts
While legislators in some states no doubt provide 
more services to constituents to obligate them for 
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support in elections as well as being more respon-
sive to such demands, no one collects such data. 
Similarly, some legislators may rival members of 
Congress in taking credit for the tax dollars spent 
in their districts, what is commonly called “pork,” 
but again no one gathers such data. We cannot, 
therefore, assess the impact of such differences. 
But few reformers have seriously suggested chang-
es in institutions to alter these functions of legisla-
tures.
The Virtues of a Professional Legislature
Since, with the exception of Nebraska, all states 
use the same three-reading-plus-conference pro-
cedures, we cannot say whether alternative proce-
dures might improve enacting quality legislation. 
There is, however, a difference among the states 
in terms of how much this entire process is com-
pressed into a limited number of days. 
 All state legislatures began as Citizen Legisla-
tures. They were intended to meet for short periods 
of time to conduct the people’s business. Members 
were essentially volunteers. They received little 
compensation other than personal expenses in-
volved in meeting at state capitols. It was expected 
that they would serve a term or two before with-
drawing.
 The opposite style is Professional Legislatures. 
Instead of meeting for short sessions, Professional 
Legislatures meet year round. Members certainly 
do not act volunteers. They are well compensated 
for their services with salaries, expense accounts 
and generous retirement benefits. They are ex-
pected to have residences in the state capitol as 
well as in their home districts. Professional Leg-
islatures provide help for members in the form of 
staff for both home and district offices. There are 
also staffs for individual committees and services 
for research, bill drafting, information technology, 
public relations, and so on.
 Hybrid legislatures combine elements of the 
other two styles. In hybrid legislatures, the work-
load expands in doing the publics’ business but 
outside employment is still the norm. Figure 9.5 
maps the three styles used by state legislatures.  No 
regional patterns are evident.35
 Figure 9.6 shows how the three styles of legis-
latures differ on session lengths, workloads of bills 
introduced and enactments. Citizen legislatures are 
generally on the low end, hybrid legislatures are in 
the middle and professional legislatures are on the 
high end, as expected.
The Impact of Professionalism
Figure 9.7 presents correlations between legislative 
professionalism and characteristics of legislators 
Figure 9.5
Legislative Styles
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to assess whether professionalism has an impact 
on who serves. There are no relationships between 
legislative professionalism and gender or racial/
ethnic group percentages. There are no relation-
ships with turnover of legislators or with interpar-
ty competition of partisan control. We can only 
conclude that level of legislative professionalism 
is not systematically related to who serves in state 
legislatures.36
 Figure 9.7 also presents correlations between 
legislative professionalism and workloads. More 
professional legislatures have longer legislative 
sessions, an element of the professionalism index.  
Professionalism is negatively related to percent of 
bills enacted. Professionalism is unrelated to num-
ber of bills introduced and number enacted.
 If the reformers advocating the Profession-
al Legislature style are correct, states with more 
professional legislatures should have better pubic 
policies. Their argument is the superior research 
capability, quality law-drafting, thorough debate, 
and expertise of professional full-time legislatures 
result in such better decisions. The opposing view 
is that Citizen Legislatures should make better de-
cisions. The reasoning is that amateur legislatures 
are closer to and more like their constituents. They 
are more representative. The result should be better 
public policies because legislatures make decisions 
preferred by their constituents. We cannot measure 
“better” policies, but we measure different policies 
in Figure 9.8.
 The correlations in Figure 9.8 offer scant evi-
dence that legislative professionalism is systemat-
ically related to state policies.  Professionalism is 
positively related to tax burdens.  It is not related 
to other financial measures, including revenue, ex-
pensive, tax regressivity and debt. It is unrelated to 
reliance on personal or corporate income taxes. It 
is unrelated to welfare and education sending and 
unrelated to abortion policies.
 Those who argue that more professional legis-
latures produce better policies could legitimately 
argue that our measures of professionalism are 
imperfect and our measures of policies are incom-
plete. We agree. However, at this point, we con-
clude only that convincing empirical support for 
their argument based on contemporary state differ-
ences has yet to be made.
Are State Legislators Like State Residents?
Measures of Population Similarity
To become a state legislator, one typically has to 
be a citizen, a resident, and above a certain age. 
This minimum age is typically 21 years old for the 
lower house and 25 for the upper house or senate.37 
So common are some characteristics of legislators 
that they might be called “informal requirements.” 
Although it is possible to be elected without meet-
ing these informal requirements, it is improbable.
 Figure 9.9 presents the distribution of state leg-
islators’ occupations from 1976 to 201538. Clearly, 
legislators occupy predominantly professional 
or managerial and upper-middle-class occupa-
tions. Lawyers and businessmen are particularly 
over-represented in state legislatures.
 The national percentage of attorneys in state 
legislatures has dropped from 22 percent nation-
wide in 1976 to 14 percent in 2015. A declining 
percentage of legislators are business owners, but 
an increasing number are business executives or 
managers. Many of the shifts in business percent-
ages are the result of legislators changing how they 
describe their occupations. To an unknown extent, 
those who would have described themselves in the 
Figure 9.6
Legislative Styles and Legislative Activities
Citizen Hybrid Professional
Legislature Legislature Legislature
Average Average Average
Length of Regular Session 85 90 137
Number of Bills Introduced 1456 1901 4478
Number of Bills Enacted 341 459 356
Percent of Bills Enacted 27 32 11
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Figure 9.7 
Legislative Professionalism Correlations With Members 
and Legislative Workloads 2010 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
Percent of Women in Legislature .17 
Percent of Latinos in Legislature .16 
Percent of African Americans in Legislature .11 
Legislative Turnover -.04 
Interparty Competition .08 
Republican Control of House -.24 
Republican Control of Senate -.09 
Republican Control of Legislature -.17 
Length of Regular Session .39 
Number of Bills Introduced -.21 
Number of Bills Enacted .14 
Percent of Bills Enacted -.54 
past as working in insurance or real estate or as 
business non-managers now describe themselves 
as business executives, managers, or consultants. 
We think it is safe to conclude that there are fewer 
from agriculture and the legal profession, as well 
as fewer government employees. We conclude 
there are more who call themselves retired and 
full-time legislators.
 Figure 9.10 compares several characteristics of 
state legislators and the American public. Women, 
African-Americans, and Hispanics are underrep-
resented. Attorneys, the largest occupation group 
of state legislators, are overrepresented—there 
are more than 37 times as many attorneys in state 
legislatures as in the workforce. The average age 
of legislators, 56, is much older than the public, 
47. Obviously, in terms of occupation and demog-
raphy, state legislators do not accurately represent 
their constituents.
Impact of More Accurate Representation
Earlier, we loosely used the term “representative.” 
Unfortunately, while few would deny that legisla-
tors should be representative, few agree on what 
that means. Do we mean that a legislature should 
enact the same policies that the public would enact 
if there were direct democracy? Some argue that 
since legislators won elections, they are repre-
sentative because they received a mandate from a 
majority of voters for what they supported. Others, 
however, would see representatives who are unlike 
those they represent as hardly likely to enact poli-
cies in the interest of the public. It may be that our 
best evidence of how representative a state legisla-
ture is rests on whether demographically it reflects 
its public. 
 We might expect that accurate reflection re-
sults in the legislature passing laws that the public 
would pass were it able. We cannot assess this rela-
tionship empirically because we lack good mea-
sures about what policies each population group 
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Figure 9.8
Legislative Professionalism Correlations With Policy 2010
Legislative 
Professionalism
Per Capita State and Local Revenue .21
Per Capita State and Local Expenditure .28
State and Local Tax Burden .44
Regressivity of State and Local Taxes .10
Per Capita State and Local Long Term Debt .23
TANF Monthly Family Benefit .23
Per of Families Children in Poverty Receiving TANF .21
Education Spending Per Child K-12 .01
Restrictiveness of Abortion Policies -.14
Percent Revenue from Personal Income Tax .22
Percent Income From Corporate income Tax .02
Figure 9.9
Occupations of State Legislators
Occupation 1976 1986 1993 1995 2007 2015
Attorney 22% 16% 17% 16% 15% 14%
Full-Time Legislator 3% 12% 15% 14% 16% 11%
Business Owner 16% 14% 10% 12% 9% 14%
Agriculture 10% 10% 8% 8% 5% 5%
Business Other 13%
Retired * 7% 7% 8% 12% 8%
Business: Executive/Manager 5% 6% 6% 5% 9%
Educator: K-12 8% 6% 6% 6% 4% 6%
Business: Non-manager 4% 5% 5% 4% 3%
Consultant/Professional/Nonprofit 6% 3% 4% 5% 8% 12%
Real Estate 5% 4% 3% 4% 4%
Insurance 5% 3% 3% 3% 2%
Communications/Arts 3% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Medical * 2% 2% 3% 4%
Government Employee: Local 3% 1% 2% 2% 1%
Educator: College * 2% 2% 2% 2%
Homemaker * 1% 1% 1% 1%
Engineer/Scientist/Architect * 1% 1% 1% 2%
Accountant * 1% 1% 1% 1%
Government Employee: State * 0% 0% 0% 1%
Clergy * 0% 0% 0% 1%
Labor Union 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Student * 0% 0% 0% 0%
Information Not Available * 0% 0% 0% 0% 5%%
Insufficient Information/Other 9% 3% 3% 3% 0% 12%
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Figure 9.11 
Accurate Representation Correlations With Policy 2015 
 
Age 
 
Women 
 
Latinos 
African 
American 
Non White/
Caucasian 
Per Capita State and Local Revenue -.18 .15 .17 -.10 -.26 
Per Capita State and Local Expenditure -.23 .10 .18 -.11 -.23 
State and Local Tax Burden .32 -.03 .08 .24 .38 
Regressivity of State and Local Taxes .17 -.09 -.06 -.10 .06 
Percent Own Source Revenue from Personal Income Tax, 2013 .14 .08 .07 .21 .08 
Percent Own Source Revenue from Corporate income Tax, 2013 -.22 .13 -.06 .00 -.04 
Percent Own Source Revenue from Sales Tax, 2013 .21 -.14 -.07 .21 .08 
Percent Own Source Revenue from Property Tax, 2013 .11 .41 .22 .31 .19 
Per Capita State and Local Long Term Debt .12 .30 .31 .05 .17 
TANF Monthly Family Benefit -.10 .43 .29 -.10 -.05 
Percent of Medicaid Paid By State and Local Governments .02 .20 .07 .10 -.13 
Education Spending Per Child K-12 -.02 .23 .26 .04 .03 
Restrictiveness of Abortion Policies -.06 -.51 -.26 -.37 -.27 
prefers. We can ask whether there are empirical re-
lations between accurate population reflection and 
our measures of state policies. Figure 9.11 presents 
correlations between policies and how accurately 
demographic measures of state legislators match 
those of their constituents.
  More accurate representation of Latinos and 
African Americans is not empirically related to 
any of the policy differences we have measured. 
More accurate representation of women is positive-
ly related to welfare benefit levels, families with 
children in poverty receiving welfare benefits and 
less restrictive abortion policies. Accurate repre-
sentation of women is related to four of the policy 
measures. These empirical relationships between 
accurate representation of women and policies may 
or may not be causal. They could be spurious. We 
do not know what would happen were many more 
women suddenly elected to a state legislature that 
poorly represents women. We also do not know 
what would happen if Latinos and African Amer-
icans were accurately represented in state legisla-
tures. It is conceivable that the lack of empirical 
links now is a function of very low levels of repre-
Figure 9.10
Characteristics of Legislators and Constituents 2015
Public Legislators
Women 51% 24%
Hispanics 17% 5%
African Americans 13% 9%
Not White/Caucasian 76% 82%
Attorneys 0.4% 14%
Average Age 47 56
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sentation. Things could change once representation 
meets a threshold we cannot currently identify.
 There are grounds for expecting inevitable 
demographic changes in the future will result in 
better representation for some. In particular, we 
expect better representation of rapidly increasing 
state Hispanic/ Latino populations. On the other 
hand, powerful interests are opposed to more equal 
representation of certain population groups. Polit-
ical actors are motivated more by the prospect of 
acquiring power than the goal of achieving equal 
representation. Indeed, political parties and current 
officeholders frequently act to deny more equal 
representation. 
 Republican and Democratic parties are eager 
to continue creating legislative districts that give 
them the greatest possible partisan advantage. State 
and local governments previously required by the 
Voting Rights Act to obtain preclearance from the 
United States Attorney General or a federal dis-
trict court no longer have to do so. Unless federal 
and state judges can be convinced to issue injunc-
tions before purported discriminatory practices 
are implemented, compliance with Voting Rights 
requirements will require lawsuits that will not be 
resolved until after one or more rounds of elections 
have occurred.  In the meantime, members will 
have served and made public policy decisions.
 In this chapter, we have seen there are few link-
ages between policies and demographic character-
istics of legislators. However, in Chapter 7, we saw 
there are important differences between policies 
enacted in states controlled by Republicans and by 
Democrats. In general, Hispanic/Latino voters and 
African American voters support Democrats more 
than Republicans.  The link between demography 
and policy is intermediated by partisanship. 
 States controlled by Republicans have enacted 
and are enacting voting laws intended to reduce the 
participation of minority groups in elections. Many 
decades ago, within the lifespan of people in your 
grandparents’ age cohorts, Democrats were the par-
ty seeking to suppress minority participation. Al-
though members of both major parties pay homage 
Figure 9.12 
Party Control of State Legislatures 2002-2017 
 (January of Each Year) 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2017
Alabama Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep Rep
Alaska Rep Rep Rep Split Split Split Rep Split
Arizona Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Arkansas Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep
California Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Colorado Rep Dem Dem Dem Dem Split Dem Split
Connecticut Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Delaware Split Split Split Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Florida Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Georgia Split Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Hawaii Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Idaho Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Illinois Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Split
Indiana Split Rep Split Split Split Rep Rep Rep
Iowa Rep Split Dem Dem Dem Split Split Rep
Kansas Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Kentucky Split Split Split Split Split Split Split Rep
Louisiana Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep Rep
Maine Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Dem Split
Maryland Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Massachusetts Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Split
Michigan Rep Rep Split Split Split Rep Rep Rep
Minnesota Split Split Dem Dem Dem Rep Dem Rep
Mississippi Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep Rep
Missouri Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Montana Rep Split Split Split Split Rep Rep Rep
Nebraska NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Nevada Split Split Split Dem Dem Dem Dem Split
New Hampshire Rep Rep Dem Dem Dem Rep Split Rep
New Jersey Split Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
New Mexico Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Split
New York Split Split Split Dem Dem Split Dem Dem
North Carolina Split Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep Rep
North Dakota Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Ohio Rep Rep Rep Split Split Rep Rep Rep
Oklahoma Dem Split Split Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Oregon Split Split Dem Dem Dem Split Dem Dem
Pennsylvania Rep Rep Rep Split Split Rep Rep Rep
Rhode Island Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
South Carolina Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
South Dakota Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Tennessee Dem Split Split Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Texas Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Utah Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Vermont Split Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Virginia Rep Rep Rep Split Split Split Split Rep
Washington Split Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
West Virginia Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep
Wisconsin Rep Rep Split Dem Dem Rep Rep Rep
Wyoming Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
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to the “sacred right to vote,” they are also working 
to make voting easier for their supporters and more 
difficult for their opponents. Politics is concerned 
with winning and losing. We should always expect 
political actors to work in their own self-interest to 
gain and retain power.
The Long Term Impact of One Party Control
In your lifetime, partisan gerrymandering of state 
legislative districts has made all but a small pro-
portion of general elections uncompetitive.  The 
winning party is decided when a district is drawn.  
The winning candidate is decided by partisan pri-
mary elections.  Uncompetitive general elections 
confirm the results of primary elections.  In many 
states, including Texas, incumbent legislators are 
more likely to be defeated in primary elections 
than in general elections.  They lose to challengers 
who say they can be more extreme than the incum-
bents.
 This pattern has been the norm in a large 
number of states in the 21st century.  As a result, 
there are many state legislatures that have been 
controlled by one party for all or almost all of the 
years 2002-2017.  Figure 9.12 is a data visualiza-
tion of single party control for these years:  darkest 
background is Republican Party control, white 
background is Democratic Party control and gray 
background is divided or split party control. Figure 
9.13 identifies the 24 states that have been con-
trolled by the same party for all or at least 14 years 
of the 16-year time period. 
 Virtually all state and local government poli-
cies are developed over a long period of time.  In 
a single year, a new majority party cannot make 
major changes in policies that involve taxing and 
spending.  Such changes take a prolonged period 
of time.  In Figure 7.10, analysis of correlations 
between Republican Party control in 2015 and a 
number of state policies was presented.  Five of 
eleven correlations were greater than the plus or 
minus .30 standard and all were in the correct pre-
diction.  The analysis concluded, “If the pattern of 
one-party control of state governments continues, 
we might well see stronger relationships between 
state partisanship and policy.”
 Figure 9.14 analyzes the policies of Figure 7.10 
Figure 9.13 
Control of State Legislature by Same Party 2002-2017 
 (13+ of 17 Years) 
Arizona Rep
California Dem
Connecticut Dem
Florida Rep
Georgia Rep
Hawaii Dem
Idaho Rep
Illinois Dem
Kansas Rep
Maryland Dem
Massachusetts Dem
Missouri Rep
New Jersey Dem
New Mexico Dem
North Dakota Rep
Rhode Island Dem
South Carolina Rep
South Dakota Rep
Texas Rep
Utah Rep
Vermont Dem
Washington Dem
West Virginia Dem
Wyoming Rep
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for the 22 states with at least 14 of 16 years from 
2002-2016 with the same party in control of the 
state legislature.  Because the number of states in 
the analysis is small, Figure 9.14 presents average 
values for both states controlled by the Republican 
Party and States controlled by the Democratic Par-
ty.  Averages that are significantly different from 
each other are in gray cells.
 In one sense, the results of Figure 9.14 are 
essentially the same as those of Figure 7.10.  Six 
correlations were strong and all were in the direc-
tion we would predict.  In Figure 9.14, five differ-
ences between averages are strong and all in the 
direction we would predict.  As was the case with 
the correlations for one year, all but one of the dif-
ferences between averages over 15 years are in the 
direction we would predict.  The only exception in 
both analyses is percent of Voting Age Population 
registered to vote in the 2014 election.
 For some, the different averages in Figure 9.14 
for long term Republican and Democratic Party 
control are easier to understand than the correla-
tions in Figure 7.10.  If we consider that Figure 
9.14 reports analysis of only 22 states, we could 
conclude any differences in findings are linked to 
measurement error.   Findings for party control for 
one year and fifteen years both show considerable 
differences between policies followed by the two 
major parties.  Unlike the Federal government, the 
majority party in almost all states has sufficient 
power to enact its policies.  Part of that power 
is from single party control and part is from the 
absence of extreme, make-no-compromises and 
take-no-prisoners partisanship that exists at the 
federal level.
Conclusion
With representative government, the elected leg-
islative bodies are supposed to be representative; 
otherwise, their policies are not what the public 
prefers. Historically, geographically based repre-
sentative districts have been used more to prevent 
equal representation than to promote it. 
 In contemporary America, all politicians speak 
often and urgently about preserving the right to 
vote and to be represented. At the same time, few 
have the opportunity to vote in meaningful elec-
tions that choose the partisan affiliation of those 
who will represent them. This will continue as long 
Figure 9.14
Long Term Single Party Control of Legislature and State Policies 2015
Republican
Control Average
Democratic
Control Average
Per Capita State and Local Revenue $8,459 $9,974
Per Capita State and Local Expenditure $9,327 $10,798
State and Local Tax Burden 8.4% 10.1%
Regressivity of State and Local Taxes 5.8% 5.4%
Per Capita State and Local Long Term Debt $6,701 $11,185
Percent of VAP Registered to Vote, 2014 General Election 60% 58%
TANF Monthly Benefit Family of 3 $406 $579
Educational Spending Per Child in ADA $14,147 $13,308
Percent Medicaid Paid by State and Local Government 37% 42%
Poverty Rate 13.9% 12.9%
Violent Crime Rate 331 365
Property Crime Rate 2,589 2,446
Prisoners Per 100,000 Population 419 293
New Prisoners Per 100,000 Population 13,469 11,517
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as partisans who will subsequently contest elec-
tions draw determine the boundaries of representa-
tive districts.
Summary
1. The legislative branch not only is expected to 
check and balance the executive branch in making 
public policy but also is expected to represent con-
stituents. Representation is difficult to achieve.
2. Although it was once necessary given commu-
nication difficulties and illiteracy, geographically 
based selection of legislators is no longer neces-
sary and no longer allows representatives to have a 
consistent constituency that is easy to represent.
3. State legislatures apportion their states’ pop-
ulations into both state upper chamber (senate) 
and lower house districts and U.S. congressional 
districts. The drawing of district lines can greatly 
disadvantage the minority party that has little say 
in the matter. Recent court decisions have in-
creased the likelihood that partisan considerations 
will dominate how legislative districts are drawn in 
the future.
4. The process of enacting a bill involves the 
“three-reading” procedure that was adopted from 
England. By conventional measures, few bills pass 
the hurdles of this procedure. State legislators say 
killing bad bills is more important than passing 
legislation.
5. There is insufficient empirical evidence to 
support the contention that states with more and 
less professional legislatures pursue systematically 
different policies.
6. The representativeness of legislatures varies 
greatly in terms of representing women and mi-
norities. No one state or group of states stands out 
as most representative.
7. Some policies are linked to better representa-
tion of women. The relationships are not necessari-
ly causal.
8. The relationships between policies and party 
control of legislatures for a single year reported in 
Chapter 7 are largely found when party control is 
measured over a much longer period of time.
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Study Guide, Chapter 9
Essay Questions
 1. What are the functions of the state legislatures other than making laws?  How would you make the case that
 lawmaking is the most important function? How would you argue that lawmaking is not the most important 
 function?
 2. The communication and transportation technology of the 18th century made state legislative districts based 
 on geography the only realistic option.  What are the advantages and disadvantages of this approach to represe-
 ntation in the 21st century?  Are geographic districts still the only realistic option?  If so, why? If not, why are 
 any options better than geographic districts?
 3. How did Evenwel v Abbott (2016) clarify the meaning of one-person, one-vote?  What principle from 
 Reynolds v. Sims (1964) was changed?
 4. Who can introduce a bill in a state legislature? What is the series of events that happen to successful bills   
 after they are introduced?  Why is it easier to kill a bill than to pass a bill?  How can partisanship play a key role 
 at each step?
 5. Is it accurate to say that every bill is submitted with the intention that it be enacted into law? Why or who 
 not?  If not, what are three alternatives for introducing legislation?
 6. What are the key arguments for why a state legislature should or should not accurately reflect the population 
 it represents by sex and race/ethnicity? Does it matter whether Republicans or Democrats control a state legisl-
 ature for many years in a row? Why or who not?
 7. Why is there concern about partisan redistricting?  Explain the arguments some make for why gerrymande-
 ring is not just a harmless political game but constrains legislative representation and, perhaps, threatens our 
 democracy.
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. Compared to their constituents, members of state legislature are
  a. older
  b. more male
  c. less Hispanic or Latino
  d. all of the above
 2. Which of the following is NOT a legal requirement for drawing district lines?
  a. contiguity
  b. population equality
  c. compliance with Voting Rights Act
  d. incumbent advantage
 3. The majority of bills submitted to state legislatures and Congress 
  a. are passed into law
  b. are not passed into law
  c. are symbolic bills
  d. propose constitutional amendments
 4. Which of the following is correlated with professionalism in state legislatures?
  a. percent women in the legislature
  b. number of bills introduced
  c. Republican control of the legislature
  d. none of the above
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Chapter 10 
EXECUTING THE LAWS AND REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE
Much information pertaining to the executive 
branch in our national government applies to the 
executive branches of the states and communi-
ties. Since the bi cameral legislature and executive 
checks and balances in the national Constitution 
copied the government form of the states and 
municipal governments at the time, this should 
not be surprising. The Massachusetts’ constitution 
written in 1780 served as a model for the federal 
constitution of 1787. More importantly, English city 
government followed the same pattern beginning 
hundreds of years earlier.
 The generalization that governors are similar to 
the president is of limited utility because the powers 
of the governors differ from one state to another. 
Different powers given to state governors allow us 
to inquire whether they affect the actions that are 
taken by the states. The governor, as the top offi-
cial of the executive branch of state government, 
is expected to provide leadership in solving social 
problems. We also expect this of the president at the 
national level. Besides providing leadership, gov-
ernors are supposed to be representative of and re-
sponsive to the public. Americans have not always 
had such high expectations of our governors.
Ambivalence Toward The Executive
American ideas about state government’s execu-
tive branch, and the governor in particular, have 
ranged widely over our history. Americans initially 
viewed the governor with outright hostility, given 
their experiences with the king’s governor. Ten 
of the original 13 states initially had a single-year 
term for their governors, believing that they could 
quickly remove those who acted irresponsibly.1 At 
present, the executive is expected to provide policy 
leadership. We   expect governors to be “vigorous 
incisive, and thoroughly trained leaders”2 This 
change has been caused by the competition of states 
in a very complex world economy as well as by the 
problems, such as crime and urban decay, inherent 
in the concentration of people in metropolitan areas.
 As we initially noted in Chapter 9, representa-
tion was primarily expected of only the legislature. 
Before the Declaration of Independence, the king 
of England had appointed the governor. His lack of 
accountability had led the colonies to demand pow-
ers for the representative legislative branch. Similar 
demands for powers for the legislative branch had 
long existed in England. When they threw off the 
influence of the king’s governor, most states simply 
weakened the office of governor to the point of be-
ing irrelevant. Several state constitutions, including 
Massachusetts’s 1780 constitution, however, used 
the office to offset what was seen as a too-pow-
erful legislature, representative though it might 
have been. This concept, of course, is the basis of 
“checks and balances.”
 Andrew Jackson’s idea that the president should 
also be a representative of the public, along with 
the growing role of the public in selecting the pres-
ident, influenced thinking among the states about 
governors.3  His perspective on presidential politics 
included the idea that “to the victor belonged the 
spoils” of government. In the resulting spoils sys-
tem, the winning president or governor appointed 
supporters to all available governmental offices, as 
a reward for their support in winning the election. 
With a turnover in the executive branch, supporters 
of the new officeholder would replace all previous 
government workers.
 Although some were entirely satisfied with this  
situation, the “better elements” of society sought 
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to reform the executive branch to make “merit’’ 
the basis of public employment. We have already 
discussed this concept in Chapters 4 and 6. At any 
rate, powers were taken from the executive branch. 
The Southern states certainly supported this trend, 
given their experience with Reconstruction era 
“carpetbagger” governors.  Ideas at this time called 
for a governor who could check the legislative 
branch but was otherwise weak. Until states expe-
rienced the need to use government to cope with 
the new problems of industrialization, it mattered 
little whether the governor was weak or strong.
 The situation changed as states filled the need 
to address problems such as crime, regulation of 
business and industry, the inequitable distribution 
of wealth in local school districts, and other prob-
lems that come with contemporary economies and 
urban life. Legislatures tend to be reactive rather 
than proactive institutions. They rarely are venues 
of creativity. Instead, they most often deliberate 
ideas that originate elsewhere. The office of the 
governor was well positioned to coordinate the 
substantive knowledge of executive branch bu-
reaucrats and draft proposals for problem-solving 
legislation. Executive leadership from the governor 
thus became urgent in our expectations. “Good-
time Charlies” could no longer be tolerated as 
governors.4
Partisan Control Trifectas
Figure 9.13 documented that, in 22 state legisla-
tures, one party had majority control of both cham-
bers for 14 or more of the years 2002 to 2017.  
Figure 10.1 
Trifecta Control of Legislature and Governor 2002-2017 
January for each year except 2017, which is based on 2016 election results.   
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2017
Alabama Dem Rep Rep Rep Rep
Alaska Rep Rep Rep
Arizona Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Arkansas Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep
California Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Colorado Rep Dem Dem Dem
Connecticut Dem Dem Dem Dem
Delaware Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Florida Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Georgia Dem Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Hawaii Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Idaho Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Illinois Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Indiana Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Iowa Dem Dem Rep
Kansas Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Kentucky Rep
Louisiana Dem Dem Rep Rep
Maine Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep
Maryland Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Massachusetts Dem Dem Dem Dem
Michigan Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Minnesota Dem
Mississippi Dem Rep Rep Rep Rep
Missouri Dem Rep Rep Rep
Montana Rep Rep
Nebraska NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Nevada Rep
New Hampshire Rep Dem Dem Rep
New Jersey Dem Dem Dem Dem
New Mexico Dem Dem Dem Dem
New York Dem
North Carolina Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Rep Rep
North Dakota Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Ohio Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Oklahoma Dem Rep Rep Rep Rep
Oregon Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Pennsylvania Rep Rep Rep
Rhode Island Dem Dem
South Carolina Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
South Dakota Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Tennessee Dem Rep Rep Rep Rep
Texas Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Utah Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep Rep
Vermont Dem Dem Dem
Virginia Rep
Washington Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
West Virginia Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem Dem
Wisconsin Dem Rep Rep Rep
Wyoming Rep Rep Rep Rep
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Figure 10.2 
Trifecta Control States, January of Each Year 
Year Rep Trifecta Dem Trifecta Total 
2002 11 11 22 
2004 12 9 21 
2006 12 7 19 
2008 9 14 23 
2010 9 17 26 
2012 21 11 32 
2014 23 13 36 
2016 22 7 29 
2017 24 6 30 
The Republican Party had long-term control in 
12 states; the Democratic Party had control in 10 
states.  A partisan control trifecta is when one party 
controls both chambers of the legislature and the 
office of governor.  Figure 10.1 is a visualization of 
trifecta party control in January from 2002 to 2017. 
Figure 10.2 identifies trifectas and controlling party 
for each two-year period. 
 Starting in January 2010, a majority of states 
have had trifecta control.  The largest number was 
36 states in January 2014.  In January 2010, Dem-
ocratic Party trifectas outnumbered Republican 
Party trifectas.  Starting in January 2012, Repub-
lican Party trifectas are the majority.  This change 
reflects the gains made by Republicans in the first 
midterm election of the Obama Presidency.  The 
continuing majority of Republican Party trifectas 
through 2017 show the success of Republican ger-
rymandering of state legislative districts.
 In Chapter 9, the policies of states with legis-
latures controlled by Republicans or Democrats 
for 14 years or more of the period 2002-2016 were 
compared.  A similar comparison for long-term tri-
fecta control by Republicans and Democrats is not 
possible.  Figure 10.3 shows that Republicans had 
long-term trifecta control in 10 states; Democrats 
had control in one state.  Important differences in 
averages between two groups of states cannot be 
found when one of the two has only two states.  
The Modern Governor
The institutional powers of governors vary across 
the states largely because of the different feelings 
toward the office noted above. Powers derived 
from the state constitutions include length of term, 
veto powers, fragmentation of the state executive 
and appointive powers for lesser offices, and bud-
get-making powers. Some governors have strong 
powers and thus might be expected to have more 
influence on what their state does, whether for 
good or for bad.
Term of Office
At the low point in recent gubernatorial powers, 
most governors were elected for two-year terms. 
So were members of lower legislative chambers 
in most states. These short terms encouraged 
responsiveness and representativeness. With only 
two years between elections, representatives must 
always be aware that the voters may defeat them 
for failing to act the way voters prefer. At least 
this was the argument for such short terms. Some 
states, such as Alabama, when George Wallace 
was governor, would not even allow a governor to 
serve consecutive two-year terms. Wallace sought 
unsuccessfully to avoid this by having his wife 
win the governorship for the next two-year term, 
presumably to be followed by George Wallace the 
term after that. Short terms handicap governors 
seeking to change state policies. Legislators and 
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bureaucrats could simply stall until the next elec-
tion when someone else would win office. Longer 
terms would seem to strengthen the governor’s 
opportunity to influence policy. 
 A four-year gubernatorial term has become the 
norm. Since 1955, nineteen states have switched 
from two to four year gubernatorial terms.5 Only 
two states now retain a two-year gubernatorial 
term: New Hampshire and Vermont. Neither limits 
the number of such terms.
 There are differences in how many terms the 
governor may serve. Fourteen states impose no 
limits whatsoever. Eight states have an absolute 
limit of two terms. Twenty-three states require that 
a governor leave after two terms for a 4-year pe-
riod and may then return. Four states limit service 
to 8 or 8 of 16 years, and Virginia allows a 4-year 
term and then 4 years off.6
 Since limits have been placed on legislative 
terms only recently, governors with limits on the 
number of their terms would seem weaker with 
regard to dealing with the legislature.7 In states 
with no limits, a governor theoretically might be 
continually reelected and make a career as gover-
nor of that state. In actuality, however, few gover-
nors serve more than 8 years. Rick Perry of Texas 
became governor in 2000 when Governor George 
W. Bush became President. Governor Perry was 
reelected in 2002, 2006 and 2010. He had served 
14 consecutive years when he decided not to seek 
reelection in 2014.
Veto Powers
As previously noted, a bill passed by a state legis-
lature does not become law if rejected by the gov-
ernor. Governors disallow bills by exercising veto 
power. Governors typically make statements about 
why they are declining bills in their veto messages. 
All state governors now have the power to veto 
bills in their entirety. The president also has such 
a power, but many governors have an even more 
flexible power, the item veto.
 All but six states give their governor the power 
to veto portions of a bill while allowing the re-
mainder to become law.8 Typically, item vetoes are 
limited to appropriation bills. With this power, the 
governor need not negotiate minute details with the 
legislature to get a budget passed. He or she can 
item veto those budget items not desired. Some-
times the governor can merely reduce the money 
given to an agency or program.9
 As we have seen, legislatures can override 
gubernatorial vetoes but seldom do. Governors 
without item veto power are less able to influence 
legislation. As noted in Chapter 9, vetoes and veto 
overrides are uncommon. Only 15 legislatures had 
more than 10 bills vetoed in regular sessions held 
in 2015.10   In previous legislation sessions, gov-
ernors’ vetoes were rarely overridden, typically 
around 15%.
Figure 10.3 
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Fragmentation of the State Executive
The president and vice president of the United 
States are the only nationally elected executives. 
The president appoints all other executives, such 
as the secretaries of state and defense, with the 
approval of the Senate. They are the president’s 
assistants and may be asked to resign for “personal 
reasons,” if the president asks. The governor of 
New Jersey is the only state chief executive who 
appoints all other top executives. Most governors 
share power in the executive branch with many 
others, some of them also selected in statewide 
elections.11
 The position of lieutenant governor exists in 45 
states. In West Virginia, the President of the Senate 
is also the lieutenant governor. The other 44 states 
choose lieutenant governors by election. Governors 
and lieutenant governors are elected as a team and 
will be from the same party in 26 states. Elections 
for lieutenant governor in 18 states are indepen-
dent of elections for governor, and it is possible 
for governors and lieutenant governors to be from 
different parties.12
 Fortunately for governors, most lieutenant 
governors are like the vice president. They exer-
cise few powers and wait in the wings in case the 
governor has to be replaced.
 All states have the office of attorney general, 
but governors appoint attorneys general in only 5 
states. The governor appoints the secretary of state 
in only 8 of 46 states that have the office. The large 
majority of these two executive officials must seek 
their own reelection and owe their election success 
to their own efforts rather than to anything done by 
the governor. Governors seeking their cooperation 
cannot threaten to fire them. And their cooperation 
with a successful governor may win them little 
support at the polls when they seek to be reelected. 
Finally, the federal courts have even undercut the 
governor’s ability to fire appointive officeholders.13
Appointive Powers
When executive offices are not elected, often the 
governor can appoint them. For many positions, 
state senates must consent to appointments. This 
arrangement is not unlike the president’s appoint-
ments of cabinet members, but there is an import-
ant difference. Presidents name all cabinet mem-
bers at the time they take office. Many states have 
important agencies governed by appointed boards 
rather than individuals. Board members serve stag-
gered terms. As a result, new governors can name 
only a minority of board members at the time they 
take office.
 Control by the new governor does not oc-
cur shortly after he or she takes office. Appoint-
ed boards may not have a majority of members 
named by new governors until more than half-way 
through the governors’ first terms in office.
 In Texas, most appointed boards have 9 mem-
bers and governors appoint only 3 every two years. 
When it was written, the Texas Constitution gave 
governors a two-year term of office.  A governor 
would have to win three consecutive elections to 
appoint all board members.  Subsequently, the term 
of office was amended to four years and, as noted 
earlier Governor Rick Perry served 15 consecutive 
years. He had appointed all members of all boards 
for at least two membership cycles. The authors 
of the Texas Constitution did not contemplate this 
would ever occur.
 Sometimes agency heads are not appointed but 
rise through civil service, again owing nothing to 
the governor. Governors with more appointments 
should have more resources for making public 
policy. Some states do not have positions that 
commonly exist in most states. For example, many 
states lack a comptroller. This would seem to nei-
ther help nor hurt the governor.
Budget-Making Powers
A budget can enormously influence what the 
state does. Those who control the budget or purse 
strings control policy. A policy with no funding 
for enforcement or implementation is empty, and 
governors differ in their influence on budgets. 
Governors in Texas and South Carolina, for exam-
ple, cannot independently develop both their own 
revenue estimates and expenditures proposals. In 
other states, governors have access to information 
not available to the legislatures. This advantage 
strengthens the governor’s hand. Furthermore, they 
have the opportunity to submit to state legislatures 
comprehensive proposals for revenues and expen-
ditures. Legislatures are inclined to consider only 
relatively small adjustments to these proposals.
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Other Powers of the Governors
The above powers are institutional powers writ-
ten into state constitutions and statutes, but there 
are other sources of influence avail to governors, 
as there are for presidents. Probably chief among 
them is the power of personality. Many governors 
are effective administrators but lack the personality 
that could make them memorable as a “great gov-
ernor. Obviously, a governor with few institutional 
powers and having a “dry” personality will little 
affect a state. Few governors are memorable once 
out of public office.
 With few exceptions, governors are members 
of one of the major political parties. This gives 
them the power of party organization. Recalcitrant 
legislators in their governor’s party can be pres-
sured to support the governor for the good of the 
party and their own reelections. The expectation 
is that in subsequent elections, voters will reward 
that party for good policies enacted. This approach 
works more effectively when there is unified party 
control. Unified party control exists when a gover-
nor’s party also holds the majority of seats in both 
chambers of the state legislature. Divided gov-
ernment exists when both parties have control of 
either the governor’s office or one of the legislative 
chambers.14
 Only the Republican governors of Florida, Ida-
ho, North Dakota, Ohio, and South Dakota enjoyed 
unified party control for all 12 years. The Repub-
lican Party enjoyed greater success in this decade. 
It is important to note that 27 states experienced 
unified government under both major parties at 
different times.
 Another power of the governor from political 
parties was provided by the patronage system or 
spoils system. When the party faithful could be 
given jobs with the state, their loyalty could be 
rewarded and their continuing actions in support of 
the party’s position encouraged. Patronage work-
ers failing to comply with the governor’s program 
could be fired and replaced with those more sup-
portive of the program.
 The merit system changed this scheme. Re-
formers sought this structure as a way of weaken-
ing the support political machines might gain with 
offering people public jobs. Employment in such a 
system uses a civil service testing procedure. For 
each government job, there are associated tasks 
for which people take competency examinations. 
Those passing such examinations are ranked on 
a listing of eligible applicants. The top names are 
sent to an agency needing some one with those 
skills. The agency must hire one, for a probationary 
period. Once that probationary period has passed, 
the government employee can be fired only for a 
specific reason.
 Obviously, merit employees owe no allegiance 
to a political party or to the governor. That was the 
reformers’ goal. A governor facing resistance in the 
bureaucracy for his or her program initiatives can 
do little against such civil servants. Their support 
and votes also cannot be expected in elections. 
Thus, the merit system weakens the governor and 
other elected executives.
 Presidents can usually gain primetime access 
on the major television networks to address the 
U.S. public. With this access, they can “go over 
the head of Congress,” appealing directly to the 
public for its support and pressure Congress to re-
spond as the president wants. This advantage might 
be called media power.  Governors have very limit-
ed or no media power. The print and broadcast me-
dia in the United States are sometimes organized 
on the national level and sometimes organized 
on the community level. For example, there are 
national networks and newspapers and community 
broadcast stations and local newspapers.
 Like the president, a mayor can seek access to 
the community through local television or radio 
stations or newspapers. There are no state-level 
media, however. The governor can tailor press 
releases, can visit localities and appear on their 
local stations, and can even make video messages 
available for use on television stations, but all can 
easily be ignored by local outlets.15 They are aware 
that other news stories sell newspapers or gain 
bigger television or radio audiences.
 There is evidence that popular presidents have 
greater power over Congress than unpopular pres-
idents.16 Popularity is also advantageous to gover-
nors as they deal with state legislatures. Rosenthal 
has assessed gubernatorial popularity in 12 states.17 
The popularity of governors varies greatly from 
state to state and over time, but even after unpopu-
lar actions such as raising taxes, governors tend to 
be more popular than corresponding state legisla-
tures. Some governors have been able to translate 
popularity into government actions that they pre-
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fer.18 Popularity is one of the important resources a 
governor can use.
Assessing Governors’ Powers
Using the institutional powers of governors as indi-
cators of their strength, we can create a combined 
measure.19 Strengthened by additional institutional 
powers, a governor might provide better leader-
ship. Figure 10.4 maps governors’ institutional 
powers. The weak powers of Southern governors, 
with the exception of Mississippi, reflect those 
states’ preferences for weak executives and lim-
ited government power. Governors in California, 
Oregon, Idaho and Nevada also have weak pow-
ers.  There is no single region with most powerful 
governors. Powerful governors are in Eastern, 
Midwestern and Western states.
 Ferguson asked informants in each state to as-
sess their governor’s personal power. Her findings 
are summarized in Figure 10.5.20 As we might ex-
pect, personal power is idiosyncratic to individuals. 
There are no regional patterns. Figure 10.6 docu-
ments personal power is unrelated to institutional 
power. The correlation is -.09. Clearly, power of 
governors is a challenging concept that is difficult 
to measure empirically.
 All of this is not to say that state governors 
cannot be effective leaders and successfully deal 
with state problems. State legislatures and publics 
seem to expect governors to be strong leaders. 
Apparently, there is little or no consensus in the 
states about the powers and resources necessary for 
governors to be strong leaders. 
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Impact of Gubernatorial Power on Policy
Do governors’ powers matter? Figure 10.7 presents 
correlations involving three measures of governors’ 
powers: institutional power, personal power and 
combined power, the sum of institutional and per-
sonal power. Twenty-three measures of states’ finan-
cial and human resources, challenges and policies 
presented in earlier chapters are correlated with the 
three power indexes.
 Quite simply, differences in state governors’ 
personal powers and combined powers are not 
empirically related to other important differenc-
es across the states.   None of the 46 correlations 
meet the .30 threshold.  Correlations do meet the 
threshold for 7 of 23 correlations with Governor’s 
institutional powers. None of the strong correlations 
involve measures of partisanship; all involve mea-
sures of state and local policy and per capita income. 
It should be noted that each of the 7 correlations 
is close to the threshold value and that none of the 
same correlations for policies in 2010 reported in the 
9th edition of this text met the .30 threshold.  Taken 
as a whole, these results suggest there are not strong 
ongoing relationships between governors’ powers 
and state and local policies.
Gubernatorial Qualifications and Compensation
Qualifications
Massachusetts and Kansas have no minimum age 
requirement for becoming governor, but the other 
48 states do.  The minimum ages is eighteen in 7 
states, twenty-five in 6 states, 30 in 34 states and 
31in Oklahoma.  U.S. citizenship is a requirement 
in 44 states, and a minimum time as a state resident, 
ranging from 30 days to 10 years, is specified in 47 
states.  Thirty-seven states require qualification to 
vote in the state.21 Again, we note several “informal 
requirements” not written into the constitution but 
so common as to discourage those not conforming. 
In 2016, four Anglo women, one Hispanic woman, 
and one Hispanic man were governors. The other 44 
governors were Anglo men.
 The median age of governors serving in 2013 
was 58, well above the median age of the American 
population, 37. All or nearly all governors have col-
lege educations and come from middle-class back-
grounds.
 Like legislators, governors are not representative 
of their constituents in these regards. In the period 
1981-2011, only 11 percent of governors had not
4.3
4
3.5
1.8
3.8
3
3.3
3.8
4
3.8
5
3.8
4
4.8
3.8
4.3
3.8
2.8
4.3
4
2.8
3.5
4.5
4.5
5
3.5
4.3
4
4 4.5
4.54.8
5
4.3
4
4.5
4 5
4.5
4.5
3.5
5
3.5 3.8
4 4.52.5
4.5
2.5
Figure 10.5
Governors’ Personal Powers
Executing The Laws and Representing The People • 239 
held prior public offices. Many public service paths 
led to the statehouse, but previous service in the 
state legislature was on the resumes of 33 percent 
of governors.  The position held immediately be-
fore governor was another statewide elective office 
for 23 percent, state legislature for 18 percent, and 
law enforcement for 17 percent.22
 The leading causes of governors leaving office 
are term limits and voluntary retirement. On leav-
ing the governorship, most also retire from public 
life. Two 1970s governors, Carter and Reagan, of 
course, became presidents. Governors Clinton and 
Bush continued this pattern through 2008.
 As we noted earlier, 36 states force the gover-
nor to leave the office, either temporarily or perma-
nently, after either one or two terms. Governors can 
also be removed from office by impeachment in all 
states except Oregon or by recall in 19 states.23 In 
impeachment, the lower house passes the charges 
against the governor (the articles of impeachment), 
and the senate serves as jury. Eight governors have 
been removed by impeachment. The latest was Rod 
Blagojevich of Illinois in 2009.
 Recalling a governor requires a certain number 
of registered voters to sign a petition for recall. 
The governor is recalled if a majority supports this 
action in the resulting election. There have been 
three gubernatorial recall elections held in U.S. 
history. In 2012, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker 
survived a recall vote. In 2003, California voters 
successfully recalled Governor Gray Davis, and in 
North Dakota in 1921, voters removed from office 
Governor Lynn J. Frazier. California voters have 
initiated 32 gubernatorial recall attempts since 
1911, but the 2003 recall of Governor Gray Da-
vis was the first to ever reach the ballot. In 1988, 
Arizona voters filed enough signatures to trigger a 
recall election for Governor Evan Mecham. Arizo-
na’s House of Representatives impeached Mecham 
before the date of the scheduled recall election.24
Figure 10.6
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Figure 10.7 
Correlations With Governors’ Powers 
Institutional Personal Combined 
Per Capita Income .38 -.10 .14 
Poverty Rate -.20 .07 -.05 
TANF Monthly Benefit Family of 3 .34 -.07 .14 
Percent Medicaid Paid by State and Local Government .26 .00 .16 
Educational spending per child in ADA .31 -.11 .09 
Infant Mortality Rate Per 100,000 Live Births -.10 .01 -.05 
State and Local Tax Burden .14 -.00 .09 
Regressivity of State and Local Taxes .18 -.02 .09 
Per Capita State and Local Revenue .32 -.01 .19 
Per Capita State and Local Expenditure .28 -.01 .17 
Per Capita State and Local Long Term Debt .28 .12 .28 
Violent Crime Rate -.04 .20 .15 
Property Crime Rate -.21 .08 -.05 
High School Educational Attainment .32 -.20 .01 
College Educational Attainment .32 -.08 .12 
Percent Population Conservative -.27 -.03 -.19 
Percent Population Republican -.11 -.08 -.01 
Republican Percent of State Legislature -.16 .13 .01 
Prisoners Per 100,000 Population -.35 .15 -.06 
New Prisoners Per 100,000 Population -.12 .21 .11 
Restrictiveness of Abortion Policies -.05 .06 .02 
Percent Revenue from Personal Income Tax .10 -.07 .01 
Percent Income From Corporate income Tax .06 -.04 -.01 
Compensation
There is enormous variation in the salaries states 
will pay to their governors in 2016. The governor 
of Maine is the most poorly paid at $70,000 per 
year, and Colorado at $90,000 is next. By contrast, 
the figures are $190,283 for Pennsylvania and 
$187,500 for Tennessee. The highest-paid governor 
receives almost three times the salary of the lowest. 
Only five governors are paid less than $100,000 
each year.25   We can see in Figure 10.8 that many 
of the mountain west states pay low salaries to 
their governors. 
 In his final years in office, Governor Rick 
Perry of Texas almost certainly received the largest 
annual income from state government. Financial 
disclosure statements filed for his candidacy for the 
2012 Republican Party nomination for President of 
the United States indicated Perry had retired from 
state employment in January 2001.  The sum of his 
$150,000 salary as governor plus retirement pay 
brought his government-related annual income to 
$242,388.26
 Governors receive the largest salaries paid 
to elected officials in each state. Governors are 
by no means the highest-paid state employees. If 
you attend a large public university, your school’s 
president or chancellor probably receives a salary 
more than three times the state governor’s salary. 
The salary paid to the President of Texas A&M is 
6.5 times the salary paid to the Governor of Texas.  
Among the highest university football coaches’ sal-
aries are those of Texas and Texas A&M (33 times 
the Governor of Texas’ salary) and Alabama (59 
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times the Governor of Alabama’s salary).27 Gov-
ernors’ salaries are paid from funds appropriated 
by state legislatures. Total remuneration paid to 
administrators and coaches in public institutions of 
higher education are not paid entirely by appropri-
ated funds. 
 Salary is only part of the compensation states 
provide governors. Housing is free at the gover-
nor’s mansion. Automobiles, airplanes, helicopters, 
and travel and expense allowances are included. If 
they were not before hand, governors become ce-
lebrities when they are elected. The status of being 
called governor, not only while in office but also 
after retiring from the office, probably is of great 
importance to those seeking the office.
 What explains the differences in salaries states 
pay their governors? We might expect that gover-
nors with greater institutional powers will be paid 
higher salaries. This is not the case, as the correla-
tions in Figure 10.9 show.
 Salaries and institutional powers are unrelated. 
Salaries are also unrelated to financial resources 
of residents and of state and local governments.   
The only correlations above .30 are with per capita 
income, size of governor’s staff and 4 measures of 
state legislators’ activities, salaries and resources.  
Legislators may approve high salaries for their 
states’ governors in order to give themselves high 
salaries. The highest correlation coefficient, .63, is 
between governors’ salaries and legislators’ sal-
aries. This much higher correlation suggests, but 
does not prove, that governors’ salaries are caused 
more by legislators’ salaries than by the workload 
or leadership considerations.
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Conclusion
This would suggest that the voters and legislators 
hesitate to give governors powers commensurate 
with their expectations for governors to provide 
strong and effective leadership. The media and 
public tend to think of governors as state chief ex-
ecutive officers, analogous to private sector CEOs. 
Yet, governors do not have CEOs’ power to hire 
and fire, direct and oversee, and decide how to al-
locate resources. It is commonplace for the perfor-
mance of state governments to be compared unfa-
vorably with the performance of successful, large 
21st century corporations. We suggest that such 
comparisons are unrealistic and inappropriate so 
long as state governors’ powers closely resemble 
those of their 18th and 19th century counterparts. 
Elections for Governor
The past two decades have seen changes in how 
and when governors are elected. Most governors 
now face elections in even-number years between 
presidential elections. In 2016, a presidential elec-
tion year, 11 governor positions were contested in 
regularly scheduled elections and a special election 
was held following the mid-term resignation of 
Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber. 
 In 39 states, elections for governor are held in 
years different from elections for president. Elec-
tions are held in even years with no presidential 
election in 34 states and in odd years in 4 states. 
Kentucky, Louisiana and Mississippi held elec-
tions for governor most recently in 2015. The most 
recent election was held in New Jersey in 2013.  
New Hampshire and Vermont have two-year 
Figure 10.9 
Correlations With Governors Salary 
Salary 
Governors’ Institutional Powers .20 
Governors’ Personal .15 
Governors’ Combined Powers .25 
Per Capita Income  .35 
Per Capita State and Local Expenditures .19 
Per Capita State and Local Total Revenue .18 
Number of bills submitted in legislature .47 
Number of bills passed by legislature .22 
Percent of bills passed by legislature -.29 
Legislators’ salaries .63 
Legislative Professionalism -.48 
Length of legislative session .33 
Governor’s staff .31 
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terms for their governors, so every other election 
for governor coincides with a presidential election.
 The intent of separating governor from presi-
dential elections is to focus attention on state rather 
than national issues that so dominate in presiden-
tial election years. The result, however, has been a 
turnout decline of nearly 4 percent, since the hoop-
la associated with presidential elections attracts 
more voters to the polls.28
 A study of gubernatorial elections between 
1970 and 2011 showed an average of 76 percent of 
governors could have run for reelection. Of those 
eligible, 78 percent did run, with 76 percent win-
ning. Defeated incumbent governors were three 
times more likely to lose in a general election than 
in a primary election.29
 The success and retention rate for state leg-
islators is higher. Given governors’ great name 
familiarity, this may seem surprising. However, 
incumbent governors draw opponents--many with 
money to spend. Furthermore, the media are will-
ing to report on elections for governor. As we will 
see shortly, both challengers and incumbents spend 
large sums in contemporary gubernatorial cam-
paigns. Perhaps we should view the success rate 
of governors seeking reelection as extraordinarily 
high.
Do Voters Punish Governors for Unpopular 
Actions?
There has been much research to suggest that 
governors who are responsible for introducing 
taxes lose their reelection efforts afterward. Cer-
tainly, over the period from 1951 to 1989, some 20 
percent of gubernatorial defeats could be attributed 
to raising taxes.30 A definitive study of 407 gu-
bernatorial elections for all states over the period 
1957-1985 found any change or adoption of a sales 
tax or income tax preceding a reelection attempt 
resulted in the incumbent losing 3 percent of the 
vote he or she had received in the prior election.31 
Obviously, if that prior election had been close, the 
incumbent might well have received “retribution” 
from the voters after the politically risky act of 
increasing taxes.
 It is certain, however, that many incumbents 
can easily withstand the loss of 3 percent of their 
vote and win reelection. Governors probably fear 
voter reactions to tax increases more than is justi-
fied. On the other hand, legislators do not jeopar-
dize their election prospects by voting to increase 
taxes. American voters punish the highly visible 
elected state official rather than those most directly 
responsible for increasing taxes.32
 With the weakening of political parties’ ability 
to get their chosen candidates into office, these 
seekers of the governorship had to create their own 
campaign organizations and provide their own 
campaign funds. Many of these candidates’ first 
ventures into public life were running for governor
 In gubernatorial contests, the most expensive 
races occur in the largest states.  The 2010 race 
for governor in California was the most expensive 
ever—more than $192 million.  The second most 
expensive race for governor was Florida in 2014, 
more than $150 million.  The third most expensive 
race for governor was Texas in 2010, more than 
$102 million.33 
Other Statewide Elected Officials
Apart from the governor, there are many other 
state wide elected executives in most states. As 
discussed above, lieutenant governors in 45 states 
have few political powers. The Texas lieutenant 
governor is an exception. The nominal job of the 
position is presiding over the state senate. How-
ever, a combination of powers granted by the state 
constitution and legislative rules give the Texas 
lieutenant governor the opportunity to influence all 
legislative decisions and many executive actions.  
 It is rumored that, when asked if he would run 
for governor, one Texas lieutenant governor asked 
why, after holding the strongest executive position 
in Texas, that of lieutenant governor, would he 
be interested in running for the weakest, that of 
governor.  Perhaps that is why the Texas Legisla-
ture, anticipating then Governor George W. Bush’s 
successful presidential campaign in 2000, passed 
legislation clarifying that, when the governorship 
becomes vacant, the lieutenant governor must 
relinquish that position and become governor.
 The attorney general is the second most often  
elected executive. The attorney general is popu-
larly elected in 43 states and is appointed by the 
governor in 5 states. In Maine, the attorney general 
is selected by secret ballot of the legislature, and in 
Tennessee, by the state Supreme Court.34
 State attorneys general are more occupied with 
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civil law than criminal law. Responsibilities in-
clude giving legal advice and dealing with state-
wide corrupt practices. Even before a bill is passed, 
the attorney general will often issue an opinion 
concerning its constitutionality and, after passage, 
opinions on interpretations of the meaning of the 
legislation. Although the courts can override these 
opinions, the attorney generals’ statements carry 
great weight. Consumer protection matters, such as 
misstated product claims, bad insurance practices, 
poorly run and maintained health facilities, and 
corrupt officials, are also among the concerns of 
attorney generals.
 The secretary of state is the chief clerk in 47 
states.  Secretaries of state are elected statewide in 
35 states, appointed by governors in 9 states and 
chosen by state legislatures in 3 states.35  A key 
responsibility is to collect, maintain and archive 
legally required reports. Almost all are responsi-
ble for administering elections. Most secretaries 
of state also charter businesses operating in their 
states, including corporations and partnerships. 
Term lengths for Secretaries of State match those 
of governors in the same state. Only sixteen states 
have maximum consecutive terms for Secretaries 
of State.  Secretaries of state are first in the line of 
succession to become governor in 3 states and sec-
ond in the line of succession, immediately behind 
lieutenant, governors in 8 states.36
 The treasurer deposits state money in banks. 
The auditor sees that state funds are properly and 
legitimately spent. Other executives include the 
public utilities commissioners, who set rates on 
public utilities, such as electricity, natural gas, and 
telephones; the regents of public higher education 
institutions, who set policies and tuition for those 
schools; and various commissioners of agriculture, 
education, labor, and land.
 Although some incumbents in these positions 
may face occasional election challenges, most are 
unknown in their states. Holders of minor state 
elective offices typically serve many consecutive 
terms until they decide to retire.
Bureaucracy
The numerous workers in the various agencies of 
government are frequently called the bureaucracy.
The bureaucracy is the part of the executive branch 
of government called upon to administer and 
implement the many laws and programs passed by 
state government. What we typically have in mind 
when we hear this word is hundreds of clerical 
workers laboring in a large room.
 In 2014, 15 percent of U.S. employees worked 
for state and local governments, but very few of 
these are clerical workers. About 57 percent of 
state and local employees were involved with pri-
mary and secondary education. The second biggest 
category of state and local employees (about 8 
percent) included health care and hospital workers, 
many of whom are nurses. Police and 
Figure 10.10 
Representativeness of State and Local Government Employment 2013 
State and Local 
Government 
Employees 
U.S 
Population 
Male 54.3% 49.2% 
Female 45.7% 50.8% 
White 65.3% 63.9% 
African-American 18.8% 12.3% 
Hispanic 11.3% 16.3% 
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those involved in fire protection constituted about 
7 percent of state and local employees; another 
4 percent were employed in corrections.37 Many 
government employees hardly match our ideas of a 
bureaucracy.
 One thing we do expect of all government em-
ployees is that no one else receives better treatment 
than that we personally receive. We expect such 
employees to understand our personal circum-
stances. When we buy something from a private 
enterprise, we feel we can go elsewhere if dissat-
isfied. Government typically does not provide this 
option. Thus, generally, if the bureaucracy treats us 
impartially, we feel slighted; but if the bureaucracy 
treats others preferentially, we are offended. We 
view the forms used in administering programs as 
burdensome “red tape.” On the other hand, little 
of the information on these forms goes unused in 
impartially evaluating our particular circumstances 
and eligibility for government services.
The Political Significance of State and Local 
Employees
State and local employees are much more likely to 
vote than others. Even in state contests, upwards 
of 80 percent vote.38 Often, their votes constitute 
more than 20 percent of the vote in local and state 
elections, which of course could easily shape the 
outcome. Schoolteachers especially are organized 
enough to affect election outcomes with their 
involvement. Unlike the legislative branch, state-
wide executives, and, as we shall see, the judicial 
branch, state and local employees more accurately 
reflect the percentage of women and minorities 
within the state.39 Thus, the bureaucracy’s partic-
ipation would seem to influence state and local 
government toward the views of the general public.
Hatch Act
The Hatch Act of 1939 made most partisan in-
volvement by federal employees illegal. Most 
states have copied this act in prohibiting much 
political activity among state and local government 
employees. The Supreme Court has upheld such 
acts. Thus, although state and local employees 
have great impact on elections by way of their 
heavy voting, they are relatively insignificant as 
sources of voluntary campaign activity, in running 
themselves, or in contributing money.
Equal Opportunity and Diversity
Civil service’s stress on “objective merit” has re-
duced discrimination based on race, ethnicity, age, 
gender, and disability. State governments have ad-
dressed discriminatory practices or effects in their 
personnel systems in response by federal and state 
laws and court rulings. Figure 10.10 shows the 
representativeness of state and local government 
employees by sex and race/ethnicity in 2013. The 
proportion of female state and local government 
employees was only 5 percent less than would be 
expected based on their presence in the population. 
African-Americans’ share of state jobs exceeded 
their population by 6.5%. Hispanics were under-
represented by 5% .40 State and local government 
employees are much more like the population of 
the United States than are elected officials at any 
level of government.
Collective Bargaining
State employees in 30 states possess collective 
bar gaining rights, but the consequences of col-
lective bargaining for state administration are far 
from clear. Collective bargaining and civil service 
practices often coexist. But unions and civil ser-
vice systems have some fundamentally different 
goals. Civil service systems use merit principles to 
determine promotions and salaries. Unions want 
these decisions to be based primarily on seniori-
ty.41 Although there was great concern about what 
collective bargaining would mean to efficiency and 
the quality of public service, careful consideration 
reveals few benefits or negative consequences. 
There is little systematic evidence that collective 
bargaining hampers productivity or reduces the 
quality of government services.42
Unresponsiveness
As noted earlier, with the possible exception of 
county governments, the merit system of em-
ployment has greatly reduced the opportunity for 
politicians to have a say in who is employed by 
government.  The old patron age system perhaps 
gave them too much say. Now that this change has 
been made, we can no longer expect always to be 
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successful when we ask politicians to get govern-
ment employees who are unresponsive to public 
opinion out of government. As we noted in our 
discussion of how a bill becomes a law, even legis-
lators may have difficulty ensuring that the law as 
administered corresponds with the actions they had 
intended.
Conclusion
The elected state executive, especially the gov-
ernor, has seen an ebb and flow in public support 
throughout U.S. history. At the time of the Dec-
laration of Independence, few wanted any politi-
cal strength for governors. Governors were then 
strengthened to check and balance the legislative 
branch. Later, Southerners distrusted both gover-
nors and legislators. With modern complex state 
economies, many now demand that the leadership 
of the governor be strengthened. Many governors 
have seen their powers improved, but this strength-
ening is largely in length of gubernatorial terms in 
rural states and in governors’ salaries in metropol-
itan states. Neither would seem to strengthen the 
governor’s hand in battling the state legislature.
Certainly, the presence or absence of other state-
wide elected executives has never been shown to 
matter much to the quality of political life or public 
policy. Similarly, strengthening the powers and 
especially in creasing the salary of governors seems 
to follow states’ movement into a more complex 
economy and to matter very little.
Summary
1. At various times in our history, we have sought 
to weaken or even to discard governors and the 
executive, and at other times, we have attempted to 
strengthen this office to help cope with problems 
raced by the states.
2. Governors vary in their institutional powers to 
influence the policies adopted by their states. Bud-
getary, appointment, and veto powers are prime 
examples.
3. There are not strong ongoing relationships 
between governors’ powers and state and local 
governments’ resources, challenges or policies.
4. Increasingly, governors are elected for 4-year 
terms with substantial salaries and other benefits, 
but it costs millions of dollars to win the office. 
Mostly, these campaign funds come from those 
anxious to get their way on state policies.
5. Most states have other statewide elected exec-
utives charged to deal with limited aspects of state 
services, such as controlling the investment of state 
surplus funds, acting as governor in the governor’s 
absence, or having one’s signature on state checks. 
Although these offices may serve as training 
grounds for governors, they have little other politi-
cal significance.
6. Unlike federal, state and local elected officials, 
employees of state and local governments resemble 
the United States population in sex and race/ethnic-
ity.
 
 
 
Executing The Laws and Representing The People • 247 
Information Sources
Figure 10.1 https://ballotpedia.org/Ballotpedia:Who_Runs_the_States,_Partisanship_Results,_Parti-
san_Control_of_Governorships; https://ballotpedia.org/Gubernatorial_and_legislative_par-
ty_control_of_state_government#Trifectas
Figure 10.2 https://ballotpedia.org/Ballotpedia:Who_Runs_the_States,_Partisanship_Results,_Parti-
san_Control_of_Governorships; https://ballotpedia.org/Gubernatorial_and_legislative_par-
ty_control_of_state_government#Trifecta
Figure 10.3 https://ballotpedia.org/Ballotpedia:Who_Runs_the_States,_Partisanship_Results,_Parti-
san_Control_of_Governorships; https://ballotpedia.org/Gubernatorial_and_legislative_par-
ty_control_of_state_government#Trifectas
Figure 10.4 Margaret Ferguson, Governors and the Executive Branch, in Virginia Gray, Russell Han-
son and Thad Kousser, eds, Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis 
10”’Edition. (Los Angeles; CQ Press, 2013).
Figure 10.5 Margaret Ferguson, Governors and the Executive Branch, in Virginia Gray, Russell Han-
son and Thad Kousser, eds, Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis 
10”’Edition. (Los Angeles; CQ Press, 2013).
Figure 10.6 Margaret Ferguson, Governors and the Executive Branch, in Virginia Gray, Russell Han-
son and Thad Kousser, eds, Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis 
10”’Edition. (Los Angeles; CQ Press, 2013).
Figure 10.7 Margaret Ferguson, Governors and the Executive Branch, in Virginia Gray, Russell 
Hanson and Thad Kousser, eds, Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analy-
sis 10”’Edition. (Los Angeles; CQ Press, 2013); BEA Regional Data GDP and Personal 
Income, SA1 Personal Income Summary: Personal Income, Population, Per Capita Per-
sonal Income, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrd-
n=6#reqid=70&step=30&isuri=1&7022=21&7023=0&7024=non-industry&7033=-1&
7025=0&7026=xx&7027=2014&7001=421&7028=3&7031=0&7040=-1&7083=lev-
els&7029=21&7090=70; http://://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/
people.html Historical Poverty Tables Table 3. Poverty Status of People, by Age, Race, 
and Hispanic Origin: 1959 to 2014 ; U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2014 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Table 3 Detailed Years of School Completed 
by People 25 Years and Over by Sex, Age Groups, Race and Hispanic Origin: 2014; http://
www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2014/tables.html
Margaret Ferguson, Governors and the Executive Branch, in Virginia Gray, Russell 
Hanson and Thad Kousser, eds, Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analy-
sis 10”’Edition. (Los Angeles; CQ Press, 2013); National Council of State Legislatures, 
Legislator Occupations, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/who-we-
elect-an-interactive-graphic.aspx#; http://www.ncsl.org/programs / legismgt/ABOUT/
OccupationNational.htm; http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/who-we-
elect-an-interactive-graphic.aspx#; Kaiser Family Foundation http://kff.org/other/state-in-
dicator/distribution-by-raceethnicity/#table; Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief, 
An Overview of Abortion Laws, July 1, 2013 http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib_OAL.pdf http://www.electproject.org/; http://www.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affili-
ation.aspx; http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/compare_state_spending_2015dH0D;
http://www.itep.org/whopays/full_report.php; http://taxfoundation.org/article/comments-
who-pays-distributional-analysis-tax-systems-all-50-states; 
248 • Chapter 10 
Citizens for Tax Justice, Who Pays Taxes in America in 2015? April 9, 2015. http://ctj.
org/pdf/taxday2015.pdf http://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/tanf-cash-
benefits-have-fallen-by-more-than-20-percent-in-most-states; http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2014/tables.html; http://www.ncsl.org/Por-
tals/1/Documents/Elections/Legis_Control_2015_Feb4_11am.pdf;
National Association of State Budget Officers, Examining 2013-2015 State Spending, 
2015;
Council of State Governments, The Book of the States 2016
Bureau of Justice Statistics Table 6. Imprisonment rates for sentenced prisoners under 
jurisdiction of state or federal correctional authorities per 100,000 U.S. residents, by sex, 
December 31, 2013 and 2014. Data source(s): National Prisoner Statistics Program  
http://www.gallup.com/poll/181505/mississippi-alabama-louisiana-conservative-states.
aspx?g_source=state%20of%20the%20states&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles
U.S. Census Bureau State and Local Government Finance, http://www.census.gov/govs/
local
Figure 10.8 Book of the States 2016, Table 4.3 The Governors: Compensation, Staff, Travel and 
Residence; http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/book-states-2016-chapter-4-state-
executive-branch
Figure 10.9 Book of the States 2016, Table 4.3 The Governors: Compensation, Staff, Travel and 
Residence http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/book-states-2016-chapter-4-state-
executive-branch;
Margaret Ferguson, Governors and the Executive Branch, in Virginia Gray, Russell 
Hanson and Thad Kousser, eds, Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analy-
sis 10”’Edition. (Los Angeles; CQ Press, 2013); BEA Regional Data GDP and Personal 
Income, SA1 Personal Income Summary: Personal Income, Population, Per Capita Per-
sonal Income, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrd-
n=6#reqid=70&step=30&isuri=1&7022=21&7023=0&7024=non-industry&7033=-1&
7025=0&7026=xx&7027=2014&7001=421&7028=3&7031=0&7040=-1&7083=lev-
els&7029=21&7090=70; http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/compare_state_spend-
ing_2015dH0D; National Association of State Budget Officers, Examining 2013-2015 ; 
http://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/compare_state_revenue_2014bZ0a; 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk; 
Keith E. Hamm and Gary F. Moncrief, Legislative Politics in the States, in Politics in the 
American States: A Comparative Analysis, 10th Edition, Virginia Gray and Russell L. 
Hanson and Thad Kousser, (Eds.), (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2013, pp. 164-165; Book of 
the States 2016, Table 4.3  The Governors: Compensation, Staff, Travel and Residence
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/book-states-2016-chapter-4-state-executive-
branch; Book of the States 2016, 2016 Regular Sessions, http://knowledgecenter.csg.
org/kc/content/book-states-2016-chapter-3-state-legislative-branch Table 3.3 Table 3.9 
Legislative Compensation and Living Expenses during Sessions; Table 3.19 Bill and 
Resolution Introductions and Enactments
Figure 10.10 Job Patterns for Women and Minorities in State and Local Governments (EEO-4), 2013;  
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/employment/jobpat-eeo4/2013/index.cfm; 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/employment/jobpat-eeo4/2013/table1/table1.html; 
Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the 
United States, States, and Counties: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013; https://www.census.
gov/popest/data/historical/2010s/vintage_2013/national.html
Executing The Laws and Representing The People • 249 
Study Guide, Chapter 10
Essay Questions
 1. What is a trifecta control state? Why might trifecta control be important to democracy?
 2. Few governors use their veto powers very often. Does this mean that veto power is not important? Explain.
 3. What is the fragmentation of the state executive and what are its possible implications for the office of gove- 
 rnor and for the state?
 4. List and explain the institutional powers of the office of governor. How and why are the institutional powers  
 of Texas governors stronger or weaker than those of governors of other states?
 5. Do states that give governors greater institutional powers experience more success in their policies?
 6. Is there any evidence that governors’ actions while in office have an impact on their levels of support in   
 later elections? Provide reasons one might expect actions to affect later elections.
 7. Discuss the responsibilities of state lieutenant governors, attorneys general, and secretaries of state. How 
 would these job descriptions differ in states with weaker and stronger institutional power for their governors?
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. Before the Declaration of independence, governor were
  a. elected by the people
  b. selected through an auction process
  c. appointed by the king
  d. appointed by Parliament
 2. Which of the following is a state-imposed limit to the time an individual can serve as governor?
  a. maximum of 8 years
  b. maximum of 2 terms
  c. no limitation whatsoever
  d. all of the above
 3. Which of the following is NOT an institutional power of the governor?
  a. power to appoint board members
  b. power to submit state budgets
  c. power to veto bills
  d. power of personality
 4. Which of the following are empirically related to state governors’ institutional powers?
  a. infant mortality is negatively correlated with institutional powers
  b. state and local tax burdens are positively correlated with institutional powers
  c. state and local spending per capita is positively correlated with institutional powers
  d. none of the above are correlated with governors’ institutional powers
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Chapter 11
ADJUDICATING THE LAW: POLICY AND THE COURTS
Other than giving coverage to sensational trials, 
the mass media (newspapers, magazines, televi-
sion, and radio) limit their coverage of the judi-
cial branch of government largely to decisions 
announced by the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, one 
might get the impression that only the federal courts 
are important in our society. Apart from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the reality is just the opposite: only 
the state courts are very important, Nearly all trials 
and other court activities are in the state and local 
court systems, not in our federal courts. 
 The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 44,800 
jobs in the United States for category “Judges and 
Hearing Officers”.  There are 860 positions in fed-
eral courts; the other 44,000 are in state and local 
judicial systems.  More than 98 percent of Judges 
and Hearing Officers are employed at the state and 
local levels.1
 State and local courts dealt with 99.5 percent of 
new civil and criminal cases filed. As Figure 11.1 
shows, in 2016 and 2017, 62.7 million criminal 
cases were filed in state courts and only 74,885 in 
federal courts; state courts dealt with more than 
99.8 percent of all criminal cases. Similarly, state 
and local courts, rather than the federal courts, adju-
dicate civil cases.2 Of 22 million civil cases filed, 
more than 98 percent were in state courts.3 
 State courts are most central to American 
criminal justice because nearly all laws that people 
can violate are state laws. If accused and brought 
to trial, proceedings will be held within state court 
systems. Statutes that prohibit certain behaviors, 
from murder to jay walking, are typically state laws. 
State or local governments most frequently pros-
ecute criminal cases. The more serious violations 
are called felonies and carry substantial fines and 
imprisonment penalties.  Less serious crimes are 
misdemeanors.
 Civil cases involve disputes between two or 
more individuals where individuals include both 
people and legal entities such as corporations, 
partnerships, sole proprietor business organizations, 
and nonprofit organizations. Most often, disputes 
concern contracts. Plaintiffs avow that defendants 
have caused them to suffer losses and file lawsuits 
seeking compensation. Across the United States, 
there will be millions of court trials every working 
day in state and local courts. You probably will be 
called multiple times in the future to fulfill your 
civic duty to serve on a jury involving a criminal 
or civil case. On each occasion, the probability is 
99 percent that you will be called to a state or local 
court. There is only a very small chance that you 
will ever be called for service in a federal court.
Organizing The Courts
We have a dual court system. Wherever you live, 
there are two court systems, one state and one fed-
eral. The state court systems and our federal court 
system share the same basic organization. At the 
bottom of both federal and state court systems, as 
shown in Figure 11.2 are the trial courts. They have 
various names, but “district” court is most common. 
The federal system trial court is named district 
court.
 Most Americans have criminal trial courts in 
mind when they think about courts of law. In crimi-
nal cases, the state’s attorney argues for the convic-
tion of the accused, based on evidence presented in 
court; the defense attorney presents evidence of the 
defendant’s innocence; a jury decides the guilt or 
innocence mainly by unanimous agreement among 
12 jurors (defendants may choose to have judges 
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rather than juries make these decisions); and a 
judge, in robes, assures fair procedures. With rare 
exception, only trial courts hold trials.
 It is also in the criminal trial courts that you 
have the “bill of rights” protections from the U.S. 
Constitution. Rights for the criminally accused in 
the individual state constitutions also apply. In the 
years after World War II, the U.S. Supreme Court 
extended the same rights in criminal procedures in 
federal courts to those charged in state courts. But 
if the state constitution offers additional protection, 
those rights are accorded to you as well. You have 
the following constitutional rights in a criminal 
case in state or federal courts (emphasis added):
 Amendment V [rights of accused persons in 
criminal trials] No person shall be held to answer 
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentation or indictment of a Grand Jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or in public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject/or the same offense to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use without just compensation.
 Amendment VI [right to speedy trial and more 
criminal trial protections] In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state 
and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the assistance of counsel for  his defense.
 Amendment VIII [bails and punishments] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. In addition, Amendment VII assures, in 
civil cases, a trial by jury and compliance with 
common law. Most of these provisions now apply 
in state courts whether or not they are also in the 
state’s constitution. Notice that a 12-person jury of 
one’s peers and a unanimous verdict are not men-
tioned, although they are available to defendants in 
Figure 11.1
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Figure 11.2 
Typical Configuration of State Courts 
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federal criminal cases. This is an example of how 
legal tradition supplements a brief constitution that 
lacks detail.
 Criminal trials result in defendants being 
judged guilty or not guilty. Punishments are as-
sessed against defendants convicted of crimes. 
Civil trials result in judgments for plaintiffs or 
defendants. Damages are awarded to plaintiffs who 
prevail. Once a trial is complete, the loser may 
then “appeal” to an intermediate appellate court.4 
Appeals claim that serious errors occurred during 
the trial. Appeals argue that, absent these errors, 
a result more favorable to the loser would have 
occurred. Appellate courts may be required at least 
to consider such appeals. But, apart from review by 
one appellate court judge and staff, few receive any 
serious attention.
 When an appellate court accepts a case, multi-
ple judges examine the court record from the trial. 
Public hearings are held for judges to ask questions 
of the attorneys representing those involved about 
trial courts’ “errors in procedures,” and “consis-
tency with other court decisions.” Incompatibility 
with the state or national constitutions, what is 
called “unconstitutionality,” also is a major consid-
eration by these courts. They do not retry the case.
 Substantive decisions--whether or not de-
fendants are guilty in criminal cases or liable for 
damages in civil cases--are not reviewed by ap-
pellate courts. Appellate courts review procedural 
decisions made during trials and decide whether to 
uphold or overrule those decisions. When decisions 
are upheld, trial outcomes are sustained. When trial 
court procedural decisions are overruled, trial con-
clusions concerning guilt and liability are vacated. 
Such cases are remanded, returned for retrial. Ap-
pellate courts can also decide that the criminal or 
civil laws applied during trials are unconstitutional. 
Laws determined to be unconstitutional are de-
clared invalid and cannot be the bases for retrials.
 Losing parties in appellate cases can appeal to 
what is usually called the state supreme court. This 
court is the final appellate court, the court of last 
resort at the state level. Texas and Oklahoma have 
two courts of last resort, one that considers only 
criminal cases and one that considers only civil 
cases. A separate appeal to the federal court system 
may be possible if there is a procedural issue sub-
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ject to federal law. Federal courts decide whether 
or not to accept these appeals. 
 As with the intermediate appellate court, the 
state supreme court need not give much consider-
ation to cases appealed to it. However, state su-
preme courts review all death sentences.
 Again, cases are not retried if accepted by 
supreme courts. Rather, they review the court 
records and previous appellate court considerations 
of the case. Individuals and groups not involved in 
the original trials may submit documents that give 
advice about issues in cases to appellate courts. 
These arguments are called amicus curiae (“friend 
of the court”) briefs. The justices may then hold 
public hearings and ask additional questions of the 
attorneys in the case. Courts of last resort either 
uphold or reverse appellate court decisions. Trial 
results may be upheld, results may be vacated and 
cases returned for retrial, and laws may be found 
unconstitutional.
 As you might expect, intermediate appellate 
courts accept few cases from trial courts, and even 
fewer are considered by the supreme courts. About 
0.09 percent of all cases--civil, criminal, juvenile, 
and traffic--reach the intermediate courts, and 0.01 
percent reach the state supreme courts.5 The cost 
of attempting an appeal is expensive. For most, 
the low probability of an appeal being accepted 
makes the cost prohibitively expensive. The result 
is corporations are the most likely parties to seek 
appeals.
 Many states divide their trial court levels into 
a tangle of courts, each with limited jurisdiction. 
This means, for example, they might deal only 
with juvenile cases, only with cases involving 
penalties of less than $1,000, or only with cases 
involving no jail terms. Local courts with extreme-
ly narrow jurisdictions, such as small claims and 
traffic courts, also further complicate this level of 
courts.
 Most states have phased out justice of the 
peace courts as outdated and subject to fraud. Judg-
es in some such courts receive pay as a percentage 
of fines imposed, and therefore more fines mean 
more pay. Unpopular “speed traps” in rural areas 
typically may involve cooperation between local 
police seeking to gain revenue for their cities and 
justices of the peace eager to earn more money.
 Although uncommon, state cases can be ap-
pealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The most 
frequent basis is the argument state law or legal 
procedure conflicts with the United States Con-
stitution. The U.S. Supreme Court accepts fewer 
than 200 cases each year, so few cases will make 
the jump. Supreme Court justices choose cases that 
will let them address points of law they wish to 
resolve. Usually, cases must first work their way up 
the state court system.
Appellate Court Activity
Once appellate courts accept cases, they can judge 
the constitutionality both of the laws involved and 
the way they are administered. This is the way the 
judicial branch checks and balances the behavior of 
the legislative and executive branches. States vary 
considerably in the extent to which appellate courts 
can accept or reject individual cases on appeal.
   In 2016, state appellate courts accepted 
approximately 257,000 new cases. Courts of last 
resort handled 29 percent of those cases; lower ap-
pellate courts handled 71 percent. As always, there 
were important differences across the states.  Cali-
fornia appellate courts accepted more than 15,000 
new cases. Wyoming appellate courts accepted 260 
new cases. The quantity and quality of appellate 
court activity vary from state to state.7 
Appellate Court Activism
The phrase judicial activism means different things 
to different people. Most frequently, those who 
dislike court decisions use the phrase. They intend 
it as an insult, not as a concept that is defined pre-
cisely and used consistently. When pundits speak 
of judicial activism, they are saying, “I am not 
happy.”
 Conservative critics prefer a more limited 
role for the courts as interpreters of the law rather 
than makers of the law, which they call judicial 
restraint. They argue that the courts should defer 
to the elected legislative and executive branches. 
These branches are closer to the people and more 
likely to follow the will of the majority. They have 
articulated this view so frequently and success-
fully that most Americans assume or believe that 
all court limitations on legislative and executive 
branch decisions are liberal. Although courts also 
uphold legislative and executive branch actions, 
commentators typically disregard those decisions. 
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They focus on activist liberal decisions and disre-
gard activist conservative decisions.
 Political scientists, seeking an objective, valid 
and reliable measure, define judicial activism as 
decisions that find government laws or behavior 
unconstitutional.9 In other words, judicial activism 
occurs when courts play their balancing role of 
checking the legislative and executive branches. 
Some researchers have studied decisions systemati-
cally and classified individual decisions as activism 
or restraint. They have contemplated the possibility 
of conservative activist and liberal restraint out-
comes.
 Empirical evidence from academic research 
shows the examples stressed by conservative 
pundits are not representative of the way courts 
behave. Thomas M. Keck argues that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has been more active in finding 
federal statutes and executive procedures uncon-
stitutional since 1995, when a majority of justices 
were conservative, than at any previous point in the 
Court’s history.10
 More recently, the Supreme Court under Chief 
Justice John Roberts has made a series of conser-
vative decisions finding legislatures and executives 
took unconstitutional actions.11  Comprehensive 
analyses find that, for more than 15 years, the U.S. 
Supreme Court made more activist conservative 
decisions than activist liberal decisions. Howev-
er, the liberal activist decisions have received the 
greatest publicity.
 Some state courts have been identified as judi-
cially active because they have made high profile 
“liberal” decisions declaring certain state-imposed 
limitations on personal rights unconstitutional with 
respect to their state constitutions’ bills of rights.12 
Courts in California and New Jersey have frequent-
ly been identified as the most activist or the earliest 
activist.
 However, when activist decisions are defined 
as those that overturn actions by executive and leg-
islative branches, results do not support the view 
that activism equals liberal decisions.
 Figure 11.3 presents results from a study of 
state courts from 1981 to 1985 that defined judi-
cial activism as finding executives or legislatures 
violated state constitutions.13 The juxtaposition of 
New York, West Virginia, Alabama, and Montana 
as most active demonstrates that activism in state 
courts is not strongly related to state liberalism or 
liberal decisions.
 The State Supreme Court Data Project gathered 
information on 21,000 decisions made by state 
supreme courts from 1995 to 1998.14 State consti-
tutionality was an issue in 5% of cases.  Federal 
constitutionality was an issue in 3% of cases.  Vio-
lations of state constitutions were declared in 21% 
of germane cases.  Violations of the U.S. Constitu-
tion were declared in 14% of germane cases.  State 
courts found violations in 18% of germane cases 
overall.  The large study of decisions from 1995 to 
1998 found constitutionality issues were rarely re-
viewed.  When reviewed, almost one in five cases 
involved a violation.
 Federal and state courts participate fully in the 
system of checks and balances through the exer-
cise of judicial review, which empowers courts 
to invalidate the actions of the other branches of 
government inconsistent with state or federal con-
stitutions.15 The most highly publicized decisions 
are those involving the most controversial issues 
on the American political agenda. These decisions 
are most often defined in terms of liberal and con-
servative positions. Although small in number, they 
dominate popular discussion of judicial activism 
and the role the courts play in federal and state 
politics.
Minority Rights
Decisions by courts to declare statutory laws and 
executive procedures as unconstitutional have 
been depicted as being counter to the majority rule 
principle fundamental to American democracy. Al-
most all government systems worldwide profess to 
follow the majority rule principle. Even hereditary 
monarchs and religious officials who hold power in 
theocracies claim the majority supports them.
 We think the great genius of the American po-
litical system is that it is concerned with both ma-
jority rule and minority rights. The United States 
is among the small number of countries worldwide 
that make minority rights the more important, more 
fundamental concern.
 As our constitutional system has evolved, we 
have come to recognize that, given the opportunity, 
majorities frequently choose to withhold from
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unpopular minority groups rights and privileges 
they enjoy themselves. The legislative and execu-
tive branches are structured to be more responsive 
to majority preferences.  As a result, their actions 
have sometimes been detrimental to out-of-favor 
minorities.
 Courts have been more active than the other 
two branches in championing the cause of minority 
rights under the law because that is the role as-
signed to them by federal and state constitutions. 
Although not all court decisions do so, judges have 
acted frequently to uphold and expand equal pro-
tection and equal application of criminal and civil 
laws.
Equal Protection Under Criminal Law
In the United States, only a minority of citizens are 
accused or convicted of serious crimes. Those who 
are accused or convicted are an unpopular minori-
ty. Beginning in the 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has, in a large number of its decisions, applied the 
federal minimum standards of justice in our nation-
al Constitution to state criminal procedures. Three 
principles stand out in their importance to state 
criminal procedures.
 The first is the “exclusionary rule,” which 
excludes illegally seized evidence from being 
presented in trials. The case is Mapp v. Ohio 
(1961). When Ms. Mapp refused to allow police 
to search her home, they ignored her and did so 
anyway. They found no evidence connecting her to 
a bombing for which she was suspected but rather 
found pornographic materials that were unlaw-
ful. She was arrested and convicted based on the 
gathered evidence. The Supreme Court overturned 
her conviction because without a search warrant 
specifying pornographic materials, the evidence 
was unlawfully obtained. Such evidence is to be 
excluded from the courts. 
 Although the initial principle was clearly 
drawn, the Supreme Court has weakened it with 
more recent decisions.16 The Court has established 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule to ensure the 
benefits of Fourth Amendment rights to privacy are 
not outweighed by the rule’s social costs.  In July 
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2016, it made a major modification in the exclu-
sionary rule in Utah v. Strieff (2016).  The court 
held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when 
an officer makes an illegal stop (a stop without 
probable cause), runs a warrant check on the sus-
pect’s ID, learns that the suspect has an outstand-
ing warrant, and then searches the suspect incident 
to arrest on the warrant.  The court held that the 
evidence seized was admissible because the of-
ficer’s discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated 
the connection between the unlawful stop and the 
evidence seized incident to arrest.17 
 The second principle is the right to legal rep-
resentation established in Gideon v. Wainwright 
(1963). Bari Gideon, unable to afford an attorney, 
unsuccessfully defended himself on a charge that 
he rifled a soda machine in a pool hall. While in 
prison, he studied law and successfully appealed 
his case to the Supreme Court. He maintained 
that it was unconstitutional for him to have been 
allowed to defend himself. Rather, he argued, the 
state should have provided an attorney. The Court 
agreed. His case involved a felony, a serious crime, 
but this principle has since been extended to even 
lesser crimes, misdemeanors, potentially involving 
incarceration. Moreover, now the assistance of an 
attorney is to be provided at the time one becomes 
the prime suspect. 
 The third principle is the right to remain si-
lent, first established Miranda v. Arizona (1966). 
Miranda confessed to a crime but was not told he 
could speak to an attorney and remain silent. The 
Supreme Court said the police had violated his 
rights to be informed. They had not told him that 
he had the right to remain silent, that anything he 
said might be used against him, and that he had a 
right to an attorney. This procedure of the police 
enumerating these rights has become called “Mi-
randizing” the accused.
 The Miranda Warning card reads as follows: 
You have the right to remain silent.  Anything you 
say can and will be used against you in a court of 
law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have 
him present with you while you are being ques-
tioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one 
will be appointed to represent you before any ques-
tioning if you wish. You can decide at any time to 
exercise these rights and not answer any questions 
or make any statements.
 Because of these and other decisions by the 
federal courts, the right to counsel has been defined 
and expanded. This right is not restricted to those 
who can afford it. It is not limited to adults. It is 
not restricted to trials. One might think that the 
legal counsel one has a right to must be qualified or 
competent, but the U.S. Supreme Court has not ex-
plicitly stated what level of competence is required 
to satisfy the right to counsel. In the absence of a 
national standard, states have determined their own 
standards. These standards vary widely.
 States disagree on whether “qualified” requires 
previous experience or previous success in crimi-
nal law.  In Texas, a defense attorney need only be 
qualified at the time he or she is appointed; pre-
vious or subsequent suspension of the attorney’s 
license to practice law need not be considered.18  
States disagree on whether or not the following are 
grounds for determining that defense counsel was 
inadequate: doing no work in preparation for trial, 
calling no witnesses, not challenging incompetent 
expert witnesses, permitting false testimony, sleep-
ing during legal proceedings, having a debilitating 
medical condition, being disinterested in defend-
ing the accused because of racism, and having 
undisclosed business or romantic relationships 
with others involved in the case, including judges, 
prosecuting attorneys, and witnesses.
Death Penalty
 The use of the death penalty has become an 
important criminal law issue in contemporary 
America. The number of states with death penalty 
punishments peaked in 1995 at 38. In 2016, 18 
states have abolished the death penalty; the gover-
nors of five states have declared moratoriums on 
executions and four states have not had executions 
in the last ten years.19
 The U.S. Supreme Court has not declared the 
death penalty unconstitutional, but it has acted to 
restrict its application. In 2002, the Court barred 
the execution of mentally retarded defendants. In 
2005, it ruled that the Constitution bars the death 
penalty for crimes committed before the age of 18. 
The most recent restriction was in 2008. In Kenne-
dy v. Louisiana (2008), the Court struck down as 
unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that allowed 
the death penalty for the rape of a child where the 
victim did not die.
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 The Kennedy v. Louisiana majority opinion 
stated that the 8th Amendment’s protection against 
excessive or cruel and unusual punishments 
“draw[s] meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety.” The court explicitly acknowledged “difficul-
ties in administering the penalty to ensure against 
its arbitrary and capricious application.”
 Arbitrary and capricious application of the 
death penalty denies the equal protection guar-
anteed by the federal constitution and all 50 
state constitutions. Throughout our history, Afri-
can-Americans have been more likely to be con-
victed of capital crimes and more likely to be exe-
cuted. The differences far exceed the standards for 
the statistical significance we use in this text. Even 
if capital punishment is constitutional in principle, 
the apparent inability or unwillingness of at least 
some state governments to administer it without 
racial bias may be arbitrary and capricious.
 The growing number of cases in which individ-
uals convicted and sentenced to death and subse-
quently exonerated by DNA tests and other physi-
cal evidence casts additional serious doubt that the 
death penalty can be administered accurately, let 
alone equally or fairly. Since 1973, 138 inmates 
were found to be innocent and released from death 
row.20 In a 2011 Gallup Poll only 52 percent of 
Americans said the death penalty is applied fairly.21
 The procedure of execution by lethal injection 
has become an issue.  In 2011, the European Union 
banned export of drugs used for legal-injection to 
the United States. In addition, a number of phar-
maceutical companies in the United States stopped 
manufacturing drugs used for lethal-injection. 
When death-penalty states ran out of drugs used 
successfully in the past, they changed to different 
drugs. A series of botched executions by lethal 
injection in 2014 resulted in delays of executions 
and appeals that lethal-injection violated the U.S. 
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment.  In Glossip v. Gross 
(2015) the Supreme Court ruled that Oklahoma’s 
use of lethal injection did not violate the ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment.  The vote was 5-4, 
with the conservative justices in the majority.22
 Evidence of wrongful executions and racial 
bias notwithstanding, the American public favors 
the death penalty for persons convicted of murder. 
With the exception of the years 1957-1967, this has 
been true since polling began in 1937. According 
to the Gallup Poll, support for the death penalty 
peaked at 80 percent in 1994 and was 61 percent in 
2015.24 So long as the decision is made by majority 
rule, the death penalty will continue in the United 
States in the foreseeable future. Only if the courts 
determine that the administration and implementa-
tion of the death penalty violates equal protection 
standards or the constitutional ban on cruel and 
unusual behavior is it likely to be abolished.
Equal Protection Under Civil Law
Perhaps the most important actions taken by courts 
to enhance equal protection under civil law have 
involved declaring criminal statutory laws uncon-
stitutional and forbidding the states from crimi-
nalizing and punishing the behaviors involved. 
Voiding criminal laws and guaranteeing equal 
protection as a civil right under federal and state 
constitutions have advanced equal protection under 
civil law.
 Consensus on which individuals and groups 
should receive equal protection has greatly 
changed since the Declaration of Independence and 
the Constitution of 1789 were written. Originally, 
women and slaves had limited legal rights and no 
political rights. Even after slavery was changed 
from legal to illegal, state and local governments 
throughout the nation denied equal protection un-
der law to African-Americans. In some states, in-
equality resulted from unequal application of laws. 
In other states, laws required separation of races. In 
every case, separation meant that African-Ameri-
cans were denied opportunities available to others. 
It is worth noting that racial inequality occurred in 
more places after the abolition of slavery than be-
fore. Post-reconstruction racial discrimination was 
expanded from slaves to all African-Americans. 
Discrimination affected not only former slaves and 
their descendants but also individuals who had not 
been slaves--whether or not they had been in the 
United States or even alive when slavery was legal.
 Today, the courts have established that equal 
protection cannot he arbitrarily withheld from 
individuals and groups on the basis of sex, race, 
national origin, religion, age, or disability. The 
contemporary legal standard is that government 
must have a legitimate reason for differential treat-
ment. All three branches of the federal government 
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have taken action to advance civil rights. Typically, 
action by some state governments to expand civil 
rights has come before comparable federal action. 
Nevertheless, it is the U.S. Supreme Court that has 
led the way in declaring unconstitutional many 
occurrences of majority groups denying to unpop-
ular minorities legal rights or privileges they grant 
to themselves.
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) is one of the 
most important in the Court’s history. Prior to 
Brown, states had the option of operating dual, 
racially segregated public schools. Such segrega-
tion did not violate equal protection constitutional 
guarantees of due process or equal protection so 
long as segregated facilities and services were 
arguably equal. In Brown v. Board of Education, 
the Supreme Court declared that “separate but 
equal” public schools were inherently unequal and 
impermissible under the constitution. All public 
school systems were to be desegregated with “all 
deliberate speed.” Southern states succeeded in 
delaying racial desegregation of public schools, but 
they were unable to prevent it.
 Southern states’ efforts to prevent interaction 
between races included laws forbidding certain 
interracial activities. African-Americans had to use 
different restrooms and drinking fountains, wait 
for trains in separate areas, and ride in different 
sections of trains and buses. It was also a violation 
of criminal law for “whites” and “non-whites” to 
marry. Furthermore, couples legally married in oth-
er states committed criminal offenses by behaving 
as married couples in states where such marriages 
were forbidden. Illegal intermarriage was a felony 
punishable by many years in prison.
 The U.S. Supreme Court decision Loving v. 
Virginia (1967) declared that racial limitations 
on marriage violated the due process guarantees 
of the 14th Amendment. Not only did the Court 
decriminalize interracial marriage, it declared that 
marriage was one of the basic civil rights and the 
right to marry was a fundamental freedom. At one 
time or another, 41states had laws making marriage 
or cohabitation between “whites” and “other races” 
illegal, although the definition of “other races” 
varied from state to state. All but 16 states had 
repealed these laws prior to the Loving v. Virginia 
decision.
 In Lawrence v. Texas (2003) the U.S. Supreme 
Court found that state laws could not make private 
sexual practices between consenting adults of the 
same sex criminal. The decision stated that, under 
the due process clause of the federal constitution, 
two adults have the right to engage in private con-
duct without government intervention. The major-
ity opinion stated, “The Texas statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intru-
sion into the individual’s personal and private life.” 
The Lawrence v. Texas opinion expressly overruled 
the Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 
which had come to an opposite conclusion. At the 
time, Texas was one of 13 states proscribing sod-
omy. Laws in four of those states, including Texas, 
made only homosexual sodomy illegal.25 Lawrence 
v. Texas also established privacy rights for both 
opposite sex and same sex couples.
 The courts have placed important restrictions 
on states’ legal authority to define private conduct 
between consenting adults as criminal. The states 
remain free to define adulthood. As always, they 
reach different decisions. There are multiple defi-
nitions of adulthood across states and within states 
for different purposes.
 You may be familiar with the concept “age of 
consent” but probably don’t know that states can 
and frequently do have different ages of consent 
for marriage without the approval of one’s parents 
and ages of consent for adult private conduct. Most 
states have multiple exceptions to their nominal 
ages of consent. With those caveats in mind, Figure 
11.4 identifies age of consent for private adult con-
duct by state. The minimum age is 16 in 30 states, 
17 in 8 states and18 in 12 states.26
 There is another limitation on private conduct 
between consenting adults related to marital status. 
Adultery is a criminal offense in about half the 
states, although there is no common definition of 
adultery. In some states, adultery is defined as rela-
tions between any two people not married to each 
other. In other states, at least one of the individuals 
involved must be married. In yet other states, adul-
tery involves a married woman having relations 
with someone other than her husband. The crim-
inal penalties for those found guilty range from a 
misdemeanor fine of $10 to a felony life sentence 
in prison. In the U.S. military, adultery is a poten-
tial court-martial offense. The civilian statutes are 
rarely enforced, if ever. It is very difficult for the 
administration of any rarely enforced law to meet 
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the equal protection standard.
 The issue of who has the right to civil marriage 
has arisen again in your lifetime. The legal issue 
is whether same sex couples should have the same 
marriage rights as eligible opposite sex couples. 
Civil marriage is distinct from and more limited 
in scope than religious marriage. Civil marriage 
involves only contract agreements and proper-
ty rights between partners. Religious marriage 
contains these secular elements but also includes 
religious sanctification. Holy matrimony involves 
ceremony, tradition, beliefs, faith and social com-
mitments.
 Religious marriage authorizes sexual relations 
between partners. For many believers, relations 
without religious marriages are sinful. Sexual 
behavior is a central concern of religious marriage. 
The decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) effec-
tively removed issues of sexual relations from civil 
marriage.
 With few exceptions, federal and state gov-
ernments are forbidden from prohibiting private 
sexual conduct between consenting adults. Court 
rulings have removed the overlap between sinful 
and illegal behavior. However, for most Ameri-
cans, conflated notions of sinful and illegal sexual 
conduct endure.
 The central legal issue of contemporary civil 
marriage in the United States is simply whether 
government has a legitimate basis for granting civil 
marriage contract and property rights to opposite 
sex couples while denying those rights to same sex 
couples. The Supreme Court issued two important 
decisions on same sex marriage, one in June 2013 
and the other in June 2015. 
 In United States v. Windsor (2013), the court 
struck down the Section 2 of the 1996 Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) that denied federal benefits 
to same sex couples that were granted to opposite 
sex couples. The Court ruled that DOMA violated 
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal pro-
tection of the law to persons of the same sex who 
were legally married under the laws of their state. 
The Court ordered the federal government to treat 
legal opposite sex marriages and same sex marriag-
es equally.
 The majority opinion in United States v. Wind-
sor  (2013) contained the following statements:
 • DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of 
the equal liberty of persons that is protected by the 
Fifth Amendment.
 • DOMA’s history of enactment and its own 
text demonstrate that interference with the equal 
dignity of same sex marriages, conferred by the 
States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was 
more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. 
It was its essence. 
 • DOMA’s principal effect is to identify and 
make unequal a subset of state sanctioned marriag-
es. It contrives to deprive some couples married 
under the laws of their State, but not others, of both 
rights and responsibilities, creating two contradic-
tory marriage regimes within the same State.
 United States v. Windsor (2013) did not address 
the central legal issue of civil marriage for state 
governments. Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage 
Act explicitly allowed states to refuse to recognize 
same sex marriages performed under the laws of 
other States. United States v. Windsor  (2013) did 
not directly challenge Section 2 and the Supreme 
Court did not rule on it. The federal government 
had to recognize all legal same sex marriages. The 
states were free to set their own policies.
 A large number of lawsuits were filed in both 
state and federal courts pressing the question: If the 
U.S. Constitution requires the federal government 
to recognize same sex marriages performed in 
states where they are legal, does the same require-
ment apply to the states? Other lawsuits pressed 
the question: Does the logic of the United States 
v. Windsor  (2013) decision mean that states must 
sanction marriage for both opposite sex and same 
sex couples?
 From July 2013 to June 2015, state courts 
issued 18 decisions, federal district courts issued 
41 decisions and federal appellate courts issued 5 
decisions requiring marriage equality. However, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit up-
held same sex marriage bans in Kentucky, Mich-
igan, Ohio and Tennessee.27 Given the conflicting 
decisions of federal appellate courts, the Supreme 
Court had to resolve the central issue of marriage 
rights once and for all. 
 On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision on whether or not states can sanction mar-
riage for opposite sex couples and deny marriage 
for same sex couples. The Court held in Obergefell 
v. Hodges (2015) that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires states to license civil marriage between 
two people of the same sex and to recognize a 
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marriage between two people of the same sex 
when their marriage was lawfully licensed and 
performed out-of-state.28
 Immediately, civil disobedience to the ruling, 
and to instructions issued by governors and other 
state authorities, occurred among clerks and other 
court employees in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississip-
pi, Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas.29 Some 
Texas county clerks refused to issue marriage 
licenses to same sex couples. Others chose to stop 
issuing any marriage licenses. A few county clerks 
in Texas, Mississippi and Arkansas resigned rather 
than issue marriage licenses.
 Three days after the Supreme Court decision 
was announced, Texas Attorney General Ken Pax-
ton issued a statement calling the Supreme Court 
decision a “lawless ruling.”30 Paxton’s statement 
also said “It is important to note that any clerk who 
wishes to defend their religious objections and who 
chooses not to issue licenses may well face liti-
gation and/or a fine. But, numerous lawyers stand 
ready to assist clerks defending their religious be-
liefs, in many cases on a pro-bono basis, and I will 
do everything I can from this office to be a public 
voice for those standing in defense of their rights.”
 The Texas Attorney General was not making 
a legal argument that the Supreme Court decision 
was lawless, and he was not offering legal assis-
tance from his office to those who chose to dis-
obey the Supreme Court ruling. He was making a 
political statement supporting the preferences of 
the very socially conservative Texans who are the 
majority of those who vote in Republican primary 
elections in non-presidential election years.
 The legal position of the Texas Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office was made clear on July 1, 2015. The 
Texas Attorney General’s Office wrote to the U.S. 
5th Circuit Court of Appeals conceding that the 
state’s ban on same sex marriage and failure to 
recognize lawful marriages performed out-of-state 
were unconstitutional.
 Symbolic opposition to same sex marriage will 
undoubtedly continue across the states for a long 
time. Proposals have been made to amend the Unit-
ed States Constitution to forbid same sex marriage. 
Other proposals have been made to stop appointing 
federal judges for unlimited terms and to allow 
voters to remove judges who make unpopular deci-
sions. 
 Many political actors have chosen to exploit 
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public confusion between civil and religious mar-
riage for their own purposes rather than educate the 
public on the differences. Arguments that religious 
organizations will be forced to conduct same sex 
marriages in violation of their religious doctrines 
are untrue and intended to frighten. Arkansas Gov-
ernor Asa Hutchinson noted the Supreme Court’s 
decision was aimed only at states, and is not a 
directive for churches or pastors.31 Most scholars, 
even among gay rights advocates, believe that the 
Constitution protects clergy from being required 
to officiate at marriages for same sex couples and 
churches from being forced to allow same sex cou-
ples to marry in their sanctuaries.32
 In September 2016, the Texas Supreme Court 
refused to accept an appeal of a ruling by a lower 
court that upheld benefits to same sex spouses of 
Houston city employees.  In October 2016, Gov-
ernor Greg Abbott, Lt. Governor Dan Patrick and 
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton requested that 
the all-Republican court reconsider and accept the 
case.  The Texas Supreme Court agreed.  Their rul-
ing in the case was announced June 30, 2017. The 
Texas Supreme Court refused to extend spousal 
benefits to same-sex couples.  The unanimous de-
cision interpreted the U. S. Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) narrowly, ques-
tioning whether it compels states to treat same-sex 
couples equally to opposite-sex couples in any 
context outside of marriage licensing. Arkansas 
recently raised this argument at the United States 
Supreme Court and lost earlier in June 2017.33
 Texas both provides child welfare services 
directly and outsources child welfare services.  In 
legislation passed in June 2017, private organi-
zations in Texas are allowed to deny adoptions 
and other services to children and parents based 
on “sincerely held religious beliefs.”  Faith-based 
organizations can also place a child in a religious 
school; deny referrals for certain contraceptives, 
drugs or devices; and refuse to contract with other 
organizations that don’t share their religious be-
liefs. Soon thereafter, a faith-based organization, 
the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, denied 
the opportunity for a married same-sex couple, 
both faculty members at Texas A&M Universi-
ty, to become foster parents for refugee children 
because they didn’t “mirror the Holy Family.” 
When the couple asked specifically about LBGT 
refugee children, they were told that none of the 
700 unaccompanied refugee children they sought 
to care for were LGBT.  Rather than acting directly 
to discriminate against same-sex married couples, 
Texas is reassigning government responsibilities 
for foster care to religious organizations who dis-
criminate against same-sex married couples. At the 
same time, Texas is under federal court oversight 
to improve what the courts have characterized as a 
“broken” foster care system.34
Selecting State Judges
The President of the United States, with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, appoints federal judges 
for life. They cannot be held accountable, either to 
the public, to Congress, or to the president, after 
they have assumed their positions. Only infirmity, 
voluntary retirement, or death will remove them 
from the bench. In sharp contrast, the voters elect 
most state judges for a limited term of office.
 There are five basic methods used in the states 
for selecting judges. Several states, however, use 
more than one system. The oldest is probably 
that of appointment with state senate advice and 
consent. The governor appoints judges with the 
consent of a majority of the state senate, often from 
a listing of qualified judges from special com-
missions. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York (at the appellate level), Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, and Vermont use this method. 
 Two states continue to use legislative appoint-
ment. Most South Carolina and Virginia judges 
gain their seats by a majority vote of the state 
legislature. At least in South Carolina, most judges 
selected are former state legislators, probably as a 
reward for legislative service.35
 Partisan elections are another older method. 
Under this system, Democrat and Republican can-
didates contest all judgeships. The voter must cast 
a vote for a Democrat or a Republican candidate 
for judge. Partisan elections are used to choose 
judges in Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Lou-
isiana, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. Six of these 
states use this method nearly exclusively.
 The newest method of selecting judges is called 
the Missouri Plan, because Missouri first adopted 
it. Under this system, a judicial selection or nomi-
nation committee with representation of attorneys 
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or the state bar association submits a listing of 
three to six “qualified” candidates to the governor, 
who fills the vacant judgeship from this list. After 
serving 1 to 3 years, the appointee must stand for 
a retention election, which is merely a yes or no 
vote. If a majority votes yes, the judge serves a full 
term before again standing for a retention elec-
tion. If a majority votes no, a vacancy is declared 
and the procedure begins anew. This procedure is 
supposed to choose more qualified judges and to 
relieve judges from needing to make promises to 
defeat challengers in elections. They run on their 
records as judges, not against opponents.
 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Iowa, 
Kansas (other than in smaller district courts), 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming use 
this plan to select most of their judges regardless of 
whether the judge is to serve in the appellate courts 
or trial-level courts. Florida, Kansas, and Oklaho-
ma use the Missouri Plan for appellate judges and 
nonpartisan elections for trial-level judges. Inter-
estingly, Missouri selects some lower-level judges 
by partisan ballot.36 Indiana and Tennessee do this 
as well. New Mexico, Pennsylvania and North Car-
olina use a variation of the Missouri Plan. Judges 
are originally selected by election rather than by 
appointment. Judges who wish to continue when 
their terms are up must stand for retention elec-
tions.
 Figure 11.5 shows the national pattern of these 
procedures for selecting judges in appellate courts 
of last resort. The major changes in the last 4 
decades have been adoption of the Missouri Plan; 
change from partisan to nonpartisan elections, and 
adding retention elections if the Governor does not 
appoint judges. 
 Clearly, older selection methods, such as 
gubernatorial appointment with state senate confir-
mation, legislative appointment, and even partisan 
election, are preferred by the older states, while the 
West uses nonpartisan elections and the Missouri 
Plan. The South proves very diverse.
 In summary, the selection of state judges fol-
lows many patterns. Often, appellate-level judg-
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es and trial level judges are selected differently. 
Reformers would advocate the Missouri Plan or at 
least nonpartisan elections. There is little evidence 
that the method of selecting judges has much im-
pact on the quality of those judges in Missouri or 
elsewhere.37 Selection of judges follows the pattern 
of popular ideas present when the selection process 
was chosen, and there are, as a result, many mainly 
regional differences.
 Regardless of the method of electoral selection, 
incumbency advantage is very common for the ju-
dicial branch. Very few incumbents lose elections.
The Term of Office
State court judges in Rhode Island are appointed 
for life. State court judges in Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire may serve until age 70. The other 
states limit judges in courts of last resort to individ-
ual terms of 6 to 14 years.  Appellate court judges 
in states that limit service serve terms of up to 12 
years. District court judges in other states serve 
terms of 4 to 14 years. State Supreme Court judges 
serve an average term of just over 8 years.38 The 
most common terms are as follows: 17 states have 
6-year terms, 12 have 8-year terms, and 12 have 
10-year terms. Trial-level judges typically serve 
6 to 8 years before needing to seek reelection. All 
states provide for impeaching judges in their state 
legislatures, but few permit recall votes to remove 
them from the bench.
Qualifications for Judgeships
With the exceptions of Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire, all states require that judges be li-
censed to practice law. Almost all of them also 
require membership in the state bar, often for at 
least 5 years. Attorneys, thus, are even more highly 
overrepresented in the judicial branch than in the 
other branches. Twenty states also set minimum 
ages for serving as trial or appellate court judges. 
The most frequent minimum age is 30. Other age 
requirements range from 18 to 35 years.39
 Judges, like their counterparts in the executive 
and legislative branches are overwhelmingly male, 
white, middle class, better educated, and wealthi-
er. The racial and gender composition of the state 
court appellate bench has been reported as strik-
ingly similar to the U.S. Court of Appeals, where 
about 31percent of the judges are women or racial 
minorities. Hurwitz and Lanier report that 37 per-
cent of judges in state courts of last resort and 34 
percent of judges in intermediate appellate courts 
are women and racial minorities.40
 Like legislators, elected judges enjoy over-
whelming incumbency advantage in winning 
reelection. For ex ample, from 1986 to 2004, the 
rate of incumbent defeat in state Supreme Court 
elections was never higher than 12.3 percent. The 
average rate of incumbent defeat was less than 
9 percent. This suggests that, although they are 
viewed as held accountable to the public, judges 
are largely out of the public view, with few think-
ing to vote against them for their actions on the 
bench. There were major differences in incumbent 
success rates across different election systems. The 
defeat rate in retention elections was 2.1 percent, 
in nonpartisan elections 5.2 percent, and in partisan 
elections 28.1 percent.41
 After notable successes in reducing partisan 
judicial elections, the focus of judicial selection 
reformers has shifted toward ending judicial elec-
tions altogether. The American Bar Association is 
the leading proponent of this change, charging that 
judicial elections, both partisan and nonpartisan, 
have become “noisier, nastier, and costlier.”42
 There is some evidence that an ethnic or par-
tisan bias among judges may influence justice. If 
you are, for example, the defendant in a criminal 
case, the wife in a divorce, a debtor, the victim of 
an employee in jury case, or a government agency 
in a business regulation case you likely will get 
more favorable justice from judges who are from 
minority backgrounds.43 Not unexpectedly, Demo-
cratic judges, at least in appellate courts, also tend 
to side with that group.44 These findings are not 
surprising and probably still hold true, although 
more recent research would be desirable.
Compensation
State Supreme Court judges receive the highest 
salary of state judges. California presently pays its 
Supreme Court judges the highest at $232,060, and 
those in Mississippi receive the lowest at $126,293. 
The average is approximately $162,000. Interme-
diate appellate courts are the next best paid. Final-
ly, the trial court level pays the lowest, typically 
$120,000 to $160,000.45 Most Americans could 
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live comfortably on such salaries, but most judges 
could earn more as private attorneys. At least this 
is the commonly made claim for why their salaries 
need to be high.
Caseload, Crime and Punishment
The United States is often depicted as a litigious 
society, one in which being sued is common. 
Most Americans believe crimes against individ-
uals and property are increasing, widespread and 
threatening.  We will assess civil litigation and 
criminal cases with empirical data. Figure 11.6 
plots the number of new criminal and civil cases 
filed each year from 1994 to 2016. New criminal 
cases increased through 2007 and then decreased 
fairly consistently through 2016.  New civil cases 
increased from 1994 to 2010, then began an unin-
terrupted decrease.   During these years, the popu-
lation of the United States increased more than 20 
percent.46
 Figures 11.7 and 11.8 show the pattern of the 
violent and property crimes for which the Feder-
al Bureau of Investigation keeps statistics.  From 
1994 to 2016 the number of annual violent and 
property crimes decreased 33 percent and 35 per-
cent respectively. The disparity in crime and case 
numbers is not easy to explain. 
 Figure 11.9 plots the number of persons super-
vised by state adult correction agencies from 1994 
to 2016. Probation is the most frequent form of 
supervision. Prison is the next most frequent fol-
lowed by jail and parole, which are essentially tied. 
The total number of persons supervised increased 
Figure 11.6
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through 2009 and then declined. Total incarcera-
tion, the sum of prison and jail, peaked in 2010 and 
then remained at the same level.  Clearly, crime 
decreased but punishment increased in this period.
Relationships Involving Crime and Punishment
Using national data, there is no evidence to support 
the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship 
between crime and punishment.  If anything, the 
data suggest a negative relationship.  However, 
while these data provide useful descriptions of 
crime and punishment trends, they do not control 
for population size.
 Summing state crimes and punishments each 
year for the entire nation makes no use of informa-
tion on how the states differ. Our criminal justice 
system does not administer a national policy. States 
and their local governments define for themselves 
what is criminal and determine their own punish-
ment policies.  If there is a link between crime and 
punishment, it must be assessed comparing the 
states, not with summed state data.
 Figures 11.10, 11.11 and 11.12 present correla-
tions between state incarceration rates and other 
correctional supervision rates and variables mea-
suring crime rates, social conditions, politics and 
policies, and attributes of state populations. The 
single-year comparative state analyses for 2013 
reverses the direction of the longitudinal results for 
the country as a whole from 1994 to 2010.
 In Figure 11.10, incarceration rates are posi-
tively correlated and above the .30 threshold, for 7 
of 9 crime rates. The correlations below .30 are .29 
and .25. This suggests that state incarceration is a 
reaction to crime. The highest correlation is be-
tween murder rates and incarceration rates, r = .74.  
There is unimpressive evidence of a similar link 
between crime rates and other correctional super-
vision rates.  Only three of 9 correlations meet or 
slightly exceed .30.
 Figure 11.11 explores relationships between 
state punishment rates and variables other than 
crime rates. Incarceration rates are positively or 
negatively correlated and above the .30 threshold 
for 11 of 13 measures.  Other correctional su-
pervision is negatively correlated above the .30 
threshold for 2 of 13 measures. Incarceration rate 
is positively correlated with poverty rates, infant 
mortality rates, restrictiveness of abortion policy 
Figure 11.7
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and percent republicans in the state legislature.  
Incarceration rate is negatively correlated with per 
capita income, TANF benefits, and families with 
children in poverty receiving TANF benefits, state 
and local tax burden, state and local revenue per 
capita, voting age population and voting eligible 
population turnout.
 Correlations between state punishment rates 
and state population attributes are summarized in 
Figure 11.12. Once again, incarceration rates have 
more strong relationships than other correctional 
supervision rates.  Incarceration rates are positively 
correlated above the .30 threshold with age adjust-
ed death rate, percent conservative and percent Af-
rican American.  Incarceration rates are negatively 
correlated above the .30 threshold with measures 
of educational attainment, median age and Anglo 
population. 
 State incarceration rates are strongly related to 
crime rates and criminal cases prosecuted.  Incar-
ceration rates are also related to measures of social 
need, resources brought to bear, politics and values 
and race/ethnicity.  Untangling spurious relation-
ships from potential causal relationships is a daunt-
ing task.
Additional Issues
States with substantial criminal or civil caseloads 
must pay the costs of providing the courts and 
judges necessary to deal with the burden of cases. 
Both the trial and possible appeals can be avoided 
by plea-bargaining. If someone accused of a crim-
inal offense agrees to plead “guilty,” no trial needs 
to be held. Usually, however, the accused have 
to be encouraged into such a plea, with the more 
serious offense being dropped in return for a guilty 
plea on a lesser offense. Certainly, plea-bargaining 
relieves an overburdened court system. Critics, 
however, note that the criminal does not pay the 
prescribed penalty for the offense committed, 
which may mean that he or she will return more 
quickly to society and commit another crime.
 While there are no exact estimates of the 
proportion of cases that are resolved through 
plea-bargaining, scholars estimate that about 90 to 
Figure 11.8
Number of Property Crimes 1994-2016
7,900,000
8,900,000
9,900,000
10,900,000
11,900,000
12,900,000
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
270 • Chapter 11 
95 percent of both federal and state court cases are 
resolved through this process.47 Trying these cases 
in court might require a tenfold increase in court 
capacity. Few politicians are likely to advocate 
such additional expense, regardless of their rhetori-
cal displeasure with plea-bargaining.
 Despite the Gideon v. Wainwright  (1963) 
decision’s assurance of legal counsel there is no 
provision that such an attorney will be a good one. 
In Bell v. Cone (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of how effective the counsel guar-
anteed by the 6th Amendment must be. The court 
ruled that the inadequacy has to be so extreme as 
to amount to not just bad legal representation, but 
the equivalent of an absence of legal representa-
tion. Anything short of that requires the defendant 
to argue and prove that, but for the lawyer’s per-
formance, the outcome of the trial would actually 
have been different. The Court’s action in a related 
case, Cockrell v. Burdine (2002), established that 
an attorney sleeping throughout trial proceedings 
was an example of absence of legal representa-
tion.  Even among those who can afford to hire an 
attorney, few can afford the best. A popular cartoon 
portrays an attorney asking of a client, “How much 
justice can you afford?” All legal proceedings in 
the United States are expensive, and the wealthy 
probably get better justice.
 No one would argue that criminal justice 
administered by the states is perfect, but the fre-
quency of wrongful convictions is substantial, 
and the impact on the lives of unjustly imprisoned 
individuals and their families is tragic.   There is 
no national effort to identify and correct wrongful 
convictions caused by pre-DNA testing procedures, 
mishandling of evidence, laboratory mistakes use 
of subsequently discredited “scientific” tests or 
misconduct by police or prosecutors.
 Through June 2016, Texas had paid 101 men 
and women who were wrongfully sent to prison 
$93.6 million according to data from the state 
comptroller’s office.  Individuals declared to be 
“actually innocent” after conviction are eligible for 
$80,000 for each year of incarceration and become 
eligible for monthly annuity payments for the rest 
of their lives, unless they are later convicted of 
felonies.48 
 The National Registry of Exonerations reported 
149 exonerations in in 2015. Texas led the nation 
in overall exonerations with 54.  New York was a 
distant second with 17.  Of the 54 Texas exonera-
tions, 43 were in Harris County alone.  The convic-
tion review section of the Harris County District 
Attorney’s office identified 42 of the 47 wrongful 
drug convictions recorded for the entire country 
in 2015.  Conviction integrity units identified 58 
nationwide wrongful convictions in 2015.  Convic-
tion integrity units are optional, and only 24 exist-
ed in the United States in 2015.49
Figure 11.9
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Figure 11.10 
Punishment and Crime Rate Correlations 2014 
 
Crime Measure 
Incarcerated per 100,000 adult 
population 
Correctional Supervision per 100,000 
adult population 
Violent crime rate .53 .14 
Murder rate .74 .33 
Rape rate .25 -.01 
Aggravated assault rate .52 .06 
Property crime rate .58 .30 
Burglary rate .64 .33 
Robbery rate .35 .27 
Larceny rate .51 .26 
Motor vehicle rate .29 .15 
Figure 11.11 
Punishment Rate and Social Conditions, Policies and Politics Correlations 2014 
 
Measure 
Incarcerated per 100,000 
adult population 
Correctional Supervision per 
100,000 adult population 
Per capita income -.52 -.26 
Poverty rate .64 .24 
TANF benefits per family -.61 -.33 
Pct. Families with children in poverty receiving TANF -.61 -.33 
Infant mortality rate .61 .29 
State and local tax burden -.52 -.09 
State and local revenue per capita -.33 -.21 
State and local spending per capita -.24 -.17 
Restrictiveness of Abortion Policy .50 .24 
Voting age population turnout -.33 -.13 
Voting eligible population turnout -.43 -.13 
Percent of voting age population registered to vote -.03 -.05 
Percent Republicans in legislature .56 .14 
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 Finally, justice is not uniform across the coun-
try. In some areas, acts that are criminal behaviors 
elsewhere are perfectly legal and, more commonly, 
the severity of the penalty for a criminal act varies 
greatly from state to state. There is also variation 
within a state. Prosecuting attorneys are typically 
based in geographical districts that differ in pop-
ulation size, makeup, and values. Particularly at 
the county level, prosecutors may be more or less 
active in pursuing cases involving so-called victim-
less crimes. The probability of being prosecuted or 
found guilty, as well as the severity of any penal-
ty, varies greatly both between states and within 
states.
 There is some evidence, furthermore, to sug-
gest that the mass media’s emphasis on numbers 
of crimes rather than the crime rate results in more 
numerous guilty verdicts and more severe punish-
ments.50 There is also the use of grand juries by 
prosecutors largely for their own political careers. 
They may gain notoriety by using the grand jury’s 
inquiry into possible crimes as a springboard to 
higher office.
 The Constitution guarantees only a trial by an 
impartial jury, not one by one’s peers. Regardless, 
there is good reason to believe that the typical trial 
jury is neither. Most states call jurors from the rolls 
of those registered to vote, which makes even the 
initial draw biased against those who are unregis-
tered. Addition ally, states typically excuse students, 
mothers of small children, and small businessmen 
whose livelihood might be affected by serving on a 
jury. Thus, additional bias is added to prospective 
juries.
 Furthermore, attorneys for the two sides in 
criminal and civil cases may excuse prospective 
jurors because they seem unlikely to vote for 
their clients. Many persons are employed to assist 
attorneys in “tailoring” juries into being the most 
favorable possible jury for their clients. Neither the 
plaintiffs’ nor defendants’ attorneys seek unbiased 
jurors.  On the contrary, they all seek jurors biased 
in favor of their clients. Given all of these biasing 
influences on our trial juries, it is thus improbable 
that a defendant will be judged by an impartial 
jury of his or her peers.
Summary
1. In the United States, we have a dual court sys-
tem with both state and federal courts. Each system 
has trial courts where cases are tried, as well as 
Figure 11.12 
Punishment Rate and Population Attributes Correlations 2014 
Measure 
Incarcerated per 100,000 adult 
population 
Other Correctional Supervision 
per 100,000 adult population 
High school educational attainment -.54 -.24 
Higher educational attainment -.61 -.20 
Median age -.37 -.20 
Age adjusted death rate* .64 .24 
Gallup Poll percent conservative .62 .14 
Percent Anglo -.32 -.24 
Percent African American .52 .43 
Percent Hispanic/Latino .16 .03 
*2013
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appellate courts that may hear cases on appeal.
2. The generalization that activist courts make 
liberal decisions is not based on comprehensive 
analyses of decisions. Analysis of all cases with 
a valid and reliable measure of activist decisions 
concludes that, in recent years, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has made more activist conservative than 
activist liberal decisions.
3. The Constitution affords those accused of 
crimes many protections in federal courts. Most 
of these protections have been extended to those 
accused in state courts, whether or not they were 
also included in state constitutions. Several U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions, such as Mapp v. Ohio, 
Gideon v. Wainwright, and Miranda v. Arizona, 
have also structured how the courts, in particular 
state courts, deal with crime in the courtroom.
4. Consensus on which individuals and groups 
should receive equal protection under law has 
changed throughout American history. The courts 
have taken the lead role in this issue.
5. Who has the right to marriage sanctioned by 
state government is a highly publicized and im-
portant contemporary civil rights issue. The United 
States Supreme Court has essentially ruled that 
states must treat opposite sex and same sex mar-
riages the same way.  The extent to which nondis-
crimination laws apply to same sex couples varies 
across the states.  Disputes about decisions related 
to same sex marriage will result in ongoing litiga-
tion.
6. State judges are selected in a variety of ways 
and the Missouri plan is the most popular. In this 
method, a knowledgeable committee selects appli-
cants with merit for final selection by the governor. 
Voters later get to approve or disapprove of the 
individual selected.  Three states use the retention 
election element of the Missouri Plan. 
7. At the national level, numbers of crimes have 
de creased since 1994, but numbers of criminal 
cases and prisoners incarcerated have increased.  
At the same time, analyses of state rate measures 
show strong links between crime and incarceration 
punishment. Incarceration rate is also correlated 
with a large proportion of social, policy and demo-
graphic measures across the states.
8. Plea-bargaining, better justice for the wealthy, 
and other problems plague our modern courts, and 
there seems little chance to solve them.  There are 
only a few conviction integrity units within state 
governments.  The states have yet to make a com-
prehensive effort to identify and rectify the prob-
lems of wrongful convictions. 
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Study Guide, Chapter 11
Essay Questions
 1. Which court system is more important to Americans in their daily lives: federal or state? What empirical   
 evidence supports your answer? What empirical evidence does not support your conclusion?
 2. Explain the different responsibilities of trial courts and appellate courts.  How do the different procedures in 
 each court reflect their different responsibilities?
  
 3. Provide four examples of how court decisions have changed the concept of “equal protection under the law” 
 in criminal cases. Have these cases most often been decided in state or federal courts? Why?
 4. Why are courts more likely to champion minority rights than the other two branches of government?  Does 
 this mean that the courts are more liberal?  Why or why not?
 5. How have court cases over the years changed the concept “equal protection under civil law” in civil cases? 
 Have these cases most often been in state or federal courts? Why?
 6. Is there empirical evidence to support the contention that there is a positive relationship between state crime 
 rates and state punishment rates?  If there were a causal relationship between crime and punishment, what evi-
 dence would be sufficient to prove it?  Could we determine which is the cause and which is the effect? 
 7. Is the American system of federal courts and state courts set up to guarantee that all individuals accused of 
 crimes will be treated equally?  Why or why not?  Provide examples.
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. Generally, Americans are affected more by,
  a. the federal court system
  b. the state court system
  c. the federal courts in criminal cases
  d. the federal courts in civil cases
 2. What is the typical name of a state’s court of last resort?
  a. district court
  b. court of criminal or civil appeals
  c. state supreme court
  d. federal district court
 3. Which of the following statements is true?
  a. The legislative branch is more active in championing minority rights than are the other two branches.
  b. The executive branch is more active in championing minority rights than are the other two branches.
  c. The judicial branch is more active in championing minority rights than are the other two branches.
  d. The judicial branch is more active in championing majority rule than are the other two branches.
 4. In United States v. Windsor (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
  a. the federal government must recognize all marriages legal under the laws of the states where marriages 
  took place
  b. all governments must recognize all marriages legal under the laws of the states where marriages took   
  place
  c. states must legalize same sex marriage or establish comparable domestic partner status within four years
  d. states have the constitutional authority to chose to recognize marriages from some states and not others, 
  but if they recognize a state’s opposite sex marriages they must also recognize that state’s same sex marria-
  ges
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Chapter 12
EDUCATION, POVERTY, AND HEALTH: 
STATE AND LOCAL EFFORTS
Liberals and conservatives take opposite positions 
on many controversial issues. Policies dealing with 
education, poverty, and crime find perhaps the 
greatest consistency of such positions across policy 
areas.1 Conservatives strongly believe in individual 
responsibility. Conservatives view criminal behav-
ior as evidence of a character fault of the individ-
ual. Some are drawn to crime; society is safe only 
after such individuals are incarcerated.
 The liberal, by contrast, notes that criminals 
are overwhelmingly uneducated and poor. For this 
reason, they argue crime results from society’s fail-
ure to meet the needs of many, in effect forcing the 
poorly educated and poor into a life of crime.
 Liberals share with conservatives the belief that 
some crimes must be punished as offenses against 
society, including murder, rape, and most violent 
crimes. The liberal, however, is likely to forgive in-
dividuals who have repaid society for criminal acts, 
perhaps even granting a second chance. The conser-
vative, seeing a faulty individual, is less likely to do 
so. The rhetoric of conservatives today includes the 
idea of “three strikes and you’re out.” This does not 
rest on an analogy to baseball but rather to an older 
style of justice, whereby a first offense resulted in 
cutting off the left hand; the second, the right hand; 
and the third, the head. Many would argue that 
three strikes are too many.
 Conservatives also apply the principle of in-
dividual responsibility to poverty. They see those 
living in poverty as having failed to make the effort 
necessary to have a job and pay their own way. If 
society provides the minimum amount of money for 
food and housing, in the conservative’s view, the 
practice removes the incentive for those on welfare 
to get a job. From the conservative perspective, 
most people on welfare have a character fault; they 
are lazy.
 The liberal views poverty as society’s failure to 
provide some people with the skills needed to get a 
job paying above minimum wage. Both liberals and 
conservatives, however, share the belief that some 
are poor through no fault of their own. Society, 
they both believe, should show compassion toward 
children, the severely disabled and the elderly. They 
strongly disagree on whether compassionate help 
should come through the involuntary taxation of 
government or through the voluntary contributions 
of individuals and charitable organizations.
 Conservatives apply the principle of individual 
responsibility to health issues.  To a large extent, 
medical problems are caused by individual choices.  
Alcohol or drug addiction is evidence of a char-
acter fault of the individual. So are obesity, tobac-
co-related cancers and other illnesses, most com-
municable diseases and unwanted pregnancy. Those 
with genetic predispositions to medical problems 
should be responsible about prevention and early 
detection. It is their responsibility to carry sufficient 
health insurance.
 Liberals view most health issues as society’s 
responsibility. The most vulnerable, the very young 
and very old, should not be held responsible for 
their own health when they lack financial means 
or physiological abilities or intellectual capacity. 
Purchasing private health insurance is an invest-
ment many of the young and healthy are willing to 
forego. Government must play a role in limiting 
the causes and damages of communicable disease 
because responsible individual behavior alone will 
not provide sufficient protection. 
 Conservatives and liberals agree that those suf-
fering debilitating health problems should receive 
compassion and care. Conservatives argue the 
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responsibility rests with individuals and charita-
ble organizations. Liberals argue that government 
must play a role, particularly when other efforts are 
insufficient.
 Finally, the liberal believes public educa-
tion offers society the leverage needed to change 
individuals. By educating everyone equally to the 
highest standards, society grants all an opportunity 
for a good life. If public education fails to educate 
children, it dooms them to difficulties in finding 
employment. Poverty and the absence of legal em-
ployment prospects might lead to criminal behav-
ior. Poor success in educating students, the liberal 
would argue, is society’s failure.
 The conservative accepts the need for public 
educational opportunities as a benefit to society. 
However, if an individual fails to use educational 
opportunities, the fault rests with the individual, 
not the educational system. Society’s role is to 
offer opportunity, not to guarantee educational 
success or economic success.
 Conservatives and liberals agree that govern-
ment has important roles to play in dealing with 
crime, poverty and public health issues. They agree 
quality public education should be provided. They 
disagree on the role government should play. They 
also frequently disagree on goals. They disagree 
on whether threshold public education quality or 
equal access to the highest quality public education 
should be the goal. They disagree on the appropri-
ate role of private sector and religious schools.
 Conservatives and liberals disagree on appro-
priate punishment for crime, acceptable levels of 
poverty, public health and education. Accordingly, 
they disagree on how to deal with each of these 
issues.
 If society embraced totally the conservative 
perspective, we might seek to identify the faulty 
characters as early as possible. Once identified, 
they could be removed. Society could then save 
the money that would otherwise be wasted in 
futile attempts to educate them, to compensate for 
their poverty, and to deal with their criminal acts. 
We currently lack the capacity to distinguish with 
certainty, for example, poorly performing students 
from those whose capacity to learn falls below an 
acceptable threshold. Would conservatives want to 
use means to identify the hopeless cases if we had 
them?
 There are some who speculate that, in the 
future, human medical and behavioral science may 
permit us to assess each individual’s capacities and 
prospects on a limitless number of dimensions. 
Even if this should be the case, liberals would still 
oppose conservatives. They would surely argue 
that the tools capable of identifying those doomed 
to failure might also provide the means to heal or 
cure them.
 Who is right? Probably, neither side can con-
vince the other of the error in its thinking. Both 
Figure 12.1 
Beneficial Educational Attainment Correlations 2014  
HS College 
ECONOMIC 
Per Capita Income .43 .76 
Poverty -.80 -.67 
HEALTH 
Life Expectancy at Birth .61 .62 
Age Adjusted Death Rate -.49 -.76 
Percent Obese Population -.40 -.73 
Infant Mortality Rate -.43 -.65 
Percent Low Birth Weight -.61 -.37 
Teen Birth Rate -.59 -.82 
CRIME 
Violent Crime Rate -.45 -.31 
Property Crime Rate -.44 -.39 
Incarceration Rate -.54 -.61 
New Prisoner Rate -.15 -.41 
State Correctional Supervision Rate -.24 -.20 
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liberals and conservatives should object to our 
one-dimensional characterization of their views 
from disagreement on a single idea. The adher-
ents of neither philosophy agree unanimously on 
appropriate courses of action when we do have 
accurate information about individuals’ prospects. 
Both conservatives and liberals would rather not 
contemplate cases of medical conditions involving 
both unspeakable suffering and certain death.
 Neither conservatives nor liberals offer one-
size-fits-all solutions to all the problems we face. 
No state has yet committed itself totally to either 
the conservative or the liberal way of thinking. 
Some states, however, target more financial and 
other resources than others. We now ask whether 
or not these differences matter.
The Importance of Education
We have previously noted that some states have 
better educated publics, some have more living in 
poverty, and some have more crime. There may 
be a pattern to these differences. At the individ-
ual level, we might well expect poorly educated 
individuals to be poor and more likely to engage 
in criminal behavior. Certainly this would be the 
connection seen by liberals, but conservatives also 
might expect a character fault to overlap into poor 
use of educational opportunities, laziness in getting 
out of poverty, and crime.
 Education is empirically linked to many bene-
ficial results of importance across the states. Figure 
12.1 summarizes some of them.
 More educational attainment by state residents 
is related to higher income and lower poverty. We 
have seen in earlier chapters that higher income 
is related to more government revenue, lower tax 
burdens, and higher government spending.
 Educational attainment is also related to health 
outcomes we prefer. Educational attainment is 
positively related to life expectancy at birth. Ed-
ucational attainment is negatively correlated with 
death rates, obesity, infant mortality, low birth 
weight and teen birth rate. 
 Educational attainment is negatively correlated 
with both property crime rate and violent crime 
rate. It is also negatively correlated with rate 
of total incarceration. We have seen earlier that 
government efforts to deal with crime through law 
enforcement and prisons are reactive. If the rela-
tionships between crime variables and educational 
attainment are causal, achieving greater education-
al attainment is a proactive means to reduce the 
incidence of crime and the cost of criminal justice.
 Figure 12.2 lists correlations with two mea-
sures of educational attainment, high school gradu-
ation and college degree completion. Only three of 
26 coefficients are below our .30 strength thresh
Figure 12.2 
Educational Attainment and Poverty Rate Correlations Over Time 
HS College HS College 
1970 -0.72 -0.40 2002 -0.76 -0.58
1980 -0.68 -0.49 2003 -0.80 -0.60
1989 -0.66 -0.60 2004 -0.74 -0.60
1990 -0.69 -0.36 2005 -0.74 -0.62
1991 -0.66 -0.58 2006 -0.73 -0.57
1993 -0.74 -0.57 2007 -0.78 -0.58
1994 -0.69 -0.46 2008 -0.79 -0.61
1995 -0.66 -0.49 2009 -0.77 -0.57
1996 -0.64 -0.46 2010 -0.82 -0.65
1997 -0.63 -0.47 2011 -0.75 -0.61
1998 -0.65 -0.47 2012 -0.70 -0.62
1999 -0.63 -0.46 2013 -.079 -0.65
2000 -0.63 -0.53 2014 -0.80 -0.67
2001 -0.63 -0.57
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old. Sometimes high school attainment has the 
higher correlation and sometimes college attain-
ment has the higher correlation.
 Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 showed that the relation-
ships between educational attainment and per capi-
ta income are consistently strong over many years. 
In addition, correlations between per capita income 
and college completion have become larger, while 
correlations with high school completions have be-
come smaller over time.  Figures 12.2 through 12.5 
contain correlations over time between the two 
measures of educational attainment and poverty, 
infant mortality, violent crime and property crime.
 Poverty rate (Figure 12.2) is consistently more 
strongly negatively correlated with high school 
completion rates than with college completion 
rates over the entire 1970 to 2014 time period. 
Infant mortality (Figure 12.3) is more strongly neg-
atively correlated with high school completion than 
college completion from 1950 to 1997.  From 1998 
to 2011, the correlations are strongly negative, but 
essentially the same.  From 2012 to 2014, infant 
mortality is more strongly negatively correlated 
with college completion than college completion.
 Correlations between educational attainment 
and crime rates are not so consistent over time. 
Violent crime rate (Figure 12.4) is consistently 
negatively correlated with high school completion 
from 1995 to 2014, but not before. Violent crime 
rate and college completion are not correlated 
above the threshold of .30 until 2013. 
 Property crime rate and high school comple-
tion (Figure 12.5) are negatively correlated ten of 
the eleven years from 2004 to 2014. Correlations 
between property crime rate and college comple-
tion are negatively correlated from 2006 through 
2014, but not before.  However, greater educational 
attainment was related to higher property crime 
rates in 1990 and earlier.
 The beneficial relationships between educa-
tional attainment and crime rates are inconsistent 
between attainment measures and exist only for the 
most recent few years. The beneficial relationships 
between educational attainment and poverty rates 
and educational attainment and infant mortality 
rates are consistently negative for both measures of 
attainment. Clearly, the desirable empirical rela-
tionships between problem level and educational 
attainment are consistent for only some policy 
areas.
Figure 12.3 
Educational Attainment and Infant Mortality Rate Correlations Over Time 
HS College HS College 
1950 -0.45 0.08 2001 -0.37 -0.34 
1960 -0.34 0.07 2002 -0.50 -0.44 
1970 -0.54 -0.21 2003 -0.45 -0.44 
1980 -0.67 -0.26 2004 -0.46 -0.50 
1989 -0.56 -0.43 2005 -0.53 -0.58 
1990 -0.57 -0.41 2006 -0.52 -0.58 
1991 -0.63 -0.52 2007 -0.56 -0.60 
1993 -0.64 -0.50 2008 -0.48 -0.56 
1994 -0.52 -0.36 2009 -0.46 -0.52 
1995 -0.60 -0.50 2010 -0.52 -0.58 
1996 -0.43 -0.39 2011 -0.49 -0.57 
1997 -0.54 -0.42 2012 -0.48 -0.63 
1998 -0.47 -0.47 2013 -0.46 -0.59 
1999 -0.51 -0.39 2014 -0.43 -0.65 
2000 -0.51 -0.54 
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Can State Policy Proactively Increase Educational 
Attainment? 
How can we achieve greater educational attain-
ment? We have been using two measures of for-
mal education in state populations. Percent of the 
population age 25 and older that has completed 
high school or the equivalent measures success in 
primary and secondary education. Every state has 
maximizing high school graduation rates as a cen-
tral education policy goal. Although all states claim 
their goal is universal high school graduation, none 
achieve it. In 23 states, more than 90 percent of 
residents have completed high school. The map of 
high school completion rates in Chapter 2, Figure 
2.2 shows the familiar regional pattern of Southern 
states with distinctly lower achievement.
 Percent of the population age 25 and older that 
has a bachelor’ s or more advanced degree mea-
sures success in higher education attainment. States 
Figure 12.4 
Educational Attainment and Violent Crime Rate Correlations Over Time 
HS College HS College 
1960 -0.18 0.09 2002 -0.41 0.01 
1970 -0.14 0.21 2003 -0.44 -0.05 
1980 -0.02 0.23 2004 -0.45 -0.07 
1989 -0.20 0.10 2005 -0.43 -0.12 
1990 -0.28 0.13 2006 -0.43 -0.17 
1991 -0.30 -0.01 2007 -0.46 -0.25 
1992 2008 -0.48 -0.21 
1993 -0.31 0.02 2009 -0.50 -0.22 
1994 -0.26 -0.04 2010 -0.45 -0.21 
1995 -0.33 -0.06 2011 -0.48 -0.29 
1996 -0.33 0.10 2012 -0.49 -0.27 
1997 -0.34 0.04 2013 -0.45 -0.33 
1998 -0.34 -0.03 2014 -.045 -0.31 
1999 -0.44 -0.12 
2000 -0.45 -0.10 
2001 -0.38 -0.05 
Figure 12.5 
Educational Attainment and Property Crime Rate Correlations Over Time 
HS College HS College 
1960 0.53 0.47 2001 -0.13 -0.11 
1970 0.52 0.63 2002 -0.19 -0.08 
1980 0.50 0.60 2003 -0.26 -0.15 
1989 0.17 0.29 2004 -0.31 -0.19 
1990 0.12 0.46 2005 -0.23 -0.16 
1991 0.13 0.27 2006 -0.33 -0.31 
1992 2007 -0.40 -0.35 
1993 0.08 0.23 2008 -0.46 -0.31 
1994 0.12 0.12 2009 -0.47 -0.34 
1995 0.07 0.03 2010 -0.44 -0.34 
1996 -0.01 -0.02 2011 -0.47 -0.36 
1997 -0.03 -0.02 2012 -0.45 -0.40 
1998 -0.03 -0.01 2013 -0.41 -0.39 
1999 -.0.16 -0.08 2014 -0.44 -0.39 
2000 -0.15 -0.13 
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claim they want high school graduates to complete 
college degrees, but financial support for public 
institutions of higher education has been declining 
in all states for more than a decade. No state has 
set a target for percent of high school graduates 
completing college degrees, but all are aware that 
higher educational attainment is a key resource for 
a strong state economy. The map of college com-
pletion rates in Chapter 2, Figure 2.3 again shows 
Southern states have distinctly lower achievement.
 As shown in Figure 12.6, the two measures of 
educational attainment in 2014 are correlated at 
.45. In general, states with highly educated popu-
lations by one measure also have highly educated 
populations by the other.  There are only three 
states with lower than average high school comple-
tion and higher than average college completion: 
Illinois, New York and Rhode Island.  However, 
there are 13 states above average on high school 
completion but below average on college comple-
tion rates.
 Since, for individuals, higher education fol-
lows high school graduation, it is tempting to think 
that high school graduation causes completion of 
degrees in higher education. We should be cautious 
because we are not analyzing data on individuals. 
Our data are aggregated to the state level. It is also 
possible that residents of states with more college 
degree earners effectively insist on more successful 
primary and secondary education for their children 
and grandchildren and for the entire population.
 While states desire educated populations, there 
are alternatives to educating their own state resi-
dents. The most prominent is to encourage those 
educated elsewhere to relocate. That way, edu-
cation costs are exported to other states as more ed-
ucated newcomers are attracted. Another option is 
to encourage residents with less formal education 
to leave. Obviously, all states cannot successfully 
export their less-educated residents and import 
residents educated elsewhere simultaneously.
 For the country as a whole, there is no viable 
option other than educating the entire population. 
But people do move for employment opportunities, 
and some states have attracted the “better educat-
ed” with good jobs.   It is tempting to conclude 
that the three states that paired below average 
high school completion rates with above average 
college completion rates are doing well in their 
balance of trade in residents with college degrees. 
Percent Population With High School Completion or Higher
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Figure 12.6 
Educational Attainment Measures 2014 
Average High School  
Completion 
Average College  
Completion 
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 There were 4 states in 2014 with below aver-
age in high school completion located above the 
regression line.  They have more residents with 
college degrees than predicted by their numbers 
of residents with high school completion.  Texas, 
North Carolina, Georgia, New Mexico also seem 
to be doing well in their balance of trade in resi-
dents with college degrees.  Texas has the lowest 
high school graduation rate but may be the most 
successful of the below average high school gradu-
ation states in attracting college graduates.
 Unfortunately, data do not exist to track chang-
es in state educational attainment caused by in-mi-
gration and out-migration.  Data also do not exist 
about deaths by state and educational attainment 
level. Population relocation is clearly an important 
factor in state educational attainment, but we lack 
the means to study it with comprehensive compar-
ative information.
State Resources for Education and Educational 
Attainment
Do states that invest more funds in education 
realize more educated residents? This is a more 
complicated question than one might imagine. The 
evidence is sufficiently mixed that both liberals and 
conservatives can confirm their beliefs by focus-
ing on supporting evidence and ignoring contrary 
evidence. 
 Figure 12.7 does not provide consistent ev-
idence that states with higher expenditures per 
K-12 student achieve higher high school gradu-
ation rates. The correlation is positive but below 
our threshold for being deemed strong for 12 of 24 
years. The correlations between educational spend-
ing and college attainment are consistently positive 
and higher than .30.
 There is no consistent relationship between 
contemporary K-12 education spending and high 
school educational attainment. There is a consistent 
positive relationship between contemporary K-12 
education spending and college educational at-
tainment.  If there is a causal relationship between 
spending and college attainment and an incon-
sistent causal relationship between spending and 
high school attainment, it must be that educational 
attainment causes educational spending, not vice 
versa.   Educational attainment can cause education 
spending if, for example, more highly 
Figure 12.7
Correlations Between Contemporary State Spending Per Child in Average 
Daily Attendance and Educational Attainment 
HS College HS College
1970 0.45 0.42 2002 0.25 0.48
1980 0.50 0.51 2003 0.20 0.48
1989 0.38 0.51 2004 0.25 0.48
1990 0.37 0.38 2005 0.24 0.46
1991 0.37 0.50 2006 0.25 0.44
1993 0.31 0.44 2007 0.25 0.47
1994 0.34 0.46 2008 0.25 0.54
1995 0.34 0.56 2009 0.32 0.52
1996 0.33 0.49 2010 0.30 0.53
1997 0.27 0.48 2011 0.36 0.47
1998 0.28 0.47 2012 0.33 0.47
1970 0.45 0.42 2013 0.33 0.52
1999 0.23 0.42 2014 0.37 0.52
2000 0.21 0.46
2001 0.20 0.48
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educated residents demand more spending in the 
public schools, both for their children and others’ 
children.
 It is not possible for expenditures on educa-
tion to cause rates of educational attainment in the 
same year. Contemporary spending on primary 
and secondary education promotes educational 
achievement for current students, ages 5-19.  Now, 
recall that the measure of state high school comple-
tion is limited to the percent of population 25 years 
and older. Kindergarteners today will not enter this 
group for another 20 years.
 The full impact of contemporary spending will 
take place when student beneficiaries of spending 
are all in the cohort used to measure educational 
achievement Thus, a proper empirical analysis of 
educational spending on educational achievement 
must measure achievement 20 years after spend-
ing.  Figure 12.8 presents such an analysis.
 Lagged correlations between earlier educa-
tional spending and later high school attainment 
are consistently higher than contemporary correla-
tions and consistently above the threshold of .30. 
On average, the correlation is .13 larger. Clearly, 
educational attainment is strongly and consistent-
ly linked to spending when the cohort of school 
children joins the cohort adults whose educational 
attainment is measured. The correlations between 
lagged primary and secondary spending and 
college attainment are also usually higher, but the 
average difference is only .01. However, lagged 
spending correlations with higher education attain-
ment greatly exceed those for high school attain-
ment starting in 2005.
 If it were possible, we would want to control 
also for people who currently live in a state other 
than where they received their higher education. 
The quantity and quality of data necessary are not 
obtainable and not likely to become available.
 There are very strong and consistent correla-
tions between what states spend on primary and 
secondary education and what states get in educa-
tional attainment when the beneficiaries of spend-
ing join the cohort measured for educational attain-
ment.  The link between what might be cause and 
what might be effect is separated by 20 years. This 
gives rise to at least two time issues. First, spend-
ing on primary and secondary education is long-
term investment in human capital. Benefits come, 
but they do not come in the short term. Second, the 
time period for education return-on-investment and 
the political time horizons of elected government 
officials are severely disconnected. State and local 
officials cannot receive credit personally for good 
spending decisions or be held accountable for bad 
spending decisions.2
Figure 12.8 
Correlations Between State Spending Per Child in Average Daily 
Attendance Twenty Years Earlier and Educational Attainment  
HS College HS College 
1970 0.70 0.47 2003 0.38 0.41 
1980 0.66 0.48 2004 0.38 0.42 
1989 0.51 0.49 2005 0.42 0.42 
1990 0.47 0.44 2006 0.40 0.51 
1991 0.49 0.48 2007 0.43 0.58 
1993 0.39 0.52 2008 0.40 0.61 
1994 0.42 0.52 2009 0.38 0.59 
1995 0.38 0.42 2010 0.37 0.59 
1996 0.50 0.58 2011 0.37 0.57 
1997 0.55 0.48 2012 0.35 0.56 
1998 0.49 0.42 2013 0.35 0.52 
1999 0.48 0.38 2014 0.32 0.53 
2000 0.38 0.46 
2001 0.39 0.43 
2002 0.45 0.41 
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 It is easy for those who believe that greater 
spending on education produces waste rather than 
results to present as supporting evidence one of the 
small contemporary correlations in Figure 12.7. 
This false conclusion can be communicated in a 
15-second sound bite, a graphic, or even a cartoon. 
Much more time and audiences with longer atten-
tion spans are necessary to explain a more complex 
pattern between past support for education and 
contemporary achievement levels.
Primary and Secondary Education Quality
 
The United States has one of the least centralized 
education systems in the world. State and local 
governments do not merely execute federal plans 
and orders. American states are the central actors in 
public education. Almost all states delegate major 
responsibility for primary and secondary education 
to local school districts. States themselves play the 
central roles in public higher education.
 The federal government has always played a 
small role in primary and secondary education. 
Grants to stimulate use of better practices and to 
aid economically impacted areas have always been 
less than 15 percent of total spending on primary 
and secondary education. The larger federal role 
has been to act as a clearinghouse of information 
on educational successes and failures.
 The major national efforts to improve educa-
tion under President George W. Bush in 2001 em-
ulated programs put into place in the state of Texas 
when he was governor. The reason for following 
the lead of Texas is certainly not because of its suc-
cess in education. As Figure 12.6 documents, Texas 
residents have the lowest high school completion 
rate in the nation. Texas’ proportion of population 
with bachelor’s degrees or more higher education 
is below average. The impetus for emulating Texas 
was probably largely political and personal.
 The major elements in the federal No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001 were put into place earlier 
in Texas. They were:
• Emphasize scores on standardized tests as a 
primary measure of educational achievement.
• Have separate testing standards for higher and 
lower performing groups of students.
• Evaluate schools and school districts based on 
test results.
• Promise financial incentives to schools for 
improving test scores.
• Impose financial penalties on schools for not 
improving test scores.
• Retain decentralized choice as an immutable 
principle.
• Permit inconsistent evaluation criteria and ex-
emptions from evaluation.
• Provide insufficient funding from the more 
central government.
 From the perspective of the local schools, the 
Texas and federal education reforms were un-
funded mandates. Teachers objected to evaluating 
education quality solely on test scores. The empha-
sis on statewide achievement testing has peaked 
and is in decline. In 2013, the Texas Legislature 
decreased the number of end-of-course exams 
from 15 to 5 and reduced their importance for high 
school graduation. It also replaced minimum, rec-
ommended and distinguished high school curricula 
with a simplified foundation graduation program.3 
The results of tests required for high school gradu-
ation were disregarded in 2016.
 No Child Left Behind required testing, but 
states could choose which tests. The inconsistent 
results from various tests were embarrassing and 
looked unprofessional.  The National Governors 
Association and the Council of Chief State School 
Officers, whose members are top-ranking state ed-
ucation officials, worked together to create a single 
set of standards and a common grading criteria that 
came to be known as the Common Core. It is being 
used in 42 states.4
 Federal agencies did not create the Common 
Core, but the Obama administration encouraged 
its adoption through its $4 billion grant program to 
states, Race to the Top.5 All but two states, Alaska 
and Texas, applied for grants. Texas Governor Rick 
Perry explained his reasons for rejecting Race to 
the Top in a February 2010 op-ed essay published 
in Texas newspapers. The reasons included:
• RTTT threatens state sovereignty to determine 
how best to educate their children.
• Turning down strings-attached money will en-
sure Texas children get the best education possible.
• Education of Texas children is too important 
to entrust to some federal bureaucrat toiling in a 
distant federal building.
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• Texas is fighting to maintain freedom to hold 
our children to high standards.6
 Governor Perry’s essay was not an attempt to 
use factual information to explain his decision. 
His purpose was to state forcefully partisan and 
ideological beliefs shared by his base of political 
support. He acted on those beliefs again when he 
insisted that the 2011 Texas Legislature decrease 
state funding of K-12 education by $5.3 billion 
dollars for 2012-2013, even though the number of 
school children was increasing.
 The federal Race to the Top grant program was 
made even more flexible in 2012. Individual school 
districts became eligible to apply for grant funds, 
even if their states did not. Of 372 applications that 
year, one was from an Alaska school district and 36 
were from Texas school districts.7
Figure 12.9
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Poverty by Race/Ethnicity 1960-2016
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Can Proactive State Policy Decrease Poverty?
Poverty remains a major problem in our society. 
In 2014, a family of four with an income below 
$23,850 was defined as living in poverty.8 The 
corresponding amount for 2016 is $24,300.9 The 
percentage of Americans living in poverty has fluc-
tuated over time, as shown in Figure 12.9. In gen-
eral, poverty rates decreased from 22.2 percent in 
1960 to 8.6 percent in 2000. Poverty then increased 
and peaked at 15.2 percent in 2010.  In 2016, the 
poverty rate was 13 percent.
 Figure 12.9 provides a clear data visualization 
of the difference between measuring poverty in raw 
numbers and measuring poverty as a rate. The 47 
million Americans living in poverty in 2014 ex-
ceeded the 40 million in 1962 and was the highest 
the United States has ever experienced.  At the 
same time, the 13 percent poverty rate in 2014 is 
much lower than the 22.2 percent rate of 1960.
 Poverty is a greater problem for some groups 
than for others. Figure 12.10 shows poverty rates 
by race and ethnicity. Poverty has consistently af-
fected African-Americans and Hispanics more than 
Anglos 
 Figure 12.11 shows poverty rates by age. A ma-
jor change has occurred since 1960. The problem 
of poverty has been shifted from the oldest to the 
youngest. In 1959 poverty rates increased with age: 
under 18 years 17 percent, 18 to 64 years 27 per-
cent, and 65 and older 35 percent.  In 2016 poverty 
rates decreased with age: 65 and older 9.3 percent, 
18 to 64 years 11.6 percent and under 18 years 18 
percent.
 The group least dependent on employment for 
themselves or their caretakers was essentially im-
mune to widespread unemployment. Poverty was 
also transferred from the group with highest voter 
turnout to those with lowest voter turnout and to 
those too young to vote.
 Poverty rates declined from 1993 to 2000 and 
then increased again. As was the case with de-
clining poverty during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
relative contributions of welfare reform and an 
extremely robust economy are subject to debate. 
Increasing poverty after 2000 suggests that not all 
periods of increasing prosperity result in poverty 
reduction. What is not subject to debate is the 
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transfer of the burden of poverty from the oldest to 
the youngest.
Public Assistance Programs
Unlike education policy, the federal govern-
ment--or the states in the guise of the federal gov-
ernment-has taken the lead in developing public 
assistance programs to ameliorate or reduce pov-
erty. There are multiple programs, but all involve a 
partnership between federal and state governments. 
The federal government establishes a framework of 
eligibility and benefit rules and provides a base-
line level of funding. State governments have the 
option of adjusting eligibility and benefit rules. For 
all except the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program, states can supplement federal contribu-
tions with state resources.10 
 There is no federal Department of Poverty and 
no state has a Department of Poverty. Neverthe-
less, there are multiple programs for dealing with 
poverty. They fall under efforts with titles such as 
social insurance, income security, human services, 
and health and nutrition.
 The most expensive social welfare programs 
are Social Security and Medicare.  They are na-
tional programs that serve the elderly, not the poor.   
State governments administer a broad variety of 
public assistance or means-tested programs. Rom 
notes that much, but not all, public assistance is 
considered an entitlement.  Any person eligible for 
benefits can obtain them and government is obli-
gated to provide the resources necessary to fill all 
claims.11
 The largest public assistance program by 
expenditure is Medicaid, which provides medical 
care for persons eligible by state policy. Medic-
aid alone accounts for about 60 percent of public 
assistance spending. In 2014 Medicaid served 70 
million individuals. Medicaid expenditures in 2014 
were $476 billion; 60 percent paid by the federal 
government and one-third paid by states. By 2016, 
more than 72 million were enrolled in Medicaid.12 
Medicaid reimburses health care providers directly. 
Medicaid recipients receive no money directly.
 The second largest program is Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families (TANF). Total expen-
ditures by federal and state governments in 2014 
were $31.9 billion; 52 percent from federal funds 
and 48 percent from state and local funds.  TANF 
replaced a program created to provide money 
directly to needy families with children. However, 
TANF is a federal block grant program and states 
may choose how to spend the funds they receive. 
In 2014, only 30 percent of TANF spending pro-
vided cash assistance.13
 The next largest public assistance program is 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP. SNAP 
helps low-in come people and families buy food. 
Under the current program, benefits are provided 
on an electronic card that is used like an ATM card 
and accepted at most grocery stores. Previously 
benefits were provided through vouchers called 
food stamps.
 The federal government pays the full cost of 
SNAP benefits and splits the cost of administer-
ing the program with the states, which operate 
the program. SNAP expenditures in 2014 were 
$70 billion, down from $76 billion in 2013. The 
average monthly benefit per person in 2014 was 
$125. SNAP is a need-based program, and the cost 
of benefits is inversely related to the state of the 
economy.  The USDA expects SNAP expenditures 
to decline to $39 billion in 2016.14
 The smallest public assistance program is the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program, CHIP. It 
funds purchase of health insurance from private 
sector companies for low-income children whose 
family income is above a state’s Medicaid eligi-
bility level. CHIP expenditures in 2014 were $13 
billion, and more than 8 million children were 
covered.15 States receive federal funds based on a 
formula that uses data on previous CHIP spending 
and state matching funds. The federal government 
paid 70 percent overall, although federal and state 
contributions vary by state.
 Might any or all of these four public assistance 
programs reduce poverty? If so, states with higher 
benefits per recipient should have lower pover-
ty rates. Analysis of a possible linkage between 
public assistance and poverty does not pose the 
same time lag issues as education policy. Public 
assistance aid provides contemporary benefits to 
recipients.
 Public assistance programs are not intended to 
eliminate poverty by supplementing the income of 
those below the poverty level to an income above 
the poverty level. If they did so, no one would have 
an income below the poverty level. Welfare policy 
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contemplates both contemporary and longer-term 
processes and goals. The purpose is probably 
closer to creating the opportunity for individuals to 
bring themselves out of poverty.
 Figure 12.12 reports correlations between 
state poverty rates and assistance per recipient for 
the public assistance programs in 2014. Each of 
the public assistance programs’ benefit per recip-
ient level level is negatively correlated with state 
poverty rate.  Medicaid and TANF spending per 
beneficiary are negatively correlated with poverty 
level and meet the threshold of .30. TANF had the 
strongest correlation, -.63. Medicaid had the next 
strongest correlation -.41.  Correlations for SNAP 
and CHIP were below the threshold of .30. 
 It is tempting to conclude there is evidence 
that states with more generous public assistance 
programs have lower poverty rates. Unfortunately, 
correlations alone are not sufficient to establish 
causal relationships. These findings are sufficient 
for us to conclude that poverty does not cause pub-
lic assistance. If it did, the correlation coefficients 
would be positive, not negative.
 We cannot rule out the possibility that the 
strong negative welfare-poverty relationships are 
spurious. Perhaps income and wealth have causal 
linkages with both state public assistance benefits 
and poverty levels. For example, it may be that 
states with few living in poverty can afford higher 
per capita expenditures on public assistance. If this 
is true, there will be few opportunities for poli-
cymakers in less prosperous states to reduce the 
number of people living in poverty.
 We saw in Figure 12.1 that high school attain-
ment rates have a very high negative correlation 
with poverty rates, -.80. That does not necessarily 
mean high school completion causes lower pover-
ty. The relationship could be spurious.
 There is another basis for thinking the apparent 
beneficial impact of public assistance on poverty 
is a spurious relationship. We will not argue that 
some states prefer higher levels of poverty for 
some or all of their residents. However, we will 
suggest that some states might have much higher 
tolerances for poverty than others. If so, that toler-
ance for poverty could cause both public assistance 
benefits and poverty levels. Southern states have 
the highest poverty and the greatest devotion to 
traditionalistic political culture that contemplates 
the smallest possible role for government. One 
element of contemporary conservatism in Southern 
and other states is the desire to keep taxes as low 
as possible, even if it means fewer government 
services.
 The impact of any welfare program is com-
plicated by the state of the national and local 
economy. Public assistance programs linked to 
employment are likely to be most successful when 
employment opportunities are most readily avail-
able. Our empirical analyses are for 2014, a year in 
which unemployment was high and the economy 
was beginning to recover from recession. The re-
cession thrust an unprecedented number of Amer-
icans into poverty. Correlations for 2014 may not 
be typical in the future. Even with these caveats in 
mind, it may be that successful government public 
assistance programs can reduce poverty.
Abortion Policy: Policy-Making When Spending 
Is Not Important
Legal Principles and Irreconcilable Conflict
We now turn to an issue that, while highly charged 
emotionally, costs relatively little money to imple-
ment: abortion restrictions.  The Supreme Court’s 
1972 decision Roe v. Wade held that a woman’s 
right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy 
Figure 12.12 
Correlations Between Poverty and Public Assistance  
Spending Per Recipient  2014 
Medicaid spending per beneficiary -0.41 
TANF benefit level -0.63 
SNAP benefit level -.07 
CHIP spending per recipient -.14 
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protected by the 14th Amendment. The decision 
gave women total autonomy over pregnancies 
during the first trimester, before fetal viability. 
States could not place undue burdens on obtain-
ing abortion during the first trimester. States had 
greater power to restrict and regulate abortions in 
the second and third trimesters.16 The court sub-
sequently clarified that fetal viability was a key 
criterion.  States’ could not unduly restrict access 
to abortion prior to fetal viability.
 The Supreme Court’s later ruling in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services (1989) clarified that 
states retained the power to place restrictions on 
how abortion services are provided. The decision 
also made clear that states were not obligated to 
provide services directly or to support financial-
ly those they authorize to provide services.  In 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey (1992), the Supreme Court established the 
principle that a provision of a law is constitution-
ally invalid if the purpose or effect of the provision 
is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
viability.
 A June 27, 2016 Supreme Court set criteria 
for identifying when health regulations constitute 
undue burdens imposed by state policy. In Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016), the Court 
found Texas’ restrictions — requiring doctors to 
have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals and 
clinics to meet the standards of ambulatory surgical 
centers — violated Casey’s prohibition on placing 
an “undue burden” on the ability to obtain an abor-
tion.17
 The Court’s decision clarified that the prohibi-
tion of undue burden requires that courts consider 
the burdens a law imposes on abortion access 
together with the benefits those laws confer.  The 
Court concluded that neither the admitting priv-
ileges requirement nor the ambulatory surgical 
center standard requirements imposed by Texas 
offered medical benefits to justify the burdens on 
access they impose.  Texas could not document 
that the restrictions advanced Texas’ legitimate 
interest in protecting women’s health.  When asked 
directly at oral argument whether Texas knew of 
a single instance in which the new requirements 
would have helped even one woman obtain better 
treatment, Texas admitted it had no evidence.18
 Texas’ intent in passing its restrictions, charac-
terized at the time as among the most severe in the 
nation, was to reduce or eliminate access to abor-
tion, not to safeguard women’s health.  This will be 
discussed in greater detail below.
 We will apply the same kind of comparative 
empirical analyses of comprehensive data present-
ed earlier in this text to abortion policies and rates. 
It is challenging to discuss the topic of abortion 
from an impartial perspective because the vocab-
ulary of abortion is itself biased. The fundamental 
conflict between those who favor and oppose the 
legality of abortion is irreconcilable.
 Abortion adversaries want Roe v. Wade (1972) 
reversed to give states the option of recriminalizing 
abortion. Short of that goal, they advocate elimi-
nating public funding and making abortions more 
difficult for medical professionals to offer and more 
cumbersome for seekers to obtain. If possible, they 
want to eliminate abortion through regulation.  The 
other side opposes recriminalizing abortion and op-
poses restrictions that impose hardships on women, 
particularly in the first trimester of pregnancy.
 Each uses language that reflects their own 
views and demonizes the other side. Abortion 
opponents refer to their position as “pro-life.” By 
implication, those who disagree are “anti-life.” 
In their vocabulary, the immediate result of con-
ception is a baby, and ending the life of a baby 
intentionally is immoral and ought to be illegal. At 
the extreme, they want all pregnancies to result in 
births. 
 Proponents of legal abortion say they are pro-
life, and certainly do not support killing babies. 
However, they define baby differently. They make 
a distinction between zygote, embryo and fetus.  
For them, fetal viability is the bright line that sig-
nals when abortion is morally unjustifiable.  They 
refer to themselves as “pro-choice” in the sense 
that women should have the right to make their 
own reproductive choices before fetal viability. 
They believe women should also have the right to 
use contraceptives to prevent unplanned pregnan-
cy.
 Those who call themselves pro-life disagree 
that they are anti-choice.  They focus on the choice 
to engage in sexual relations.  They reject the 
concept of unplanned or unintended pregnancy, 
although some make exceptions for pregnancy 
resulting from illegal intercourse.  Many also 
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disagree that unmarried women should have access 
to contraception. Some would also forbid access to 
contraception to married women.
 We will call each side by its preferred label, 
pro-life or pro-choice. At the same time, we recog-
nize the adversaries define life and choice in ways 
that make their own standpoint the only possible 
position.
Comparative State Analysis of Abortion Policies 
and Results
We will measure abortion rate as number of abor-
tions divided by the number of fertile women.   
The contemporary definition of fertility is between 
the ages of 15 and 44 years.  Abortion rate is 
expressed as number of abortions per 1,000 wom-
en.  We use data collected by the Alan Guttmacher 
Institute, a pro-choice organization, because they 
are generally regarded as the most valid.   Federal 
and state governments also use these data, as do 
abortion policy adversaries.
 Starting in 1998, the Guttmacher Institute has 
compiled information on state abortion policies 
that can be compiled in indexes describing how 
restrictive state policies are. An index from state 
policies in 2009 was used in Chapters 9, 10 and 
11.19 Figure 9.11 included a correlation indicating 
restrictiveness of state abortion laws is negatively 
related to more accurate representation of women 
and African Americans in state legislatures.  Figure 
10.7 showed no relationship between governors’ 
powers and abortion policy.  Figure 11.11 showed 
abortion policy is positively related to incarcera-
tion rate.
 Abortion policy restrictiveness in the states 
has increased rapidly and the changes continue. In 
the analysis that follows, we will use a summary 
of state policies from a 2014 Guttmacher Institute 
report on state laws that classifies states as not 
hostile, hostile or extremely hostile to abortion 
rights.20 
 Because during each session many state leg-
islatures consider laws to make abortion more diffi-
cult for providers and seekers, any index is soon 
out of date. Accurate index construction is further 
complicated by so many state laws being voided 
by federal courts or subject to stays of execution 
pending court review. Losing parties almost always 
appeal. The indexes have limitations, but they do 
provide useful snapshots of state policies.
 Figure 12.13 describes how the abortion rate 
and number of abortion providers has changed 
since 1973. Overall rates of abortion in the United 
States increased immediately after the procedure 
was legalized in 1973. They peaked in the early 
1980s. Since 1981, rates have been declining in a 
fairly consistent pattern. The number of providers 
shows a similar pattern. Providers peaked in 1984 
and have been declining since then. Both abortion 
Figure 12.13
Abortion Rates and Providers 1973-2011
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rates and providers began decreasing before states 
began enacting laws restricting abortions after the 
1989 Webster decision.
 Figure 12.14 is a scatterplot of abortion rates 
for the most recent year data are available. It plots 
abortion rates by occurrence and residence. Most 
states are very close to the line that suggests abor-
tions essentially involve residents only. In some 
states, an unusually large proportion of residents 
go elsewhere for abortions. Wyoming, Mississippi 
and South Carolina are examples. Delaware, Kan-
sas and Maryland have large proportions of women 
from other states coming for abortions.
 Figure 12.15 presents correlations between 
abortion policy restrictiveness in 2014, measured 
as level of hostility to abortion rights, for 2010 and 
2014 with intended consequences and likely unin-
tended consequences. States with more restrictive 
abortion policies have lower abortion rates. Cor-
relation coefficients are -.38 to -.48.  States with 
more restrictive abortion policies do not succeed in 
achieving fewer providers.  Abortion policies are 
also unrelated to decrease in abortion rates from 
2008 to 2011. 
 More restrictive abortion policies are positive-
ly related to infant mortality rates and low birth 
weight rates.  These empirical relationships may 
be unintended consequences or they may be spu-
rious.  More restrictive state abortion policies are 
positively related to teen birth rate.  All states have 
at least nominal programs to lower teen birth rates.  
However, a successful policy to increase the pro-
portion of all pregnancies resulting in births will 
inevitably produce a higher teen birth rate.
 Figure 12.16 is a scatterplot of abortion policy 
restrictiveness in 2010 and 2014. Restrictiveness of 
state abortion laws in 2010 and 2014 are strongly 
related. The correlation is .75.
 States with more restrictive abortion laws have 
fewer abortions. But does that mean more restric-
tive laws cause fewer abortions? The reader will 
probably not be surprised that the answer to this 
question is neither easy nor unambiguous. Abortion 
rates from different years are consistently correlat-
ed at the highest levels. The matrix in Figure 12.17 
establishes abortion rates for 1998, 2004, 2008 and 
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Figure 12.14 
Abortion Rates State of Residence and Occurrence 2011 
Women come from other states 
Women go to other states 
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2011 are all highly and positively correlated with 
each other close to the highest possible values. 
We suggest that, while there is an empirical link 
between policies and rates, it is likely the case that 
states have enacted abortion policies over time 
that more accurately reflect their ongoing abortion 
rates.
 Before we conclude that abortion rates cause 
abortion policies, let us consider some additional 
relationships. If abortion policies and rates are spu-
riously related, what might be the missing linking 
variable or variables? The recent enactment and 
Supreme Court rejection of Texas’ abortion regula-
tions, perhaps the most restrictive in the nation by 
Texas may provide insights. 
 As discussed above, the law known as HB 2 
required doctors to have admitting privileges at 
nearby hospitals and clinics to meet the standards 
of ambulatory surgical centers. Texas politicians 
claimed that their only goal in enacting the two 
new major restrictions on abortion providers was to 
protect the health and safety of women.  That was 
never their goal; it was a political talking point.
 In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016), 
the United States Supreme Court noted several em-
pirical realities that belied the claim of promoting 
the health and safety of women: 
• The admitting privileges requirement provides 
few, if any health benefits for women, but did re-
sult in approximately one-third of abortion provid-
ers ceasing to provide abortions
• The admitting-privileges requirement led to the 
closure of half of Texas’ clinics, or thereabouts.
• Many medical procedures, including childbirth, 
are far more dangerous to patients, yet are not 
subject to ambulatory surgical-center or hospital 
admitting-privileges requirements
• Abortion “is at least as safe as other medical 
procedures routinely performed in outpatient set-
tings”
• The statutory provision requiring all abortion 
facilities to meet all surgical center standards does 
not benefit patients and is not necessary
• The surgical-center requirement provides no 
benefit when complications arise in the context of 
an abortion produced through medication
• Nationwide, childbirth is 14 times more like-
ly than abortion to result in death, but Texas law 
allows a midwife to oversee childbirth in the pa-
tient’s own home.
• Texas partly or wholly grandfathers (or waives 
in whole or in part) the surgical-center require-
ment for about two-thirds of the facilities to which 
the surgical-center standards apply. But it neither 
grandfathers nor provides waivers for any of the 
facilities that perform abortions.
 The Court could have noted, but did not, that 
Texas’ argument that many women could reduce 
Figure 12.15 
Abortion Policy Restrictiveness and Results Correlations 
2010 
Hostility to Abortion 
Rights  
2014 
Hostility to 
Abortion Rights  
INTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Abortion rate by occurrence 2011 -0.38 -0.43 
Abortion rate by residence 2011 -0.36 -0.48 
Number of abortion providers 2011 -0.18 -0.21 
Percent decrease in abortion rate by occurrence 2008-2011 -0.14 -0.06 
Percent decrease in abortion rate by residence 2008-2011 -0.19 -0.07 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Infant mortality rate 2014 0.54 0.53 
Percent low birth weight 2014 0.31 0.19 
Teen birth rate 2014 0.34 0.43 
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travel time by going to New Mexico or Mexico 
contradicted the main goal of protecting the health 
and safety of women’s health.  Neither New Mex-
ico nor Mexico mandated its abortion providers to 
meet the admitting privileges or the surgical-center 
requirements of Texas’ law.
 The Court also could have recognized that 
many state officials involved in the decision stated 
explicitly that the goal was to eliminate abortion 
providers in Texas.  
 During the special legislative session when 
HB 2 was passed, Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst 
tweeted a message to supporters indicating the 
goal was to nearly eliminate abortion through 
regulation. His message indicated up to 36 existing 
abortion clinics would be forced to close, leaving 
only 6 clinics operating in Texas.21
 A few hours later, Mr. Dewhurst attempted 
to play down his original post, saying that both 
he and the bill were “unapologetically pro-life” 
and for women’s health. Opponents said his first 
message demonstrated that the legislation was a 
backdoor statewide ban on abortion. In January, 
Mr. Perry had told those gathered at an annual 
anti-abortion rally in Austin that his goal was to 
“make abortion, at any stage, a thing of the past” 
and that the ideal world was a world without abor-
tion.22   He had made similar statements in the past 
to religious organizations.
 Just before the final Senate vote that would 
send the bill passed by the House to Governor Per-
ry for his signature, Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst 
thanked both supporters and opponents and “even 
the press” for being there and asked for everyone 
“to love each other, as Christ loved the church, as 
we love all of those unborn babies.”23
 Dewhurst’s successor as Lieutenant Governor, 
Dan Patrick, has stated publicly on many occa-
sions, including his inauguration speech in January 
2015 and his campaign web site, “I am a Christian 
first, Conservative second and Republican third.”24 
He reportedly told Mike Huckabee he had a Chris-
tian obligation to ignore Senate rules if the lives of 
fetuses were at risk.25
 The strategy of placing burdens on women and 
abortion providers by arguing they will protect the 
health and safety of women seems untenable under 
current federal court rulings.  The Right To Life 
Movement is pivoting from rhetoric focusing on 
women to rhetoric focusing on fetuses to justify 
further regulation of abortions. Texas began work-
ing to implement this new strategy even before 
the Supreme Court declared the HB 2 restrictions 
unconstitutional.
 According to The Texas Tribune, Governor Ab-
bott sent a fundraising email to supporters on July 
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Figure 12.16 
Abortion Policy 2010 and 2014 
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21, 2016.  Abbott cited a new administrative rule 
change initiated July 1, saying Texas is working to 
“turn the tides” against the abortion industry in the 
state and protect the “rights of the unborn.”
 “I believe it is imperative to establish higher 
standards that reflect our respect for the sanctity of 
life,” Abbott said in the email. “This is why Texas 
will require clinics and hospitals to bury or cremate 
human and fetal remains.”26 The new rules would 
prohibit abortion providers from disposing of fetal 
remains in sanitary landfills, instead allowing only 
cremation or interment of all remains — regard-
less of the period of gestation. Abortion providers 
currently use third-party special waste disposal 
services.
 A similar requirement for abortion providers to 
bury or cremate fetal tissues in Indiana was sus-
pended from going into effect by a federal judge.  
Planned Parenthood noted that the burial or cre-
mation requirement could increase its expenses 
between two- and three-fold.27
 A similar requirement enacted in Louisiana is 
also on hold pending legal challenges.  The Texas 
limitations would be far more stringent than regu-
lations in almost every other state which all allow 
aborted fetal tissue to be disposed of in a similar 
fashion to human tissue.28
 Abortions rights groups contend the regulations 
could help deter abortions in the social conser-
vative state.  They would force providers to seek 
disposal through crematoriums or funeral homes, 
and those businesses could face a backlash if they 
are seen as being aligned with abortion providers.
 Indiana, Louisiana and Governor Abbott 
contend that the burial or cremation requirement 
maintained dignity for the potential life represented 
by the fetus.
 The news media have portrayed the require-
ment as applying to abortion providers and hospi-
tals.  However, the Texas proposed rule specifies 
disposition methods for fetal tissue and other 
tissues that are products of spontaneous or induced 
human abortion (emphasis added). The rule ex-
plicitly applies to hospitals, ambulatory surgical 
centers, birthing centers, abortion facilities, free-
standing emergency medical care facilities and 
emergency medical services.  The new rule does 
not apply to miscarriages or abortions that occur at 
home or at other locations.
     The rule makes health care providers respon-
sible for ensuring compliance.  The rule does not 
specify who will pay for the new requirements.  
When asked, Texas officials have responded they 
expect health care providers to pay.
   The order was to be effective December 19, 
2016.  A lawsuit was filed by Whole Woman’s 
Health and other plaintiffs in federal district court 
on December 12.  In addition to other issues, the 
plaintiff argued that the Texas rule did not promote 
the health and safety or women or of the general 
public.  They requested that the court find Texas’ 
actions unconstitutional and forbid implementa-
tion of the new rule.29 The federal court did stop 
enforcement of the rule pending the outcome of 
the lawsuit.  Nevertheless, the Texas Legislature 
passed the order under court review as a statutory 
law in its 2017 regular legislative session.  Federal 
courts will determine the legal status of both the 
rule and the law.
 The Texas Legislature in 2017 passed and Gov-
ernor Abbott signed another law intended to make 
illegal the most common, and medically safest, 
Figure 12.17 
Abortion Rate Correlations 
2004 2008 2011 
1998 0.97 0.83 0.86 
2004 0.88 0.92 
2008 0.98 
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procedure for second-trimester abortions.  Several 
abortion rights groups sued the state and the law 
was blocked by federal district court before it went 
into effect.  Texas’ appeal of this decision is pend-
ing.
 Governors Perry and Abbott, Lieutenant Gov-
ernors Dewhurst and Patrick and many other 
Texas Republican statewide elected executives and 
legislators have stated explicitly that they enacted 
policies pertaining to sexual intercourse that reflect 
their political and religious beliefs and values. 
Texas policies that instruct public schools to offer 
“abstinence only’’ sex education and restrict access 
to birth control resources also reflect their fun-
damentalist religious beliefs.  They will not use 
government resources to fund or facilitate behavior 
they view as sinful.  To the extent possible, they 
want to use government to eliminate sinful behav-
ior, or, at least minimize it.
 Recent events in Texas concerning abortion 
policy and outcome is that core religious and 
ideological values may be the link underlying a 
spurious relationship between abortion policies 
and abortion rates.  Figure 12.18 offers analyses to 
assess this possibility across the fifty states.
 Abortion policies and abortion rates are re-
lated most strongly to political ideology. With 
one exception, the correlations between values 
and abortion rates are larger than corresponding 
correlations between values and abortion policy.  
The correlations between both Conservative and 
Moderate or Liberal ideology and abortion policy 
and rates are nearly as strong as the correlations 
between policies and rates. Correlations between 
Very Religious residents are almost as large. The 
correlation between Conservative Ideology and 
Very Religious is .67. Correlations between parti-
sanship of state residents and abortion policies and 
rates are also comparable to correlations between 
abortion policies and rates. 
 Political scientists expect politicians will some-
times act as their constituents prefer and sometimes 
as they themselves prefer.  In the case of abortion 
policies, the two seem to overlap. Both the federal 
constitution and all state constitutions articulate 
the principle that government should not offi-
cially favor a particular religion. When religious 
beliefs and political ideologies overlap as they do 
on issues surrounding abortion, it is impossible to 
separate the two.  Some powerful Texas elected 
officials have made it clear that they are motivated 
primarily by their religious beliefs.  This benefits 
them politically because they share beliefs with 
the small number of strong partisans who vote in 
Republican primary elections. 
Conclusions
The challenges presented by education, poverty, 
and health will continue to trouble society. De-
spite having spent billions of tax dollars on these 
problems, they continue to require more resources. 
Not surprisingly, liberals and conservatives react 
predictably to failure to resolve these problems. 
The conservative sees a need for more efficiency 
and better performance. In addition to better public 
schools, more options in the private sector should 
be available and aided by funds from taxpayers. 
There should be less welfare fraud and less gentle 
treatment for criminals. The liberal sees a need to 
redouble efforts to assure adequate education and 
better future employment options to all. 
 Major differences of opinion on proper govern-
ment activities programs existed during the 18th, 
19th, and 20th centuries. For policies involving 
taxing and spending in particular, the arguing has 
generated considerable heat but little light.
 There is no reason to expect resolution of these 
issues in the 21st century. Each side seems content 
with repeating its central tenets, identifying sup-
porting evidence and ignoring opposing evidence. 
Neither perspective shows much interest in the 
possibility of learning from “experiments” being 
conducted in state “laboratories.”
 Can government be an effective means to im-
prove our lives? The different choices made by the 
American states would seem to provide an excel-
lent opportunity to address this important question 
with comprehensive empirical data. This chapter 
has concentrated on the policy areas of greatest 
expenditures by state and local governments.
 Measurement is a major issue in comparative 
state and local government research. Quite simply, 
different measures will produce completely differ-
ent results.
 Our analyses of education spending identified 
some of the challenges. First, how should we mea-
sure education expenditures? The choice between 
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per capita and per recipient spending is important. 
Research has documented that spending correlates 
positively and strongly with per recipient measures 
but not with per capita measures for both education 
and public assistance.22  When both per capita and 
appropriate per recipient measures are available, 
we think per recipient measures are superior. The 
important point is that those who want to find em-
pirical relationships that support their beliefs can 
do so without difficulty.
 Another measurement problem is that the infor-
mation we seek is not always available. High quali-
ty information about spending in American govern-
ments becomes available at some point, but when 
data become available differs widely from policy to 
policy and from year to year. Some behaviors that 
we would like measured every year are not. As a 
result, the most current information may be 1 year 
old or many years old. There is no doubt that you 
can find data on the Internet that was not available 
to us when we wrote this sentence.
 There are additional challenges for empirical 
analysis when data are available on an irregular 
schedule, as is the case with abortion rates.
 Another concern was raised in our discussion 
of education policy. Spending on public school 
students who are 5 to 18 years old today cannot 
“cause” rates of high school completion or bacca-
laureate degrees among adults age 25 and older to-
day. Sometimes there must be a lag between what 
we think might be measures of cause and effect. 
Many lags are possible, and we do not know prop-
er lags for every policy we want to study. In the 
case of education, the correct lag between spending 
and benefits is decades. Over long periods of time, 
relocation of population, births and deaths compli-
cate research comparing the states.
 Our best efforts at proper research using the 
best measures find many strong relationships be-
tween state and local efforts to deal with problems 
and desired results. Greater spending on education 
per pupil results, years later, in residents who have 
completed more formal education. States with 
higher Medicaid and TANF support levels have 
Figure 12.18 
Abortion Policy and Rate Correlations With Population Values Measures 
Population Measures from 2012 2014 Hostility to Abortion Rights 
2011 Abortion 
Rate 
Percent Very Religious 0.67 -0.43 
Percent Christian 0.38 -0.08 
Percent Conservative 0.61 -0.70 
Republican Percent Population 0.49 -0.70 
Percent Moderately Religious 0.12 0.30 
Percent Moderate or Liberal -0.60 0.68 
Democratic Percent of Population -0.47 0.66 
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lower poverty rates. States with more restrictive 
abortion laws have lower abortion rates.
 Still, correlations do not prove causal relation-
ships. It may well be the case that all or almost 
all the empirical relationships are spurious. We 
cannot rule out the possibility that, in some sense, 
the values and preferences of state populations 
cause both government efforts and the results we 
have measured. It may be that state wealth plays 
a role in facilitating results but is not an import-
ant causal factor. We think it is worth considering 
that “throwing money at a problem” is sometimes 
necessary to improve things but rarely--if ever--is 
sufficient to improve things.
Summary
1. Conservatives and liberals have inconsistent 
views of the roots of some problems and the pos-
sibility that government action can cause improve-
ment. Conservatives see those not benefiting from 
education, victimized by poverty, and engaging in 
criminal behavior as having character faults. Lib-
erals think inferior education leads to poverty and 
crime.
2. States whose populations have more formal 
education have greater income, lower rates of pov-
erty, better health and lower crime.
3. There are positive correlations between lagged 
state spending per student and rates of high school 
completion and college degrees.
4. States that provide greater benefits to recipients 
have lower poverty rates.  There are grounds to 
view Medicaid, TANF and SNAP as successful.
5. States with more restrictive abortion laws 
have lower abortion rates, and the relationship has 
become stronger over time.  It seems abortion laws 
have changed to better correspond to ongoing abor-
tion rate differences.
6. Interrelationships between abortion policy and 
abortion rates may be spuriously linked by the 
fundamental ideological and religious values of 
residents and elected officials.
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Figure 12.2 U.S. Statistical Abstract and Book of the States, Multiple Years and U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements, Table 3, 
Poverty Status of People , by Age, Race and Hispanic Origin 1959 to 214.
Figure 12.3 Sources for Table 12.2 and CDC Vital Statistics System, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/
Figure 12.4 Sources for Figure 12.2 and http:ww.ucrdatatool.gov
Figure 12.5 Sources for Figure 12.4
Figure 12.6 Sources for Figure 12.1, Information on Salary Ratios:
https://www.nea.org/assets/docs/NEA_Rankings_And_Estimates-2015-03-11a.pdf
Figure 12.7 Sources for Figure 12.1 and Digest of Education Statistics, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/
digest/current_tables.asp
Figure 12.8 Sources for Figure 12.7
Figure 12.9 Census Bureau Historical Poverty Tables http://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/
demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-people.html Table 3. Poverty Status of People, 
by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin 1959 to 2016
Figure 12.10 Sources for Figure 12.9
Figure 12.11 Sources for Figure 12.9
Figure 12.12 http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-spending-per-enrollee/; http://kff.org/
other/state-indicator/total-chip-spending/ Compare SNAP Participation and Benefits
http://snap.insidegov.com/; http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/compare_state_
spending_2016b40a 
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Figure 12.13 Recent trends in abortion from Stanley K. Henshaw and Kathryn Kost, “Trends in the 
Characteristics of Women Obtaining Abortions, 1974 to 2004,” Guttmacher Institute, 
Trends in the Characteristics of Women Obtaining Abortions, 1974-2004 (with supple-
mental tables) https://www.guttmacher.org/report/trends-characteristics-women-obtain-
ing-abortions-1974-2004-supplemental-tables State Facts About Abortion https://www.gut-
tmacher.org/fact-sheet/state-facts-about-abortion?gclid=CPPg05fTis4CFQJsfgodfXYF9g 
Jones RK and Kooistra K, Abortion Incidence and Access to Services in the United States, 
2008, Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, 2011, Jones RK and Jerman J, 
Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2011,  Perspectives on 
Sexual and Reproductive Health, 2014, Frost JJ et a, Return on investment: A fuller assess-
ment of the benefits and cost savings of the US publicly funded family planning program, 
The Milbank Quarterly, 92(4): 667-720., 2014, Unpublished estimates obtained from 
analysis of the CDC’s annual abortion surveillance for 2011, the Guttmacher Institute’s 
2010/2011 Abortion Provider Census, and information obtained from state health depart-
ments. Rates are based on Vintage 2012 population estimates 
Figure 12.14 State Facts About Abortion https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/state-facts-about-abor-
tion?gclid=CPPg05fTis4CFQJsfgodfXYF9g
Figure 12.15 http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3625; https://www.guttmacher.org/laws-affecting-
reproductive-health-and-rights-2014-state-policy-review U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States: 2008, Table 109. Infant Mortality Rates by Race—States: 
1980 to 2004, www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08statab/vitstat.pdf; http://www.ameri-
cashealthrankings.org/FL/IMR U.S. Statistical Abstract, various years. CDC, National Cen-
ter for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Reports on Infant Mortality 1997-2013, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/nvsr.htm CDC Vital Statistics System, http://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/nvss/ National Vital Statistics System, public-use and nonpublic-use Birth File.
Table 6. Low birthweight live births, by race and Hispanic origin of mother, state, and terri-
tory: United States and U.S. dependent areas, 2000-2002, 2003-2005, and 2012-2014
National Center for Health Statistics, Births: Final Data for 2014; http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
fastats/teen-births.htm Table 5. Birth rates for teenagers aged 15–19, by age of mother: 
United States and each state and territory, 1990–2012 and percent change in rates, 2007–
2012 and 1991–2012; 2014 data from http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/teen-birth-rate-
per-1000/
Figure 12.16 http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3625 https://www.guttmacher.org/laws-affecting-
reproductive-health-and-rights-2014-state-policy-review See Figure 12.7, and Guttrnacher 
Institute, State Policies in Brief, An Overview of Abortion Laws, July r, 2013, h1:1:p://ww-
w.g!!ttmacher.org/statecenter/snibs/s 11ib  OAL.ndf, http://kff.org/womens-
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Figure 12.17 Recent trends in abortion from Stanley K. Henshaw and Kathryn Kost, “Trends in the 
Characteristics of Women Obtaining Abortions, 1974 to 2004,” Guttmacher Institute, 
Trends in the Characteristics of Women Obtaining Abortions, 1974-2004 (with supple-
mental tables) https://www.guttmacher.org/report/trends-characteristics-women-obtain-
ing-abortions-1974-2004-supplemental-tables;  State Facts About Abortion https://www.
guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/state-facts-about-abortion?gclid=CPPg05fTis4CFQJsfgodfXY-
F9g Guttmacher Data Center https://data.guttmacher.org/states/table?dataset=data
Guttmacher Institute, An Overview of Abortion Laws as of January I, 2009,
http://www.guttmacher.org/sections/abortion.php?pub spib; https://www.guttmacher.org/
laws-affecting-reproductive-health-and-rights-2014-state-policy-review
Figure 12.18 State Facts About Abortion https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/state-facts-about-abor-
tion?gclid=CPPg05fTis4CFQJsfgodfXYF9g; http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3625; 
https://www.guttmacher.org/laws-affecting-reproductive-health-and-rights-2014-state-pol-
icy-review; http://www.gallup.com/poll/125066/State-States.aspx U.S. State Political Data, 
U.S. Religion and Society Data, http://www.gallup.com U.S. State Political Data, U.S. Reli-
gion and Society Data, ht:tp;f/www.gallup.cQrnf,
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Study Guide, Chapter 12
Essay Questions
 1. What do conservatives and liberals disagree on? What do conservatives and liberals agree on?  (No, this   
 is NOT a trick question!) What are the general patterns of agreement and disagreement between conservatives  
 and liberals? Do empirical analyses support the views of one, of both or of neither?
 2. State population rate of high school completion or higher and rate of baccalaureate degree completion were  
 correlated r=0.45 in 2014.   Why are some likely reasons that this correlation isn’t very close to r=1.00?  What  
 changes in demography or policy would likely result in a correlation much closer to r=1.00?
 3. Why should the relationship between state education expenditures and high school graduation rates be   
 assessed with lagged rather than contemporary data?  What is lagged data and when do you think it should   
 be used?  What problems would likely occur in analyses that ignore the need for lagged data?
 4. A newly elected future governor of Texas wants to reduce poverty in the state.  He or she asks for your 
 expert opinion about what could be done to begin to decrease poverty rates in 4 years and then accelerate that  
 decrease in 8 years.  What is your advice?  Why might another advisor urge the governor to be less aggressive  
 in this policy area?
 5. The United States Supreme Court overturned Texas’ HB 2 requirements for abortion providers, partly 
 because there was no evidence the restrictions advanced Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting women’s health 
 beyond the requirements that existed before.  The preliminary Texas rule requiring burial or cremation of fetal 
 tissue says the “public benefit anticipated as a result of adopting and enforcing these rules will be enhanced 
 protection of the health and safety of the public.”  Assume the courts will want a measure of how much the new 
 requirements enhance protection of the health and safety of the public.  What empirical measures could be used 
 to assess the proper changes in the health and safety of the public after the new restrictions have been enforced?  
 Why those measures, instead of others?
 6. Discuss how the empirical analyses in Chapter 12 can help address the question ”Can government be an 
 effective means to improve our lives?”  Do data analyses lean toward an affirmative answer?  Do you agree or 
 disagree?  Why?
 7.  Discuss the role in Texas politics played by the ongoing confusion arising from equating “illegal behavior” 
 and “sinful or immoral behavior.”  Which groups benefit from, or are penalized by, this confusion?  What desi-
 gnated entity has the authority to determine what is sinful or immoral behavior for all the residents of Texas?
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. Conservatives view criminal behavior as __________, while liberals argue that crime results from ________.
  a. society’s failure/character fault
  b. society’s influence/character failure
  c. character fault/society’s failure
  d. laziness/incompetence
 2. Prior to the 1960s, the poorest in our society were __________, and currently the poorest are ____________.
  a. age 18-64/under 18
  b. age 65 and older/under 18
  c. under 18/age 18-64
  d. under 18/age 65 and older
 3. There are beneficial correlations between educational attainment and
  a. poverty
  b. violent crime rate
  c. infant mortality
  d. all of the above
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 4. Adversaries on abortion policy agree on which of the following?
  a. when life begins
  b. in some circumstances, the rights of pregnant women must supersede all other considerations
  c. it is appropriate to base statutory law on religious doctrine if at least 75% of registered voters agree
  d. none of the above
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Chapter 13
THE STATE OF THE STATES AND COMMUNITIES
The purpose of this final chapter is to highlight the 
major themes and findings of this text and comment 
from a broader perspective. To repeat what was 
written in the first chapter, if this were a more con-
ventional textbook, readers would have had to trust 
that our statements were supported by appropriate 
interpretation of factual information. We took a 
different approach. We presented numerous empiri-
cal analyses about patterns of behavior across states 
and communities.
 Our knowledge would be more advanced if 
social scientists could use the methodology com-
mon in the natural sciences: experiments. We could 
then assign states, local governments, and even 
families and individual Americans to treatment and 
control groups. Short of total experimental control, 
we could know more information sooner and with 
greater confidence if we had a bit of cooperation 
from those we wish to study. For example, it would 
help advance knowledge if, say, twenty state legis-
latures would agree to pass and implement a small 
number of bills drafted by political scientists and 
give us access to observe how they are deliberated 
and implemented. If new policies improved tar-
geted social problems, we could make confident 
recommendations to the other states. Alas, human 
beings are not as cooperative with researchers as 
are cultures in Petri dishes, fruit flies, or laboratory 
rats.
 Absent experimental control, our best alterna-
tive is to collect and gather the best data we can as 
the individuals and groups we study go about the 
business of living their lives. That has been the en-
terprise reported in this text. Below, we summarize 
some of what has come before.
States Behave Differently
Given the opportunity, American states differ in 
almost every conceivable way. Since the states are 
the primary units in American federalism, they 
almost always grant themselves wide latitude for 
making distinctive choices. The idea that the federal 
government imposes inflexible “one-size-fits-all” 
programs on the states is purely ideological rheto-
ric. Over the course of American history, Republi-
cans, Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives have 
raised this phony complaint.  The reality is the 
opposite. The states use the federal government to 
make themselves look good and further their own 
divergent goals.
 The states vary greatly in the demographic at-
tributes of their publics, including the fundamental 
distinction of how wealthy they are, their politics, 
their institutions of government, their histories and 
culturally shaping events, the problems they face, 
and the public policies they enact. This has been 
key to our comparative analyses but also is a central 
problem with assessing what differences are caused 
by political, institutional, and policy differences.
State and Local Governments Are Very Different 
From Federal Government
Students in American public schools study what 
they call national politics and government. We call 
it federal politics and government to emphasize the 
key role of the states. Congress receives more me-
dia attention than all state and local legislative bod-
ies combined. The President of the United States 
receives more media attention than Congress. Our
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popular culture focuses on one government and 
neglects the other 90,000.
 The central elements of federal politics we 
know so well rarely apply to state and local pol-
itics. Three branches of government with checks 
and balances exist in state but not local govern-
ments. Some governors and mayors have institu-
tional strength comparable to that of the president. 
Most elected local government officials have weak-
er powers and fewer support resources than their 
federal counterparts. The popular attention, turn-
out, and closeness of typical presidential elections 
rarely occur in state and local elections.
Government Revenue and Expenditure Policies 
Are Political
Nothing exemplifies that politics is concerned with 
winning and losing more than revenue and expen-
diture policies in American governments. Con-
siderations of principle and fairness are trumped 
by personal gain. By design, government budgets 
are detailed and confusing. The process of making 
spending decisions is opaque and, for most, incom-
prehensible.
 To the average citizen, tax policies are even 
more mysterious. Americans believe that the taxes 
they pay are far too high in the absence of infor-
mation about other countries, other states, or other 
local governments. The winners in the conflict over 
who pays more or less for government have suc-
ceeded in convincing others that tax rates are the 
only important element. The truth is much more 
complex and requires knowledge of rates, bases, 
payments, income, tax burdens, tax shifting and tax 
incidence. Republicans are currently attempting to 
pass changes in federal tax laws that will shift even 
further the burden of paying from businesses to in-
dividuals and from wealthier to poorer individuals.  
By the time you read this in 2018 they may have 
been successful.  The complexity of federal taxes 
allowed them to claim, falsely, the changes were 
reforms that would benefit primarily middle class 
Americans. 
The Past Affects The Present
Few would disagree with the idea that our present 
reflects our past. But, sometimes our perceptions 
are distorted. Many of our most important ideas 
and values in American government and politics 
are very old. Many of our notions about govern-
ment date from periods when government acted 
differently than it does today. Americans no longer 
live on subsistence farms far from neighbors. Inev-
itably, some elements of conventional wisdom are 
out of date, based on myth, or simply incorrect.
 Major changes in the way Americans live have 
resulted in governments becoming more active. 
The authors of the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution of 1789 did not consider that 
their federation would someday create interstate 
highways, regulate commercial and private air traf-
fic, or license use of the airwaves. That is because 
they could not foresee modern automobiles, air-
planes, telephones, radio, or television. The scope 
of government activity has grown because the 
public wanted it to grow to deal with new problems 
faced by society.
State and Community Governments Matter To 
You
The states and communities spend nearly half of all 
government revenues in providing most of the ser-
vices we depend on daily. These governments typ-
ically provide education, law enforcement, home-
land security, highways and streets, fire protection, 
water and electricity, and most other services. State 
and local courts handle nearly all criminal and civil 
court proceedings. Most crimes are violations of 
state laws, and state laws also shape civil cases. 
Changing which state you live in alters your life. 
You may face higher taxes, fewer services, dom-
ination by the other political party, different laws 
and institutions, and different demographic char-
acteristics of those around you. Nevertheless, you 
would find greater differences were you to move to 
another country. We have been unable to identify 
a “best” state based on one state performing best 
across multiple standards.
Legislative Representation Poses Problems
Legislative representation is difficult to achieve. 
Our system of geographic-based selection of leg-
islators, the only option in the 18th century, may 
be reconsidered as alternatives are developed in 
the 21st century. For now, it is most difficult to say 
which state legislature is most representative on all 
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dimensions.
 Legislatures in metropolitan states have great-
er workloads and receive greater salaries. There 
is insufficient evidence to support the contention 
that states with more professional legislatures have 
more successful policies. Empirical data analy-
ses do not permit rejection of the idea that more 
accurate representation of women is linked to more 
successful policies. The relationships might not be 
causal.
The Courts Are Misunderstood
The reality of American courts differs greatly from 
public perception.  In novels, films, and television 
dramas, criminal cases and civil lawsuits result in 
courtroom trials. In reality, approximately 80 per-
cent of criminal cases conclude with plea-bargain 
agreements, and approximately 90 percent of civil 
cases reach settlement without trials. The news 
media portray federal courts as most important, yet 
they typically handle between one and two percent 
of the nation’s court workload. Population size 
drives crimes, arrests, court caseloads, and judges’ 
salaries.
 There is intensive media coverage of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, particularly in cases that over-
turn executive or legislative branch actions or 
judicial precedents. Media personalities who are 
commentator-entertainers have much to say about 
“liberal activist” judges and courts. The opinions 
they espouse are frequently linked to their own 
beliefs but need not be based on systematic anal-
ysis of appropriate comprehensive data. Recent 
courts have made more activist conservative than 
activist liberal decisions. The so-called liberal 
decisions frequently preserve or extend the rights 
of equal protection to unpopular minority groups. 
Courts play the lead role in limiting the principle 
of majority rule when it conflicts with the rights of 
individuals and groups who are disfavored by the 
majority.
Policies, At Least Those We Considered, Are Relat-
ed to Results
Governments’ policies are sometimes reactive to 
problems and sometimes proactive, and frequent-
ly both. State efforts, even when they are linked 
to lower problem levels, originate as reactions to 
problems. States with more educated populations 
experience less poverty and less crime. States with 
greater poverty rates have larger crime rates.
 We found evidence to support the contention 
that proactive government policies can be effec-
tive in achieving desired results. State educational 
attainment has beneficial relationships with many 
outcomes we care about. There is a positive re-
lationship between state rates of expenditure on 
primary and secondary public school students and 
later rates of high school completion and bache-
lor’s degrees.
 States with larger Medicaid and TANF benefits 
per recipient have lower poverty rates. States with 
greater violent crime rates have greater rates of 
expenditure on police and corrections. States with 
more restrictive abortion laws have lower abortion 
rates and fewer providers.
 Any of these empirical relationships could be 
spurious. For example, states whose publics favor 
individual choice on the issue of abortion may 
have less restrictive laws and higher abortion rates. 
Even if state legislators in such states preferred 
more restrictions, they might fear taking action 
would lead to defeat in the next election.
Causality Is Difficult To Determine
There is legitimate disagreement on how to mea-
sure government performance and its impact. 
Measurement choices always influence empirical 
findings. Even if all analyses presented in this text 
were based on the best possible measures, any of 
the relationships we identified could be spurious. 
Government activity and its impact are never 
caused by only one thing. Not all state and local 
governments are pursuing identical goals.
 Cause and effect is not always immediate. 
Sometimes the impact of efforts to deal with 
problems is recognized decades later. In addition, 
sometimes governments take years to act “imme-
diately.” When we use everyday electronic devices 
that operate at light speed, it is easy to forget that 
change in large groups of human beings frequently 
requires many generations.
Do We Have A Democracy, Or Even A Republic?
Some would think it outrageous even to contem-
plate this question. There is an idealized version 
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of politics that many accept as a normative model 
for all American governments. Its elements in-
clude consensus on the proper role of government, 
informed and active citizens, responsible politi-
cal parties, competitive elections with high voter 
turnout, responsive elected officials, and competent 
professional government employees. Unfortunate-
ly, at the state and local levels, the elements do not 
always exist individually and have never existed 
simultaneously.
 Citizens disagree on fundamentals. Participa-
tion is primarily in the form of voting, and turn-
out levels are typically very low. New styles of 
campaigning and independent fundraising have 
weakened political parties’ influence over candi-
dates and officeholders. Both major parties have 
sought to draw election districts that are uncom-
petitive. Elections in such districts are typically 
uncontested. The most informed electorate cannot 
influence government if they have no choice at the 
polls. Even in competitive elections, incumbents 
are rarely defeated. Government officials receive 
massive input from businesses and organized inter-
est groups but precious little from their “normal” 
constituents.
 We should not forget that the American found-
ers did not intend direct democracy. Indirect rep-
resentative democracy was their model, and only a 
few officials were to be chosen by popular election. 
The rest were to be appointed. Over hundreds of 
years, we have changed those values and expecta-
tions to include suffrage for all, equal opportunity, 
and government transparency. American democra-
cy is imperfect and evolving. In the long term and 
big picture, we think things have become better. 
To paraphrase an assessment commonly attributed 
to Winston Churchill, democracy as practiced in 
American state and local governments is the worst 
form of government except for all those others that 
have been tried.
Successful Innovations Can Be Hard To Achieve 
And Recognize
State and local governments have been the major 
source of successful innovations in America. When 
some stand out because of superior governance 
or policy, others follow their lead. Changes that 
involve significant allocation or reallocation of 
resources are most difficult to achieve. Some inno-
vations are relatively easy to recognize. Practices 
that save money by increasing energy efficiency 
or effectively using computer and other electronic 
technologies are examples. As discussed earlier, 
the rewards for investment in education and other 
improvements in human capital can take decades. 
Lag time between action and result, population 
relocation, and other factors further complicate rec-
ognizing better practices.
Americans’ Views Of The “Proper Role Of Gov-
ernments” Change
Americans value improvement and modernization. 
We have a history of adapting successfully to chal-
lenges. We remain committed to the goal of limited 
government even as our ideas about the proper 
balance between private and public sectors adjust 
to changing times. For most of the last three de-
cades, the popular preference seems to have been a 
larger role for private businesses and a smaller role 
for governments. In the words of President Ronald 
Reagan in his 1981 inaugural address, “Govern-
ment is not the solution to the problem, govern-
ment is the problem.”
 In the second decade of the 21st century, Amer-
ica seems to be emerging from a depression that 
began in Wall Street and spread to the rest of the 
world. National and international financial markets 
have recovered, some more than others.  However, 
few are confidant that a “new normal” has been 
achieved that will be the foundation for economic 
expansion.
 The U.S. housing and labor markets have not 
yet returned to pre-recession levels even though 
interest rates have remained at historic lows and 
corporate profits, including corporations who 
were saved from insolvency by government inter-
vention, are at historic highs. This public sector 
reaction to private sector problems is not unprece-
dented. American history includes numerous cycles 
between greater and lesser public sector attempts 
to stimulate the economy and regulate the private 
sector.
 The federal government has played an import-
ant role in dealing with the depression.  However, 
many state governments have been active in pur-
suing the opposite of federal policy. Many chose 
to substitute federal stimulus funds for declining 
state revenues rather than to boost the economy by 
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retaining and creating jobs. Political leaders have 
declared as failures in their states federal programs 
they prevented from being implemented in their 
states. Logically, this is nonsense. Electorally, it is 
enormously successful.
 The current conflict over economic policy will 
give way to different future conflicts over econom-
ic policy. We will continue to cycle between want-
ing governments to play larger and smaller roles.  
And some states will work to counter the efforts of 
others.  Politics is the word we use to describe this 
phenomenon.
Red States Versus Blue States
The federal government is caught in a pattern of 
hyper partisanship where gridlock is normal and 
cooperation is rare. Republicans and Democrats 
in Congress are unwilling to cooperate with each 
other.  The leaders of each party have worked 
actively against the initiatives of President Obama 
and President Trump.  The Republican majorities 
in Congress were very effective in working against 
President Obama.  When Republicans gained 
control of both chambers of congress and the 
Presidency in January 2017, there was widespread 
expectation that they would fulfill their longstand-
ing promise to abolish Obamacare and replace it 
with something better.  However, there was insuffi-
cient agreement within the Republican party either 
to abolish or replace Obamacare.  President Trump 
is following President Obama’s leadership style by 
issuing executive orders to circumvent Congress.  
In President Trump’s first two years in office, 
Congress did manage to reduce federal tax burdens 
on corporations and the wealthiest taxpayers and 
to confirm conservative judges to serve on federal 
district and appellate courts, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  
 States have made this gridlock between and 
within parties possible by gerrymandering election 
districts and using government to maximize the 
political power of current majorities. It may take a 
new reform movement to restore general elections 
as institutions that moderate extremism and make 
communication, cooperation and compromise 
between parties necessary. Given the current hyper 
partisan nature of federal politics, such reform 
would have to be initiated and pursued by the 
states.
 Hyper partisanship has had a different impact 
on the states. We are experiencing unified parti-
san control of executive and legislative branches 
in a near record number of states. The distinction 
between Red and Blue states reflects the current 
differences between Republican and Democratic 
parties. In the larger historical perspective, it is 
yet another iteration in the ongoing disagreement 
between ideologies and preferences characterized 
today as Conservative and Moderate. Conserva-
tives have succeeded in making Liberal a taboo 
word.
 Partisan state majorities can govern without 
cooperation from the opposite major party in close 
to half the states. Perhaps more so than ever in the 
past, they can use government to enact--their oppo-
nents would say impose--policies that reflect their 
core ideological values. Those essential principles 
include goals grounded in religious beliefs that are 
not subject to challenge by worldly events such as 
those we have used to compare state and local gov-
ernments.  Figures 13.1 and 13.2 contain analyses 
that suggest this process may be well underway.
 Figure 13.1 shows a strong linkage between 
ideological and religious views and state and local 
government policies. Correlations linking resi-
dents’ Conservative, Moderate or Liberal and Very 
Religious views are in the directions you would 
predict. 
 The same pattern holds for Figure 13.2 link-
ages between ideological and religious views and 
state and local results in education, economic 
development, and health. We may be on the verge 
of the experimental laboratory of the American 
States producing results that establish once and for 
all which practices are more and less successful. 
Whether or not that happens, states will continue to 
disagree on what constitutes success.
 Time and again, data visualizations in this text 
have shown unmistakable regional distinctive-
ness between Southern and Non-Southern states. 
Whether these patterns will evolve into a durable 
Conservative-Moderate disagreement that affects 
all states remains to be seen.
The Present Affects The Future
You might not want to think about it now, but 
some day your generation will be as old as your 
parents’ generation is today. Later, you will be as 
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old as your grandparents’ generation is today. You 
will face new challenges. You might have future 
employment in a job or field that does not exist 
today. As your life progresses and America moves 
forward, your expectations of and interests in state 
and local government will change. For some of 
the benefits of government to be available in the 
future, efforts must begin much sooner than you 
might think. 
 We have discussed the likely lag between 
investment and reward in public education. This 
principle applies to government investments and 
long-term projects in general. The roads, bridges, 
mass transit, storm protection, medical break-
throughs, and other benefits of your long-term 
future will be based on programs from the past, the 
present, and the near future. Much of the work nec-
essary to provide what you will want in the future 
is already underway.
Texas Exeptionalism
Writing in Democracy in America, which set out to 
explain why the American Revolution had suc-
ceeded while the French Revolution had failed, 
Alexis de Tocqueville observed Americans were 
“quite exceptional”, by which he meant different 
rather than better. Over the centuries, however, the 
idea has taken hold here that America is liberty’s 
staunchest defender, democracy’s greatest exem-
plar and home to the usually brave--a country like 
no other.1
 There is not unanimous agreement on the exact 
meaning and scope of American exceptionalism.  
For some it is an ideal, for others it is a self-evident 
description of our country, our people, our ethos, 
and our form of representative democracy. On the 
other hand, Texas exceptionalism does mean that 
Texas and Texans are different and better.  This at-
titude is exemplified by the apocryphal story about 
advice a Texas father gave to his son.  “When you 
first meet people, never ask where they are from.  
If they are from Texas, they will tell you soon 
enough.  If they are not from Texas, you don’t need 
to embarrass them.”
 Texans love Texas and are proud to tell one and 
Figure 13.1
Values and Policy 2014
Moderate Very
Conservative Liberal Religious
TANF benefit -0.60 0.63 -0.71
Public assistance plus Medicaid per 
recipient -0.36 0.31 -0.53
Welfare spending/poverty rate -0.66 0.68 -0.66
Medicaid spending per beneficiary -0.42 0.43 -0.44
SNAP benefit -0.36 0.35 -0.20
K-12 spending per student -0.61 0.59 -0.59
CHIP spending per enrollee 0.03 -0.00 0.05
Hostility to Abortion Rights 2014 0.60 -0.61 0.66
Incarceration rate 0.60 -0.64 0.65
State and local tax burden -0.14 -0.22 .16
State and local tax regressivity 0.13 0.08 0.10
State and local debt per capita -0.67 0.63 -0.43
State and local expenditure per 
capita -0.35 0.37 -0.37
State and local revenue per capita -0.39 0.41 -0.41
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all.  Texans walk with a swagger and are quick to 
remind non-Texans “It’s not a brag if it is true.” In 
2012, 82% of people born in Texas lived in Texas.  
Since 1950, 79% to 82% of people born in Texas 
lived in Texas.  In 2012, 61% of Texas residents 
were born in Texas, 22% were born in other states 
and 17% were born in other countries.  The over-
whelming majority of Texans regard time spent out 
of state as temporary.2
 Texans have a romantic view of themselves and 
their state as independent.  The success of Texas 
is of its own making.  It is likely that many regret 
the nineteenth century decision to give up being 
a sovereign nation and join the United States.  If 
Texas were an independent nation, its gross nation-
al product would be the 12th highest.3
 It is a certainty that a majority view the federal 
government as an adversary.  Very few recognize 
how much Texas relies on the federal government.
 Electricity came to rural Texas, when most of 
Texas was rural, courtesy of the federal govern-
ment.  The Texas Legislative Budget Board esti-
mates that 34% of Texas’ revenue in the 2016-2017 
fiscal biennium comes from the federal govern-
ment.4 In Bryan and College Station, the federal 
government has paid for more than 90% of the cost 
of State Highway 6. 
 Texas’ state government officials want the fed-
eral government to leave Texas alone.  They decry 
wasteful federal bailouts but forget the federal 
government bailed out Texas financial institutions 
that were the epicenter of the savings and loan 
meltdown in the 1980s.5 When natural disasters, 
such as hurricanes, floods, drought, tornados and 
fires strike, Texas governors do not call the legisla-
ture into special session to authorize funds to help 
residents and businesses recover.  They write to the 
President of the United States and ask for federal 
funds.  Texas also relied on the federal government 
during the Ebola outbreak of 2014 and is currently 
asking the federal government to fund recovery 
from Hurricane Harvey while it spends none of the 
money in its “rainy day fund.” 
 When a 2013 explosion in West, Texas killed 
15 people and wiped out hundreds of homes, 
Texans, particularly Governor Perry, were out-
raged that FEMA did not respond immediately.  
Governor Perry did not publicize that FEMA’s 
legal mandate was to respond to natural disasters, 
not man-made disasters such as the explosion in 
Figure 13.2 
Values and Results 2014 
Moderate  Very 
Conservative Liberal Religious 
Per capita income -0.70 0.71 -0.64
High school completion -0.25 0.34 -0.51
College completion -0.72 0.73 -0.59
Poverty 0.44 -0.50 0.55
Violent crime rate 0.14 -0.18 0.28
Murder rate 0.41 -0.46 0.58
Property crime 0.36 -0.36 0.45
Abortion rate 2011 -0.70 0.65 -0.41
Infant mortality 0.57 -0.57 0.69
Low birth weight 0.39 -0.47 0.55
Teen birth rate 0.70 -0.72 0.69
Adult obesity 0.67 -0.70 0.68
Life expectancy at birth -0.58 0.64 -0.66
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West.  When he finally made the necessary request, 
FEMA responded immediately.  No Texas official 
withdrew or amended the previous criticism.
 Texas wanted federal emergency aid and 
funding to rebuild West, but it did not want any 
federal interference as the state retained control 
over regulations and inspections to prevent future 
explosions.  To date, Texas has made no chang-
es.   Texas’ McClennan County Sheriff’s office and 
Texas Rangers opened criminal investigations with 
no tangible results.  An investigation by the Federal 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms deter-
mined the explosion was deliberately set and was 
a criminal act.  The agency is offering a $50,000 
reward to help find the person who committed the 
crime.6
 Texas government officials’ excoriating the 
federal government is part of the rhetoric all state 
officials use to distract attention from how much 
state and local government activities are financed 
by the federal government.  Texas Republicans 
face little credible electoral opposition from Dem-
ocratic opponents, so they run against Washington, 
D. C.  When the President of the United States is a 
Republican, they criticize famous Democrats in the 
U.S. Senate and House of Representatives.  When 
the President is a Democrat, they make the Presi-
dent the personification of federal abuse.  If Repub-
licans control both chambers of Congress, blame is 
placed on Democrats in Congress or on the federal 
cabal.
 Again, political actors are not required to tell 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth 
and also to provide appropriate background infor-
mation.  Their view their responsibility as seeking 
and regaining political power, and are not averse 
to providing partially correct or totally incorrect 
information out of context if it helps meet those 
goals. 
 The ongoing political conflict in Texas has 
always been between political conservatives and 
moderates, not between Republicans and Dem-
ocrats. Now, there is major conflict between 
conservative and ultraconservative Republicans.  
Republican control is not the fundamental prob-
lem.  Texas has been a one-party state for almost 
all its history.  If there is a problem, it is the loss of 
balance and consideration of multiple legitimate 
points of view combined with using beliefs, pri-
marily religious beliefs, to make policy decisions.  
Analysis of empirical information such as the 
information in this text is limited to a very small 
role.
Obamacare
The current conflict over implementation of the Af-
fordable Care Act, or Obamacare, has been present-
ed as a life and death struggle between conflicting 
political ideologies that define the Republican and 
Democratic parties.  States are the fields of battle.
 Obamacare is based on ideas originally sug-
gested by Republicans to extend health care to 
all and lower total costs using private insurance 
companies. It is a typical public sector and private 
sector hybrid and a classic federal and state part-
nership based on policies implemented with great 
success in Massachusetts under the leadership of 
Republican Governor Mitt Romney. Yet, Repub-
licans in Congress and most states controlled by 
Republicans have refused to cooperate. Many have 
denounced vociferously and worked openly to sab-
otage Obamacare.  As a presidential candidate in 
2012, Governor Romney had to disown his effec-
tive program.
 In 2017, 31 states and the District of Columbia 
participated in the Obamacare program to expand 
health insurance coverage either through tradition-
al Medicaid or by alternatives possible under the 
Affordable Care Act. Only one of the non-partic-
ipating states, Idaho, has set up its own insurance 
marketplace. Ignoring their usual preference for 
state control, the other 18 states have relied on the 
federal government to establish and administer 
insurance marketplaces. 
 Leaders of non-participating states have said 
that increasing insurance coverage by expanding 
Medicaid eligibility is too expensive, even though 
federal funds were to pay for the first two years 
of increased eligibility and no less than 90% after 
that.  Rejecting expansion of insurance cover-
age through the Affordable Care Act makes no 
economic or policy sense. State leaders making 
decisions not to participate must think it makes 
political sense. Even though the Republicans in 
Congress had the opportunity to abolish and/or 
replace Obamacare without any help from Dem-
ocrats, they failed to do so in the first eighteen 
months of the Trump presidency. Both House and 
Senate bills, written in secret and passed without 
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public hearings, were met with strong opposition 
from many Republican senators and governors 
as well as from Democrats in Congress and state 
governments.  As President Trump said at a Febru-
ary 2017 meeting of state governors at the White 
House, “Nobody knew health care policy could be 
so complicated.”8 
 Republicans and Democrats exchanging pre-
viously held positions is not a new phenomenon.  
Neither is supporting or opposing policies depend-
ing on who receives credit for success. The pursuit 
of power through partisanship remains constant.
 There is a conflict of interest between the gain-
fully employed young and healthy and the larger 
population. The conflict is an example of market 
failure. The young and healthy will not purchase 
health insurance voluntarily if they believe they 
will receive necessary care in the future whether 
they pay or not. You can understand that we are all 
better off if all participate, and that the market fail-
ure could be solved by strict government enforce-
ment.
The Destiny Of Demography
You face the prospect of the largest proportion 
of retired people living with the smallest propor-
tion of working people in our history. For most of 
your life, you will be in the smaller group who are 
employed. Simple arithmetic makes it clear that an 
ever-shrinking group of younger taxpayers cannot 
pay for ever-expanding benefits to the rapidly in-
creasing number of those who have stopped work-
ing. It seems doubtful that current benefits to older 
and/or retired Americans can be sustained.
 The problems are difficult. The older and 
younger will have to work together to reassess and 
reconsider what is possible. Expectations for retire-
ment will have to change. Some benefits currently 
provided to all who reach a certain age may have 
to be limited to those with the greatest needs.
 Creative solutions will be necessary to resolve 
successfully the different preferences of older and 
younger. Businesses and non-profit and voluntary 
organizations must be major participants. But 
balancing conflicting needs and resolving public 
controversies are fundamental tasks assigned to 
governments. We expect that numerous American 
state and local governments will provide leader-
ship.
 We would like to conclude with the expectation 
that success in some states will be adopted in oth-
ers. However, the states do not currently agree on 
which results are successes and which are failures. 
We will end instead with the observation that po-
litical conflicts within and between the states will 
continue. Whatever results from the conflicts, there 
will be winners and losers. There will be politics.
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Information Sources
Figure 13.1 
and
Figure 13.2
See Figure 7.8, 10.7, 12.1, 12.15, 12.18
National Vital Statistics Reports December 23, 2015
Table I-9 Low birth weight births by race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, 
each state and territory 2014
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Study Guide, Chapter 13
Essay Questions
 1. Does the current federal system in the United States inhibit states from making their own decisions?    
 If so, to what degree?  How much opportunity do states have to behave differently?  Why do states like to claim  
 that the federal government exceeds its authority?
 2. To what extent do the defining elements of federal politics also apply to state and local politics?
 3. Discuss how Americans’ current ideas about what government “should be” sometimes come from times when  
 problems and government activities were quite different from what they are today.
 4. Do you think it is appropriate for Americans to speak of “the government” without recognizing there are   
 multiple levels of government in the United States?  Do you think graduates of Texas A&M University should  
 be mindful of differences between federal, state and local government in the United States?  Why or why not?
 5. Is there reason to think that state and local governments can be successful in attempts to achieve some goals  
 by being proactive?  If so, what empirical evidence supports your answer?  If not, what empirical evidence 
 supports your answer?
 6. Why do elected officials and candidates criticize the federal government so often?  Is there sufficient evidence 
 in this chapter to support the view that the federal government is at war with Texas?  Why or why not?  Is there  
 sufficient evidence elsewhere?  If so, what is it?
 7. Has your view on the “proper role of government” changed as a result of reading this text? Why or  why not?   
 How would you articulate a mission statement in 1 or 2 sentences?
Multiple Choice Questions
 1. Which of the following statements is FALSE?
  a. states behave differently
  b. state and local governments are very similar to federal government
  c. state and local government is very different from federal government
  d. state and community governments matter
 2. Correlations between government efforts and success in dealing with problems are sufficient in and of them-
 selves to prove which causal relationship(s)
  a. with appropriate effort, state and local governments can always solve problems or make things better
  b. state and local governments’ efforts do more harm than good
  c. problems are exacerbated by government efforts more often than government efforts are successful
  d. correlations alone are never sufficient to prove causality
 3. Which of the following beliefs exemplify the idea of Texas exceptionalism?
  a. Texans are better than residents of other states
  b. Texas governments make better decisions and policies than the federal government
  c. Texas is self-sufficient and receives very little tangible assistance from the federal government
  d. all of the above
 4. Which of the following is highly probable in the future?
  a. the American population will consist of its largest proportion of retired people and its smallest proportion  
  of working people
  b. Republicans and Democrats at the state level will insist that members of Congress end gridlock or be   
  removed from office by state party officials exercising the power of partisan recall
  c. Voters will insist that state legislatures reassign the job of drawing election district boundaries to indepen-
  dent commissions with instructions to make elections in every district as competitive as possible
  d. a majority of Americans age 65 and older will voluntary give up some Medicare and Social Security ben-
  efits on the condition that funds be used to reduce poverty among those youngest.
322 • Chapter 13
 1 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35438548
 2 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/upshot/where-people-in-each-state-were-born.html?rref=up-  
 shot&abt=0002&abg=1&_r=0#Texas
 3 http://gov.texas.gov/files/ecodev/IfTXWereANation.pdf    http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/2015/ 
 gsp0615.htm 
 4 Fiscal Size-Up 2016-2017, May 2016, http://www.lbb.state.tx.us/Documents/Publications/Fiscal_SizeUp/Fiscal_Size- 
 Up.pdf 
 5 “Savings and Loan Crisis” Federal Reserve History http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/42 
 6 http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/deadly-west-texas-fertilizer-plant-explosion-was-criminal-act-feds-n572231   
 http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/2013/05/mclennan-county-sheriffs-office-texas-rangers-open-criminal-investigation-in-  
 to-west-plant-explosion.html/
 7 http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/ 
 8 http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/27/politics/trump-health-care-complicated/index.html
Notes
